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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Free movement by the citizen is of course as dangerous to a tyrant  
as free expression of ideas or the right of assembly …    
it often makes all other rights meaningful –  
knowing, studying, arguing, exploring,  
conversing, observing and even thinking.’ 
  
Aptheker v Secretary of State1 
Contents:  
1.1 Introductory Remarks – 1 
1.2 The Proposed Research – 6  
1.3 Terminology – 16 
1.4 Research Questions – 19 
1.5 Research Methods – 20  
 
 
1.1 Introductory Remarks 
The year 2016 will see us celebrate the ten-year anniversary of the entry 
into force of Directive 2004/382 that was intended to simplify and strengthen 
the free movement rights of EU citizens. Yet a decade later, those fine ideals still 
appear like an unfulfilled promise for a significant proportion of the 14 million 
citizens who reside in a European country other than their own3 and the 300 
million citizens who make use of their right to travel within the European Union 
                                                  
1 Aptheker v Secretary of State, 378 US 500, 519-520 (1964) (Douglas J concurring). 
2 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158/77 (hereafter the Free Movement Directive, Directive 2004/38 and the 
Directive). The Directive was incorporated at point 3 of Annex VIII to the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area between the European Communities, their Member States and the Republic of Austria, 
the Republic of Finland, the Republic of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Kingdom of 
Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Swiss Confederation [1994] OJ L 1/3 by EEA Joint Committee 
Decision No 158/2007 of 7 December 2007 [2008] L124/20. 
3 Eurostat, Migration and migrant population statistics (migr_pop1ctz) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics> accessed on 9 May 2015. As at 1 
January 2014, there were 14.3m EU citizens living in a country other than their country of nationality.  




every year.4 If the results of the 2012 EU Citizenship consultation are any 
indication of the scale of the problem, almost one in five EU citizens have 
encountered difficulties when making use of their right of free movement in the 
EU.5  
The Free Movement Directive is the key EU legal instrument that 
regulates the free movement of persons within the thirty-one countries that 
make up the European Economic Area. Adopted in 2004, it aimed to 
consolidate the existing different EU legal instruments on residence rights, 
reflect developments in the case law on EU citizenship, simplify visa and 
residence formalities and improve the rights of family members. However, the 
implementation of Directive 2004/38 by the Member States has been far from 
satisfactory and the Commission has deplored the fact that not a single Member 
State had been able to implement the Directive correctly.6  
Despite the Commission’s acknowledgement that the free movement of 
persons is ‘one of the pillars of EU integration’ which warrants a ‘rigorous 
enforcement policy’, 7 the progress made in improving the situation in certain 
Member States has been disappointing. Although the closure of infringement 
                                                  
4 Eulalia Claros, Alessandra Di Tella, ‘Briefing: Tourism in the EU Economy’, (European Parliament 
Research Service, July 2014) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/140843REV1-tourism-in-the-
EU-economy-FINAL.pdf> accessed on 9 May 2015. In 2012, over 300 million EU citizens travelled to 
another Member State.  
5 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee: EU Citizenship Report 2013 - EU citizens: your rights, your future’, 
COM(2013) 269 final, (hereafter 2013 Citizenship Report (I)), in which the Commission reports at para 
2.2 that ‘almost one in five of all participants in the 2012 public consultation on EU citizenship reported 
problems with moving to or living in another EU country’. 
6 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’, COM(2008) 840 final (hereafter 2008 
Implementation Report), 1. 
7 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee under Article 25 TFEU: On progress towards effective EU Citizenship 
2011-2013’, COM(2013) 270 final (hereafter 2013 Citizenship Report (II)), para 2.3.1. 
[3] 
 
cases8 might suggest that the implementation of the Directive has improved 
since 2008,9 many of the problems that were identified at that time continue to 
plague citizens who choose to exercise their fundamental right to free 
movement within the EU.10 The practical application of the Free Movement 
Directive by the Member States therefore still has some way to go before it 
complies with the way in which the free movement rules were designed to 
function.11 
The enforcement action that the Commission has so far taken does not 
appear to have necessarily been linked to how well transposition complies with 
the Directive in individual Member States. In other words, the way in which the 
Directive has been written into national law does not seem to be the only factor 
that determines how well that Member State might implementing the Directive. 
By way of example, judging by the Commission’s 2008 implementation report, 
the quality of transposition of Belgium, Italy and the UK could be considered as 
having been close to the EU average.12 Yet the Commission went on to open 
infringement procedures against each of these countries in 2011.13 The same fate 
                                                  
8 2013 Citizenship Report (II), para 2.3.1. 
9 The year in which the Commission released its 2008 Implementation Report (n 6). 
10 See for example, Niam Nic Shuibhne and Jo Shaw, ‘General Report’ in ‘XXVI FIDE Congress Report, 
Volume 2: Union Citizenship: Development, Impact and Challenges’ (Copenhagen, 28-31 May 2014) 
(hereafter FIDE 2014 Report).   
11 Ibid, 137, where the authors observe that ‘national practices consistently fall short of the citizen-
centric framework established by EU law’. See also, European Parliament, Report on the activities of 
the Committee on Petitions 2013 (2014/2008(INI) (hereafter 2013 Petitions Committee Report) which 
‘[d]eplores that European citizens continue to experience frequent problems caused by the 
misapplication of Internal Market law by public authorities while exercising their freedom of 
movement’. 
12 Annex, State of Play of Transposition of Directive 2004/38, 2008 Implementation Report (n 6). See 
further Chapter 10 (The Implementation of Directive 2004/38 Compared). 
 These studies served as the basis for the 2008 Commission Implementation Report. 
13 Commission documents released on 28 April 2015 (GestDem 2015/1535); see also ‘Free movement: 
Determined Commission action has helped resolve 90% of open free movement cases’, Press release 
IP/11/981 (25 August 2011); ‘Free movement: Commission asks the UK to uphold EU citizens' rights’ 
Press release IP/12/417 (26 April 2012); ‘February infringements package: main decisions (Free 
[4] 
 
has befallen Cyprus, Germany, Poland and Spain14 whose transposition efforts 
fared better than the EU average.15 Conversely, countries like Denmark, France, 
Hungary and Slovenia, whose overall transposition was arguably more 
problematic,16 have not been the subject of such formal proceedings.17 
As the Commission rightly claims, progress has surely been achieved in 
persuading some of the Member States to address problems in the 
implementation of Directive 2004/38.18 The Commission’s avowed strategy to 
attempt to resolve instances of the incorrect application of EU law dialogue with 
the Member States has certainly had a positive role to play.19 
Nonetheless, the situation as experienced by citizens on the ground tells 
a somewhat different story. The results of the 2012 EU citizenship 
consultation20 are echoed by reports of the EU’s assistance services such as Your 
                                                  
movement: Commission asks Belgium to comply with EU rules), Press release MEMO/13/122 (21 
February 2013). The infringement proceedings against Italy were closed on 10 December 2013, 
following commitments made to amend the Italian implementing law, Legislative Decree No 30/2007 
(Decreto Legislativo 6 febbraio 2007, n 30 ‘Attuazione della direttiva 2004/38/CE relativa al diritto 
dei cittadini dell'Unione e dei loro familiari di circolare e di soggiornare liberamente nel territorio 
degli Stati membri’, GU n 72 del 27 marzo 2007). For an examination of implementation in Italy, see 
Chapter 8 (Implementation in Italy). For a review of the Commission’s enforcement action, see Chapter 
10 (Implementation of Directive 2004/38 Compared).    
14 Annex, 2008 Implementation Report (n 6). 
15 See further Chapter 10 (The Implementation of Directive 2004-38 Compared). 
16 Annex, 2008 Implementation Report (n 6); see further Chapter 10 (Implementation of Directive 
2004/38 Compared). 
17 Commission documents released on 28 April 2015 (GestDem 2015/1535). 
18 2013 Citizenship Report (II) (n 7), para 2.3.1: ‘In 2011, the Commission took action against twelve 
Member States. In 2012 - beginning of 2013, it sent reasoned opinions in seven of these twelve cases. 
As a result, so far, five Member States have amended their legislation or committed themselves to doing 
so.’ 
19 Commission, Communication ‘A Europe of Results - Applying Community Law’, COM(2007) 502 
final, 7-8; Commission, ‘EU Pilot Evaluation Report’, SEC(2010) 182, 3. 
20  ‘Europeans have their say: Analysis report - Public consultation 2012 “EU citizens - your rights, your 
future” (hereafter 2012 EU Citizenship consultation), para 2.3, which reports that 27% of EU citizens 
residing in an EU country other than their own report having encountered problems. 
[5] 
 
Europe Advice21 and SOLVIT,22 which face almost yearly increases in reported 
problems.23 In addition, the EU institutions continue to receive significant 
numbers of complaints24 and petitions25 from individuals and civil society 
organisations. This state of disconnect between the ways in which we might 
expect the Free Movement Directive to be applied in theory and the way the 
                                                  
21 Annual reports for Your Europe Advice (2007-2010) 
<http://europa.eu/youreurope/advice/about_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015; Commission, Single 
Market Scoreboard (Your Europe Advice governance tool) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/youreurope_a
dvice/index_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015. 
22 Annual reports for SOLVIT (2004-2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/documents/index_en.htm> 
accessed on 9 May 2015; Commission, Single Market Scoreboard (SOLVIT governance tool) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/solvit/index_
en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015. 
23 2013 Citizenship Report (I) (n 5), para 2.2 which notes that 21% of Your Europe Advice enquiries and 
13% of SOLVIT complaints related to free movement and residence rights in 2012. For a detailed 
examination of these problems, see Xavier Le Den and Janne Sylvest, ‘Understanding Citizens' and 
Businesses' Concerns with the Single Market: a View from the Assistance Services’ (Report for 
Commission, Ramboll 2011)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/20concerns/feedback_report_en.pdf> accessed 
on 26 May 2015. 
24 Commission, ‘25th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2007), 
COM(2008) 777 final; idem, ‘26th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 
(2008), COM(2009) 675 final; idem, ‘27th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law 
(2009), COM(2010) 538 final; idem, ‘28th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law 
(2010), COM(2011) 588 final; idem, ‘29th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law 
(2011), COM(2012) 714 final; idem, ‘30th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law 
(2012), COM(2013) 726 final; idem, ‘31st Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law 
(2013), COM(2014) 612 final; ‘Report from the Commission - Monitoring the application of Union law 
2014 Annual Report’ COM(2015) 329 final. These reports contain statistical information on the number 
of complaints received by policy area, including in respect of the free movement of persons. An overview 
of the data as it relates to the free movement of persons can be found in Chapter 10 (Implementation of 
Directive 2004/38 Compared).  
25 In its 2013 Petitions Committee Report (n 11) the European Parliament notes that ‘[t]he number of 
petitions received has highly increased, almost doubled since 2012.’ 
[6] 
 
rules are applied in practice by the Member States is a manifestation of the so-
called ‘implementation gap’.26   
1.2 The Proposed Research  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the implementation gap in the 
context of Directive 2004/38. This study is primarily concerned with the 
practical implementation of EU law in the Member States in the specific area of 
the free movement of persons. This dissertation seeks to engage with the 
established theoretical legal scholarship on the free movement of persons, as 
well as with ongoing discussions that continue to animate empirical research on 
the implementation of directives. The research is intended to make an original 
contribution in the field of implementation research by focusing on the practical 
implementation of EU directives which has so far been neglected by the 
majority of studies that engage in empirical research on the implementation of 
directives. 
This study pursues a two-fold aim. Firstly, it aims to identify the various 
elements of implementation that should be taken into account to assess the 
overall implementation of the Free Movement Directive both in law and in 
practice. More specifically, the first purpose of this research is to investigate 
                                                  
26 The Commission has coined the term ‘implementation gap’ to refer to the divide ‘between the EU 
legal framework and the way it is implemented and applied in practice Commission’: ‘The Single Market 
through the eyes of the people: a snapshot of citizens' and businesses' views and concerns’, Press Release 
IP/11/1074 (26 September 2011); see further Commission, ‘The Single Market through the lens of the 
people: A snapshot of citizens' and businesses' 20 main concerns’, SEC(2011) 1003. The existence of 
this divide has previously been highlighted in Your Europe Advice Reports (n 21). See also, European 
Citizen Action Service (ECAS), ‘Difficulties Experienced by Citizens When Exercising their Mobility 
Rights in Single Market - A Citizens Signpost Service feedback report’ (July 2008), 37: ‘there is a 
growing gap between the case law of the European Court, the much improved legislative framework and 
the way it is being applied on the ground by Member States’; Mario Monti, ‘Report to the President of 
the European Commission José Manuel Barroso’ (9 May 2010): ‘There is a significant gap between what 
is in the law books and what happens in practice’. See further Simona Millio, From Policy to 
Implementation in the European Union: The Challenge of a Multi-Level Governance System 
(I.B.Tauris 2010) 3-21. 
[7] 
 
how implementation may be measured as a dependent variable in a way that 
goes beyond transposition so that it also encapsulates application and 
enforcement. In other words, a first aim is to explore how all elements of 
implementation could be measured in a way that can better reflect how well the 
Directive has been implemented by a Member State.  
Secondly, the study will also investigate how Member States exercised 
their discretion as to the ‘form and methods’ of implementation under Article 
288(3) TFEU27 – in other words by looking at the policy choices that were made 
by Member States in order to implement Directive 2004/38 – and test a 
number of hypothesis to determine whether they have a bearing on how 
successfully the directive has been implemented. In other words, the second aim 
of this study is to explore the existence of any correlation between, on the one 
hand, the policy choices that were made by the Member States as part of the 
implementation process, and on the other hand, how correctly the Directive has 
implemented by the Member States. 
The first line of research will look beyond the approach that the 
Commission has used when assessing the implementation of the Directive in its 
role as guardian of the Treaties.28 In this connection, various studies have 
suggested that the Commission often limits the assessment of implementation 
                                                  
27 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47. 
28 Article 17 TEU and Article 258 TFEU. The term ‘guardian of the Treaties’ has been used by the Court 
of Justice; see for instance Case C-431/92 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2189, para 22; Case C-
365/97 Commission v Italy (San Rocco case) [1999] ECR I-7773, para 60. 
[8] 
 
to transposition29 or ‘formal legal compliance’.30 In the specific context of the 
Free Movement Directive, the Commission’s assessment of its implementation 
has arguably relied heavily on an examination of the national implementing 
                                                  
29 See for example, Deidre Curtin, ‘Directives: The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of Individual 
Rights (1990) 27 Common Market Law Review, 703-739, 710-711: ‘the systematic monitoring by the 
Commission of the incorporation of directives into national law resulting in the immediate initiation of 
infringements procedures as soon as the deadlines are reached is superficial in the sense that it does 
not reach the substantive content of the implementing measures’; Sacha Prechal, Directives in EC Law 
(2nd edition, Oxford University Press 2005) 7: ‘As such it is relatively simple to initiate infringement 
procedures more or less automatically as soon as the period provided for implementation has expired 
if no national implementing measures have been notified. Yet, if they have been notified, nothing is said 
about either their quality or their application and enforcement in practice. Without much exaggeration 
it can be said that there is a large area of “hidden failures” by the Member States which the Commission 
is not able to deal with in more systematic fashion which a successful strategy for safeguarding 
compliance would require. In this respect, especially individual complaints from the Member States 
plays an important role in discovering the (potential) failures.’; Marta Ballasteros, Rostane Mehdi, 
Mariolina Eliantonio and Damir Petrovic, ‘Tools for Ensuring Implementation and Application of EU 
Law and Evaluation of their Effectiveness’, (PE493.014, European Parliament, 2013), 43-45: ‘As the 
Guardian of the Treaties, the Commission checks compliance of the Member States’ transposition 
measures (when they have been communicated) with EU law. The assessment is done horizontally for 
all Member States and is usually presented jointly through studies which serve to highlight possible 
inconsistencies in the way Member States have transposed EU law. Often these studies are undertaken 
by subcontractors. Conformity checking studies are only occasionally made available to the public on a 
cases by case basis’; Antoaneta Dimitrova and Bernard Steunenberg, ‘Too difficult to handle? 
Compliance with EU policy in a multi-level context’ (2014) (Annual APSA Conference in Washington, 
24 August 2014) 7: ‘The European Commission is often quite well informed about the legal transposition 
of a directive from the obligatory member state notifications of domestic legislative measures, often 
combined with qualitative expert reports. This is not necessarily the case with the actual 
implementation of policy.’ See also, Commission, Communication ‘Better Monitoring of the Application 
of Community Law’, COM(2002) 725 final, 8-9; COM(2007) 502 final (n 19) 2-3 and 6; Commission, 
Communication ‘Better governance for the Single Market’, COM(2012) 259 final, 3-4. 
30 Lisa Conant, ‘Compliance and What EU Member States Make of It’ in Marise Cremona (ed.), 
Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 1-30. Conant uses the 
terms ‘compliance with law on the books’ to denote formal legal compliance that involves the adoption 
of national implementing measures and  ‘compliance with law in action’ to refer to practical application 
and enforcement, while arguing that ‘future scholarship should merge research on the law on the books 
and the law in action for more useful results’, ibid, at 15.   
[9] 
 
measures that transpose the Directive into national law.31 In other words, the 
assessment has been undertaken primarily on the basis of the legal instruments 
that incorporate the Directive into the national legal order.  
However, implementation is not solely concerned with transposition,32 
given that the obligation to implement is addressed to all branches of 
government.33 Implementation also requires the effective application34 of the 
national implementing measures that are intended to give effect to directives.35 
The national administrative authorities are therefore obliged to apply the 
                                                  
31 Milieu and Edinburgh University, ‘Conformity studies of Member States’ national implementation 
measures transposing Community instruments in the area of citizenship of the Union  - Final Report’ 
(December 2008) (hereafter 2008 Conformity Study). This study served as the basis for the 2008 
Commission Implementation Report.  
32 See Samuel Krislov, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Joseph Weiler 'The Political Organs and the 
Decision-Making Process in the United States and the European Community', in Mauro Cappelletti, 
Monica Seccombe, Joseph Weiler (eds.), Integration Through Law, Volume 1: Methods, Tools and 
Institutions Book: Political Organs, Integration Techniques and Judicial Process (de Gruyter 1986) 3-
112, 62; Heinrich Siedentopf and Christoph Hauschild, ‘Phases of Implementation’ in Heinrich 
Siedentopf and Jacques Ziller (eds), Making European Policies Work, Volume 1: Comparative Syntheses 
(Sage 1988) 26-72, 42-72; Curtin (n 28), 710-711; Francis Snyder, 'The Effectiveness of European 
Community Law. Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques', (1993) 56 Modern Law Review, 19-54, 
22-23; Richard Brent, Directives: Rights and Remedies in English and Community Law (Informa Law 
/ Routledge 2001) 97; Prechal (n 28) 5-6, and 32; Oliver Treib, ‘Implementing and Complying with EU 
Governance Outputs’, (2014) 9(1) Living Reviews in European Governance, 6 
<http://www.europeangovernance-livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2014-1/> accessed on 2 June 2015.  
33 Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891, para 26. See further Chapter 3, Section 3.1 
(General Obligations Relating to Implementation). 
34 See further Chapter 3, Section 3.5 (Obligations Relating to the Application of Directives). 
35 See to that effect Declaration (19) on the Implementation of Community Law annexed to the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) OJ C 191/1 at 102, which stresses that it is ‘essential for the proper functioning 
of the Community that the measures taken by the different Member States should result in Community 
law being applied with the same effectiveness and rigour as in the application of their national law.’  
[10] 
 
national implementing measures in a way that does not undermine the 
effectiveness36 (effet utile)37 of the EU rules.38  
                                                  
36 As pointed out by Snyder (1993) (n 31) 24-27, the term ‘effectiveness’ is capable of being ascribed 
several different meanings in EU law.. Moreover, as observed by Stine Andersen, The Enforcement of 
EU Law: The Role of the European Commission (Oxford University Press 2012) 42-43, citing Kal 
Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’ in 
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (Sage 
2002), the notion of effectiveness has a broader meaning in international relations theory and refers to 
‘the degree to which a rule induces changes in behaviour that further the rule’s goals; improves the state 
of the underlying problem; or achieves its policy objective’ .   
37 The reference to effectiveness as used here is to the concept of ‘effet utile’ as developed by the Court 
of Justice in its case law; see for example, Case C-61/11 PPU El Dridi [2011] ECR I-3015, para 55. See 
further Malcolm Ross, ‘Effectiveness in the European Legal Order(s): Beyond Supremacy to 
Constitutional Proportionality?’ (2006) 31 European Law Review, 476-498; Vassilios Skouris, 'Effet 
Utile Versus Legal Certainty: The Case-law of the Court of Justice on the Direct Effect of Directives' 
(2006) 17 European Business Law Review, 241–255; Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel, European 
Union Law (Robert Bray and Nathan Cambien (eds), 3rd edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2011) 154-155, 
761;  
38 Case 158/80 Rewe (Butter-buying cruises) [1981] ECR 807, paras 41 and 43 (national authorities 
should not apply legislative or administrative measures which are contrary to directly effective 
provisions of a directive); Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann (n 32), para 26 (obligation to achieve 
the result of a directive is binding on all authorities of the Member States; national implementing 
measures must be interpreted in the light of wording and purpose of the directive, even in the absence 
of direct effect); Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839, paras 30-33 (administrative 
authorities under obligation to apply directly effective provisions of directives and to refrain from 
applying conflicting provisions of national law); Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, para 8 
(duty of consistent interpretation applies regardless of whether national rules where adopted before or 
after directive); Case C-63/97 BMW [1999] ECR I-905, paras 22-23 (duty of consistent interpretation 
applies to national implementing measures, including any transitional rules); Case C-224/97 Ciola 
[1999] ECR I-2517, paras 30-34 (supremacy of EU law binds administrative authorities, when making 
administrative acts and issuing decisions); Case C-218/01 Henkel [2004] ECR I-1725, para 60 (duty of 
consistent interpretation applies to administrative authorities which are competent to apply a 
directive); Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I-8835, para 114 (duty of consistent 
interpretation is inherent in the Treaty in order to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law). See also 
Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (1986) (n 31) 67; Prechal (n 28) 51-54, 65-72 and 180-215 which 
respectively discuss the obligation of result under Article 288(3) TFEU, administrative compliance and 
the duty of consistent interpretation; see further Maartje Verhoeven, The Costanzo Obligation 
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Moreover, implementation also concerns enforcement by the national 
courts. As will be seen, 39 the redress mechanisms before the national courts 
must allow for effective remedies.40,41 Such remedies can ensure the 
                                                  
(Intersentia 2011) for a detailed examination of the obligations incumbent upon the national 
administrative authorities in the case of conflict between national law and EU law.    
39 See further Chapter 3, Section 3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives). 
40 The right to an effective remedy is guaranteed by Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which by virtue of Article 51(1) of the Charter, also applies to the Member States when they are 
implementing EU law.  
41 Case 13/68 Salgoil [1968] ECR 453, 463 (national courts must protect rights conferred by EU law; 
national law determines which courts are competent); Case 179/84 Bozzetti [1985] ECR 2301, para 17 
(Member States are responsible for ensuring that individual rights conferred by EU law are effectively 
protected in each case), Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, para 12-13 and Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] 
ECR 1989, para 5 (national courts are entrusted with ensuring the legal protection conferred on 
individuals by directly effective provisions of EU law; national law determines what procedural rules 
apply, subject to the principle of equivalence that requires that such rules must be no less favourable 
than those governing similar actions under national law); Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, 
paras 21 and 22-23 (national courts are obliged to give primacy to EU law in case these conflict with 
provisions of national law; national courts need not await a decision of a higher court which has sole 
jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of a national law); Case 19/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, 
para 14 (national law determines what procedural rules apply, subject to the principle of effectiveness 
that requires such rules not to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights 
conferred by EU law); Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann (n 32), para 26 (obligation to achieve the 
result of a directive is binding on all authorities of the Member States, including the courts); Case C-
106/89 Marleasing (n 37), para 8 (national courts have to interpret national law, as far as possible, in 
the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve its intended result); Case 
222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, at para 18 (the principle of effective judicial protection is a common 
principle of law among the constitutional traditions of the Member States); Case C-213/89 Factortame 
I [1990] ECR I-2433, para 19 (it is for the national courts, in application of the principle of cooperation 
laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, to ensure the legal protection which persons derive from directly effective 
provisions of EU law); Joined Case C-87/90 to 89/90 Verholen [1991] ECR I-3757, para 16 (EU law 
does not preclude a national court from examining of its own motion whether national rules are in 
conformity with directly effective provisions of a directive); Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van 
Schijndel [1995] ECR I-4705, para 22 (EU law does not require national courts to raise of their own 
motion a breach of EU law, where this would require them to abandon the passive role assigned to them 
by going beyond the ambit of the dispute as defined by the parties and by relying on facts and 
circumstances which the parties have not put forth); Case C-302/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, para 
38 (the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU requires the Member States to ensure 
judicial protection of an individual’s rights under Community law).  
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enforcement of the EU rules in case these come into conflict with the national 
implementing measures42 or their practical application by the national 
administrative authorities falls foul of the objectives of the directive.43 In 
addition, in situations where such court proceedings raise a question of 
interpretation of the directive, the national courts may have the obligation in 
certain cases to refer the matter to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling 
under Article 267 TFEU.44  
This study will engage with the existing literature on EU compliance 
studies,45 which has identified the limitations of relying on transposition to 
measure the dependent variable of implementation.46 This becomes all the 
                                                  
42 Case 158/80 Rewe (Butter-buying cruises) (n 37), para 41 (conflicting provisions of national law may 
be legislative in nature); Case 106/77 Simmenthal (n 40), para 21 (national courts are obliged to give 
primacy to EU law in case these conflict with provisions of national law); Case 14/83 von Colson and 
Kamann (n 32),  para 26 (national implementing measures must be interpreted by the national courts 
in the light of wording and purpose of the directive, even in the absence of direct effect); Case C-63/97 
BMW (n 37), paras 22-23 (duty of consistent interpretation applies to national implementing measures, 
including transitional rules); Case C-83/11 Rahman [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:519 (judgment of 5 
September 2012), para 25 (where the provisions of a directive are not directly effective, an applicant is 
still entitled to judicial review of national measures taken in application of the directive to determine 
whether these have remained within the limits of the discretion set by that directive).  
43 Case 158/80 Rewe (Butter-buying cruises), (n 37), para 41 (conflicting provisions of national law may 
be administrative in nature); Case 222/86 Heylens [1987] ECR 4097, para 14 (national law must 
provide a right to an effective judicial remedy against a national decision refusing free access to 
employment); Case C-224/97Ciola, (n 37), paras 30-34 (conflicting provisions of national law include 
not only general abstract rules but also specific individual administrative decisions); Case C-459/99 
MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591, paras 101-103 (national law must provide right to an effective judicial 
remedy against a national decision refusing entry to an individual claiming to be the family member of 
an EU citizen); Case C-83/11 Rahman (n 41), para 25 (where the provisions of a directive are not directly 
effective, an applicant is entitled to judicial review of whether the application of the national measures 
taken in application of the directive have remained within the limits of the discretion set by that 
directive).  
44 See further, Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4 (Reference for a preliminary ruling).  
45 See Chapter 4 (Factors Affecting Non-Compliance). 
46 Esther Versluis, ‘Even Rules, Uneven Practices: Opening the “Black Box” of EU Law in Action’ (2007) 
30 West European Politics, 50-67, 64, who has remarked that ‘practical implementation requires more 
of the Commission’s attention. When directives are ‘only’ transposed into national legislation, while 
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more apparent when it is considered that a core provision of the Free Movement 
Directive could be correctly transposed into national law, but might nonetheless 
be the subject of incorrect application by the national authorities47 and proves 
excessively difficult to enforce before the national courts.48  
In pursuing the first aim of examining implementation through its 
constitutive elements, this research aims to propose a framework for assessing 
the implementation of the Free Movement Directive which will allow for fuller 
consideration of all constitutive elements of implementation and which goes 
beyond transposition, so that it also addresses the Directive’s application by the 
national administrative authorities and its enforcement by the national courts. 
In order to ensure that such a framework remains workable – so that it could 
potentially be extended to assess implementation of Directive 2004/38 by all 
Member States and perhaps even to serve as an inspiration for other directives 
– the proposed implementation framework will suggest indicators derived from 
existing publicly available information and internal documents obtained 
through freedom of information requests.   
                                                  
they are not applied in practice, the usefulness of legislation becomes questionable’. See also, Tanja 
Börzel, ‘Non-compliance in the European Union: pathology or statistical artefact?’ (2001) 8 Journal of 
European Public Policy, 803–824, 804-806; Ellen Mastenbroek, ‘EU Compliance: Still a “Black Hole”?’ 
(2005) 12 Journal of European Public Policy, 1103-1120, 1104; Miriam Hartlapp and Gerda Falkner, 
‘Problems of Operationalization and Data in EU Compliance Research’ (2009) 10 European Union 
Politics, 281-304, 284-296; Dimiter Toshkov, Moritz Knoll and Lisa Wewerka, ‘Connecting the Dots: 
Case Studies and EU Implementation Research’ (2010) Institute for European Integration Research 
Working Paper 10/2010, 5; Mariyana Angelova, Tanja Dannwolf and Thomas König, ‘How Robust Are 
Compliance Findings? A Research Synthesis’ (2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy, 1269-1291, 
1273; Treib (n 31) 17-20.  
47 See for example, Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman (n 43) 165-166: ‘while the applicable national 
legislation itself complies with Union law, it is the application of the relevant Union law rules by the 
national administrative (or other) authorities that constitutes the basis for the Member State’s failure 
to fulfil obligations.’   
48 A practical example relates to the requirement that EU citizens who do not work must be in possession 
of ‘comprehensive sickness insurance’ in order to enjoy a right of residence under the Directive. As will 
be seen in Chapter 10 (Implementation of Directive 2004/38 Compared), such problems affect Italy 
and the UK, as well as France, Spain and Sweden for different reasons. 
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At the same time, the second objective of this study is to determine what 
policy choices were made by the Member States when they implemented the 
Directive49 and investigate whether there may be any correlation between these 
policy choices and the extent to which the implementation by the national 
authorities comply with the EU rules.  
In particular, this will involve consideration of the extent to which the 
choices made by Member States in exercising their discretion under Article 
288(3) TFEU as to the form and method of application of the Directive by the 
administrative authorities and its enforcement by the national courts might 
account for the discrepancy between formal legal transposition – the 
incorporation of a directive on the statute books – and the situation on the 
ground – how the law is applied and enforced in practice. This study will 
proceed by comparing the implementation of the Directive in three Member 
States where transposition was above the EU average but against which the 
Commission nevertheless initiated infringement proceedings under Article 258 
TFEU. 
For example, it could be that when a Member State chooses to adopt 
transposition measures its officials do so by replicating the terms of the Free 
Movement Directive. One might expect that this policy choice is likely to 
increase the chances of overall compliance by that Member State when 
implementing the Directive. On the other hand, such a replicative approach to 
transposition might create problems further down the line for administrative 
authorities tasked with interpreting unfamiliar or unclear legal terminology.50 
                                                  
49 For a discussion in the environmental field, see Sonja Bugdahn, ‘Of Europeanization and 
Domestication: The Implementation of the Enviromental Information Directive in Ireland, Great 
Britain and Germany’ (2005) 12 Journal of European Public Policy, 177-199, 178-179: ‘[t]he 
implementation of EU policies is best conceptualized as a blend of domestic choices of options in a 
policy area, only some of which have been determined by the EU. Member states can make choices of 
non-prescribed or non-recommended policy options that limit, mediate or accompany the 
Europeanization of the policy area in various forms (‘forms of domestication’).’  
50 Prechal (n 28) 32-33. 
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As will be seen, the concepts of ‘registered partnership’ and ‘durable 
relationship, duly attested’ contained in the Directive have been transposed 
verbatim into national law by many Member States, but this has resulted in 
diverse national interpretations of these concepts within the EU.51 
Likewise, a Member State may choose to endow its courts with the power 
to hear new evidence that might not have been presented to the administrative 
authorities, when ruling on appeals made against administrative decisions that 
deny or restrict rights under the Directive. We might infer that this policy choice 
might enhance the likelihood that a Member State’s implementation will 
comply with the Directive. However, the introduction of such evidential 
flexibility in appeal proceedings does not necessarily guarantee that the courts 
will always judge cases in compliance with EU law because the underlying legal 
rules might be unclear or ambiguous and therefore subject to multiple 
interpretations by the judicial authorities, as the example of ‘comprehensive 
sickness insurance’ will show.52  
It is anticipated that exploring these themes will enable useful 
comparisons to be made between Member States that could help to shed light 
on examples of best practices in the implementation of the Free Movement 
Directive. In this way, conclusions will be drawn that will encourage 
achievement of the underlying objective of the Directive ‘to avoid divergent 
administrative practices or interpretations constituting an undue obstacle to the 





51 See further Chapter 10 (Implementation of Directive 2004/38 Compared). 
52 See further Chapter 10 (Implementation of Directive 2004/38 Compared). 




Research on the implementation of directives concerns the analysis of 
how EU legislation is given effect by the Member States.54 It has previously been 
observed that while ‘the implementation process of a directive can … be divided 
into several stages, the major problem one encounters in this respect is that 
neither the EC institutions, including the Court of Justice, nor many scholars 
follow a coherent terminology’.55 While some consider this lack of consistency 
in terminology immaterial,56 others consider it a necessity to ‘draw a sharp 
distinction between legal incorporation [i.e. transposition] and the later stages 
of the implementation process’.57 Given that this study is intended to explore 
the various legal factors that might affect implementation outcomes, it will 
therefore be necessary to refer with precision to the relevant stages of the 
implementation process. 
When a directive is adopted by the EU institutions, EU law requires the 
Member States to give this directive legal effect in its domestic legal order. The 
process by which this is achieved is termed ‘implementation’. Overall, 
implementation comprises three interlinked stages: transposition, application 
and enforcement.58 These different stages of implementation can be 





54 Ulf Sverdrup, ‘Implementation and European Integration: A Review Essay’ (ARENA Working Paper 
25/2005) 3; Michael Zürn and Christian Joerges (eds), Law and Governance in Postnational Europe 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) 8; Treib (n 31) 1. 
55 Prechal (n 28) 6. 
56 ibid. 
57 Treib (n 31) 8. 





Implementation      =    Transposition   +        Application        +       Enforcement 
                        (decentralised) 
 
 







Table 1.3 Three stages of implementation 
 
The term ‘transposition’ refers to the process by which a directive is 
incorporated into the national legal order. The Member States have a discretion 
in choosing the ‘form and methods’ with which they implement an EU directive, 
to ensure that implementation caters to the specificities of each country’s legal 
system. As a result, the ways in which a Member State transposes a directive can 
take several forms. This could involve the enactment of a legislative act or, for 
example, the adoption of regulations under delegating legislation. Whatever the 
form chosen by a Member State, transposition generally refers to the process of 
enacting or adopting a legal instrument that incorporates an EU directive in the 
domestic legal system through legally-binding instruments. Such instruments 
are collectively referred to as ‘national implementing measures’. These include 
legislative instruments, delegated legislation and regulations. They may also be 
complemented by administrative circulars issued to guide the authorities when 
they apply the national implementing measures.  
Once the national implementing measures have been adopted by the 
Member States, these need to be applied and enforced. The term ‘application’ is 
used to refer to the administrative measures taken by the authorities of the 
Member states to give practical effect to the national implementing measures 
(and therefore also the EU directive in question). The measures will be taken in 
respect of the persons and situations falling within the scope of the EU directive 
concerned. Such administrative measures include individual decisions and 
other acts of the administrative authorities taken to ensure a directive is applied 
to persons and situations falling within its scope.  
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The term ‘enforcement’ refers to the processes by which observance of EU 
directives is monitored and secured, whether at the national level 
(‘decentralised enforcement’) or the EU level (‘centralised enforcement’). The 
term ‘decentralised enforcement’ refers to proceedings before the national 
courts that ensure the Member State and individuals observe the terms of a 
directive. EU law requires that the application of EU directives by the 
administrative authorities of the Member States should be subject to scrutiny 
by the national courts. As a result, Member States must provide for a right of 
judicial review against measures taken in application of an EU directive by the 
Member States. Decentralised or internal enforcement therefore describes the 
processes by which the judicial authorities of a Member State ensure observance 
with an EU directive by adjudicating disputes concerning its application at the 
national level. 
The terms ‘centralised enforcement’ or ‘EU enforcement’ refer to the 
process whereby the EU institutions secure the observance of EU directive by 
the Member States. The Commission has the power to monitor the 
implementation of EU directives by the Member States. In case problems are 
identified, it may have recourse to several non-judicial processes to ensure 
observance of directives by the Member States. If such processes are 
unsuccessful, the Commission may initiate legal proceedings before the EU 
Court of Justice in case Member States fail to comply with EU law. 
The term ‘compliance’ is used here to refer to the outcome of 
implementation and relates to ‘the extent to which rules are complied with by 
their addressees’.59 When Member States implement a directive this may result 
in different outcomes that reflect the extent to which implementation by the 
Member States is consistent with the objectives laid down by the directive and 
EU law more generally. When implementation by the Member States complies 
with EU law, this is termed ‘compliant implementation’. In situations where 
implementation does not comply with EU law, this is referred to as ‘non-
                                                  
59 Zürn and Joerges (n 50) 8.  
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compliance’ or ‘non-compliant implementation’. This might result from 
problems in national transposition of an EU directive by the legislative or 
executive, problems in the application of the directive by the administrative 
authorities, or problems in the enforcement of an EU directive by the judicial 
authorities of a Member State. 
1.4 Research Questions 
This research aims to investigate the implementation of Directive 
2004/38 on residence rights – the most important legislative instrument 
governing the free movement of persons within the European Union – by 
undertaking a comparative analysis of its implementation in Belgium, Italy and 
the UK.  
The purpose is, firstly, to identify the constitutive elements of 
implementation and how these should be taken into account to assess the 
implementation of the Free Movement Directive and, secondly, to explore the 
existence of any correlation between, on the one hand, the policy choices that 
were made by the Member States as part of the implementation process, and on 
the other hand, how correctly the Directive has implemented by the Member 
States. 
The research therefore contemplates two sets of questions.  The first one 
aims to determine what factors relating to transposition, application and 
enforcement should be taken into account to determine the overall outcome of 
a Member State’s performance in the implementation of Directive 2004/38.  
The first set of questions relates to measuring implementation outcomes 
as a dependent variable.60 This will involve an examination of the various stages 
involved in the implementation of directives, namely transposition, application 
and enforcement.  The identification of these stages and the corresponding 
obligations that they generate for Member States will serve as the basis for 
uncovering the specific obligations that implementation of the Free Movement 
                                                  
60 Treib (n 31) 18-20. 
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Directive entails. This will then be followed by the identification of suggested 
indicators that could be used to measure all aspects of implementation of the 
Directive. 
The second set of questions involve an investigation of independent 
variables61 of a legal nature that might allow for intervention that could improve 
implementation outcomes.62 The research will explore what policy choices are 
open to the Member States when transposing, applying and enforcing the 
Directive and whether these affect implementation outcomes. This will then be 
followed by an investigation into the existence of any correlation between such 
legal policy choices that are made by a Member State and implementation 
outcomes. These research questions will be addressed through a detailed review 
of the state of implementation in the Member States under study, which will 
scrutinise the state of transposition, application and enforcement in Belgium, 
Italy and the UK. The treatment of certain key issues under the Directive in the 
three Member State will also be compared.  
The study will close with an evaluation of the results and the formulation 
of recommendations relating to the implementation of the Directive by the 
Member States and its enforcement by the European Commission. 
1.5 Research Methods  
This dissertation aims to engage in qualitative research. The study will 
involve an examination of the legal frameworks governing the free movement 
of persons and their application by reference to legislation and other official 
documents. It aims to engage in empirical legal research and will therefore draw 
on data contained in official reports and public requests for information. In 
                                                  
61 Treib (n 31) 20, 29. 
62 Dimiter Toshkov, ‘The Quest for Relevance: Research on Compliance with EU Law’ (2011) online 
paper <http://www.dimiter.eu/articles/Compliance%20review.pdf> accessed on 30 May 2015. 
Toshkov argues that ‘even if scholars can increase the reliability and validity of their causal inferences 
about the determinants of compliance, the research will still remain of limited practical significance if 
the variables we study cannot be subject to intervention.’, ibid, 16.  
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comparing the implementation of the Free Movement Directive in Belgium, 
Italy and the UK this study will also give due consideration to the scholarship 
on comparative law.     
1.5.1 Using Comparative Law Methods 
When comparing the implementation of EU directives across several 
Member States, it is appropriate to have regard to the methods advocated by 
scholars of comparative law.63 Several comparatists would even argue it is 
essential.64  
Infusing research on EU directives with the methods of comparative law 
is warranted because comparative legal research has contributed to the 
elaboration and evaluation of EU law.65 It has also been specifically referred to 
                                                  
63 John Bell, ‘Comparative Law’ in Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan (eds), The New Oxford Companion 
to Law (Oxford University Press, 2008), 183-184: ‘Comparative law involves a process of drawing 
lessons from a confrontation of two or more legal systems. Comparison is a method which can serve a 
number of purposes. It can illuminate the researcher's understanding of their own legal system by 
highlighting features that are distinctive or those that are shared by many legal systems. It can be a way 
of approaching a new legal system, seeking to understand its distinctive features; and it is used as a 
method of law reform—examining how other systems tackle a problem within the home system.’  
64  Meinhard Hilf, ‘Comparative Law and European Law’ in Encyclopaedia of International Law (Rudolf 
Bernhardt, 1997) Volume 10, 45-49, 47: ‘A comparative approach is essential for the effective 
implementation of Community law within the Member States and thus for a law which is felt to be a jus 
commune throughout the Community.’ See also Peter De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World 
(3d ed, 2008, Routledge-Cavendish), 182: ‘The need to employ the comparative method, to be able to 
deal with different European systems of law, is becoming increasingly evident’.  
65 George Bermann ‘Comparative Law in the New European Community’ (1997-1998) 21 Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review, 865-869. See also Rob van Gestel and Hans-W Micklitz, 
‘Comparative Law and EU Legislation’ in Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut (eds), The Method and 
Culture of Comparative Law (Hart Publishing 2014) 301-317, 307-316: the authors observe that 
‘[d]uring the early years of the European Community, comparative law was a rich source of inspiration 
for the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States. Comparative research was often undertaken to 
look for common ground in the laws of the Member States and to find general principles of European 
law to inform the legislature.’ While comparative research is still undertaken today, the authors lament 
that ‘the function of comparative law as a source of inspiration and evaluation has become less 
important, whereas its potential for justifying predetermined policy goals and plans for new legislation 
has grown’, ibid, 316.  
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in the case law of the Court of Justice66 and has influenced the way the Court 
adjudicates cases.67  Moreover, doing so would heed the call of some 
comparatists for fuller integration of the study of EU law in comparative law.68    
As in other disciplines, there are several methods advocated for 
undertaking comparative law research.69 However, these various approaches 
can be combined in order to operationalise comparative legal research.70   
In the first place, it is necessary to determine the parameters of the 
comparison. In the context of the implementation of the Free Movement 
Directive, this means comparing the national measures related to transposition, 
                                                  
66 Pierre Pescatore ‘Le recours, dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautés 
Européennes, à des normes déduites de la comparaison des droits des États Membres’ (1980), Revue 
Internationale de Droit Comparé, 337-346; Lord Steyn, ‘The Challenge of Comparative Law’ (2006) 8 
European Journal of Law Reform,  
3-12, 4-5; Koen Lenaerts, ‘Le Droit Comparé dans le Travail du Juge Communautaire’ in François van 
der Mensbrugghe, L’Utilisation de la Méthode Comparative en Droit Européen (Presses Universitaires 
de Namur 2003), 111-168; Takis Tridimas, General Principles of EC Law (Oxford 1999), 15-16. 
67 Thijmen Koopmans, ‘The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of Legal Traditions’ (1991) 39 
American Journal of Comparative Law, 493-507. 
68 See for example, Mathias Reimann, ‘Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the 
International Age’ (2000-2001) Tulane Law Review, 1103-1120, 1111; Mathias Reimann, ‘Comparative 
Law and Neighbouring Disciplines’ in Mauro Bussani and Ugo Matei (eds), The Cambridge Companion 
to Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 21. 
69 See for example, Béatrice Jaluzot, ‘Méthodologie du Droit Comparé: Bilan et prospective’ (2005) 57 
Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, 29-48; Pier Giuseppe Monateri (ed), Methods of Comparative 
Law (Edward Elgar 2012).  
70 The methodology used here follows that suggested in Esin Örücü, ‘Methodology of Comparative Law’ 
in Jan Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar 2012), 560-576. Similar 
approaches are suggested by John Reitz, ‘How to Do Comparative Law’ (1998) 46 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 617-636; See further Gerhard Dannemann, ‘Similiarities or Differences’ in Mathias 
Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford 
University Press 2006) 383-419, 406-418; De Cruz (n 58) 240-247; Koen Lemmens, ‘Comparative Law 
as an Act of Modesty: A Pragmatic and Realistic Approach to Comparative Legal Scholarship’ in Maurice 
Adams and Jacco Bomhoff, Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 
2014) 302-325; Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 13-40.  See also, 




application and enforcement of the Directive. The purpose is to identify whether 
the policy choices made by the Member States in implementing the Directive 
affect overall implementation outcomes. 
When engaging in micro-comparison relating to a specific legal 
problem,71 the so-called ‘functional method’72 examines legal rules by reference 
to their function, namely by comparing the rules that address a given problem 
in the different countries concerned. A comparative study of the 
implementation of an EU directive therefore calls for identifying all legal rules 
that give effect to that directive.73 In order for the assessment of implementation 
                                                  
71 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (translation Tony Wier, 3rd 
ed, Oxford University Press 1998), 4-5, explain that ‘[c]omparative lawyers compare the legal systems 
of different nations. This can be done on a large scale or on a smaller scale. To compare the spirit and 
style of different legal systems, the methods of thought and procedures they use, is sometimes called 
macrocomparison. … Microcomparison, by contrast, has to do with specific legal institutions or 
problems, that is, with the rules used to solve actual problems or particular conflicts of interests.’ 
(emphasis in original); see also Dannemann (n 64) 387-388. 
72 Zweigert and Kötz (n 65) 34 state that ‘[t]he basic methodological principle of all comparative law is 
that of functionality. From this basic principle stems all the other rules which determine the choice of 
laws to compare, the scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparative law and so on. 
Incomparables cannot usefully be compared, and in law the only things which are comparable are those 
which fulfil the same function.’ (emphasis in original). See further Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional 
Method of Comparative Law’, in Reimann and Zimmermann (n 64) 339-382; Dannemann (n 64)  386-
390; Antonios Emmanuel Platsas, ‘The Functional and the Dysfunctional in the Comparative Method 
of Law: Some Critical Remarks’ (2008) 12(3) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 
<http://www.ejcl.org/123/art123-3.pdf> accessed on 10 July 2015;  James Gordley, ‘The Functional 
Method’ in Monateri (n 63) 107-119. For a brief discussion of the use of the functional method in Italy, 
see Pier Giuseppe Monateri, ‘Critique et différence: le droit comparé en Italie’ (1999) 51 Revue 
Internationale de Droit Comparé, 989-1002, 991-992. The functional method is considered the 
mainstream approach in traditional comparative law; see for example Annalise Riles, ‘Wigmore’s 
Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information’ (1999) 40 Harvard International Law 
Journal, 221-283, 231. 
73 Zweigert and Kötz (n 65) 35-36: ‘The basic principle for the student of foreign legal systems is to avoid 
all limitations and restraints. This applies particularly to the question of 'sources of law'; the comparatist 
must treat as a source of law whatever moulds or affects the living law in his chosen system, whatever 
the lawyers there would treat as a source of law, and he must accord those sources the same relative 
weight and value as they do. He must attend, just as they do, to statutory and customary law, to case-
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to be as comprehensive as possible, consideration must also be given to all 
potential instances of non-compliance that can be found in national law. In the 
specific context of the Free Movement Directive, this involves examining 
connected rights, such as the rights of EU citizens to access social assistance, or 
the rights of family members to work or study. 
The ‘formants approach’ also gives consideration to the legal professionals 
who shape the law, which it views ‘as a set of interlocked documents used by 
professionals according to their personal and institutional strategies ’.74 
Accordingly, a comparison must include not only legislation and case law, but 
also ‘soft law’ instruments such as parliamentary reports, ministerial circulars 
or internal guidance, as well as academic and professional writings. It should 
also encompass reports by governmental and non-governmental organisations. 
This ensures that consideration is given to as many legal sources as possible in 
order to address all aspects of implementation in the national legal order. 
A descriptive account of the different legal orders can then follow. At this 
stage, a first vertical comparison is made between the Directive and the national 
implementing measures to identify areas of divergence between the two sets of 
rules.  This will cover transposition, application and enforcement by individual 
Member States. 
The next step involves comparing implementation horizontally across 
Member States by identifying both similarities and differences75 between the 
national implementing measures by reference to key concepts of the Directive. 
                                                  
law and legal writing, to standard-form contracts and general conditions of business, to trade usage and 
custom. This is quite essential for the comparative method.’  
74 Dannemann (n 64) 306-307; Pier Giuseppe Monateri, ‘Methods in Comparative Law: An Intellectual 
Overview’ in Monateri (n 63) 7-24, 8. 
75 Dannemann (n 64) 396: ‘The functional comparatist will find greatest satisfaction in unearthing 
similarities in results which are hidden deep inside a jungle of different styles, methods, procedures, 
and sources of law – just as critics of functionalism may derive the greatest pleasure from uncovering 
hidden differences where the law appears similar’. For a defence of the view that comparative law should 
analyse both convergence and divergence between laws, see Ruth Sefton-Green, ‘Compare and 
Contrast: Monstre à deux têtes’ (2002) 54 Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, 85-95.   
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This comparison must be operated by reference to the national context in which 
implementing rules operate.76 In addition to constitutional traditions, due 
consideration must also be given to the divergent functions of the Free 
Movement Directive and the national legal framework within which the 
national implementing rules are to be found, because they pursue different 
objectives, namely market integration and immigration control respectively.77   
An explanation of the observed similarities or differences in implementation 
of the Directive can then follow. At this stage, certain hypotheses can be 
formulated78 to explain how legal policy choices might affect implementation 
outcomes and whether certain policy choices could be considered as promoting 
better implementation outcomes.79  
The confirmation stage involves verifying these hypotheses against available 
empirical evidence. This will be done by examining whether there is any 
correlation between various legal policy choices and implementation outcomes 
even if only on a probability basis.80 The results can serve to confirm or refute 
these hypotheses. Based on these results, recommendations can then be 
formulated as to how implementation of the Free Movement Directive could be 
improved both at EU level and at national level.  
It has been suggested that the EU has led to the development of ‘multi-
directional legal transplants’ whereby, on the one hand, legal concepts of EU 
law are received into national law,81 and on the other hand, Member States 
                                                  
76 Örücü (n 64) 569. 
77 Renaud Dehousse, ‘Comparing National and EC Law: The Problem of the Level of Analysis’ (1994) 42 
American Journal of Comparative Law, 761-781, 769-780: regarding environmental policy, ‘[w]hereas 
the primary objective of national policies is to protect the environment, many Community measures are 
primarily inspired by another function concern, namely to avoid that differences between national 
policies which hamper intra-Community trade.’  
78 Örücü (n 64) 569. 
79 Siems (n 64) 297-301; Örücü (n 64) 569. 
80 Örücü (n 64) 570.  
81 Foxerramon Bengoetxea, ‘A Case of Multidirectional Constitutional Transplant in the EU: Infra-state 
Law and Regionalism’ in Sacha Prechal and Bert Van Roermund (eds), The Coherence of EU Law 
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influence each other in the shaping of their national laws.82 For example, 
Member States may look to the experience of other countries to decide upon the 
ways in which to transpose a specific directive.83 Moreover, following 
                                                  
(Oxford University Press 2008), 423-447,428-429: ‘EC law neither clearly, nor openly, contains 
domestic transplants. It presents itself as an autonomous legal order – a law with its own language. 
What really came as a surprise was the opposite phenomenon – transplants moving from EC law to 
domestic legal systems. Indeed, it is surprising that it should be the newly created Community law and 
its concepts that should end up exerting an important influence on domestic laws, legal systems, and 
cultures. Such transplants are now part and parcel of the theoretical training in domestic law. These 
include direct effect, direct applicability, Member State liability for breaches of Community law (even 
domestic judicial liability for wrongful applications of EC law), provision of interim measures where 
rights might be in jeopardy, limits to procedural autonomy – like the duty to raise, ex officio, issues of 
EC law – institutional autonomy, equal pay for equal work, and competition law. They are not all 
regulated in the same way. Some of them have entered domestic legal orders through EC law. Some of 
these top-down influences might themselves be the result of the initial influence of a particular domestic 
law on EC law, which is then exported to other domestic systems. … One such type of multidirectional 
transplant is regionalism. The regional transplant originates in domestic legal systems, or rather in 
some of the constitutions of the original Member States and those of the Member States that later joined 
the EC, as well 
as in the constitutional evolution of some Member States, original or adhered’. On legal transplants 
more generally, see Michele Graziadei, ‘The Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and 
Receptions’ in Reimann and Zimmermann (n 64) 441-475; Jörg Fedtke, ‘Legal Transplants’ in Smits (n 
64) 550-554. On legal transplants in European law, see Alan Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European 
Private Law’ (2000) 4(4) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law: <http://www.ejcl.org/44/art44-
2.html> accessed on 10 July 2015.  
82 Ibid, 432: ‘We have explained top-down dynamics where domestic legal orders and constitutional 
systems are influenced by constitutional developments at the EU level, or by recognitions of institutions 
or specificities of some but not all of the existing Member States. We have also explained side-to-side 
dynamics where developments of one particular EC or EU institution influence other institutions at the 
same level, or where institutions or specific institutional arrangements at the domestic level inspire 
those in a different Member State.’ 
83 Jane Bates, ‘The Conversion of EEC Legislation into UK Legislation’ (1989) 10 Statute Law Review, 
110-123, 122-123: ‘A further factor which should be mentioned as an influence upon the draftsmen is 
the attitude taken by other Member States in implementing Community legislation. Where a draftsman 
is unsure of the best method of implementation of, for example, a permissive directive the approach 
taken by other Member States can often provide useful guidelines and in this case it can be a good reason 
for slowing down the implementation timetable in order to take a lead from another Member State. The 
approach taken by other Member States is particularly useful where implementation of a concept which 
is alien to our legal system is required. For example, when first implementing Community legislation 
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transposition, the existence of networks also provides another forum within 
which best practices in application and enforcement can be shared between the 
Member States.84 Comparative legal research can therefore help to identify best 
practices in implementation and thereby offer alternative policies that can be 
the subject of intervention by the Member States.  
1.5.2 Sources of information 
This study will draw upon sources of information that are currently 
available in the public domain, supplemented by those obtained through public 
requests for information. These will include documents relating to the 
formulation and implementation of Directive 2004/38 that were adopted by the 
EU institutions, including internal documents relating to infringement 
procedures that have been released in the public domain. It will also review 
documentation published by the national authorities including legislation and 
other documents issued by government ministries and agencies tasked with the 
application of the Directive. In addition, where available, it will draw upon 
documents published by the national courts relating to the enforcement of the 
Free Movement Directive including case law and activity reports. The above 




on Value Added Tax, the draftsman studied the French and German legislation for clues as to how best 
to carry out implementation in the United Kingdom.’  
84 Bengoetxea (n 75) 432: ‘The top-down and side-to-side dynamics interact with other less 
institutionalized dynamics arising from sub-state or infra-state actors and from citizens and economic 
actors. Networks of regions sharing best practice in law and policy making are examples to the point 
and these are flourishing in different areas: employment, social policy, education, environment, 
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Directive 2004/381 is an instrument of significant legal importance 
within the EU’s legal order. It determines the conditions under which EU 
citizens can exercise their right of free movement within the EU, which today is 
still considered by the majority of EU citizens as the EU’s most positive 
achievement.2. The first part of this Chapter examines how this right has been 
an early feature of the European integration process (section 2.1).  However, the 
right of free movement has come under challenge as never before and there is 
some doubt whether the Directive will survive in its current form (section 2.2). 
It is against this background that an examination of the implementation of the 
Directive will be undertaken in three different Member States. The final part of 
this Chapter provides an explanation for electing to use Belgium, Italy and the 
UK for this case study (section 2.3). 
2.1 Free Movement of Persons as a Driver of European Integration 
Freedom of movement within a state’s national territory is a core right of 
citizenship which democratic states tend to guarantee.3 Historically, the control 
                                                  
1 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158/77 (hereafter the Free Movement Directive, Directive 2004/38 and the 
Directive). 
2 See Commission, ‘European Commission upholds free movement of people’, Press release 
MEMO/13/1041, 25 November 2013 and other materials cited at n 95.  
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, UNGA Res 217 A(III), art 13(1); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 21(1); see 
also Willem Maas, ‘Equality and the Free Movement of People: Citizenship and Internal Migration’ in 
Willem Maas (ed), Democratic Citizenship and the Free Movement of People (Nijhoff 2013) 9-30, 9.  
[29] 
 
of borders has been an intrinsic aspect of a state’s territorial sovereignty,4 which 
enables a state to prevent interference with ‘the territorial integrity of the state’.5 
Seen from this perspective, the freedom of movement represents ‘a substantial 
and important departure from international law’6 where the obligation of States 
to admit non-nationals on the national territory is limited to humanitarian 
situations.7  
                                                  
4 Mark Salter, ‘Rights of passage. The Passport in International Relations’ (Lynne Reiner 2003) 12-123 
and 128-129. 
5 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS xvi, art 2(4); see further Brian Opeskin, Richard 
Perruchoud and Jillyanne Redpath-Cross (eds), Foundations of International Migration Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 123-126. 
6 Elspeth Guild, The Legal Elements of European Identity: EU Citizenship and EU Migration Law 
(Kluwer 2004) 86. 
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, n 3, arts 13-14; Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150, arts 31-33. See further Alice Edwards, ‘Human Rights, Refugees, and The 
Right “To Enjoy” Asylum’ (2005) 17 International Journal of Refugee Law 293-330, 302, who argues 
that ‘[t]he right to leave any country and the right to seek asylum are two sides of the same coin in the 
refugee context. Although Article 13(2) of the UDHR does not mention a right ‘to enter any country’, it 
would make a nonsense of the 1951 Convention if this was not intended, at least for the purposes of 
refugee status determination, especially where an individual has reached a country’s territory, such as 
its territorial seas or a waiting zone in an international airport.’ 
[30] 
 
The free movement across borders is an original European construct.8,9  
It is a product of the European integration process10 that emerged from a desire 
to prevent the possibility for renewed conflict on the continent following the end 
of the Second World War and which proposed economic integration11 as the 
antidote12 that would ensure that war would become ‘not merely unthinkable, 
but materially impossible’.13  
                                                  
8 Admittedly, the Agreement of the Common Nordic Labour Market, 22 May 1954, 199 UNTS 3, predates 
the EEC Treaty by three years, however this does not undermine the European origins of the right of 
free movement across borders. The EEC Treaty was followed a year later by the Treaty establishing the 
Benelux Economic Union, 3 February 1958, 381 UNTS 166.  For an overview, see Sara Iglesias Sánchez, 
‘Free Movement of Persons and Regional International Organisations’ in Richard Plender (ed), Issues 
in International Migration Law (Brill/Nijhoff 2015), 231-235. 
9 The EU rules on the free movement of people across borders have served as an inspiration for a number 
of other regional economic areas, such as the European Community of West African States and the 
Southern Common Market, Mercosur/Mercosul: see, for example, Kristina Touzenis, ‘Free Movement 
of Persons in the European Union and Economic Community of West African States’ (2012) UNESCO 
migration studies 4; Diego Acosta Arcarazo, ‘Is Free Movement in Europe an Anomaly? The New Open 
Borders Policy in South America’ (EU Law Analysis, 14 November 2014) 
<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2014/11/is-free-movement-in-europe-anomaly-new.html> 
accessed on 4 June 2015. For an overview of free movement rules in other regional blocs, see further 
Sánchez (n 8).    
10 For a summary of the competing theories of integration, see Paul Craig, ‘Development of the EU’ in 
Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds), European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 9-35, 
31-34. 
11 Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (George Allen & Unwin, 1961 / Routledge 2011), 1-
2, defined ‘Economic integration … can take several forms that represent varying degrees of integration. 
… A higher form of integration is attained in a common market where not only trade restrictions but 
also restrictions on factor movements are abolished ’; for a critical examination of this definition see 
Jacques Pelkmans, Economic Integration: Methods and Economic Analysis (Pearson Education, 
2006) 2-9. See further Richard Baldwin and Charles Wyplosz, The Economics of European Integration 
(5th ed, McGraw-Hill, 2015). 
12 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Daniel Verdier, ‘European Integration as a Solution to War’ (2005) 
11 European Journal of International Relations, 99–135, 104-111. 
13 Robert Schuman, Declaration of 9 May 1950.  
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The initial impulse for free movement in the EU was the signing of the 
European Coal and Steel Treaty14 whose provisions15 later inspired the free 
movement provisions found in the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community16 between the Benelux states,17 France, Germany and Italy. The 
EEC Treaty foresaw the formation of a common market in which factors of 
production – labour, capital and entrepreneurship18,19 – would be free to move 
around the Community.20  The four freedoms21 did not initially provide for a 
                                                  
14 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 18 April 1951, 261 UNTS 140 (hereafter 
the ECSC Treaty), which would pool coal and steel production under a common supervision by a 
supranational authority. 
15 Article 69 of the ECCSC Treaty provided for a right of free movement albeit limited to workers with 
qualifications in coal mining and steel-making; see further Willem Maas, ‘The Genesis of European 
Rights’ (2005) 43 Journal of Common Market Studies, 1009-1025, 1010; Friedl Weiss and Frank 
Wooldridge, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community (Kluwer 2007) 14.   
16 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 UNTS 11 (hereafter EEC 
Treaty or Rome Treaty) 
17 Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. While the UK’s initial attempts to join were thwarted by 
Charles de Gaulle, the country eventually acceded in 1973 along with Denmark and Ireland in the first 
wave of enlargement. For a historical perspective, see Danny Nicol, EC Membership and the 
Judicialization of British Politics (Oxford University Press 2001) 34-35. 
18 Richard Lipsey and Colin Harbury, First Principles of Economics (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1988) 5-
6. 
19 The fourth factor of production, land, is not covered by the freedom of movement because it is by its 
very nature immovable. However, it is affected by other Treaty rules including, among others, Article 
18 TFEU which prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality that would prevent a Member State 
from enacting rules that reserve ownership of land to its own nationals. 
20 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (4th ed, Oxford University 
Press 2014) 9. 
21 The free movement of goods (Articles 12-17 and 30-37 EEC, now Articles 30 and 34-37 TFEU), the 
free movement of workers (Article 48-51 EEC, now Article 45-48 TFEU), the freedom of establishment 
and the provision of services (Articles 52-58 and 59- EEC, now Articles 49-55 and 56-62 TFEU) and the 
free movement of capital (Articles 67-73 EEC, now Articles 63-66 TFEU). For a comprehensive overview 
of the four freedoms, see Barnard (2014), n 20; for a detailed examination of the development of the 
free movement of persons, see Sioffra O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship. From 
the Free Movement of Persons to Union Citizenship (Kluwer 1996).  
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right of free movement for all citizens22 and instead limited free movement to 
workers,23 the self-employed,24 providers of services25 and their recipients.26 
Thus, free movement was originally conceived for the benefit of persons 
exercising some sort of economic activity.27 Sometimes nicknamed Homo 
economicus,28 these ‘market citizens’29  benefited from rights as economic 
actors rather than as political actors.30  
 This first phase in the evolution of the free movement of persons served 
to advance the objectives of economic integration pursued by the EEC Treaty.31 
                                                  
22 Barnard (2014), n 20, 229. However, it was not until the end of the transitional period in 1968 that 
secondary legislation was adopted to give effect to the free movement of these economically active 
citizens. 
23 Regulation (EEC) No 38/64 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community [1964] OJ 
62/965 (not published in the OJ English special edition), replaced by Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Community [1968] OJ English special edition, 475; 
Council Directive 68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the 
Community for workers of Member States and their families [1968] OJ English special edition, 485. 
These were supplemented by Regulation (EEC) No 1251/70 on the right of workers to remain in the 
territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, OJ English special edition: Series 
I Chapter 1970 (II), 402. 
24 Council Directive 73/148/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the 
Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services, 
[1973] OJ L172/14; Council Directive 75/34/EEC concerning the right of nationals of a Member State 
to remain in the territory of another Member State after having pursued therein an activity in a self-
employed capacity, [1975] OJ L14/10. 
25 ibid. 
26 In Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377, para 16, the Court of Justice 
held that the free provision of services implies the freedom for the recipient of services to travel to 
another Member State in order to receive services there, whether they be tourists, persons receiving 
medical treatment, or those travelling for business or educational purposes.   
27 Guild, n 6, 86. 
28 Patrick Dollat, La Citoyenneté Européenne: Théorie et Statuts (Bruylant 2008) 63.  
29 Michele Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’ in Shaw and More (eds) New Legal Dynamics of 
European Union (Clarendon Press 1995) 73-90; See further Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘The Resilience of 
EU Market Citizenship’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1597–1628. 
30 Maas, 15, 1020. 
31 Ferdinand Wollenschläger, ‘Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for Integration Beyond the Market’ 
(EUSA Eleventh Biennial International Conference, Los Angeles, 23-25 April 2009), 5-7 
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Free movement has therefore been considered as ‘the bedrock upon which the 
entire construction of European rights has been built’.32 Besides being a vehicle 
for economic integration,33 free movement also encouraged social and cultural 
exchanges that engendered feelings of an ‘incipient common European 
identity’.34 Together with the Treaty prohibition on discrimination on grounds 
of nationality,35 free movement provided the basis on which a ‘nascent’ 
European citizenship could be constructed.36   
 Following a period of political inactivity that hampered efforts37 to fulfil 
Community objectives including the freedom to provide services,38 the Single 
                                                  
<http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/wollenschl%C3%A4ger_05E.pdf> accessed 11 June 
2015 
32 Willem Maas, ‘Migrants, states, and EU citizenship’s unfulfilled promise’ (2008) 12 Citizenship 
Studies, 583-596, 583. 
33 See further Ettore Recchi, ‘Cross-State Mobility in the EU: Trends, puzzles and consequences’ (2008) 
10 European Societies, 197-224, 213-216 who provides a useful analysis of the economic arguments in 
favour of the free movement of people and the empirical evidence that might support it.  
34 Mass, n 32, 584. See also Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans and Vicki Squire, ‘Acts of European 
Citizenship: A Political Sociology of Mobility’ (2010) 48 Journal of Common Market Studies, 945–965, 
947. For a view to the contrary, see Richard Bellamy ‘Evaluating Union Citizenship: Belonging, Rights 
and Participation within the EU’ (2008) 12 Citizenship Studies, 597-611, 598. 
35 Article 18 TFEU. 
36 Espen Olsen, ‘The Origins of European Citizenship in the First Two Decades of European Integration’ 
(2008) 15 Journal of European Public Policy 40-57.   
37 It was during this time that the Commission issue its first proposal on the creation of European 
citizenship and its first proposal for a directive on the right of residence that extended beyond the 
‘market citizen’: ‘Towards European Citizenship’, Report from the Commission to the Council, COM(75) 
321 and Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Rights of Residence for Nationals of Member 
States in the Territory of another Member State, COM(79) 215; see further Andrew Evans, ‘European 
Citizenship’(1982) 45 Modern Law Review 497-515, 502, who notes that ‘while the Treaty authors 
apparently approached free movement merely as a means of ensuring that national immigration 
barriers would not prevent Community nationals moving to those areas of the Community where they 
were most in demand, the Community institutions saw this freedom as a basis for European citizenship’. 
For an overview of developments on the concept of European citizenship prior to the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty, see Weiss and Wooldridge (n 15) 164-168; see also Robin White,  Workers, 
Establishment, and Services in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2004) 121-122. 
38 See for example, Commission, ‘Completing the Internal Market - White Paper from the Commission 
to the Council’ COM(85) 310, para 6. The White Paper identified the physical, technical and fiscal 
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European Act39 sought to reinvigorate the EEC40 and called for the progressive 
establishment of the internal market by 31 December 1992.41 In the run-up to 
the launch of the single market, the EU institutions adopted a series of directives 
that extended free movement rights beyond ‘market citizens’ for the benefit of 
retired persons in receipt of a pension,42 economically inactive persons43 and 
students.44    
 Against this backdrop, the creation of EU citizenship by the Maastricht 
Treaty45 and the general right of free movement which it engendered46 was 
initially described as a ‘catalogue of already existing rights’.47 This meant that 
‘[i]n practical terms and notwithstanding the direct effect of Article 8a of the EC 
                                                  
barriers which prevented the realisation of the common market. As regards barriers to the free 
movement of individuals, see paras 47-56 and 88-94.  
39 The Single European Act [1987] OJ L 169/1. 
40 Paul Craig (n 10) 18-20. 
41 Article 13 SEA, which introduced a new Article 8a into the EEC Treaty.  
42 Council Directive 90/365/EEC on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons 
who have ceased their occupational activity [1990] OJ L180/28.  
43 Council Directive 90/364/EEC on the right of residence [1990] OJ L180/26. 
44 Council Directive 90/366/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for students [1990] OJ 
L180/32, which was struck down by the Court of Justice for having been adopted on an incorrect legal 
basis in Case C-295/90 European Parliament v Council [1992] ECR I-4193, para 20. The directive 
should have been adopted by the Council and the European Parliament under the cooperation 
procedure rather than the consultation procedure, ibid para 4. The directive was replaced by Council 
Directive 93/96/EEC on the right of residence for students [1993] OJ L317/59. 
45 Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C 191/1 (hereafter the Maastricht Treaty). Article G(C) inserted 
new Articles 8 and 8a-8e into the Treaty Establishing the European Community (hereafter EC Treaty), 
ibid, 7. 
46 EC Treaty [1992] OJ C 224/6, Article 8a EC. 
47 Maarten Vink, ‘Limits of European Citizenship: European Integration and Domestic Immigration 
Policies’ (2003) Constitutionalism Webpapers No 4/2003 <https://www.wiso.uni-
hamburg.de/fileadmin/sowi/politik/governance/ConWeb_Papers/conweb4-2003.pdf> accessed 6 
June 2015. See also Robert Kovar and Denys Simon, ‘La citoyenneté européenne’ (1993) 29 Cahier de 
droit européen, 285-315, 287. Dimitry Kochenov and Richard Plender, ‘EU Citizenship: from an 
Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text’ (2012) 37 European Law 
Review, 369-396, 372-373.  
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Treaty48 nationals of the Member States enjoyed no greater migration rights on 
1 November 1993 than they enjoyed the previous day’.49 As a result, many 
scholars have dismissed the creation of the concept of Union citizenship by the 
Maastricht Treaty as ‘unbalanced, incomplete and ambiguous’,50 a ‘citizenship 
with little substance’,51 and branding it as a form of ‘citizenship-lite’.52,53 
 Nonetheless, EU citizenship was intended to be ‘a dynamic and evolving 
concept’.54  As a result, others have observed that ‘[t]he importance of the TEU 
citizenship provisions lies not in their content but rather in the promise they 
hold out for the future. The concept is a dynamic one, capable of being added to 
or strengthened, but not diminished’.55 The advent of Union Citizenship 
therefore marked a new phase in the evolution of the free movement of persons, 
which saw the Court of Justice play an active role in extending free movement 
                                                  
48 Now Article 21 TFEU.  
49 Stephen Hall, Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the Union (Nijhoff 1995) 8.  
50 Claude Blumann, ‘Citoyenneté européenne et champ d'application personnel du droit 
communautaire’ (2003/2004) Revue des affaires européennes, 73-82, 78-79.   
51 Willem Maas, ‘Unrespected, Unequal, Hollow: Contingent Citizenship and Reversible Rights in the 
European Union’ (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European Law, 265-280, 277.   
52 See for example, Richard Rose, Representing Europeans: A Pragmatic Approach (Oxford University 
Press,2013), 68-69. The term appears first to have been coined by Jo Shaw, ‘Citizenship: Contrasting 
Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism’ (2010) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 
2010/60, 1. 
53 For references to other scholars who shared the view that EU citizenship was ‘purely decorative and 
symbolic’, see Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship Writing the Future’ (2007) 13 
European Law Journal, 623-646, 647.   
54 Spanish Delegation to the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, ‘European Citizenship’ 
21 February 1991, containing annexed Memorandum ‘Towards a European Citizenship’, 24 September 
1990, Council Document SN 3940/90, 2. 
55 David O’Keeffe, ‘Union Citizenship’ in David O’Keeffe  and Patrick Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the 
Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law 1994) 87-108, 106; see also Hall (n  49) 10: ‘[t]he real importance of 
the Union Treaty in the area of migration rights, however lies in what it might presage.’ 
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and equal treatment rights to non-economically active citizens.56,57 The turning 
point came ‘with the Court’s judgment in Martínez Sala,58 in which the 
application of Article 21 TFEU made a distinct legal difference’59 which ushered 
in a new era of ‘social citizenship’.60,61   
                                                  
56 It was the Court’s ruling in Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691 heralded the start of this 
new phase; see to that effect Sybilla Fries and Jo Shaw, ‘Citizenship of the Union: First Steps in the 
European Court of Justice’ (1998) 4 European Public Law 533-559; Catherine Jacqueson, ‘Union 
Citizenship and the Court of Justice: Something New under the Sun? Towards Social Citizenship’ 
(2002) 27 European Law Review, 260-281.  
57 For a review of these developments, see for example, James D. Mather, ‘The Court of Justice and the 
Union Citizen’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal, 722-743; Matthew Elmore and Peter Starup, ‘Union 
Citizenship – Background, Jurisprudence, and Perspective: the Past, Present, and Future of Law and 
Policy’, (2007) 26 Yearbook of European Law, 57-113, 77-95; Peter Van Elsuwege and Dimitry 
Kochenov, ‘On The Limits of Judicial Intervention: EU Citizenship and Family Reunification Rights’ 
(2011) 13 European Journal of Migration and Law 443-466; Ferdinand Wollenschläger, ‘The Judiciary, 
the Legislature and the Evolution of Union Citizenship’ in Phil Syrpis (ed), The Judiciary, The 
Legislature and the EU Internal Market, (Cambridge University Press 2012) 302-330. 
58 Case C-85/96 (n 56). 
59 Niamh Nic Shuibnhe, ‘The Third Age of EU citizenship’ in Syrpis (n 57) 331-362.  
60 Jo Shaw, ‘The Interpretation of European Union Citizenship’, (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 293-
337; Jo Shaw, ‘Citizenship of the Union: Towards Post National Membership?’ in Academy of European 
Law (ed.), Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, vol VI(1) (Kluwer 1998) 237-347; see 
further Dollat (n 28) 365-420; Sandrine Maillard, L’émergence de la citoyenneté sociale européenne 
(Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille 2008); Tina Oršolić Dalessio, ‘The Social Dimension of EU 
Citizenship – A Castle in the Air or Construction Gone Wrong?’ (2013) German Law Journal, 869-888. 
61 However, for Maas and Plender (n 47) 371: ‘the continuity of pre-Maastricht citizenship law was only 
broken … when Rottmann was decided and a new non-market rights-based paradigm of EU citizenship 
law emerged’; see further Dimitry Kochenov ‘A real European Citizenship. A new jurisdiction test’ (2011) 
18 Columbia Journal of European Law, 55-109. Traditionally it has been the movement across a border 
that was seen as activating EU citizenship rights: Guild (n 6) 68-81; Bellamy (n 34) 598; Tiziana De 
Pasquale, ‘Problemi interpretativi della nozione giuridica di cittadinanza: un concetto “europeizzato” di 
diritto pubblico interno? La controversa relazione tra cittadinanza dell'Unione europea e cittadinanze 
nazionali degli Stati Membri’ (2012) 22 Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario, 445-479, 456-
459; Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, PG Macioti and Vicki Squire, ‘Mobility Interrogating Free 
Movement: Roma Acts of European Citizenship’ in Engin Isin and Michael Saward (eds), Enacting 
European Citizenship (Cambridge University Press 2013) 132-154, 133. However, recent developments 
in the case law of the Court of Justice suggest that in certain circumstances free movement is no longer 
a pre-condition for claiming the benefit of EU citizenship rights, see for example Case 135/08 Rottman 
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Despite some earlier setbacks,62 EU citizenship also emboldened the 
Commission to challenge national administrative formalities that constituted 
barriers to the free movement of persons before the Court of Justice.63  
The concept of EU citizenship has also acted as a catalyst for endowing 
Europe’s citizens with additional rights of free movement through the adoption 
of Directive 2004/38, for example, by creating a new general right of permanent 
                                                  
[2010] ECR I-1449 (Member States are under an obligation to ensure a decision to withdraw citizenship 
observes the principle of proportionality); Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177 (Member 
States may not refuse to grant a right of residence to the non-EU parents of EU children living in their 
home country where a refusal to do so would deprive those children of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights attaching to the status of EU citizenship). See further, Nathan Cambien, ‘Union 
Citizenship and Immigration: Rethinking the Classics?’ (2012) 5 European Journal of Legal Studies 8-
31; Niamh Nic Shuibnhe, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law, (Oxford University Press 2014) 
130-156. 
62 Case C-321/87 Commission v Belgium [1989] ECR I-997 (Commission failed to prove systematic 
nature of Belgian border control measures). 
63 See for example, C-68/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR I-2637 (Member States cannot 
oblige nationals of other Member States to answer questions about the nature and duration of their stay 
as a condition for entry onto their territory); C-157/03 Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I-2911 
(Member States cannot require family members of EU citizens to obtain a long-stay family reunification 
visa as a pre-condition to obtain a residence card; Member States must issue residence cards with six-
month deadline imposed by directive); Case C-503/03 Commission v Spain [2006] ECR I-1097 
(Member States cannot deny entry to the non-EU family member of an EU citizen or refuse to issue 
them a visa on the sole basis that the family member has an alert issued against them on the Schengen 
Information System without first verifying if the person represents a genuine, present and sufficiently 
serious threat to public policy or public order); C-408/03 Commission v Belgium [2006] ECR I-2647 
(Member States cannot impose limitation on the origin of a student’s resources and must accept a 
declaration from the student as sufficient proof of possessing such resources); C-398/06 Commission 
v Netherlands [2008] ECR I-56 (Member States cannot require non-economically active citizens to 
demonstrate they possess sufficient resources to cover their needs for a stay of at least a year's duration). 
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residence64 without any integration conditions attached.65 The adoption of the 
Free Movement Directive has therefore been heralded as marking a third phase 
in the evolution of free movement in the EU.66  
Taken together, both legislative and judicial developments in respect of 
the  free movement of persons could be characterised as a ‘negative’ form of 
European integration in that they have demanded compliance with EU law in a 
way which ‘reduces the range of national policy choices and represents a 
fundamental loss of political control’.67 The EU’s action in this field limits the 
discretion of the Member States to control access of non-nationals to their 
territory and therefore creates tensions between EU free movement rules and 
national legislation seeking to regulate immigration.68 
                                                  
64 Directive 2004/38, arts 16-18. See for example, Ferdinand Wollenschläger, ‘A New Fundamental 
Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic 
Paradigm of European Integration’ [2011] 17 European Law Review, 1-34, 19, this represents ‘a 
substantial innovation of the new residence directive’. Note that art 17 is based on the right of permanent 
residence that was granted to workers and the self employed under Regulation 1251/70 (n 23), art 3(2), 
and Directive 75/34 (n 24), art 3(2). 
65 Guild (n 6) 93: ‘The right to remain completely un-acculturated or un-assimilated is so central to the 
process of EU citizenship that it becomes transformed into a discourse of strength in diversity’ 
66 Nic Shuibnhe (n 59) 333.   
67 Maarten Vink, ‘Negative and Positive Integration in European Immigration Policies’, (2002) 6 
European Integration Online Papers No 13, 2 <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2002-013.pdf> accessed on 
6 June 2015. Compare for example, Oliver Treib, ‘Implementing and Complying with EU Governance 
Outputs’, (2014) 9(1) Living Reviews in European Governance, 16 <http://www.europeangovernance-
livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2014-1/> accessed on 2 June 2015, who considers that legislation 
generally belongs to the realm of positive integration ‘where the EU defines certain policy goals or 
standards that 
member states are required to implement’.   
68 Robin White ‘Conflicting Competences: Free Movement Rules and Immigration Laws’ (2004) 29 
European Law Review, 385-396; Steve Peers, ‘Free Movement, Immigration Control and constitutional 
conflict (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review, 173-196; Jo Shaw and Nina Miller, ‘When Legal 
Worlds Collide: An Exploration of What Happens When EU Free Movement Law Meets UK 
Immigration Law’ (2012) 38 European Law Review, 137-166. 
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Contrary to public perceptions,69 the right of free movement is not 
unconditional.70 Prior to attaining permanent residence, EU citizens who do not 
work are required to possess independent resources so as not to become an 
unreasonable burden on social assistance in their country of residence.71 This 
has been considered as an example of how EU citizenship ‘re-affirms the linkage 
between belonging, rights and participation within the member states’72 and 
how EU law provides sufficient protections against ‘benefits tourism’.73 
Since the entry into force of the Free Movement Directive that coincided 
with enlargement of the EU, it has become apparent that the Member States 
have been enforcing these conditions with much more vigour74 by taking 
advantage of ambiguities in their national implementing measures75 or 
                                                  
69 Simone Veil, ‘Report by the High Level Panel on the free movement of persons’, 18 March 1997, C4-
0181/97, 89 concludes that ‘in the minds of European citizens, free movement conjures up an idea which 
goes well beyond the rights actually conferred by the Treaty. For many people, it suggests a right to 
move to and live in the countries of the Union without having to comply with any particular formalities, 
which is not in fact the case.’;  Xavier Le Den and Janne Sylvest, ‘Understanding Citizens' and 
Businesses' Concerns with the Single Market: a View from the Assistance Services’, (Report for 
Commission, Ramboll 2011) 8, 10, 26-28  
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/20concerns/feedback_report_en.pdf> accessed 
on 26 May 2015, which gives further examples of this ‘expectation gap’ in which citizens’ perceptions of 
what their EU rights should be does not match the existing EU legal framework. 
70 Bellamy (n 34) 598. 
71 Directive 2004/38, art 7(1)(b) and (c), art 14(2) and recital (10). 
72 Bellamy (n 34) 598. 
73 Francis Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the EU - A Legal Analysis’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal, 591-610, 
596. 
74 See for example, Sergio Carrera and Anaïs Faure Atger, ‘Implementation of Directive 2004/38 in the 
context of EU Enlargement A proliferation of different forms of citizenship?’ (2009) CEPS Special 
Report, 8-10: ‘Not only do Member States tend to apply a sufficient resources test to all citizens of the 
Union whether or not they are workers or self-employed, but they also tend to refuse registration 
certificates or family reunification on the basis of “insufficient resources.” ’ For a further examination 
of the administrative practice of the Belgian, British and Italian authorities in this connection, see 
Chapters 7, 8, and 9 respectively.  
75 European Parliament, ‘Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the 
application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’, (PE 418.397, European Parliament, 
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stretching the scope of permissible transitional restrictions affecting workers 
from the new Member States.76  Spurred by the financial crisis,77 popular 
resentment towards migrants78 has engendered a rise in political hostility 
                                                  
24 March 2009) (hereafter the Vălean Report), in which it is observed that ‘the interpretation by 
Member States of “sufficient resources” under Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC is often unclear, 
as most Member States require that evidence of sufficient resources be given; the notion of 
“unreasonable burden to the social assistance system of the host Member State” and if and in what cases 
the decision to expel a Union citizen who has become an unreasonable burden (Article 14, recital 10) is 
in many Member States uncertain as well.’ 
76 Samantha Currie, ‘“Free” movers? The post-accession experience of accession-8 migrant workers in 
the UK’ (2006) 31 European Law Review 207-229, 218-219: ‘The United Kingdom has, however, in 
addition to the [Worker Registration Scheme] put in place restrictions which aim to counteract the 
alleged threat posed by “benefit tourists” from the A8. Indeed, the United Kingdom purports to be acting 
in accordance with the transitional arrangements; the explanatory note to the [Worker Registration 
Regulations states that: “The existing Member States can derogate from the Community free movement 
rights of workers during the transitional period. This suggests the transitional arrangements permit 
wide derogation from the free movement acquis when, in actual fact, the Member States can derogate 
only from the provisions of EU law that provide for access to employment for EU workers, and for the 
family members of such workers. Once access has been granted, an A8 migrant worker is in the same 
position as any other EU migrant worker and is entitled to a variety of social and family rights that 
attach to the status of worker under Community law and operate on the basis of equal treatment.’ 
77 Espen Olsen, ‘European Citizenship: Towards Renationalization or Cosmopolitan Europe?’ in Elspeth 
Guild, Cristina Gortázar Rotaeche and Dora Kostakopoulo, The Reconceptualization of European 
Union Citizenship (Brill/Nijhoff 2014) 343-360, 351: ‘The EU is currently undergoing an institutional 
and financial crisis which may well lead to increased conflict and contestation on basic principles of 
integration, such as those linked to free movement and citizenship.’  See also Raúl Trujillo Herrera, 
‘Free Movement of Workers in Times of Crisis. Some Observations’ in Silveira, Alessandra, Canotilho, 
Mariana and Madeira Froufe, Pedro (eds), Citizenship and Solidarity in the European Union (Peter 
Lang 2014) 117-124, 121: ‘the Commission is aware of decisions taken here and there by different 
Member States in the light of the crisis, decisions susceptible to have negative effects on EU nationals 
willing to move to work in another Member State … or envisaging possible restrictions as regards access 
to social benefits … [which] can eventually be [the] subject of infringement procedures.’ 
78 Thomas Turner and Christine Cross, ‘Do Attitudes to Immigrants Change in Hard Times? Ireland in 
a European Context’ (2015) 17 European Societies, 372-379: ‘mean scores for those who believed that 
immigrants are bad for the economy increased in the 12 countries between 2002 and 2010. … Overall, 
negative attitudes to the impact of immigrants on the economy increased more strongly than positive 
attitudes between 2002 and 2010 across all 12 countries.’ Their findings are based on results of the 
European Social Survey, a biennial multi-country survey covering over 20 nations. The 12 countries 
analysed were Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, UK, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, France, 
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towards the very idea of free movement79 sometimes encouraged by unflattering 
media reports.80 Indeed, the free movement of persons appears to have become 
                                                  
Portugal and Sweden. See also, Dimiter Toshkov and Elitsa Kortensk, ‘Does immigration undermine 
public support for integration in the European Union?’ (2015) 53 Journal of Common Market Studies, 
910-925, 922: ‘immigration has indeed undermined public support for integration. In [Spain, France, 
Ireland and The Netherlands], aggregate support for the European constitution is negatively associated 
with the number of [Central and Eastern European] immigrants present in the region’. As regards the 
UK, see ‘Immigration and Euroscepticism: the rising storm’, The Guardian (London, 18 December 
2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/dec/18/immigration-euroscepticism-
rising-storm-eu-referendum> accessed 18 December 2015. 
79 See previous section; see also ‘Editorial Comments: Free Movement of Persons: Salvaging the Dream 
and Explaining the Nightmare (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review, 729-739, 730-731: ‘It would 
have been difficult these last months to pick up a newspaper without reading of opposition to the free 
movement of persons. The United Kingdom Government has been vocal, for example, about the need 
to limit free movement within the European Union … In Germany, the debate has centred on the issue 
of access to social benefits, specifically the limits to such access for job-seekers and Union citizens who 
are economically inactive … In Belgium, a dramatic increase in the expulsion of Spanish nationals … 
has been justified with reference to the excessive burden they were imposing on the Belgian social 
security system. Switzerland has now voted in favour of the introduction of a cap to immigration from 
the European Union. The debate on free movement is thus not restricted to one Member State and 
cannot be explained glibly with reference to any one State’s domestic, political scene or the power of its 
popular press.’ See also Anthony Valcke, ‘EU Free Movement Rules Come Under Challenge’, Europe 
Update Issue 10, American Bar Association Section of International Law, November 2014, 15-17.  
80 William Allen and Scott Blinder, ‘Migration in the News: Portrayals of Immigrants, Migrants, Asylum 
Seekers and Refugees in National British Newspapers, 2010 to 2012’ (2013) Migration Observatory 
report, COMPAS, University of Oxford; Scott Blinder and William Allen, ‘Constructing Immigrants: 
Portrayals of Migrant Groups in British National Newspapers, 2010–2012’ (2016) 50 International 
Migration Review (forthcoming).   
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the key issue81 in the UK’s proposed referendum on continued membership of 
the EU.82 
This anxiety has not gone unnoticed by the Judges in Luxembourg.83 The 
recent rulings of the Court of Justice in Dano84 and Alimanovic85 would suggest 
a hardening of the Court’s case law in respect of the free movement rights not 
only as regards economically inactive citizens86 but also formerly employed 
workers.87 These two judgments could be considered as the latest in a number 
                                                  
81 ‘EU referendum: polling reveals freedom of movement most contentious issue’, The Guardian 
(London, 9 October 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/oct/09/eu-
referendum-polling-reveals-freedom-of-movement-most-contentious-issue> accessed 9 October 2015, 
which reports that ‘[n]early six in ten Britons believe freedom of movement should be restricted, and a 
further 14% think that there should be no free movement of people between different EU countries at 
all, according to the analysis. Only 16% of the British public believe freedom of movement should be 
kept in its current form or that there should no controls at all.’ 
82 The European Union Referendum Act 2015 received Royal Assent on 17 December 2015. The question 
‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?’ 
will be put to a referendum at a date to be later specified. 
83 Steve Peers, ‘Benefit Tourism by EU citizens: the CJEU just says No’, (EU Law Analysis, 11 November 
2014) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2014/11/benefit-tourism-by-eu-citizens-cjeu.html> accessed 
on 15 June 2015; Géraldine Renaudière, ‘Free movement and social benefits for economically inactive 
EU citizens: The Dano judgment in historical context’, (EU Law Analysis, 12 November 2014) 
<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/free-movement-and-social-benefits-for.html> 
accessed on 15 June 2015. 
84 Case C-333/13 Dano [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358 (judgment of 11 November 2014). 
85 C-67/14 Alimanovic [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:597 (judgment of 15 September 2015). 
86 Daniel Thym, ‘The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and Social Benefits for 
Economically Inactive Union Citizens’ (2015) 52, Common Market Law Review 17-50; Herwig 
Verschueren, ‘Preventing “Benefit Tourism” in the EU: A Narrow or Broad Interpretation of the 
Possibilities Offered by the ECJ in Dano?’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review, 363-390. 
87 Steve Peers, ‘EU citizens’ access to benefits: the CJEU clarifies the position of former workers’ (EU 
Law Analysis, 15 September 2015) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/eu-citizens-access-
to-benefits-cjeu.html> accessed 21 December 2015; Sion Kramer, ‘Had they only worked one month 
longer! An Analysis of the Alimanovic Case [2015] C-67/14’ (European Law, 29 September 2015) 
<http://europeanlawblog.eu/?tag=c-6714-alimanovic> accessed 21 December 2015; Maria Haag, 
‘C‐67/14 Alimanovic: the not so fundamental status of Union citizenship?’ (Durham European Law 
Institute law blog, 29 September 2015) <https://delilawblog.wordpress.com/2015/09/29/maria-
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of recent cases where the Court has been granting greater latitude to Member 
States to restrict the ability of EU citizens to enjoy equal treatment, thereby 
prolonging the shift in its case law that was first initiated in the context of 
frontier workers and students.88  Could this judgment mark a fourth retrograde 
phase in the development of free movement in the EU?89  
There is a real risk that Member States take advantage of these rulings to 
impose new restrictions on the free movement of citizens.90 As one eminent 
scholar has warned:91 
‘No doubt, under the pressure of public opinion, popular press and 
Eurosceptics, some Member States will interpret and apply the 
possibilities offered by the wording of the judgment in Dano as broadly 
as possible. Such a broad interpretation does not only threatens to 
undermine the acquis of more than 50 years of social security 
coordination in the EU, but also threatens to throw us back to the era 




21 December 2015. 
88 Síofra O’Leary, ‘The curious case of frontier workers and study finance: Giersch’ (2014) 51 Common 
Market Law Review, 601-622, commenting on Case C-20/12, Giersch [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:411 
(judgment of 20 June 2013). See further, Alexander Hoogenboom, ‘Mobility of Students and the 
Financial Sustainability of Higher Education Systems in the EU: A Union of Harmony or Irreconcilable 
Differences?’ (2013) 9 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, 15-59; François Moyse, ‘La Libre 
Circulation des Étudiants : Les Bourses d’Études’ in Jean-Yves Carlier and Cédric Chenevière (eds), ‘La 
Libre Circulation des Travailleurs et des Citoyens’ (2013) CeDIE Working Papers 2013/7, 12-20. 
89 See to this effect, Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Earned citizenship – understanding Union citizenship through 
its scope’ in Dimitry Kochenov (ed) EU Citizenship and Federalism: the Role of Rights (Cambridge 
University Press 2015) (forthcoming): ‘The reactionary phase – which we are witnessing at present – is 
characterised by an apparent retreat from the Court’s original vision of citizenship in favour of a 
minimalist interpretation, which reaffirms the centrality of the national link of belonging, positing the 
responsibility for the most vulnerable individuals in society firmly with the state of origin.’ 
90 See to this effect, Michael Blauberger and Susanne Schmidt, ‘Welfare migration? Free movement of 
EU citizens and access to social benefits’ (2014) 1 Research and Politics, 1-7. 
91 Verschueren (n 87) 388. 
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In light of the potential further degradation of the free movement rights 
of citizens,92 it becomes all the more important that national implementation of 
Directive 2004/38 is effectively monitored so that appropriate remedial action 
can be taken by the EU institutions. It is in this vein that this study will explore 
whether a framework can be developed to capture implementation of the 
Directive in all its guises – be it transposition, application or enforcement. 
2.2 Free Movement of Persons under Challenge   
Directive 2004/38 on residence rights is the most important legislative 
instrument governing the free movement of people within the European Union. 
It seeks to give further expression to no less than six Treaty articles93 that cover 
EU Citizenship, the free movement of persons and workers, the freedom of 
establishment and the provision of services, as well as the prohibition of 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. It also gives substance to the 
fundamental right to free movement guaranteed by Article 45 of the EU 
Charter.94 The Directive is without doubt one of the key legal instruments of the 
Single Market and goes to the heart of what is regarded as the most cherished 
right of EU citizens.95 
                                                  
92 Hansen (n 99). 
93 Namely Articles 18 TFEU (non-discrimination on grounds of nationality), 20 TFEU (Union 
citizenship), 21 TFEU (free movement of persons), 45 TFEU (free movement of workers), 49 TFEU 
(freedom of establishment) and 56 TFEU (free provision of services). For the sake of completeness, it 
should also be mentioned that Article 3(2) TEU provides that ‘[t]he Union shall offer its citizens an area 
of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is 
ensured’.  
94 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (as adapted by the Treaty of Lisbon) [2007] 
OJ C 303/1. 
95 Commission, ‘European Commission upholds free movement of people’, Press release 
MEMO/13/1041, 25 November 2013, citing Standard Eurobarometer 79, Spring 2013; Eurobarometer 
83, Report on European Citizenship, Spring 2015, 4: ‘For the first time since the Standard 
Eurobarometer survey of spring 2012 (EB77), “the free movement of people, goods and services within 
the EU” has returned to the top of the list of the EU’s most positive results (57%, +2 percentage points 
since autumn 2014), ahead of “peace among Member States of the EU” (55%, -1) which was ranked in 
first place in autumn 2014.’ 
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Yet recent events would suggest the Directive’s integrity is far from 
assured. The legal framework of the Directive that governs the free movement 
of persons has come under challenge in the actions and pronouncements of 
senior governing officials in several Member States. In 2013, ministers in 
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK wrote to the Irish Presidency of 
the European Council on the matter of free movement of persons within the 
Union.96 The tone of the letter appeared to call into question the very idea of the 
free movement of persons97 and seemed to suggest the Directive’s safeguards 
against ‘benefits tourism’ were insufficient.98 However, in their letter, the 
                                                  
Spring 2013:  ‘Freedom of movement is the most cherished right of EU citizenship: for 56% of European 
citizens, free movement is the most positive achievement of the European Union.’  
96 In April 2013, the Ministers of four EU Member States - the UK, Austria, Germany and the 
Netherlands - wrote to the Irish Presidency of the European Council on the matter of free movement of 
persons within the Union. The letter specifically criticised the existing legal framework of Directive 
2004/38 as regards expulsions and re-entry bans. It also concerned the issue of “benefits tourism”, 
namely the abuse of national welfare systems by EU citizens who move around the EU, and raised 
concerns of fraud, including marriages of convenience. The measures proposed by the quartet included 
curtailing the right of newly arrived migrants to claim benefits and introducing bans on re-entry for 
those found to be abusing or defrauding the system: <http://docs.dpaq.de/3604-
130415_letter_to_presidency_final_1_2.pdf> accessed 15 June 2015. The letter was subsequently 
followed by a personal call by David Cameron to impose further restrictions on the free movement of 
persons, see ‘Free movement within Europe needs to be less free’, Financial Times (London, 26 
November 2013) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/add36222-56be-11e3-ab12-00144feabdc0.html> 
accessed 15 June 2015. 
97 Yves Pascouau, ‘Strong attack against the freedom of movement of EU citizens: turning back the 
clock’, European Policy Centre Commentary (30 April 2013): 
<http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_3491_strong_attack_against_the_freedom_of_move
ment_of_eu_citizens.pdf> accessed 1 June 2015. 
98 Articles 24(2) and 14 of the EU’s Directive on free movement already respectively provide for a ban 
on newly-arrived inactive migrants claiming social assistance in the first three months of their arrival 
and for as long as they might be looking for work and allows a Member State to expel inactive EU citizens 
who become an unreasonable burden on the host country’s social assistance system. 
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quartet offered no concrete evidence to back up the claims of systemic abuse 
and fraud which would justify the specific measures that it advocated.99  
This letter came amid troubling developments that have manifested 
themselves in recent years in connection with the free movement of persons. 
Since the Directive entered into force in 2006, Belgium,100 Germany101 and the 
UK102 among others have all adopted questionable policies in respect of EU 
migrants seeking to access benefits.  
                                                  
99 For an overview of reactions by EU officials, see for example, Peo Hansen, ‘Undermining Free 
Movement – Migration in an Age of Austerity’ (Eurozine, 6 February 2015) 
<http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2015-02-06-hansenp-en.html> accessed 15 June 2015. 
100 The Belgian authorities are reported to have developed a database that tracks social security claims 
by EU citizens and this information is then used by the Belgian Immigraion Office to verify the 
residencerights of claimants on a systematic basis, see for example ‘Libre circulation des citoyens 
européens: du mauvais usage par la Belgique de ses banques de données sociales’, La Libre Belgique 
(Brussels, 5 February 2015). 
101 Germany has amended the rules that give effect to the Directive, namely the Act on Freedom of 
Movement/EU of 30 July 2004 (Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizügigkeit von Unionsbürgern 
(Freizügigkeitsgesetz/EU - FreizügG/EU) vom 30. Juli 2004 (BGBl. I S. 1950, 1986)), in order to allow 
for the expulsion and imposition of a re-entry ban on EU citizens and their family members who 
repeatedly pretend they meet the conditions for entry and residence in Germany. The Law Amending 
the Act on the Freedom of Movement/EU and Other Regulations of 2 December 2014 (Gesetz zur 
Änderung des Freizügigkeitsgesetzes/EU und weiterer Vorschriften vom 2. Dezember 2014 (BGBl. I 
S. 1922)).  
102 The UK has tightened the rules on access to benefits by EU migrants by modifying the Immigration 
(European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1003), which transpose the Directive in the UK. 
See for example Department for Work and Pensions, ‘Improved benefit test for migrants launched’, 
Press release, 13 December 2013 <www.gov.uk/government/news/improved-benefit-test-for-
migrants-launched> accessed 22 December 2015; ibid, ‘New rules have been introduced to restrict 
migrants’ access to benefits’, Touchbase Newsletter, January 2014, 4 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270302/Touchbase_Jan1
4.pdf> accessed 22 December 2015; ibid, ‘Minimum earnings threshold for EEA migrants introduced’, 
Press release, 21 February 2014 <www.gov.uk/government/news/minimum-earnings-threshold-for-
eea-migrants-introduced> accessed 22 December 2015; ibid, ‘EU jobseekers barred from claiming 
Universal Credit’, Press release, 9 March 2015 <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/eu-jobseekers-
barred-from-claiming-universal-credit> accessed 22 December 2015. The changes are contained in the 
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The expulsions of Roma from France103 and Italy104 has raised concerns 
about those countries’ respect for the procedural safeguards that are intended 
to protect EU citizens under the Directive. In 2011, the Danish government 
made a short-lived attempt to reinstate border checks at its borders with the 
stated intention of addressing cross-border criminality and curbing benefits 
tourism.105  
More recently, the combination of the unprecedented refugee crisis and 
the recent terrorist attacks in Paris have led to the re-introduction of border 
                                                  
Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 201 (SI 2013/3032) and 
the Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/1451).   
103 See Commission Press Release, ‘European Commission assesses recent developments in France, 
discusses overall situation of the Roma and EU law on free movement of EU citizens’, IP/10/1027, 29 
September 2010; Sergio Carrera and Anaïs Faure Atger, ‘L’Affaire des Roms: A Challenge to the EU’s 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2010) CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe, 
September 2010; Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera, ‘Introduction’ in Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera and 
Elspeth Guild, Foreigners, Refugees or Minorities? Rethinking People in the Context of Border 
Controls and Visas (Ashgate 2012) 1-20; Sergio Carrera, ‘Shifting Responsibilities for EU Roma 
Citizens: The 2010 French Affair on Roma Evictions and Expulsions Continued’ (2013) CEPS Papers in 
Liberty and Security in Europe No 55, June 2013; Jacqueline Gehring, ‘Roma and the Limits of Free 
Movement in the European Union’ in Maas (n 3) 143-174; Julia M. Markham-Cameron, ‘The EU and 
the Rights of the Roma: How Could the EU have Changed the French Repatriation Program of 2010?’ 
(Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union, 2013); Sergio Carrera, 
‘The Framing of the Roma as Abnormal EU Citizens’ in Guild, Gortázar Rotaeche and Kostakopoulo (n 
77) 33-63. 
104 See Bruno Nascimbene, ‘Rom, rumeni e bulgari: una diversa applicazione delle norme dell’Unione 
europea sulla libera circolazione?’ (2010) Corriere giuridico, 1545-1550; ibid, ‘La disputa sui Rom e i 
diritti dei cittadini dell’UE’ (2010) Istituto Affari Internazionali Documenti IAI 10-19; Kate Hepworth, 
‘Abject citizens: Italian “Nomad Emergencies” and the Deportability of Romanian Roma’ (2012) 16 
Citizenship Studies, 431-449; Aradau, Huysmans, Macioti and Squire, n 61.  
105 Agreement between the Danish People's Party and the Christian Democrats, ‘Permanent toldkontrol 
i Danmark (styrket grænsekontrol)’ (Permanent customs control in Denmark (strengthened border 
control)): 
<http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Pressemeddelelser/pdf/2011/permanen
t%20toldkontrol%20i%20danmark.pdf> accessed 14 December 2015; Commission Press Release, 
‘Statement by Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, on the announced permanent 
customs controls in Denmark’, MEMO/11/296, 13 May 2011. See further Olsen (n 77) 348-352. 
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controls in several Member States.106 Following calls from the Council,107 the 
current Commission’s proposal108 to amend the Schengen Border Code109 
proposes to impose enhanced security checks against EU citizens entering and 
leaving the Schengen zone.110 More worrying, are the reports that Member 
States are contemplating recourse to Article 26111 of the Schengen Border Code 
                                                  
106 Commission, ‘Member States’ notifications of the temporary reintroduction of border control at 
internal borders pursuant to Article 23 et seq. of the Schengen Borders Code’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control/docs/ms_notifications_-
_reintroduction_of_border_control_en.pdf> accessed 21 December 2015 
107 Conclusions of the Council of the EU and of the Member States meeting within the Council on 
Counter-Terrorism, Press release 848/15, 20 November 2015, which invited the Commission to 
"present a proposal for a targeted revision of the Schengen Borders Code to provide for systematic 
controls of EU nationals, including the verification of biometric information, against relevant databases 
at external borders of the Schengen area, making full use of technical solutions in order not to hamper 
the fluidity of movement". 
108 Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation No 562/2006 (EC) as regards the reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at 
external borders, COM(2015) 670 final. 
109 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code) [2006] OJ L 105/1. 
110 The proposal aims to amend Article 7 of the Schengen Borders Code by imposing enhanced security 
checks on EU citizens and their family members. This would require that, on entry to and exit from the 
Schengen zone, persons enjoying the right of free movement under EU law will be subject to checks on 
the Schengen Information System, the Interpol database and national databases on travel documents 
to verify their identity and nationality and the validity and authenticity of their travel document, as well 
as ensuring such persons are not considered to be a threat to public health or to the internal security, 
public policy or international relations of the Member States. 
111 Article 26(1) provides that:  
‘In exceptional circumstances where the overall functioning of the area without internal border 
control is put at risk as a result of persistent serious deficiencies relating to external border 
control as referred to in Article 19a, and insofar as those circumstances constitute a serious 
threat to public policy or internal security within the area without internal border control or 
within parts thereof, border control at internal borders may be reintroduced in accordance with 
paragraph 2 of this Article for a period of up to six months. That period may be prolonged, no 




to reinstate internal border controls for up to two years throughout the EU.112 
While these proposals – if adopted – will not lead the Directive to be amended, 
such developments are likely to affect how EU citizens exercise their rights 
under the Directive and how Member States restrict their free movement in 
practice. 
Furthermore, the British government’s calls for further limitations to be 
placed on EU migrants’ access to benefits as part of its strategy to renegotiate 
the terms of the UK’s membership of the EU113 in the run up to its proposed 
referendum114 strikes at the very heart of the Directive, besides also requiring 
Treaty change.115 
What has proved even more surprising is the reaction of Commission 
officials. Some Commissioners have made ambiguous statements about what 
the free movement of people should entail in practice.116 For the first time in 
                                                  
112 Steve Peers, ‘Leaked document reveals EU plans to suspend Schengen for two years’ (EU Law 
Analysis, 2 December 2015) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2015/12/exclusive-leaked-
document-reveals-eu.html>.  
113 Letter from David Cameron to Donald Tusk, ‘A new settlement for the United Kingdom in a reformed 
European Union’, 10 November 2015 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald_
Tusk_letter.pdf> accessed 22 December 2015. 
114 See n 82. 
115 Steve Peers, ‘Cameron's Chatham House speech: Full speed ahead for the renegotiation of the UK’s 
EU membership?’ (EU Law Analysis, 10 December 2015) 
<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2015/11/camerons-chatham-house-speech-full.html> accessed 22 
December 2015; ibid, ‘The nine labours of Cameron: Analysis of the plans to change EU free movement 
law’ (EU Law Analysis, 28 November 2014) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/the-nine-
labours-of-cameron-analysis-of.html> accessed 22 December 2015. For background, see for example, 
Jo Shaw, ‘Between Law and Political Truth? Member State Preferences, EU Free Movement Rules and 
National Immigration Law’ (2015) 17 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 247-286, 277-
284. 
116 In March 2015, Commission Vice-President Timmermans declared that ‘access to the labour market 
does not mean automatic access to social security systems. We will need to work with that with a number 
of Member states in the years to come’: Commission Press Release, ‘Transcript of Speech of First Vice-
President Timmermans to Policy Network, London: A Fresh Start’, Speech 15-4571, 6 March 2015. Such 
a statement is difficult to reconcile with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European 
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history, we are hearing calls at the highest levels in several EU countries for a 
rethink of one of the cornerstones of the EU’s Single Market.117 Against this 
background, an examination of the Directive is therefore both timely and 
topical.  
2.3 The Choice of Member States  
The research has been limited to a comparison of three Member States in 
order to allow for a comprehensive analysis of legislation, case law and 
statistical information whenever available.  
In making the choice of the three jurisdictions to compare, consideration 
was first given to Member States with significant absolute numbers of resident 
EU citizens, as this would help to ensure that the national administrative 
authorities have had significant experience in the application of the Directive 
and increase the likelihood that a substantial body of national case law exists.  
France, Italy, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom have the largest 
absolute numbers of EU citizens residing on their territory and broadly 
                                                  
Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union 
[2011] OJ L141/1, which guarantees migrant workers access to all social and tax advantages enjoyed by 
national workers, or even with the Court’s case law, see for example, Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 
Vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] ECR I-4585, para 32. A month later, the Commissioner for 
Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility, Marianne Thyssen, asserted that ‘we need to 
ensure that the rules reflect the changes in the economy and society and, as I said before, that they are 
seen as being fair by citizens and political leaders’: Commission Press Release, ‘Intervention of 
Commissioner Marianne Thyssen at 3rd Labour Mobility Congress’, Speech 15-4841 (23 April 2015). 
This appears to be echoing calls made by politicians in the UK for ‘fair movement not free movement’; 
see for instance ‘Nick Clegg to call for tighter controls on immigration from new EU states’, The 
Guardian, 4 August 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/aug/04/nick-clegg-tighter-
controls-immigration-new-eu-states>  accessed  9 October 2015. 
117 For a discussion of the political controversies generated by the EU free movement rules, see for 
example Christina Boswell and Andrew Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 190-195. See also Kees Groenendijk, ‘Forty Years of Free Movement of 
Workers: Has it been a Success and Why?’ in Paul Minderhoud and Nicos Trimikliniotis (eds) 
Rethinking the Free Movement of Workers: The European Challenges Ahead (Wolf Legal Publishers, 
2009), 11-23.   
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comparable levels of EU residents as a proportion of the total population.118 The 
limited linguistic abilities of the author prevented consideration being given to 
Germany or Spain, because it was felt important to be able to review the source 
material without relying on translations.119  
It was also considered appropriate to identify Member States which have 
resulted in similar transposition outcomes. In transposing the Free Movement 
Directive into national law, the national implementing measures adopted by 
Italy and the UK have achieved an average outcome in comparison with the 
other Member States.120  France was below average in terms of transposition 
outcomes but, unlike Italy and the UK, its implementation has not been called 
into question by the Commission opening formal infringement procedures.121 It 
was therefore felt that it would not be appropriate to select France because it 
                                                  
118 Eurostat, Migration and migrant population statistics <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics> accessed on 9 May 2015. In 
2014, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK had a resident EU population of 2.2%, 3.8%, 2.4%, 
4.3% and 4.1% respectively as a proportion of the total population. These correspond to 1.5m EU citizens 
living in France, 3.1m in Germany, 1.4m in Italy, 2m in Spain and 2.6m in the UK.  
119 Roberto Scarciglia, Introduzione al Diritto Pubblico Comparato (Il Mulino, 2006), 79: ‘Per 
comparare è importante conoscere la lingua’; Vivian Grosswald Curran, ‘Comparative Law and 
Language’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 675-707, 680: ‘for comparatists, knowing the 
languages of legal systems they study signifies access to all that the legal texts imply and connote, but 
do not state, to their infinity of links to the contexts that spawned them and that they also affect’. On 
the pitfalls of translation in comparative law, see Barbara Pozzo, ‘Comparative Law and Language’ in 
Mauro Bussani and Ugo Matei (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) 88-113. Some scholars appear to advocate more forcefully against the use of 
translation; see for example, Susan Millns, ‘European Comparative Legal Studies in Public Law’ in 
Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut (eds), The Method and Culture of Comparative Law (Hart 
Publishing 2014) 283-300, 296: ‘translation, particularly if carried out literally, will result in a poor 
understanding of complex legal phenomena which are known only to individuals systems.’  
120 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’, COM(2008) 840 final (hereafter 2008 




would be more difficult to obtain official information about the Commission’s 
enforcement efforts against France compared to the other two countries who 
faced such formal infringement procedures. The other Member States with 
comparable transposition outcomes to Italy and the UK include Belgium and 
Ireland122 whose source materials fall within the author’s linguistic capabilities.    
Belgium was ultimately chosen as the third Member State because it 
achieved a transposition outcome that was broadly similar to the British and 
Italian outcomes. It also has significant numbers of EU citizens living in the 
country123 and it presented many similarities with France in terms of the policy 
choices made in the implementation of the Directive.124 Ireland, on the other 
hand, has faced no formal infringement action for incorrect transposition and 
its EU population is relatively small by comparison.125  
Despite the average levels of transposition in Belgium, Italy and the UK, 
the Commission opened infringement procedures against all three Member 
States,126 although the case against Italy was subsequently closed following 
amendments made to its national implementing measures that transpose the 
                                                  
122 The other Member States whose transposition at the EU average include the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Romania, see 2008 Implementation Report (n 120), Annex. 
123 Eurostat, Migration and migrant population statistics (n 118). Belgium had a resident EU population 
of 824,000 in 2014, or 7.4% of the total population.  
124 France, like Belgium, enacted legislation to amend the country’s unitary law on immigration. The 
countries also shared similarities in their administrative application of the rules on residence. While 
judicial enforcement in France is entrusted to the administrative courts with two degrees of appeal, 
redress against administrative decisions in Belgium lies before a specialised tribunal with a single 
degree of appeal. However, both countries operate limited judicial review which does not allow the 
courts to remake administrative decisions. 
125 Eurostat, Migration and migrant population statistics (n 118). Ireland had 373,000 EU citizens 
residing in the country in 2014, which corresponds to 8.1% of the total population. 
126 Information from Commission dated 28 April 2015 (GestDem 2015/1535); see also ‘Free movement: 
Determined Commission action has helped resolve 90% of open free movement cases’, Press release 
IP/11/981 (25 August 2011); ‘Free movement: Commission asks the UK to uphold EU citizens' rights’ 
Press release IP/12/417 (26 April 2012); ‘February infringements package: main decisions (Free 




Directive into the Italian legal system.127 These three Member States therefore 
present comparable outcomes in transposition.  
Finally, it was also deemed necessary to ensure that the chosen Member 
States had availed themselves of a broad range of policy options in order to 
implement the Directive.  Italy and the UK have adopted a similar approach to 
transposition, by opting for ‘bolt-on’ legislation that is distinct from the main 
immigration legislation, using legislative powers delegated to the executive 
branch of government. On the contrary, Belgium has chosen to transpose the 
Directive through the parliamentary enactment of consolidating legislation that 
amends the unitary law governing the entry and residence of non-nationals on 
Belgian territory. In addition, the Member States differ in the degree to which 
they have made use of terminology that replicates the wording of the Directive.  
In terms of application, Belgium and Italy have opted for decentralised 
models of application owing to their constitutional traditions, with the 
application of the rules shared between the municipalities and centralised 
agencies to varying degrees. Conversely, the UK has chosen to appoint a 
centralised administrative authority that applies the national transposition 
measures due to its unitary tradition.  
Finally, judicial enforcement is entrusted to specialised courts in Belgium 
and the UK, while in Italy it is the ordinary courts that have been given this 
competence. In addition, Italy and the UK have made the further policy choice 
of giving their courts full powers of judicial review that include the ability to 
remake decisions taken by the administrative authorities in application of the 
national transposition measures. The opposite is true of the Belgian 
immigration appeals council, which has only been endowed with a limited 
                                                  
127 2013 Citizenship Report (II), para 2.3.1. The infringement proceedings against Italy were closed on 
10 December 2013, following commitments made to amend the Italian implementing law, Legislative 
Decree No 30/2007 of 6 February 2006 (Decreto Legislativo del 6 febbraio 2007, n 30 ‘Attuazione 
della direttiva 2004/38/CE relativa al diritto dei cittadini dell'Unione e dei loro familiari di circolare 
e di soggiornare liberamente nel territorio degli Stati membri’ (GURI n 72 del 27-03-2007)); see 
further Information from Commission dated 3 August 2015 (GestDem 2015/2901). 
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mandate to control the legality of the decisions of the administrative authorities. 
The countries also differ in the extent to which legal aid is provided to EU 
citizens and their family members in free movement cases. Legal aid is available 
at all levels in Belgium and Italy, but free legal representation is conditional 
upon meeting an income test that is set some way below the average net monthly 
wage in both countries.128 Since April 2013 when the Legal Aid and Punishment 
and Sentencing of Offenders Act came into force,129 legal aid is generally no 
longer available for legal representation before the UK’s First-Tier Tribunal in 
free movement cases, save in exceptional circumstances.130 This study will seek 
to examine if such differences in enforcement networks have an impact on 
implementation outcomes. 
The three Member States have therefore made policy choices in 
implementing Directive 2004/38 that provide a compelling basis for 
comparison. 
On a final note it should also be pointed out that each Member State 
attaches a different degree of importance to the issue of the free movement of 
persons. In Italy, the issue is of relatively low importance,131 but overall the issue 
of immigration has high saliency. This is due to Italy having to bear the burden 
of the constant arrival of significant numbers of persons seeking refuge in Italy 
or in EU countries further afield for all sorts of reasons. In Belgium, the free 
movement of persons is of medium importance132 because it is associated with 
a wider political aim of achieving budgetary discipline and control over the 
country’s expenditures at all levels of government.  In the UK, on the other 
hand, the issue has high salience133 because it is associated with major public 
discontent about immigration in general and a government motivated by the 
                                                  
128 See Chapter 10 (Implementation of Directive 2004/38 Compared). 
129 ‘LASPO goes on the statute book’, The Law Society Gazette (London, 1 May 2012). 
130 See Chapter 9 (Implementation in the UK). 
131 See Chapter 7 (Implementation in Belgium). 
132 See Chapter 8 (Implementation in Italy). 
133 See Chapter 9 (Implementation in the UK). 
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political desire to assert complete control over all forms of immigration to the 
UK. The level of salience which attaches to the free movement of persons 
therefore differs in each Member State. 
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Directives are one of the main instruments for enacting EU policies under 
Article 288 TFEU, the other being regulations and decisions. Unlike 
regulations, which are directly applicable,1 directives lay down certain 
objectives that Member States must then achieve through their implementation 
into the national legal order.2  
The adoption of a directive imposes certain general obligations on the 
Member States, which will first be examined (section 3.1).  Although Article 
288(3) TFEU leaves a discretion to the Member States as to the ‘methods and 
form’ of implementation, the Court of Justice’s case law has imposed significant 
limitations on the exercise of that discretion.  
These obligations and limitations will then be examined in the specific 
context of the three stages of implementation. The implementation of a 
directive entails obligations that apply in respect of directives as regards the 
form of transposition (section 3.2), as well as specific obligations relating to the 
                                                  
1 Article 288(2) TFEU: ‘A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States.’ On the difference between regulations and directives, see for 
example, Francesco Capotorti, ‘Legal Problems of Directives, Regulations and their Implementation’ in 
Heinrich Siedentopf and Jacques Ziller (eds), Making European Policies Work, Volume 1: 
Comparative Syntheses (Sage 1988) 151-168. 
2 Article 288(3) TFEU: ‘A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member 
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.’ 
See further Jos Kapteyn and Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the 
Communities, (3d edition, Laurence Gormely (ed), Kluwer Law International, 1998), 326-331; 
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methods of transposition that depend upon the content of the directive (section 
3.3). These obligations also have an incidence on the drafting of national 
implementing measures (section 3.4). Specific obligations also arise in the 
context of the application of a directive by the national administrative 
authorities (section 3.5) and their enforcement by the national courts (section 
3.6). 
3.1 General Obligations to Implement Directives 
Directives are one of the legislative instruments that are available to the 
EU institutions to exercise their competences under the Treaties.3 They consist 
in ‘a form of indirect regulatory or legislative measure’.4 
Under the ordinary legislative procedure,5 which applies to most EU 
legislation  relating to the free movement of persons,6 the Commission has the 
sole power to make a proposal for a directive, which the Council and European 
Parliament are then empowered to adopt jointly.7 Directives require a simple 
majority in the European Parliament and a qualified majority in the Council.8 
Once a directive has been adopted, the Member States are under an obligation 
                                                  
3 Article 289 TFEU. 
4 Case C-298/89 Government of Gibraltar v Council [2003] ECR I-3605, para 16. 
5 The former co-decision procedure under Article 251 EC was renamed by the Lisbon Treaty as the 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’ under Article 294 TFEU.  
6 See for example, Article 18 TFEU (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality), Article 
21(2) TFEU (free movement of persons), Article 46 (free movement of workers), Article 50(1) (freedom 
of establishment), Article 53 (recognition of professional qualifications) and Article 59 (freedom to 
provide services). Note that Article 48 contains special rules in connection with legislative instruments 
adopted in the field of social security. 
7 Article 289 TFEU. 
8 Article 289(1) TFEU: ‘[t]he ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the 
European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the 
Commission’; Article 231 TFEU: ‘the European Parliament shall act by a majority of the votes cast’; 




to give it effect in their national legal order within the timeframe specified by 
the directive concerned. 
The obligation on Member States to implement EU directives is 
contained in the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU: 
‘A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each 
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods.’ 
Furthermore, Article 4(3) TEU9 also requires Member States to ‘take any 
appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions’ and to ‘refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the 
attainment of the Union's objectives’. This is also given further expression by 
Article 291(1) TFEU, which provides that ‘Member States shall adopt all 
measures of national law necessary to implement legally binding Union acts.’ In 
order to take all appropriate measures to implement a directive, the national 
authorities must insure that they do so in a way that complies with other 
provisions of the Treaties,10 fundamental rights11 and general principles of EU 
law.12 
                                                  
9 Formerly, Article 10 EC, which provided that ‘Member States shall take all appropriate measures, 
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement 
of the Community's tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this 
Treaty.’ 
10 See to that effect, Case C-410/96 Ambry [1998] ECR I-7875, para 30.  
11 Case C-20/00 Booker Acquaculture [2003] ECR I-7411, para 88. 
12 Case C-2/97 Società Italiana Petroli [1998] ECR I-8597, para 48. 
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Article 288(3) TFEU lays down an ‘obligation of result’,13 which is binding 
on all the authorities of the Member States.14 The obligation to implement a 
directive applies to the national courts15 and administrative authorities16 – 
including decentralised authorities17 – as well as the legislature18 and the 
executive acting in its decision-making capacity.19  
In order to achieve the result prescribed by a directive, the Member States 
retain a discretion and they can choose ‘form and methods’20 or the ‘ways and 
means’21 which are used to give effect to a directive. This is considered to be a 
reflection of the principle of subsidiarity.22 The Member States therefore enjoy 
                                                  
13 Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Robert Bray (ed), 
Sweet and Maxwell 1999) 574; Sacha Prechal, Directives in EC Law (2nd edition, Oxford University 
Press 2005) 31. 
14 On the addressees of directives, see Prechal (n 13) 57. See also Richard Brent, Directives: Rights and 
Remedies in English and Community Law (Informa Law / Routledge 2001) 98. 
15 Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891, para 26. See further case law cited at n 260. 
16 Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839, para 33. 
17 Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo (n 16), para 31; Case C-8/88 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-
2321, para 13; Case C-438/99 Melgar [2001] ECR I-6915, para 32. 
18 This is clear from infringement cases under Article 258 TFEU in which Member States have been 
found liable for a failure to comply with Treaty obligations due to the delay by the legislative organ of 
the state to transpose a directive; see for example Case C- 77/69 Commission v Belgium [1970] ECR 
243, paras 13-15 (delay due to dissolution of parliament); Case 8/70 Commission v Italy [1970] ECR 
961, paras 8-9 (delay attributed to chamber of deputies).  
19 See to that effect, Case C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands [1990] ECR I-851, paras 7-8. See also 
the Opinion of AG Cruz Vilaça in Case 412/85 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 3503, para 19.  
20 Article 288(3) TFEU. 
21 The expression is used by the Court of Justice in Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann (n 15), para 15. 
22 Commission, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity. Communication of the Commission to the Council and 
European Parliament’ SEC (92) 1990 final, 15: ‘the Treaty of Rome devised an original instrument which 
typifies subsidiarity: the directive sets the result to be achieved but leaves it to the Member states to 
choose the most appropriate means of doing so.’; Protocol (No 30) on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality (as annexed to the Treaty Establishing the European Community by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam) [1997] OJ C 340/105, Article 6: ‘The Community shall legislate only to the 
extent necessary. Other things being equal, directives should be preferred to regulations and framework 
directives to detailed measures.’ See also, Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (n 13) 573; Prechal (n 13) 5; Maartje 
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a discretion as to the ‘form’ of implementation – namely which organs of the 
state bears responsibility for implementation and which kind of national legal 
instrument is used to give effect to a directive in their national legal system23 – 
and  the ‘methods’ of implementation – that is to say the content of the national 
implementing measures.24 This discretion is sometimes referred to as the 
principle of national institutional autonomy.25 Nonetheless, the Member States 
do not enjoy absolute discretion in this respect and the Court of Justice has 
placed limitations on the autonomy of the Member States. 
Firstly, it is implicit in Article 288(3) TFEU that the Member States have 
a discretion to determine which organs of the State will be tasked with 
implementation as they see fit. In line with their respective constitutional 
traditions,26 the Member States have the freedom to decide on which authority 
– national, federal, regional, or local – is competent to transpose a directive and 
adopt national implementing measures.27 This discretion also extends to 
deciding which administrative authority will be responsible for the application 
                                                  
Verhoeven, ‘The “Costanzo Obligation” and the Principle of National Institutional Autonomy: 
Supervision as a Bridge to Close the Gap?’ (2010) 3 Review of European Administrative Law, 23-64, 26. 
23 Capotorti (n 1) 154. 
24 ibid. 
25 Prechal (n 13) 62; Verhoeven (n 22) 24; Maartje Verhoeven, The Costanzo Obligation (Intersentia 
2011) 43-49. 
26 Article 4(2) TEU specifically recognises that ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States 
before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political 
and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government.’ See further Capotorti (n 1) 162; 
Verhoeven (n 22) 28. 
27 Joined Case 51 to 54/71 International Fruit Company [1971] ECR 1107, para 4; Case 96/81 
Commission v Netherlands [1982] ECR 1791, para 12; Case 97/81 Commission v Netherlands [1982] 
ECR 1819, para 12; Joined Cases C-227 to 230/85 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 1, para 9; Case 
C-156/91 Hansa Fleisch [1992] ECR I-5567, para 23; C-435/92 Association pour la protection des 
animaux sauvages [1994] ECR I-67, para 26. However, the Court has consistently held that a Member 
State remains under an obligation to implement a directive no matter to which organ of the State it has 
delegated the responsibility to implement a directive; see, for example, Case 52/75 Commission v Italy 
[1976] ECR 278, para 14; Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands, cited above, para 12; Joined Cases C-
227 to 230/85 Commission v Belgium, cited above, para 9; Case C-157/89 Commission v Italy [1991] 
ECR I-57, para 17. 
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of the national implementing measures28 and which judicial authority will be 
entrusted with their enforcement in accordance with the principle of procedural 
autonomy.29 Although the Member States are free to decide on which organs of 
the state will be tasked with the various aspects of implementation of a directive, 
this internal allocation of powers must not prevent the directive in question 
from being correctly implemented.30  
Secondly, the Member States are also required to choose the most 
appropriate form and method of implementation to ensure the directive can 
function effectively within the national legal systems. The Court has held that 
Member States must adopt all necessary measures within the framework of 
their national legal systems in order to ensure that the directive is fully effective 
in accordance with the objective it pursues.31  Such an obligation results from 
                                                  
28 See, to that effect, Case 240/78 Atalanta [1979] 2137, para 5 (in the absence of any specific provisions 
to the contrary, Member States have the power to designate the institutions that are responsible for the 
application of regulations relating to the common organisation of agricultural products). See also Case 
C-33/90 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-5987 (failure by the regional authorities to implement 
various directives on waste by not communicating information on the treatment of waste); Case C-
274/98 Commission v Spain [2000] ECR I-2823 (failure by autonomous regions to implement a 
directive on the protection of water against pollution by nitrates by not establishing action 
programmes); Case C-417/99 Commission v Spain [2001] ECR I-6015 (failure by the State to 
implement a directive on ambient air quality by not designating the competent authorities and bodies 
responsible for its application in practice). See also Prechal (n 13) 63. 
29 See Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989, para 5, and other case law cited at n 247.   
30 Case C-156/91 Hansa Fleisch (n 27), para 23; Case C-374/97 Feyrer [1999] ECR I-5153, para 34; C-
428/07 Horvath [2009] ECR I-6355, para 50. Moreover, the Court has consistently held that ‘a Member 
State may not rely on provisions, practices or situations prevailing in its own internal legal system to 
justify failure to observe the obligations and time-limits laid down by directives’, see for example, Case 
52/75 Commission v Italy (n 27), para 14; Case 163/78 Commission v Italy [1979] ECR 771, para 5; Case 
283/86 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 3271, para 7; Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94 and C-
188/94 to C-190/94  Dillenkofer [1996] ECR I-4845, para 53; C-450/00 Commission v Luxembourg 
[2001] ECR I-7069, para 8, Case C-421/12 Commission v Belgium [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2064 
(Judgment of 10 July 2014), para 43.  
31 Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann (n 15), para 15; Case C-222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, para 
17; Case C-208/90 Emmott (n 98), para 18; Case C-145/05 Levi Strauss [2006] ECR I-3703, para 16; 
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the combined application of Article 288(3), which obliges Member States to 
achieve the result prescribed by a directive, and Article 4(3) TEU, which 
requires Member States not only to take all appropriate measures to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations that result from the directive but also to refrain 
from taking any measure that could jeopardise its objectives.32  
As a result, Member States are under an obligation to choose the most 
appropriate form and methods in order to ensure the effectiveness (effet utile) 
of the directive within the national legal systems having due regard to the 
objectives pursued by the directive that is being implemented.33  
The obligation to implement a directive under Article 288(3) TFEU 
requires the Member States to give effect to a directive both in law and in 
fact.34 This is further reflected by Article 197(1) TFEU, as inserted by the 
Treaty of Lisbon,35 which provides that ‘[e]ffective implementation of Union 
law by the Member States, which is essential for the proper functioning of the 
Union, shall be regarded as a matter of common interest’. It therefore follows 
that implementation goes beyond an obligation merely to incorporate a 
directive in each Member State’s legal system by adopting national 
                                                  
Case C-268/06 Impact [2008] ECR I-2483, para 40; Case C-81/07 Commission v Greece [2008] ECR 
I-48, para 17; Case C-396/07 Juuri [2008] ECR I-8883, para 26. 
32 See for example, Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann (n 15), para 26. 
33 Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497, para 73. 
34 See for example, Case C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands (n 19), para 25, Case 361/88 Commission 
v Germany [1991] ECR I-2567 at para 24, Case C-214/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-9601, at 
para 23, and Case C-507/04 Commission v Austria [2007] ECR I-5939 at para 298. See further, Prechal 
(2005) (n 13) 51-52. 
35 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, 17 December 2007, 2702 UNTS 3 (hereafter the Lisbon Treaty), Article 1, para 150).    
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implementing measures.36 Once adopted, the national implementing measures 
also need to be applied and enforced by the national authorities.37  
As a result, it is generally accepted that implementation comprises three 
separate but inter-related elements: transposition, application and 
enforcement.38 The obligation to implement a directive can accordingly be 
seen as consisting in the following three sets of obligations:  
                                                  
36 Richard Brent (n 14) 131; Prechal (2005) (n 13) 52. 
37 See for example, Advocate General Jacobs’ Opinion in Case C-237/90 Commission v Germany [1992] 
ECR I-5973, para 14: ‘ it is not sufficient simply to incorporate the terms of a directive into national 
legislation; in addition Member States must ensure that the legislation is applied in practice’. 
38 Most research clearly distinguishes the three stages of implementation; see for example, Samuel 
Krislov, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Joseph Weiler 'The Political Organs and the Decision-Making 
Process in the United States and the European Community', in Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe, 
Joseph Weiler (eds) Integration Through Law, Volume 1: Methods, Tools and Institutions Book: 
Political Organs, Integration Techniques and Judicial Process (de Gruyter, 1986) 3-112, 62; Heinrich 
Siedentopf and Christoph Hauschild, ‘Phases of Implementation’ in Heinrich Siedentopf and Jacques 
Ziller (eds), Making European Policies Work, Volume 1: Comparative Syntheses (Sage 1988) 26-72, 42-
72; Deidre Curtin, ‘Directives: The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of Individual Rights (1990) 27 
Common Market Law Review, 703-739, 710-711; Francis Snyder, 'The Effectiveness of European 
Community Law. Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques', (1993) 56 Modern Law Review, 19-54, 
22-23; Brent (n 14) 97; Prechal (n 13) 5-6, and 32; Lorenzo Allio and Marie-Hélène Fandel, ‘Making 
Europe Work: Improving the Transposition, Implementation and Enforcement of EU Legislation’ 
(2006) European Policy Centre Working Paper 25, 10-11; Balazs Mellar, ‘Transposition, 
implementation and enforcement of consumer law’, PE416.221 (European Parliament 2009) 2; Dimiter 
Toshkov, ‘The Quest for Relevance: Research on Compliance with EU Law’ (2011) 3 
<http://www.dimiter.eu/articles/Compliance%20review.pdf>  accessed on 30 May 2015; Oliver Treib, 
‘Implementing and Complying with EU Governance Outputs’ (2014) 9(1) Living Reviews in European 
Governance, 6 <http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2014-1/> accessed on 2 
June 2015. However, some scholars only identify two stages in implementation, namely legal 
implementation (transposition) and practical implementation (application and enforcement); see for 
example Simona Milio (ed), From Policy to Implementation in the European Union (IB Tauris 2010) 
5-6; Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Post-accession Compliance with EU Gender Equality Legislation in 
Postcommunist New Member States’ (2009) 13 European Integration online Papers No 23, 3 
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-023a.htm> accessed 4 July 2015, for whom ‘Compliance with EU 
law comprises at least two distinctive stages... The first stage is the correct (and timely) transposition of 
the requirements of EU law into national legislation. The second stage is the subsequent correct 
application of the rules by those towards they are addressed, including the enforcement of the rules by 
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(i) obligations relating to transposition,39 which involves the 
incorporation of the directive into national law through the adoption of legally-
binding national implementing measures that give effect to a directive in the 
national legal order, including general obligations that apply to all directives, 
specific obligations contained in each directive and the drafting of national 
implementing measures;  
(ii) obligations associated with the practical application40 of the national 
implementing measures (and therefore the directive concerned) by the national 
administrative authorities; and  
(iii) obligations connected to the (decentralised) enforcement41 of the 
national implementing measures, which allows recourse to the national courts 
and quasi-judicial institutions to compel observance of these measures or of the 
directive in question in the event of a conflict with provisions of national law.  
The different stages of implementation may be illustrated by the 
following graphic: 
Stages of Implementation 
 
 
Implementation      =    Transposition          +        Application             +     Enforcement 





















Table 3.1: Stages of implementation, their instruments and actors 
 
                                                  
public authorities if the targets of the rules do not comply.’; Lisa Conant, ‘Compliance and What EU 
Member States Make of It’ in Marise Cremona (ed), Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law 
(Oxford University Press 2012) 1-30, who uses the terms ‘compliance with law on the books’ to denote 
formal legal compliance that involves the adoption of national implementing measures and  ‘compliance 
with law in action’ to refer to practical application and enforcement,.  
39 See Sections 3.2 (Obligations Relating to the Form of Transposition), 3.3 (Obligations Relating to the 
Methods of Transposition) and 3.4 (Implications for the Drafting of National Implementing Measures). 
40 See Section 3.5 (Obligations Relating to the Application of Directives). 




An examination of the specific obligations relating to each stage of 
implementation will now follow. 
3.2 Obligations Relating to the Form of Transposition 
Transposition represents the first stage of implementation and refers to 
the process of incorporating a directive into national law through the adoption 
of national implementing measures.42 It is therefore concerned with ‘the simple 
adoption of law on paper’.43 Article 288(3) TFEU leaves Member States a choice 
as to the form and method which transposition can take.44  
As mentioned above, Member States have a discretion at to which organ 
of the state will be tasked with transposing a directive into the national legal 
order. This can be an organ of the legislative45 or executive46 branches of the 
                                                  
42 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 38) 62; Siedentopf and Hauschild (n 38) 42-57, who refer to 
transposition as ‘incorporation’; Curtin (n 38) 714-718; Stephen Weatherill, ‘Constitutional Issues in 
the Implementation of EC Law: Addressing the Imbalance in Favour of Market Deregulation’ (Biannual 
Meeting of the European Community Studies Association, 29 May -1 June 1997, Seattle) 1; Brent (n 14) 
97; Prechal (n 13) 5-6; Allio and Fandel (n 38) 10-11; Mellar (n 38) 2; Conant (n 38) 15-19, who refers 
to transposition as part of ‘compliance with the “law on the books”’; Treib (n 38) 6. See further Denis 
Batta, ‘Comparative Study on the Transposition of EC Law in the Member States’ (PE378.294, European 
Parliament, 2009). 
43 Weatherill (n 42) 1. 
44 Nonetheless, it should be noted that some directives may also contain detailed provisions on the 
method of implementation; see for example Case C-195/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I- 1169, 
paras 13-14 (regarding Italy’s failure to respect the sequence of measures under a directive aiming to 
protect waters against pollution caused by nitrates); Case C-384/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR 
I-3823, paras 39-40 (concerning the insufficiency of a general water purification programme to 
implement the more specific objective of the directive in question to reduce water pollution caused by 
certain harmful substances).  
45 See to that effect, Case C- 77/69 Commission v Belgium [1970] ECR 243, paras 13-15 (delay due to 
dissolution of parliament); Case 8/70 Commission v Italy [1970] ECR 961, paras 8-9 (delay attributed 
to chamber of deputies).  
46 See to that effect, Case C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands (n 19), paras 7-8. See also the Opinion 
of AG Cruz Vilaça in Case C-412/85 Commission v Germany (n 19), para 19.  
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state operating at central47 or decentralised levels, including federal,48 
regional,49 local50 or municipal authorities.51 
The competent authorities of the Member States also have a choice as to 
the form of implementation, namely the kind of legal instrument that is used to 
give effect to a directive in their national legal system. This may, for example, 
involve the enactment of legislation by parliament, the issuance of a decree by 
the executive or the adoption of regulations by administrative authorities using 
delegated powers.  
Whatever the form of the national implementing measures, a Member 
State can also choose to amend its existing national legislation that might 
already be in place.52 In such cases, the national implementing measures would 
then consist in a legal instrument that amends its existing legislation or 
regulations. Alternatively, a Member State may decide to have recourse to a 
separate free-standing legal instrument that is separate from existing legislation 
or regulations,53 what some authors have termed ‘bolt-on transposition’.54 The 
                                                  
47 Case C-260/96 Commission v Belgium [1994] ECR I-1611, paras 6-8. See also to that effect, Case C-
8/88 Commission v Germany (n 17), para 13. 
48 ibid. See also Case C-224/97 Ciola [1999] ECR I-2517, para 30; Case C-383/00 Commission v 
Germany [2002] ECR I-4219, para 18. 
49 Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands (n 27), para 12; Case 97/81 Commission v Netherlands (n 27), 
para 12; Joined Cases C-227 to 230/85 Commission v Belgium (n 27), para 9; Case C-156/91 Hansa 
Fleisch (n 27),  para 23; C-435/92 Association pour la protection des animaux sauvages (n 27), para 
26. 
50 ibid. 
51 Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo (n 16), paras 31-33; Case C-438/99 Melgar [2001] ECR I-6915, para 
32. 
52 Case 8/77 Sagulo [1977] ECR 1495, para 4, in which the Court held that “under the third paragraph 
of Article 189 of the Treaty it is for the Member States to choose the form and methods to implement 
the provisions of the directive in their territory either by the adoption of a special law or regulations or 
by the application of appropriate provisions of their general regulations on aliens” in a case concerning 
the free movement of workers. 
53 ibid. 
54 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Rapport Britannique’ in XVIII FIDE Congress Report, Volume 1, ‘Les Directives 
Communautaires: Effets, Efficacité, Justiciabilité’ (Stockholm, 3-6 June 1998) 124-172, 126 who refers 
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precise form of the legal instrument does not matter provided that it complies 
with the internal allocation of powers within the Member State concerned.55 
The Member States do not have an unfettered discretion in their choice 
of the form of the national implementing measures.56 Limits have been placed 
by the EU judiciary on the kind of instruments which Member States can use to 
transpose a directive, based on the general principles of legal certainty and 
effective judicial protection.57   
Firstly, the Court of Justice has consistently held that whatever 
instrument the Member States choose in effecting transposition, the national 
implementing measures must be capable of producing binding legal effects in 
accordance with the principle of legal certainty.58 The national implementing 
                                                  
to ‘“bolt-on” transposition, i.e. transposition of the Directive in a separate piece of secondary legislation, 
rather than consolidation of the EC-derived law and the pre-existing law in a single instrument.’ He 
goes on to remark that ‘the “bolt-on” approach damages the ease with which the law can be understood. 
Typically, more than one source must be consulted; and the inter-relation between different sources 
carefully assessed.’ See also Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos, ‘The Transposition of EU Law: “Post-
Decisional Politics” and Institutional Economy’, (2001) 7 European Law Journal, 442-58, 451. 
55 See to that effect, Case C-8/88 Commission v Germany (n 17), para 13: ‘it is for all the authorities of 
the Member States, whether it be central authorities of the State or the authorities of a federated State, 
or other territorial authorities, to ensure observance of the rules of Community law within the sphere 
of their competence’ (emphasis added).  See further Prechal (n 13) 63. 
56 For a fuller exploration of the limits placed by the Court of Justice on a Member State’s discretion in 
implementing directives, see Curtin (n 38) 714-718; Christiaan Timmermans, ‘Rapport 
Communautaire’ in XVIII FIDE Congress Report (n 54) 15-37, 21-23; Brent (n 14) 109-129; Prechal (n 
13) 31-36 and 73-87. 
57 See further n 89-93 and accompanying text. 
58 Case C-239/85 Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 3645, para 7; Case C-190/90 Commission v 
Netherlands [1992] ECR I-3265, para 23. See also Case C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands (n 19), 
paras 7-8 where the Court accepted that transposition of a directive by way of a law and two ministerial 
decree was effective because the decrees were adopted pursuant to the law, they were published in the 




measures must be legally binding in the sense that they create rights and 
obligations which can be enforced before the national courts.59  
As a result, transposition by way of an administrative circular or 
guidelines or mere administrative practice would not be sufficient.60 Circulars 
– whether administrative61 or ministerial62 – do not create legal effects erga 
omnes,63 may be amended at any time64 and individuals might not be 
sufficiently informed of their rights and obligations.65 Similar objections have 
been raised against the use of administrative guidelines,66 internal 
memoranda67 or general government policy68 none of which are legally binding.  
Likewise, administrative practices, which are not legally binding, may be 
changed at will and lack the necessary publicity.69   
                                                  
59 Case C-306/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR I-5863, para 19; Case C-220/94 Commission v 
Luxembourg [1995] ECR I-1589, para 11; Case C-298/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-6747, 
para 16;  
60 Advocate General Jacobs has previously suggested in his Opinion in Case C-58/89 Commission v 
Germany [1991] ECR I-4983, paras 27-36, that administrative practices could constitute sufficient 
transposition where certain conditions are met. For further discussion, see Brent (n 14) 113. However, 
the Court of Justice has yet to depart from its consistent case law that considers transposition by 
administrative circular or practices to be insufficient. 
61 Case C-145/82 Commission v Italy [1983] ECR 711, paras 7-11. 
62 Case 116/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 1323, paras 12-16. 
63 Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2567, para 20; Case C-9/92 Commission v 
Greece [1993] ECR I-4467, para 20. See also, Case 29/84 Commission v Germany, [1985] ECR 1661, 
paras 18-21, 27-28, 30-31 and 36-38, in which the German government’s contentions that the 
administrative practice was binding on the authorities and had been publicised were nonetheless not 
considered sufficient by the Court of Justice to fulfil the obligation to transpose a directive on the 
recognition of professional qualifications of nurses.   
64 Case C-239/85 Commission v Belgium (n 58), para 7; Case 116/86 Commission v Italy (n 62), para 
15; Case 147/86, Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1637, para 16.   
65 Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany (n 63), para 20. 
66 Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands (n 27), para 13. 
67 Case 173/83 Commission v France [1985] ECR 491, para 10.  
68 Case C-221/94 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR I-5669, para 22. 
69 Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 1473, paras 10-11; Case 300/81 Commission v Italy 
[1983] ECR 449, para 10; Case 160/82 Commission v Netherlands [1982] ECR 4637, para 4; Case 
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Although the Court of Justice does not consider that administrative 
circulars or guidelines are of themselves sufficient to transpose a directive into 
national law, this does not necessarily mean that such instruments should not 
be taken into consideration when assessing transposition. The purpose of such 
circulars is to provide direction to the national administrative authorities which 
are tasked with the practical application of the national implementing 
measures. As such, administrative circulars are capable of being considered 
appropriate measures of a general nature that are intended ‘to ensure fulfilment 
of the obligations … resulting from the acts of the institutions’ within the 
meaning of Article 4(3) TEU.70  Although they may not be legally binding, such 
circulars indicate how the national implementing measures are intended  to be 
interpreted and applied by the national administrative authorities. The Court of 
Justice has previously held that the national implementing measures must be 
viewed in the light of their interpretation by the national courts.71 It is therefore 
submitted that it is also appropriate to examine the national implementing 
                                                  
236/85 Commission v Netherlands [1987] ECR 3989, para 18; Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1637, 
para 16; Case C-236/91 Commission v Ireland [1992] ECR I-5933, para 6; Case C-381/92 Commission 
v Ireland [1994] ECR I-215, para 7; Case C-242/94 Commission v Spain [1997] ECR I-3031, para 6; 
Case C-197/96 Commission v France Commission v France [1997] ECR I-1489, para 14; Case C-358/98 
Commission v Italy [2000] ECR I-1255, para 17, C-145/99 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-2235, 
para 30; Case C-354/99 Commission v Ireland [2001] ECR I-7657, para 28.  
70 Moreover, a directive will usually contain ancillary provisions that oblige the Member States to adopt 
‘the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive’ and 
therefore foresee the adoption of administrative circulars as part of the transposition process. 
71 The Court of Justice has consistently held that ‘the scope of national laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions must be assessed in the light of the interpretation given to them by national 
courts’: Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Katsikas and Others [1992] ECR I-6577, para 
39; Case C-382/92 Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435, para 36; C-300/95 Commission 
v United Kingdom [1997] ECR I-2649, paragraph 37; Case C-372/99, Commission v Italy, [2002] ECR 
I-819, para 20; Case C-129/00 Commission v Italy [2004]  ECR I-14637 para 30; Case C-441/02 
Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I-3449, para 42; Case C-490/04 Commission v Germany [2007] 
ECR I-6095, para 49. 
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measures by reference to the relevant administrative circulars and guidelines 
that may apply.72  
A similar problem arises when a Member State claims that transposition 
is not necessary because existing national case law already implements the 
directive. The Court of Justice has held that the existence of judicial case law 
that is consistent with the provisions of a directive cannot of itself fulfil the 
obligation to implement a directive,73 since the case law of a Member State does 
not provide ‘the clarity and precision needed to meet the requirement of legal 
certainty’.74  
It therefore follows that de facto implementation alone will not suffice 
and Member states are also under an obligation to ensure that there is a specific 
legal framework that ensures the full application of the directive concerned.75  
                                                  
72 This is also the Commission’s practice as regards conformity assessments undertaken by external 
consultants; see for example, Serge Gutwirth, Paul de Hert and Pieter Paepe, ‘Correspondence Table, 
Belgium’, 1 and 74, Annex to Milieu and Edinburgh University, Conformity studies of Member States’ 
national implementation measures transposing Community instruments in the area of citizenship of 
the Union - Final Report’ (December 2008).  
73 Case C-236/95 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-4459, para 14; Case C-58/02, Commission v Spain 
[2004] ECR I-621, paras 24-25. See further Marcus Klamert, ‘Judicial Implementation of Directives 
and Anticipatory Indirect Effect’ (2005) 43 Common Market Law Review, 1251-1275, 1270 who notes 
‘The question whether a national court decision can bring about adequate implementation of a directive 
pursuant to Article [288 TFEU] can therefore not be answered in general. First, it depends on the nature 
of the directive concerned. In most cases its content or addressees will require transparent and legally 
binding implementing measures. Second, even if the directive allows for “softer” measures of 
implementation, adequacy depends on the quality of the national case law … [which would] require a 
judgment by the national Supreme Court confirming a number of previous decisions by lower national 
courts. A solitary decision will very rarely suffice as act of transposition.’ 
74 Case C-144/99, Commission v Netherlands, [2001] ECR 3541, para 21; Case C-421/12 Commission v 
Belgium (n 30), para 46. 
75 Case C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands (n 19), para 25; Case C-131/88 Commission v Germany 
[1991] ECR I-2567, para 8; Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany (n 63), para 24; Case C-3/07 
Commission v Belgium [2007] ECR I-154, para 11. 
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Transposition must be effected in such a way that it guarantees ‘the full 
application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner’.76 
The provisions of a directive may sometimes explicitly require the 
adoption of national implementing measures.77 In the absence of such explicit 
provisions, the Court of Justice has recognised that a directive may implicitly 
call for the adoption of specific national implementing measures in cases where 
a directive ‘expressly requires Member States to ensure that their measures 
transposing the Directive include a reference to it or that such reference is made 
when they are officially published’.78 However, the enactment of a general 
                                                  
76 Case C-6/04 Commission v UK [2005] ECR I-9017, paras 21 and 27; C-418/04 Commission v Ireland 
[2007] ECR I-10947, para 158. 
77 See for example, Article 4(2) of Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 
90/313/EEC [2003] OJ L 41/26, which allows the Member States to refuse a request for environmental 
information ‘if disclosure of the information would adversely affect: (a) the confidentiality of the 
proceedings of public authorities, where such confidentiality is provided for by law’. In Case C-204/09 
Flachglas Torgau [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:71 (judgment of 14 February 2012), paras 61 and 63 , the 
Court held in this connection that ‘by specifying in indent (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 4(2) of 
Directive 2003/4 that the protection of the confidentiality of public proceedings must be ‘provided for 
by law’, a condition which corresponds to the requirement laid down in Article 4(4) of the Aarhus 
Convention that the confidentiality of proceedings must be ‘provided for under national law’, the 
European Union legislature clearly wanted an express provision to exist in national law with a precisely 
defined scope, and not merely a general legal context. … None the less, public authorities should not be 
able to determine unilaterally the circumstances in which the confidentiality referred to in Article 4(2) 
of Directive 2003/4 can be invoked, which means in particular that national law must clearly establish 
the scope of the concept of ‘proceedings’ of public authorities referred to in that provision, which refers 
to the final stages of the decision‐making process of public authorities’.   
78 Case C-137/96 Commission v Germany [1997] ECR I-6749, para 8; Case C-360/95 Commission v 
Spain [1997] ECR I-7337, para 13; Case C-361/95 Commission v Spain [1997] ECR I-7351, para 15; Case 
C-59/07 Commission v Spain [2007] ECR I-161, para 19; Case C-502/08 Commission v Spain [2009] 
ECR I-161, para 21; Case C-294/09 Commission v Ireland [2010] ECR I-46, para 17; Joined Cases C-
444/09 and C-456/09 Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres [2010] ECR I-14031, para 62; Case C-523/09 
Commission v Spain [2010] ECR I-19, para 13; Case C-326/09 Commission v Poland [2011] ECR I-28, 
para 22; Case C-326/09 Commission v Poland [2011] ECR I-161, para 58; Case C-29/14 Commission v 
Poland [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:379 (judgment of 11 June 2015), para 49. However, the Court has also 
held that ‘a national measure which fails to refer, in its explanatory memorandum, to the directive 
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enabling law that requires the adoption of ministerial regulations or further 
implementing measures would not be sufficient in this connection, if the latter 
have yet to be adopted.79  
In a case involving the free movement of persons, the Court of Justice has 
examined the issue in the context of the former EU directives on the residence 
rights of worked having ceased their activity80 and those who do not work81. The 
Court held that existing German law, which merely contained a general 
reference to ‘save where otherwise provided by Community law' could not be 
considered as achieving  ‘in a sufficiently clear and precise manner the actual 
implementation in full’ of the directives concerned.82 It follows that national 
legislation that merely contains a general reference to the directive in question 
would not satisfy the requirements for correct and complete transposition.83   
                                                  
concerned cannot be regarded as a valid measure transposing the directive’; Joined Cases C-444/09 
and C-456/09 Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres, cited above, para 63. 
79 Case C-216/94 Commission v Belgium [1995] ECR I-2155, paras 7-12. See also, Commission, ‘Better 
Regulation Toolbox’ (2015) 237 <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/guidelines/docs/br_toolbox_en.pdf> accessed on 27 November 2015 (hereinafter ‘Better 
Regulation Toolbox’): ‘Occasionally, Member States notify transposition measures that merely specify 
a framework for future implementation. These so-called "empty shell" transpositions are to be 
considered as a failure to notify, and such non-compliance should be spotted during the transposition 
check.’ 
80 Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-
employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity [1990] OJ L 180/28, repealed by 
Directive 2004/38. 
81 Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence [1990] OJ L 180/26, repealed 
by Directive 2004/38. 
82 Case C-96/95 Commission v Germany [1997] ECR I-1653, para 36. In this case, the German 
legislation at issue the Law on Aliens of 9 July 1990 (Ausländergesetz vom 9. Juli 1990 (BGBl. I S. 
1354)), paragraph 2(2)) merely provided that ‘[t]his Law applies to non-German nationals who are 
entitled to freedom of movement by virtue of Community law, save where otherwise provided by 
Community law and the Law on EEC residence.’  
83 For a discussion on exceptional circumstances where this form of transposition might be appropriate, 
namely a directive containing detailed prescriptions leaving no discretion to the Member States, see 
Timmermans (n 56), 22. 
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Nonetheless, ensuring de jure implementation will not necessarily 
require the Member States to enact legislation or adopt regulations in every 
single case. In this context, the Court of Justice has consistently recognised that: 
‘the implementation of a directive does not necessarily require legislative 
action in each Member State. In particular the existence of general 
principles of constitutional or administrative law may render 
implementation by specific legislation superfluous, provided however 
that those principles guarantee that the national authorities will in fact 
apply the directive fully and that, where the directive is intended to create 
rights for individuals, the legal position arising from those principles is 
sufficiently precise and clear and the persons concerned are made fully 
aware of their rights and, where appropriate, afforded the possibility of 
relying on them before the national courts.’84 
                                                  
84 Case 29/84 Commission v Germany (n 63), para 23. The Court has reformulated this proposition as 
follows: ‘the transposition of a directive into domestic law does not necessarily require that its 
provisions be incorporated formally and verbatim in express, specific legislation; a general legal context 
may, depending on the content of the directive, be adequate for the purpose provided that it does indeed 
guarantee the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner so that, where 
the directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the persons concerned can ascertain the full 
extent of their rights and, where appropriate, rely on them before the national courts.’;  see Case 252/85 
Commission v France [1988] ECR 2243, para 5; Case 363/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 1733, 
para 7; Case C-360/87 Commission v Italy [1991], para 7; Case C-131/88 Commission v Germany (n 
75), para 6; Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany (n 63), para 15; Case C-58/89 Commission v 
Germany [1991] ECR I-4983, para 13; Case C-59/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2607, para 
18;  Case C-13/90 Commission v France [1991] ECR I-4327, summary para 1 (full text of judgment not 
reproduced); Case C-14/90 Commission v France [1991] ECR I-4331, summary para 1 (full text of 
judgment not reproduced); Case C-64/90 Commission v France [1991] ECR I-4335, summary para 1 
(full text of judgment not reproduced); Case C-190/90 Commission v Netherlands (n 58), para 17; Case 
C-433/93 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2303, para 18; Case C-365/93 Commission v Greece 
[1995] ECR I-499, para 9; Case C-96/95 Commission v Germany (n 82), para 35; Case C-217/97 
Commission v Germany [1999] ECR I-5087, para. 31; Case C-144/99 Commission v Netherlands 
[2001] ECR I-3541, para 17; Case C-49/00 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-8575, para 21; Case C-
233/00 Commission v France [2003] ECR I-6625, para 76; C-455/00 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR 
I-4201, para 23; Case C-58/02 Commission v Spain (n 74), para 26; Case C-410/03 Commission v Italy 
[2005] ECR I-3507, para 60; Case C-6/04 Commission v United Kingdom (n 76), para 21; Case C-
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Where a Member State contends that implementation has been achieved 
by relying on general principles of law or existing legal provisions, the Court has 
emphasised the importance of ensuring that individuals are able to rely on 
rights created by the EU directive in question85 and has stressed the significance 
of this requirement in cases where a directive is intended to confer rights on 
nationals of other Member States.86 In practice, however, general principles of 
law are unlikely to guarantee compliance with a directive in cases where a 
directive contains ‘precise and detailed provisions’.87 Nonetheless, it may 
happen that existing legislation is sufficient to ensure that the objectives of a 
directive are achieved.88  
It can therefore be surmised from the above that EU law requires that 
whatever the form of the national implementing measures, these must have 
binding legal effect and be given the appropriate publicity.89 The Member States 
must in any event provide a specific legal framework that enables individuals to 
exercise rights and enforce obligations arising under a directive.90 These 
                                                  
102/08 Finanzamt Düsseldorf-Süd v SALIX Grundstücks [2009] ECR I-4629, para 40;  Case C-456/08 
Commission v Ireland [2010] ECR I-859, para 65 ; Joined Cases C-180/10 & C-181/10 Słaby and Kuć 
[2011] ECR I-8461, para 31. 
85 Case C-29/84 Commission v Germany  (n 63), para 23; Case C-365/93 Commission v Greece (n 84), 
para 9; Case C-144/99 Commission v Netherlands (n 84), para 18; Case C-63/01 Evans [2003] ECR I-
14447, para 36. 
86 See for example, Case C-144/99 Commission v Netherlands [2001] ECR I-3541, para 18 and Case C-
478/99 Commission v Sweden [2002] ECR I-4147, para 18, which both concerned the implementation 
of Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L 95/29. 
87 Case 29/84 Commission v Germany (n 63), para 31. 
88 For an example in which the general legal context was accepted by the Court as consisting in adequate 
implementation, see Case 248/83 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 1459, paras 18 and 30 
concerning directives on gender equality in connection with access to employment and working 
conditions. See also Case 163/82 Commission v Italy [1983] ECR 3273, para 9, in which the Court 
accepted that a general provision of Italian law covering was sufficient to give effect to the provision of 
a directive on gender equality as regards working conditions. 
89 See for example, Case C-159/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-4007, para 32. 
90 See n 75 and accompanying text. For examples where the Court accepted that a general legal context 
consisted in adequate implementation, see case law cited at n 88. 
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requirements are founded upon the general principles of EU law of legal 
certainty and effective judicial protection.91 The former requires that 
individuals must be able to ascertain the extent of their rights and duties from 
the national implementing measures,92 and the latter requires that the legal 
position of individuals is sufficiently defined by the national implementing 
measures so it can be relied upon before the national courts.93     
Secondly, where a directive is intended to regulate a domain that is 
already the subject of prescriptions under national law, the national 
implementing measures must be of equivalent legal effect to the national 
provisions which are already in existence in the national legal order.94 The Court 
has previously held that in a situation where national legislation is in conflict 
with EU law, this conflict can only be remedied by means of provisions of 
national law which have the same binding legal force as those which need to be 
brought into line with EU law.95 The maintenance of conflicting provisions of 
national law constitutes a breach of EU law because it creates an ambiguous 
state of affairs, which keeps individuals in a state of uncertainty as to the 
possibility of relying on EU law.96 The fact that, where a Member has failed to 
transpose a directive or has done so incorrectly, certain provisions of a directive 
                                                  
91 Brent (n 14) 111; Prechal (n 13) 108; Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel, European Union Law (Robert 
Bray and Nathan Cambien (eds), 3rd edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2011) 897. 
92 On the principle of legal certainty, see further Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law 
(Oxford University Press 1999) 163-169; Mark Brearley and Mark Hoskins, Remedies in EC Law, (2nd 
ed, Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 37-38. 
93 On the principle of effective judicial protection, see further Section 3.6 (Obligations Relating to the 
Enforcement of Directives). 
94 Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium (n 69), para 10. See also to that effect, as regards the obligation 
to comply with Treaty provisions, Case C-151/94 Commission v Luxembourg [1995] ECR I-3685, para 
18; Case C-358/98 Commission v Italy [2000] ECR I-1255, para 17; Case C-367/98 Commission v 
Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731, para 41. 
95 Case 168/85 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 2945, para 13.  
96 Case 159/78 Commission v Italy [1979] ECR 3247, para 22; Case 74/86 Commission v Germany 
[1988] ECR 2139, para 10; Case C‐120/88 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I‐621, para 9; and Case 
C‐119/89 Commission v Spain [1991] ECR I‐641, para 8; Case C-160/99 Commission v France [2000] 
ECR I-6137, para 22. 
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are capable of producing direct effect97 – and can therefore be relied upon by 
individuals before the national courts – does not relieve a Member State from 
the obligation to adopt the national implementing measures.98 In circumstances 
where provisions of a directive may have direct effect, this is only a minimum 
guarantee and is not sufficient to ensure the correct and complete 
implementation of a directive99 or the fulfilment of obligations arising under the 
Treaty.100 As a result, the obligation to transpose directives also entails that 
conflicting provisions of national law should be repealed or amended.101  
In the circumstances where a directive is required to be transposed by a 
specific instrument of national law, the various forms which transposition can 




97 On the concept of direct effect, see further Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2 (Supremacy, direct effect and 
consistent interpretation). 
98 Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium (n 69), para 12; Case C-208/90 Emmott [2001] ECR I-4269, 
para 20; Case C-433/93 Commission v Germany (n 84), para 24; Case C-96/95 Commission v Germany 
(n 82), para 37; Case C-253/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-2423, para 13; Case C-298/99 
Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-3129 para 23; Case C-475/08 Commission v Belgium [2009] ECR I-
11503, para 44;  
99 Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium (n 69), para 12; C-301/81 Commission v Belgium [1983] ECR-
467, para 13; Case C-433/93 Commission v Germany (n 84), para 24; Case C-96/95 Commission v 
Germany (n 82), para 37; Case C-253/95 Commission v Germany (n 98), para 13. 
100 Case C-475/08 Commission v Belgium [2009] ECR I-11503, para 44. See also to that effect, the case 
law confirming that the direct applicability of a provision of the Treaty or of a regulation is only a 
minimum guarantee and does not displace the obligation on Member States to take all appropriate 
measures to fulfil their treaty obligations; Case 72/85 Commission v Netherlands [1986] ECR 1219, para 
20; Case 168/85 Commission v Italy (n 95), para 11; Case C-120/88 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-
621, para 10; Case C-119/89 Commission v Spain [1991] ECR I-641, para 10; Case C-159/89 Commission 
v Greece [1991] ECR I-691, para 10; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur and 
Factortame [1996] ECR I 1029, para 20; Case C-132/05 Commission v Germany [2008] ECR I-957, 
para 68; Case C-512/08 Commission v France [2010] ECR I-8833, para 54. 
101 See to that effect Case 74/86 Commission v Germany [1988] ECR 2139, paras 10-11; Case 169/87 
Commission v France [1988] ECR 4093, para 11. 
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Transposition: Form of National Implementing Measures 
 
Level of government Central/Federal/Federated/Regional/Local 
Branch of government Executive Legislative 
Instrument of national 
implementing 
measures 
delegated legislation or 
regulations 
(+ administrative circulars) 
law 
(+ administrative circulars) 
 
Form of national 
implementing 
measures 




Conditions to be met 




-specific legal framework 
-publicly available 
-legally binding (enforceable 
rights) 
-same legal effect as existing 
national law in same field of law 
 
Effective legal protection
legal position of individuals must 
be:  
-sufficiently defined  




Expected result Transposition must guarantee effectiveness of Directive and 
full application 
 
Table 3.2 Forms of transposition 
 
 
Having examined the obligations that relate to the form of transposition, 
one can proceed to identify the obligations relating to the methods of 
transposition and the content of the national implementing measures. 
3.3 Obligations Relating to the Methods of Transposition 
In addition to the general obligations arising under the Treaty and 
general principles of EU law previously discussed, a directive will also impose 
specific obligations on the Member States. These obligations are not uniform 
and their nature will depend on the content of the directive itself.102 These 
                                                  
102 Case 38/77 Enka [1977] ECR 2203, para 11, where the Court held that ‘it emerges from the third 
paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty [now Article 288 TFEU] that the choice left to the member states 
as regards the form of the measures and the methods used in their adoption by the national authorities 
depends upon the result which the Council or the Commission wishes to see achieved.’  See also, 
Capotorti (n 1) 153-154; Brent (n 14) 97-98;  European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Opinion of the 
European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘25th Annual report from the Commission on 
monitoring the application of Community law (2007)’ [2011] OJ C 18/95, para 3. which observes that 
‘when it comes to implementation, Directives permit various degrees of latitude, from non-explicit 
provisions leaving Member States fairly extensive leeway in choosing national transposition measures, 
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specific obligations will, to varying degrees, impact the discretion which 
Member States enjoy as to the ‘methods’ of implementation and therefore the 
content of the national implementing measures.103  
Directives will generally contain two types of provisions, which can be 
categorised as core provisions and ancillary provisions, some of which may be 
solely addressed to the EU institutions or other Member States.104 The nature 
of the provision does not matter for the purposes of implementation since 
Member States will be held to the same standards under Article 288(3) to 
achieve the result prescribed by the directive concerned.105 The difference is that 
ancillary provisions do not by their nature require transposition although they 
will need to be applied in practice.106 
The core provisions comprise the substance of a directive, in other words, 
they prescribe the ‘result to be achieved’ within the meaning of Article 288(3) 
TFEU. Core provisions include those covering the scope and purpose of the 
directive and those defining its terms.107 When transposing core provisions of 
                                                  
to explicit or prescriptive provisions such as definitions, lists or tables detailing substances, objects, or 
products which require that Member States enact ‘simple transposition measures’ to comply with the 
provisions of the Directive.’ 
103 Case C-60/01 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-5679, paras 25-29; Case C-32/05 Commission v 
Luxembourg [2006] ECR I -11323, paras 37-40. See further, Capotorti (n 1) 153-154; Prechal (n 13) 49; 
Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (n 91) 897.  
104 See Prechal (n 13) 41-51; Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis and Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law 
(Janek Tomasz Nowak ed, Oxford University Press 2014) 169. 
105 See to that effect, Case C-131/88 Commission v Germany (n 75), para 61. However, it should be noted 
that in Case C-32/05 Commission v Luxembourg (n 103), para 35, the Court also held that ‘a provision 
which concerns only the relations between the Member States and the Commission does not, in 
principle, have to be transposed [but] it is open to the Commission to demonstrate that compliance with 
a provision of a directive governing those relations requires the adoption of specific transposing 
measures in national law’.  See also Case C-296/01 Commission v France [2003] ECR I-13909, para 92; 
Case C-429/01 Commission v France [2003] ECR I-14355, para 68. For an example where the Court 
ruled that a notification obligation required express transposition into national law, see Case C-410/03 
Commission v Italy [2005] ECR I-3507, paras 49-56. 
106 See further n 131 and accompanying text. 
107 Prechal (n 13) 41. 
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the directive in the national implementing measures, a Member State is under 
a duty to satisfy requirements of specificity, clarity and certainty.108 These 
requirements find their basis in the principles of legal certainty and effective 
judicial protection.109 
Core provisions may lay down objectives that might involve substantive 
law. The objectives might also extend to procedure,110 whether administrative111 
or judicial.112 While a directive as a whole is usually addressed to the Member 
States, specific provisions may also grant rights to individuals113 or impose 
obligations on them.114 The core provisions may also prescribe the particular 
                                                  
108 Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium (n 69), para 11 (national implementing measures must be clear, 
certain and legally binding); Case 300/81 Commission v Italy (n 69), para 10 (idem); Case 143/83 
Commission v Denmark [1985] ECR 427, para 10 (national implementing measures must display the 
precision and clarity that are necessary for the protection of individuals falling within the scope of the 
directive); Case 257/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 3249, para 12 (the principles of legal certainty 
and the protection of individuals require that national implementing measures should be worded 
unequivocally); Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany (n  63), paras 20-21 (legal certainty requires 
that national implementing be legally binding and must exhibit specificity, precision and clarity); Case 
C-418/04 Commission v Ireland) (n 76), para 187 (provisions of national implementing measures must 
be sufficiently specific to guarantee transposition of the corresponding provisions of the relevant 
directive); Case C-197/96 Commission v France (n  69), para 15 (legal certainty requires that national 
implementing measures be legally binding and must exhibit specificity, precision and clarity). 
109 See further n 89-93 and accompanying text. 
110 Case 48/75 Royer (n 33), paras 71-73, concerning the free movement of workers. 
111 See for example, Articles 8-11 and 19-21 of Directive 2004/38 on the administrative procedure for 
the issue of residence documentation, discussed further in Chapter 6 (The Obligations Contained in 
Directive 2004/38). For further examples, see Prechal (n 13) 41-42. 
112 See for example, Articles 15, 30 and 31 of Directive 2004/38 on procedural safeguards, discussed 
further in Chapter 6 (The Obligations Contained in Directive 2004/38). For further examples, see 
Prechal (n 13) 41-42. 
113 For example, the core provisions of Directive 2004/38, although addressed to the Member States, 
grant rights to EU citizens and their family members. See Chapter 6 (The Obligations Contained in 
Directive 2004/38) for a discussion of the implications of the Directive being addressed to Member 
States. See further Prechal (n 13) 42-43.  
114 See for instance, the directive on air carrier liability, which imposes obligations on air transport 
companies to return third-country citizens who are refused entry to the Schengen area and imposes 
penalties on air transport companies who transport third country nationals without adequate travel 
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legal or factual state of affairs that the Member States are required to bring 
about115 and may contain detailed prescriptions in this connection.116 As a result, 
a directive may therefore leave no room for discretion on the part of the Member 
State as to the content of their national implementing measures.117  
The opposite may also be true, given that some core provisions may give 
the Member States a discretion whether to derogate from the contents of a 
directive118 or to confer their own interpretation to certain concepts.119 Some 
directives may allow Member States to adopt measures that are more stringent 
than the directive’s provisions,120 or on the contrary measures that are more 
                                                  
documents; Directive 2001/51 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 [2001] OJ L187/45, Articles 2 and 4. 
115 Case 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen [1977] ECR 113, para 23; Case C-72/95 
Kraaijeveld [1996] ECR I-5403, para 56; Case C-127/02 Waddenvereniging and 
Vogelbeschermingsvereniging [2004] ECR I-7405, para 66. 
116 See Prechal (n 13) 41. See also Jürgen Bast, ‘On the Grammar of EU Law: Legal Instruments‘ (2003) 
NYU/Max Plank Institute Jean Monnet Working Paper No 9/03, 13. 
117 Case 38/77 Enka (n 33), para 17 (the definition of the terms ‘price paid or payable’ under a directive 
concerning the common customs tariff left no room for discretion by the Member States). See also, 
Capotorti (n 1) 153-154; Economic and Social Committee (n 139) para 3.7, which identifies 
‘prescriptive/explicit provisions, which require Member States' transposition measures to comply with 
the provisions of the directive. These include definitions; prescriptive/ explicit provisions, which place 
specific obligations on the Member States; annexes to directives, which may include lists or tables 
detailing substances, objects or products; and specimen forms which apply throughout the European 
Union’. 
118 See, for example, Article 3(4) of Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights [2011] OJ L 304/64, which 
allows Member States to exclude consumer contracts concluded off-premises with a value not exceeding 
€50 from the scope of the national implementing measures that give effect to this directive.  
119 See, for example, Case C-83/11 Rahman [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:519 (Judgment of 5 September 
2012), paras 24-25, concerning the discretion provided to Member States when facilitating the entry or 
residence of family members other than core family members under Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38, 
discussed further in Chapter 6 (The Obligations Contained in Directive 2004/38). See further, Prechal 
(n 13) 43. 
120 See, for example, Article 8 of Directive 1993/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L 
95/29, which allows Member States to impose more stringent protections for consumers. Likewise, 
Member States are allowed to retain or adopt more stringent protections for consumers under Article 8 
of Directive 1999/44 on consumer goods guarantees [1999] OJ L 171/12. 
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favourable.121 Specific limitations might also be contained in the relevant 
directive on how Member States exercise their discretion in this context122 or 
impose a duty to inform the Commission of the national measures taken.123  
When transposing specific provisions of a directive, the Member States 
are also bound by the principle of proportionality.124 This is particularly the case 
when the Member States are exercising their discretion in the transposition of 
a directive, such as when laying down deadlines125 or imposing penalties to 
sanction breaches of the national implementing measures.126 Likewise, in cases 
where Member States are explicitly permitted to derogate from the provisions 
of a directive, the national measures that give effect to such derogations must 
be limited to those that are strictly necessary to fulfil the objectives of the 
derogation in question.127 Where a directive provides for specific criteria that 
must be met in order to benefit from a derogation, the national implementing 
                                                  
121 See, for example, Article 37 of Directive 2004/38, which allows Member States to adopt more 
favourable provisions that those contained in the Directive.  See further, Prechal (n 13) 42-43. 
122 See, for example, the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, whose Article 2(3) allows Member 
States to exclude certain persons who engage in financial activity on an ‘occasional or very limited basis’ 
in circumstances where ‘there is little risk of money laundering’; the provision then goes on to list what 
factors Member States must take into account to determine the likelihood of such a risk; Directive 
2015/849 on preventing money laundering and terrorist financing [2015] OJ L 141/73. 
123 See, for example, Directive 1993/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L 95/29 and 
Directive 1999/44 on consumer goods guarantees [1999] OJ L 171/12. In the case of both directives, 
Article 8a requires those Member States which make use of the option to impose more stringent 
protections for the benefit of consumers under Article 8 to inform the Commission of the measures 
taken.  
124 Case C-2/97 Società Italiana Petroli (n 12) para 48. 
125 ibid, paras 49-50. 
126 Case C-382/92 Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435, para 55; Case C-383/92 
Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2479, para 40. See also to that effect, in cases involving 
the imposition of penalties for breaches of EU regulations, C-68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 
2965, para 24; Case C-326/88 Hansen [1990] ECR I-2911, para 17; Case C-7/90 Vandevenne and 
Others [1991] ECR I-4371, para 11; Case C-29/95 Pastoors [1997] ECR I-265, para 24. 
127 Case C-63/96 Skripalle [1997] ECR I-2847, para 26. See also to that effect, C-40/93 Commission v 
Italy [1995] ECR I-1319, para 23. 
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measures must specifically contain these criteria128 and must keep to the limits 
prescribed by the directive.129 
In addition, a directive will also contain ancillary provisions that 
complement its core provisions. Although the nature of some ancillary 
provisions means they do not need to be transposed130 – because they only 
concern relations between the Member States and the Commission131 – the 
Member States are nonetheless still required to comply with them.132 Ancillary 
provisions are therefore no less important or legally binding than core 
provisions.133 
Ancillary provisions include provisions that specify the date of entry into 
force of the directive.134 These should be distinguished from provisions relating 
to the deadline for transposition, which corresponds to the period allowed for 
the adoption of national implementing measures by the Member States. While 
                                                  
128 Case C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands (n 19), para 28; Case C-118/94 Associazione Italiana per 
il WWF [1996] ECR I-1223, para 22. 
129 412/85 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 3503, paras 17-19. 
130 See further, Prechal (n 13) 49; Better Regulation Toolbox (n 79) 237: ‘Frequently, directives contain 
provisions that require Member States to notify specific reports/action plans/facilities. These 
provisions often contain separate deadlines and are different from the general obligation to notify 
transposition measures. Noncompliance with such provisions should be classified as bad application, 
as opposed to a failure to notify.’ 
131 Case C-296/01 Commission v France (n 105), paragraph 92, Case C-429/01 Commission v France 
(n 105), para 68; Case C-32/05 Commission v Luxembourg (n 103), para 35, where the Court held that 
‘a provision which concerns only the relations between the Member States and the Commission does 
not, in principle, have to be transposed [but] it is open to the Commission to demonstrate that 
compliance with a provision of a directive governing those relations requires the adoption of specific 
transposing measures in national law’. See also, Case C‐72/02 Commission v Portugal [2003] ECR I-
6597, paras 19-20.  
132 See for example, Case 274/83 Commission v Italy [1985] ECR 3583, paras 40-43 (failure to 
communicate the text of the national implementing measures constitutes a breach of the directive in 
question). See also, Prechal (n 13) 44. 
133 Prechal (n 13) 44. 
134 In accordance with Article 297 TFEU, directives must be published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union and ‘enter into force on the date specified in them or, in the absence thereof, on the 
twentieth day following that of their publication.’ 
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the Treaty is silent on the deadline for transposition, the EU institutions have 
committed themselves to ‘insert into directives a time limit for transposition 
that is as short as possible and that generally does not exceed two years’.135 
However, this does not appear to have been followed systematically.136 The 
deadline for transposition tends to be the same date for all Member States, but 
for some directives certain Member States have benefitted from longer 
transposition deadlines.137  
Ancillary provisions will also include an obligation on the Member States 
to adopt ‘the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to 
comply’ with the directive in question, thus reaffirming the obligations 
contained in Articles 288(3) and 291(1) TFEU and Article 4(3) TEU.138 In 
addition, such a provision will also include a so-called ‘interconnection clause’ 
that requires Member States to include a clear reference in their national 
implementing measures to the directive that is being implemented.139 The 
                                                  
135 European Parliament, Council and Commission, ‘Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making’ 
[2003] OJ C 321/1, para 33; see also European Parliament and Commission, ‘Framework Agreement 
on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission’ [2010] OJ L 304/47, 
para 44. 
136 See for example, Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market [2006] OJ L 376/36, which 
although it entered into force on 28 December 2006 contained a deadline for transposition expiring on 
28 December 2009, namely three years after its entry into force; see also Directive 2006/106 on driving 
licences (recast) [2006] OJ L403/18, which entered into force on 19 January 2007, but only required 
Member States to transpose certain provisions by 19 January 2011 and to ensure they applied the 
directive as a whole from 19 January 2013.  
137 See, for example, former Directive 1993/38 on public procurement in the utilities sectors [1993] OJ 
L 393/84 (repealed by Directive 2004/17 [2004] OJ L 134/1), whose Article 45 provided for longer 
transposition deadlines for Greece, Portugal and Spain. For other examples, see Prechal (n 13) 18-19. 
138 Prechal (n 13) 44.  
139 Commission, Eighth Annual Report from the Commission on Monitoring the Application of 
Community Law 1990 [2011] OJ C 338/1, 7: ‘the Council has introduced the interconnection principle, 
which means that in their national implementing measures Member States explicitly refer to the 
Directive being incorporated’; Economic and Social Committee, ‘Opinion of the European Economic 
and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission A Europe of results — Applying 
Community law COM(2007) 502 final’ [2008] OJ C 204/9, para 3.6. See further, Commission 
‘Legislative Drafting – Commission Manual’ (1 January 1997) (hereafter Commission Legislative 
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purpose of such a clause is to make explicit the EU origin of the national 
implementing measures.140,141  
 Directives also usually require the Member States to communicate to the 
Commission details of the national implementing measures that have been 
adopted to give effect to a directive.142 In practice, this obligation requires the 
Member States to provide the full text of the national implementing measures 
that purport to transpose the directive concerned to the Commission, so that 
the latter can ascertain whether the Member State has ‘effectively and 
completely implemented the directive’.143 The information provided by the 
Member States must be clear and precise and it ‘must indicate unequivocally 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions by means of which the 
Member State considers that it has satisfied the various requirements imposed 
on it by the directive’.144 This obligation applies even in circumstances where a 
Member State contends that the adoption of national implementing measures 
is not necessary because the objectives of the directive have already been 
                                                  
Drafting Manual), para I 6.9.3 <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/better_regulation/documents/legis_draft_comm_en.pdf> accessed on 3 October 2015. See 
also see Timmermans (n 56) 22. 
140 Commission Legislative Drafting Manual (n 139) para I 6.9.3; see also Prechal (n 13) 44-45. 
141 As noted above, n 78 and accompanying text, the Court of Justice has previously ruled that Member 
States are under an obligation to adopt national implementing measures in cases where a directive 
‘expressly requires Member States to ensure that their measures transposing the Directive include a 
reference to it or that such reference is made when they are officially published’; see for example Case 
C-137/96 Commission v Germany. 
142 Prechal (n 13) 45. 
143 Case 274/83 Commission v Italy (n 132), para 42; Case C-427/07 Commission v Ireland [2009] ECR 
I-6277, para 107: ‘In the absence of such information, the Commission is not in a position to ascertain 
whether the Member State has genuinely implemented the directive completely genuinely implemented 
the directive completely’. See also, Joint Political Declaration of 28 September 2011 of Member States 
and the Commission on explanatory documents [2011] OJ C369/14, para 4, and Joint Political 
Declaration of 27 October 2011 of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
explanatory documents [2011] OJ C369/15, para 1. See further, Prechal (n 13) 45. 
144 Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands (n 27), paras 7-8; Case 97/81 Commission v Netherlands (n 
27), paras 7-8. 
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achieved through an existing legal framework or general principles of national 
law.145 A failure by a Member State to notify the Commission of the national 
implementing measures will constitute a breach of its duty of sincere 
cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU,146 which will justify the initiation of 
infringement proceedings by the Commission under Article 258. 147,148 Under 
Article 260(3) TFEU,149 as inserted by the Lisbon Treaty,150 the Commission can 
now request the imposition of financial penalties when a Member State has 
failed to notify its national implementing measures. 151  
In some cases, the obligation on the Member States to notify national 
implementing measures may be supplemented by a requirement to provide a 
                                                  
145 Case C-69/90 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-6011, paras 11-16. 
146 Ibid. See also to that effect, Case 33/90 Commission v Italy (n 28), paras 16-21; Case C-421/12 
Commission v Belgium [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2064 (judgment of 10 July 2014), paras 33-34. 
147 Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands (n 27), para 8; Case C-456/03 Commission v Italy [2005] 
ECR I-5335, para 27; Case C-427/07 Commission v Ireland (n 143), para 107; Case C-421/12 
Commission v Belgium (n 146), para 34. See further Capotorti (n 1) 162.  
148 For a further discussion of infringement proceedings, see further Chapter 5, Section 5.2 
(Consequences of Non-Compliant Implementation at EU Level). 
149 Article 260(3) TFEU provides as follows:  
‘When the Commission brings a case before the Court pursuant to Article 226 on the grounds 
that the Member State concerned has failed to fulfil its obligation to notify measures 
transposing a directive adopted under a legislative procedure, it may, when it deems 
appropriate, specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member 
State concerned which it considers appropriate in the circumstances. If the Court finds that 
there is an infringement it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on the Member State 
concerned not exceeding the amount specified by the Commission. The payment obligation 
shall take effect on the date set by the Court in its judgment.’ 
150 Treaty of Lisbon (n 35), Article 1, para 212). 
151 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission - Implementation of Article 260(3) of the 
Treaty’ [2001] OJ C 12/1. See further, Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman (n 104) 170-171. 
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so-called ‘correlation table’152,153, which is a document that identifies the 
provisions of the national implementing measures that correspond to each 
provision of the EU directive that is being transposed.154  
                                                  
152 Despite the Commission’s efforts, this obligation is not systematically imposed due to the reticence 
of the Council. The Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making (n 135), para 34 merely provides 
that ‘[t]he Council will encourage the Member States to draw up, for themselves and in the interests of 
the Community, their own tables which will, as far as possible, illustrate the correlation between the 
directives and the transposition measures and to make them public’. See also, Commission 
Communication ‘A Europe of Results - Applying Community Law’, COM(2007) 502 final, 6, where the 
Commission indicated it would ‘continue systematically to include an obligation for a correlation table 
to be communicated in each new proposal for a directive’. However, according to former Commission 
President Manuel Barroso, ‘The Council often opposes the adoption of a legal obligation for correlation 
tables to be provided in new EU directives. The Council opposed any obligation on correlation tables 
being included in the 2003 Agreement on better law-making. As a result, this agreement, in its 
paragraph 34, only encourages Member States to provide such tables. The Council therefore often 
replaces an article in a draft directive with a paragraph in the preamble referring to the value of such 
tables being provided if considered useful by Member States. This is despite the fact that many Member 
States use correlation tables as part of their internal administrative or parliamentary procedures.’; see 
Joint Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission to Written Questions by Chris Davies 
MEP (ALDE), E-9373/10 and E-9931/10 [2011] OJ C 265E/20, 66 
 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2010-9931&language=SL> 
accessed on 31 December 2015.  The European Parliament and the Commission are broadly in 
agreement that the obligation to include correlation tables should be systematically imposed; see 
Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission 
(n 135), para 44: ‘In order to ensure better monitoring of the transposition and application of Union 
law, the Commission and Parliament shall endeavour to include compulsory correlation tables’. At 
present, the Commission still has to provide justification for the inclusion of such an obligation in 
directives, as made apparent by the Joint Political Declaration (n 143), para 6 which states that ‘[i]n 
justified cases, Member States undertake to accompany the notification of transposition measures with 
one or more explanatory documents, which can take the form of correlation tables or other documents 
serving the same purpose.’ 
153 The usefulness of such correlation tables has been highlighted by Asya Zhelyazkova and Nikoleta 
Jordanova, ‘Signalling “Compliance”: The Link Between Notified EU Directive Implementation and 
Infringement Cases’ (2015) 16 European Union Politics 408-428, 425: ‘our findings suggest that the 
implementation process improves whenever the European Commission or the member states consider 
compliance with a directive important and clearly signal that in order to generate an expectation of 




Ancillary provisions may also include reporting obligations on the 
Member States or the EU institutions or both, which might call for one-off155 or 
regular156 reporting duties in connection with the implementation of the 
directive in question by the Member States. This might take the form of 
undertaking assessments or studies or the compilation of statistics relating to 
matters covered by the directive concerned.157 Such a reporting obligation might 
be combined with an option for the Commission to formulate a proposal for to 
amend the directive concerned where necessary.158  According to the Court of 
Justice, the purpose of such obligations is to enable supervision of the 
application of a directive in two stages: a first assessment being carried out by 
the Member States and then a subsequent review being conducted by the 
Commission159 to enable it to fulfil its role as guardian of the Treaties.160  
The ancillary provisions may also call for the prior notification of national 
measures adopted on the basis of the discretion granted to the Member States 
                                                  
154 Marta Ballasteros, Rostane Mehdi, Mariolina Eliantonio and Damir Petrovic, ‘Tools for Ensuring 
Implementation and Application of EU Law and Evaluation of their Effectiveness’ (PE493.014, 
European Parliament, 2013) 38-41. 
155 See for example, Article 9 of Directive 2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of 
movement for workers [2014] OJ L 128/8. 
156 See for example, Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 
September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255/22, whose Article 60 
requires both the Member States to submit bi-annual reports on the application of the directive and the 
Commission to draw up a report on the implementation of the directive every five years. 
157 See for example, Article 19 of Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA [2011] OJ L 101/1, which requires the Member 
States ‘to establish national rapporteurs … [tasked with] the carrying out of assessments of trends in 
trafficking in human beings, the measuring of results of anti-trafficking actions, including the gathering 
of statistics in close cooperation with relevant civil society organisations active in this field, and 
reporting’. 
158 See for example, Article 24 of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the 
status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2003] OJ L 16/44. 
159 Case 248/83 Commission v Germany (n 88), para 37. 
160 Article 17 TEU and Article 258 TFEU. 
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under a directive. Depending on the directive in question, a failure to comply 
with this notification obligation may render a non-notified national measure 
unenforceable.161  
Some directives may also contain ancillary provisions that relate to 
cooperation between Member States,162 including the exchange of information 
or the creation of networks between the national authorities.163 Such provisions 
                                                  
161 See for example Article 5 of Directive 2015/1535/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of 
rules on Information Society services [2015] OJ L 241/1, which requires Member States to notify all 
draft technical regulations to the Commission. Article 6 provides for the automatic postponement of the 
entry into force of a technical regulation which the Commission opposes on the grounds that they may 
restrict the free movement of goods or services or the freedom of establishment. According to consistent 
case law of the Court of Justice, failure to notify a draft technical regulation renders the standard 
unenforceable, see for example, Case C-194/94 CIA Security [1996] ECR I-2201, para 54 (as regards 
Directive 83/189 [1983] OJ L 109/8) and Case C-307/13 Ivansson [2014] ECR not yet reported 
(judgment of 10 July 2014), para 48 (as regards Directive 98/34 [1998] OJ L 204/37).  However, not all 
notification obligations necessarily carry such legal consequences; see for example Case 380/87 
Enichem [1989] ECR 2491, para 20, concerning the notification obligation contained in Article 3(2) of 
Directive 75/442 on waste [1975] OJ L 194/47, which ‘merely requires the Member States to inform the 
Commission in good time of any draft rules within the scope of that provision, without laying down any 
procedure for Community monitoring thereof or making implementation of the planned rules 
conditional upon agreement by the Commission or its failure to object’. Aside from the enforceability of 
non-notified measures, a failure to comply with notification obligation may also constitute a breach of 
EU law that can be the subject of infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU, see to that effect, 
Case 128/78 Commission v United Kingdom [1979] ECR 419, paras 14-15. 
162 This provides further expression to Article 4(3) TEU which provides that ‘[p]ursuant to the principle 
of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other 
in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.’ See further, F. Lafarge, ‘Administrative Cooperation 
between Member States and the Implementation of EU Law’ (2010) 16 European Public Law, 597-616; 
Micaela Lottini, ‘From “Administrative Cooperation” in the Application of European Union Law to 
“Administrative Cooperation” in the Protection of European Rights and Liberties’ (2012) 18 European 
Public Law, 127-147.   
163 See for example, Article 15 of Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare [2011] OJ L 88/45, 
which provides for the creation of a health technology assessment network tasked with fostering 
cooperation between the Member States in the field of health technology. 
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may also impose a duty to consult or engage with certain actors,164 such as civil 
society groups.165 Finally, Member States may also be tasked with informing the 
public of the contents of a directive.166 
In the circumstances where a directive needs to be implemented by a 
specific instrument of national law, the obligations relating to the methods of 
transposition and their impact on the content of the national implementing 
measures can be summarised as follows: 
 
 











-specific factual/legal result 
Ancillary provisions
-entry into force 
-deadline for transposition 





164 See for example, Article 22 of Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 
98/30/EC [2003] OJ L 176/57, concerning the obligation to consult other Member States or national 
regulatory agencies before exempting gas interconnectors from certain provisions of the directive. 
165 See for example Article 5 of Directive 2014/54 (n 155) which requires Member States to ‘promote 
dialogue with the social partners and with relevant non-governmental organisations which have, in 
accordance with national law or practice, a legitimate interest in contributing to the fight against 
unjustified restrictions and obstacles to the right to free movement, and discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, of Union workers and members of their family with a view to promoting the principle of 
equal treatment.’ 
166 See for example, Article 4(1c) of Directive 94/62/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on 
packaging and packaging waste [1994] OJ L 365/10, as inserted by Directive 2015/720/EU [2015] L 
115/1, which requires both the Commission and the Member States to ‘actively encourage public 
information and awareness campaigns concerning the adverse environmental impact of the excessive 
consumption of lightweight plastic carrier bags’. See also Article 6(2) of Directive 2014/54 (n 155) which 
requires Member States to ‘provide, in more than one official language of the institutions of the Union, 
information on the rights conferred by Union law concerning the free movement of workers that is clear, 
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Transposition must guarantee effectiveness of Directive and full 
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Table 3.2 Methods of transposition 
 
 
The different obligations contained in specific provisions of a directive will 
have an impact upon the choices that the relevant authorities of the Member 
States make when they endeavour to draft the provisions that feature in their 
national implementing measures. 
3.4 Implications for the Drafting of National Implementing 
Measures 
It has already been noted that the Member States are not necessarily 
under an obligation to ensure that ‘the content of the directive be incorporated 
formally and verbatim in express, specific legislation’ provided that the existing 
legal framework complies with the principles of legal certainty and effective 
judicial protection.167 Nonetheless, it has also been observed that the provisions 
of a directive may implicitly call for specific national implementing measures to 
be adopted, such as when a directive requires the Member States to include a 
reference to the directive in question.168  
                                                  
167 See Section 3.5 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives). For a case relating to the free 
movement of persons, see Case C-96/95 Commission v Germany (n 82), para 35, in which Germany 
unsuccessfully sought to argue that the existing legislation adequately transposed the provisions of 
Directives 90/364 (n 81)  and 90/365 (n 80). 
168 See Section 3.2 (Obligations Relating to the Form of Transposition) and case law cited at n 78. See 
also, Economic and Social Committee (n 139), para 3.6: ‘There are also instances where the directive 
contains an article to the effect that the national provisions transposing the directive must make 
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In the event that a Member State does adopt national implementing 
measures, it is under an obligation to ensure that the national implementing 
measures do not produce ambiguity that would prevent individuals from 
understanding their rights and obligations under the directive or prevent the 
national courts from enforcing those rights and obligations.169 The national 
implementing measures must therefore be drafted in specific, clear and precise 
terms.170 However, the Court of Justice will not sanction ‘a mere terminological 
difference’ which has no effect on the fulfilment of a Member State’s obligations 
to achieve the result prescribed by a directive.171 
The Member States also have an obligation to transpose a directive in 
full.172 As a result, unless explicitly permitted by a directive, the national 
authorities do not have a discretion to choose to implement some but not all the 
core provisions of a directive, so-called ‘cherry-picking’.173 
                                                  
reference to the directive or be accompanied by a reference of this kind when they are published. 
Ignorance of this clause, known as the “interconnection clause”, is penalised by the Court, which refuses 
to provide for an exception where Member States plead that their existing domestic law already 
complies with the directive.’ 
169 Case 143/83 Commission v Denmark (n 108), para 10; Case 257/86 Commission v Italy (n 108), 
para 12; Case C-120/88 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-621, para 11; Case C-119/89 Commission v 
Spain [1991] ECR I-641, para 10; Case C-159/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR I-691, para 11; Case 
C-306/91 Commission v Italy [1993] ECR I-2133, paras 14-15; Case C-478/01 Commission v 
Luxembourg [2003] ECR I-2351, para 20. 
170 See case law cited at n 108. See further Prechal (n 13) 75.   
171 Case 363/85 Commission v Italy (n 84), para 16. 
172 Case C-96/95 Commission v Germany (n 82), para 36. 
173 See for example, Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Cases C-182/15 Lyttle, C-392/13 Rabal Cañas 
and C-80/14 USDAW [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:65 (Opinion of 13 May 2015), para 67: ‘Member States 
may, pursuant to Article 5 of Directive 98/59, grant workers greater protection by, for example, 
lengthening the time allowed for the tallying of directive-relevant dismissals. However, the directive is 
no smörgåsbord, meaning that it is not open to cherry-picking! Member States may not offset an 
increased level of protection by reducing it in other respects, for instance by interpreting the concept of 
‘redundancy’ more restrictively. Like the methods for calculating the thresholds — and therefore the 
thresholds themselves — that concept does not lie within their discretion.’ See also European Economic 
and Social Committee, ‘Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on How to improve 
the implementation and enforcement of EU legislation’ [2005] OJ C 24/52, 4.2.8. 
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When embarking upon the drafting of national implementing measures, 
the Member States have displayed differing approaches that range from 
replicating the exact provisions of the directive to using more elaborate drafting 
techniques.174 EU law does not favour one approach over the other,175 since each 
approach involves its own set of limitations.176    
The national officials who draft the national implementing measures may 
choose to resort to verbatim or literal transposition, also known as the ‘copy out’ 
technique.177 While this has the advantage that the national implementing 
                                                  
174 Capotorti (n 1) 161; Jane Bates, ‘The Conversion of EEC Legislation into UK Legislation’ (1989) 20 
Statute Law Review, 110-123, 119: ‘The draftsman will consider whether or not the terminology used in 
the Community legislation requires explanation or re-definition in the context of United Kingdom 
legislation.’; Dimitrakopoulos (n 54) 449: ‘[f]aced with an unclear text, national officials can either copy 
it into national law thus effectively leaving unresolved the issue of clarity or elaborate by trying to 
facilitate subsequent steps in the implementation chain.’; Prechal (n 13) 32: ‘Member States have a 
choice of different modalities of implementation, lying anywhere between verbatim transposition of the 
directive’s provisions into national law at one end of the spectrum and a “translation” of the directive 
into the terminology and concepts of the national legal system at the other’; ibid, 76: ‘Member States 
have in principle  the choice between verbatim transposition on the one hand, and “translation” of the 
directive into national legal concepts and terminology on the other (plus all the possible variations lying 
between the two extremes)’; ibid, 187: ‘Different modalities of transposition can be chosen, with 
verbatim transposition a one end of the spectrum and translation into national legal concepts and 
terminology at the other. … From a Community law point of view, as a rule neither method is imperative, 
provided that the content of the measures adopted to transpose the directive is sufficiently clear and 
precise.’  
175 Prechal (n 13) 187: ‘[f]rom a Community law point of view, as a rule neither method is imperative, 
provided that the content of the measures adopted to transpose the directive is sufficiently clear and 
precise’. 
176 For a review of the relative merits and drawbacks of the respective approaches to the drafting of 
national implementing measures, see Brent (n 14) 109-110; Prechal (n 13) 31-36. 
177 Lynn Ramsey, ‘The Copy Out Technique: More of a ‘Cop-Out’ than a Solution’ (1996) 17 Statute Law 
Review, 218-228, 222-224: ‘Copy out has been defined as: a “technique . . . in which EC directives are 
simply grafted onto UK law”; “the verbatim transposition of the directive into English law”; and where 
“the implementing legislation simply refers to or literally adopts the same, or virtually the same, 
language as the directive itself”. Each definition contains an aspect of reproduction. However, the first 
two definitions suggest that the entire directive is copied whereas the final definition suggests that copy 
out occurs where certain words or phrases are duplicated. … In practice, drafters have tended not to 
copy out the entire directive, even where the directive is brief. Instead they have restricted the use of 
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measures use the terminology of the directive concerned,178 there is a danger 
that this approach may lead to ‘under-implementation’.179 This occurs where 
‘the measures taken to transpose the directive do not achieve the aims of the 
directive’180 or omit ‘crucial aspects of the directive thus undermining 
effectiveness’.181  
Firstly, replicating the wording of a directive may cause problems of 
interpretation and create ambiguities contrary to the principle of legal 
certainty.182 On the one hand, the wording used in a directive may not be 
sufficiently clear183 or might consist in novel concepts unknown in national 
                                                  
copy out to certain articles, phrases or words which are either replicated or followed more loosely in the 
implementing legislation. Either way, the resultant legislation is a synthesis of different drafting styles 
which may pose problems for those seeking to rely upon or interpret the legislation.’  
178 Brent (n 14) 110: ‘“copy-out” has the merit of ensuring all provisions of a directive are reproduced in 
English law’; Prechal (n 13) 32: ‘Verbatim reproduction may have the advantage that, at least at first 
sight, the member state has complied with its obligation.  The obvious disadvantage is then, however, 
that national legislation may be using unfamiliar terms.  Consequently, there is no guarantee that the 
implementing measures will be understood, interpreted, and applied correctly.’(emphasis in original) 
There may also be instances where replicative transposition is the better approach; see for example, 
Bates (n 174) 119: ‘[w]here the terminology has an established Community meaning the wording used 
in the Community legislation should generally be left unaltered in order to avoid confusion.’   
179 The term is used by Ramsay (n 177) and Dimitrakopoulos (n 54). 
180 Ramsay (n 177) 222. 
181 Dimitrakopoulos (n 54) 449. 
182 Ramsay (n 177) 228: ‘The principle of legal certainty must be the aspiration in the creation of all 
legislation. It is apparent from the foregoing that copy out may adopt ambiguities which are at odds 
with the principle.’ 
183 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 38) 82, who take the view that ‘[a] vague and open-ended directive 
gives a Member State wide latitude for wrongful application. … A detailed directive which is poorly 
drafted may itself constitute an obstacle to implementation’; Richard Wainwright, ‘Techniques of 
Drafting European Community Legislation: Problems of Interpretation’, (1996) 17 Statute Law Review 
7-14, 11, who deplores ‘a general deterioration in the quality and consistency of Community legislation 
… Last minute compromises … produce texts which are, in some cases, specifically designed to be 
unclear.’; Dimitrakopoulos (n 54) 445-446, who remarks  that ‘[t]he content of directives is frequently 
vague (‘fudges’) as a result of political compromises that occur in formulation.’; Prechal (n 13) 33, for 
whom ‘directives themselves are often vague and open to a variety of interpretations, since they must 
accommodate different national legal concepts and constructions’; Bates (n 174) 119-120 suggests this 
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law.184 Reliance on the ‘copy out’ technique therefore misses the opportunity to 
elaborate concepts of EU law in the national implementing measures in order 
to ensure their linguistic compatibility with existing legislation.185 The absence 
of explanatory provisions using familiar national legal terminology in the 
national implementing measures may lead to problems of interpretation by the 
national authorities or the national courts,186 which are then faced with the task 
of interpreting unfamiliar concepts of EU law. This risks undermining the 
consistent interpretation of EU law in all Member States.187,188  
                                                  
is a problem specific to the transposition of ‘the “permissive directive" which requires a minimum 
standard to be set but prescribes no maximum’.  
184 Bates (n 174) 119 provides an example: ‘some provisions do not fit into the domestic drafting style. 
For example, the use of the word "normally', frequent in Community legislation, is meaningless in a 
United Kingdom context and the draftsman therefore has to find an alternative on each occasion when 
this word is used’. See also, Prechal, (n 13) 188 who notes that the national implementing measures 
‘may literally just take over the terms of the directive, which could be unfamiliar to the national legal 
order’.   
185 Ramsay (n 177) ‘one of the principal objectives which drafters should strive to achieve is legal 
compatibility. … [T]he drafter should aim to ensure that the language used is consistent with other 
legislative measures covering the same subject matters. It is submitted that the use of copy out may call 
into question the drafter's commitment to the goal of legal compatibility. … The use of copy out in this 
way may also create legislation which contains different linguistic styles. Linguistic inconsistencies will 
arise where if the copied out material contains more general or aspirational statements and other 
sections, which are not copied out, are characterized by detail and precision.’ 
186 See to that effect, European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Opinion of the European Economic 
and Social Committee on “Better lawmaking”’ [2005] OJ C 24/39, 1.2.4. See also, Neville Brown and 
Tom Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities (5th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) 
407: ‘[t]he interpretation however of texts copied out, in time may create confusion in the courts, 
resulting in an increased number of references to the Court of Justice.’ 
187 The Court of Justice has consistently held that terms used in EU law must be uniformly interpreted 
and applied throughout the Member States, except where an express or implied reference is made to 
national law; see for example Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paras 3-4; Case 49/71 Hagen [1972] 
ECR 23, para 6; Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415, para 7, Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] para 11; Case 
C-273/90 Mecio-Fell [1991] ECR I-5569, paras 8-12; Case C-468/93 Emmen [1996] ECR I-1721, para 
22; Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I-6917, para 43; and Case C-5/08 Infopaq International [2009] 
ECR I-6569, para 27; C-433/08 Yaesu Europe [2009] ECR I-11487. para 18.  
188 Although in theory, the national courts could seek the assistance of the Court of Justice by making a 
reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, there may be several reasons that lead a 
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On the other hand, while a directive may refer to a term that might also be 
in use in the national legal system, an identical term might have a different 
substantive content in national law compared to the meaning given to it by the 
directive.189  The problem here too is that the terms contained in a directive 
might be interpreted according to national law,190 rather than given their 
autonomous meaning under EU law, which again may undermine the 
consistent interpretation of EU law throughout the Union.  
Secondly, a directive may prescribe the result to be achieved in national 
law ‘in general and unquantifiable terms’191 without containing any detailed 
specifications as to the methods to be used. Member States are then under an 
obligation to specify in their national implementing measures how that result is 
to be brought about.192 National implementing measures that merely replicate 
such provisions without further explanation as to how that result should be 
                                                  
national court to refrain from making a reference to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU; see 
further Chapter 10 (The Implementation of Directive 2004/38 Compared). 
189 See to that effect, Case 283/81 CILFIT (n 187), paras 19-20: ‘It must also be borne in mind … that 
Community law uses terminology which is peculiar to it. Furthermore, it must be emphasised that legal 
concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in community law and in the law of the various 
Member States. … [E]very provision of Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted in 
the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and 
to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied.’ See also, Brent 
(n 14) 110: ‘[t]he directive may employ Community law concepts which have a different substantive 
content from, but used the same terminology as, English law doctrines instead of community law 
concepts.’ 
190 Brent (n 14) 110: ‘[t]he result is that national courts may be tempted to apply English law doctrines 
instead of Community law concepts.’ 
191 Case C-365/97 Commission v Italy (San Rocco case) [1999] ECR I-7773, paras 67-68; Case C-60/01 
Commission v France (n 103) para 27; Case C-32/05 Commission v Luxembourg (n 103) para 38;  
Economic and Social Committee (n 139), para 3.7, refers to ‘non-explicit provisions, which merely set 
forth general goals, leaving Member States fairly extensive leeway in choosing national transposition 
measures’. See also, Brent (n 14) 110: ‘a directive may simply prescribe a result to be achieved without 
specifying in detail the means.’  
192 Economic and Social Committee (n 139), para 3.8: ‘In the case of non-explicit provisions, evaluation 
of the full, faithful and effective nature of the transposition does not relate to the actual drafting of the 
national measures but their content, which must enable the directive's objectives to be achieved.’ 
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achieved may result in incomplete transposition that fails to achieve a 
directive’s stated objectives.193  
On the opposite end of the scale, national officials may also opt for more 
elaborate forms of transposition that are intended to facilitate the application 
and enforcement of a directive.194 However, this approach is also not without its 
shortcomings195 and may lead not only to ‘under-implementation’ but also to 
‘over–implementation’.196 The latter occurs when implementation goes beyond 
the results prescribed by a directive through ‘the use of concepts, obligations, 
mechanisms and procedures that were never meant to be a part of the 
directive’.197  
Firstly, the absence of concepts under national law that correspond to 
those used in a directive may lead the national authorities to try to address this 
discrepancy. This could take the form of explanatory provisions in the national 
implementing measures that attempts to elaborate on the concepts contained 
in the directive by using more familiar national legal terminology. In some 
cases, this can lead to ‘under-implementation’ because ‘certain provisions of a 
directive may be omitted from national law in whole or in part’198 resulting in 
incomplete transposition.  However, in other cases, this can lead to ‘over-
implementation’ because such explanatory wording might impose additional 
                                                  
193 Ramsay (n 177) 225-227, who observes that ‘[t]he use of copy out may result in the adoption of terms 
which merely replicate the obligation imposed upon the Member States by the directive without 
providing the mechanism to achieve the required result’ and points out the ‘obvious risks where drafters 
copy out ambiguous statements or statements which merely provide the goal to be achieved but leave 
the Member State discretion in the method to achieve the goal.’  
194 Dimitrakopoulos (n 54) 449, who explains that ‘those who take a bolder stance, try to interpret the 
directive, in an attempt to facilitate street-level implementation.’   
195 Prechal, (n 13) 188, who observes that ‘the “translation” of the directive into national legal 
terminology is not necessarily a safeguard for proper interpretation and application by the courts’. The 
author goes on to provide several examples drawn from the case law of the Court of Justice, ibid, 188-
190.   
196 The term is used by Ramsay (n 177), and Dimitrakopoulos (n 54). 
197 Dimitrakopoulos (n 54) 449. 
198 Brent (n 14) 110 
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requirements that are not contained in the directive that give a national 
meaning to what should be an EU concept. In both cases, this leads to a different 
meaning being ascribed to EU concepts that departs from what the directive had 
intended,199 thus undermining its consistent interpretation in all the Member 
States.  
Secondly, the national authorities might be tempted to insert additional 
provisions in their national implementing measures which are not prescribed 
by the directive and in connection with which Member States do not enjoy a 
discretion. This practice is sometimes referred to as ‘gold-plating’200 and 
consists in the inclusion of additional requirements in the national 
implementing measures, which are neither required nor foreseen by the 
directive in question.201 Gold platting may be benign, but the contrary is also 
                                                  
199 Ramsay (n 177) 222: ‘Over-implementation may arise where a directive contains words or phrases 
without legal effect in the UK context and drafters choose alternatives which have a broader meaning 
than the directive intended. … Over-implementation may also arise where the directive is transposed 
through regulations adopted under an existing piece of legislation and the scope of that Act is wider 
than that of the directive.’ 
200 See for example, European Economic and Social Committee (n 173) 1.4. 
201 See for example, Michael Kaeding, Better Regulation in the European Union: Lost in Translation 
or Full Steam Ahead? The Transposition of EU Transport Directives across Member States (Leiden 
University Press 2007) 176: ‘A gold plate is any burden placed on national businesses that is not strictly 
required by the original EU directive. In other words, anything beyond the minimum requirements 
necessary for meeting a directive can be considered gold plate’. UK Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, ‘Transposition Guidance: How to Implement European Directives Effectively’ 
(April 2013), 8, provides further examples: ‘Gold-plating is when implementation goes beyond the 
minimum necessary to comply with a Directive, by: extending the scope, adding in some way to the 
substantive requirement, or substituting wider UK legal terms for those used in the Directive; or not 
taking full advantage of any derogations which keep requirements to a minimum (e.g. for certain scales 
of operation, or specific activities); or retaining pre-existing UK standards where they are higher than 
those required by the Directive; or providing sanctions, enforcement mechanisms and matters such as 
burden of proof which are not aligned with the principles of good regulation; or implementing early, 
before the date given in the Directive.’ For an alternative view on ‘gold-plating’, see Eva Thomann, 
‘Customizing Europe: Transposition as Bottom-Up Implementation’ (2015) Journal of European Public 
Policy (published online, 27 Feb 2015): . See further Commission, ‘Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee 
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true.202 For example, gold-plating may take the form of the inclusion in national 
implementing measures of additional exceptions which are not permitted by a 
directive.203 Such a practice is therefore also likely to undermine the uniform 
application of EU law in all Member States, which according to the Court of 
Justice is a fundamental requirement of the EU’s legal order.204      
In practice, many Member States use a combination of approaches to the 
drafting of national implementing measures that blend both literal and 
elaborative techniques of transposition.205 In general, it would appear that the 
provisions of a directive which contain detailed specifications will tend to be 
                                                  
and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Internal Market Strategy - Priorities 2003-2006’, COM(2003) 238 
final, 57; ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Better Governance for the Single 
Market’, COM(2012) 259 final, 5; Jacques Pelkmans and Anabela Correia de Brito, ‘Enforcement in the 
EU Single Market’ (2012) CEPS Papers, 5.  
202 Various examples are given in European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Abstracts from EESC 
Opinions Referring to Gold-Platting and Transposition’ (25 June 2015) 
<http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/abstract-from-eesc-opinions.pdf> accessed on 28 
November 2015. 
203 See for example, Case 247/85 Commission v Belgium [1987] ECR 3029, para 58: ‘it must be observed 
that this does not appear amongst the reasons, listed limitatively in … the directive, for which Member 
States may derogate from the … provisions of the directive’. See further, Case C-71/92 Commission v 
Spain [1993] ECR I-5923, para 24, in which the Court held that ‘a provision allowing other exceptions 
to be introduced by other laws is likely to create an ambiguous legal situation making it impossible for 
those concerned to ascertain their rights and obligations without ambiguity’. 
204 See for example, Joined cases 66, 127 and 128/79 Meridionale Industria Salumi [1980] ECR 1237, 
para 11; Joined Cases C‐143/88 and C‐92/89 Zuckerfabrik [1991] ECR I‐415, para 26; Joined cases C-
453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04 ABNA Ltd [2005] ECR I-10423, para 104. See also, Case 10/76 
Commission v Italy [1976] ECR 1359, para 12, where the Court emphasised that the obligation on 
Member States to implement directives within the deadline is to ensure the uniform implementation of 
EU law.  
205 Dimitrakopoulos (n 54) 454. 
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literally transposed,206 whilst more loosely drafted provisions of a directive are 
likely to be the subject of more elaborate forms of transposition.207 
The risks which drafting techniques pose to the conformity of the national 










206 Economic and Social Committee (n 139), para 4.1, which notes that ‘[i]t seems to be becoming 
increasingly common for prescriptive/explicit provisions to be transposed by simply transcribing them, 
as the transposition of this type of provisions leaves Member States no margin of manoeuvre; the 
Commission and the Court thus focus their attention more on ensuring that the wording of the 
transposition measures corresponds with, or even is identical to, the prescriptive provisions of the 
directive. However, the Court has never gone as far as to rule that the obligation to transpose faithfully 
necessitates direct transcription. The Commission tends to favour this transcription procedure, while 
taking particular care to ensure that the definitions included in the directive are faithfully reproduced 
in the transposition text, so as to prevent any semantic or conceptual disparities which would hinder 
the uniform application of Community law in the Member States or its effectiveness.’ See also, Ramsay 
(n 177) 228, who suggests that the use of the ‘copy-out’ technique ‘should be restricted to directives 
which are clear and precise and which cover no pre-existing domestic legislation. If not, the UK runs 
the risk of enforcement actions raised by the European Commission and, more probably, damages 
actions raised by aggrieved individuals. This would be ironic given that these were the very dangers it 
sought to avoid.’ 
207 See to that effect, Economic and Social Committee (n 139), para 4.1, which notes that ‘Checking the 
transposition of non-explicit provisions is, however, more problematic. Here we are talking about cases 
where, in accordance with Article 249 of the EC Treaty, a directive merely sets out general objectives 
and leaves it to the Member States to determine the ways and means of attaining them. Evaluation of 
whether the directive has been transposed fully and faithfully must then focus on the actual content of 
the national measures, and not on the drafting of them. The Court thus advocates that checking of 
transposition measures must be done pragmatically on a case by case basis, in the light of the objectives 
of the directive and the sector concerned; and this may throw the Commission off course.’ 
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Table 3.4 Drafting Techniques and their Risks 
 
 
When a Member State proceeds to adopt the national implementing 
measures and transposes a directive, this does not end its obligations under 
Article 288(3) TFEU. The national implementing measures also need to be 






3.5 Obligations Relating to the Application of Directives 
The second stage of implementation relates to application of the directive 
and consists in the administrative measures taken by the national authorities to 
give practical effect to the national implementing measures that transpose a 
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directive.208,209 It is also sometimes referred to as administrative 
implementation.210 
                                                  
208 See Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 38) 62; Siedentopf and Hauschild (n 38) 57-68; Alberto Gil 
Ibañez, The Administrative Supervision & Enforcement of EC Law (Hart 1999) 14: ‘Application is, in 
fact, more concerned  with the correct administration of Community law and includes the adoption of 
acts of individual application. This phase implies an immediate and daily activity on he part of the 
administrations consisting of putting the law into practice’; Prechal (n 13) 6; Conant (n 38) 27-29, who 
sees application as an aspect of ‘compliance with the “law in action”’.   Confusingly, some authors use 
the term ‘implementation’ instead of ‘application’ to refer to ‘the process whereby EU law is applied at 
national and subnational levels’; see, for example, Allio and Fandel (n 38) 11; Mellar (n 38) 2. Compare 
Treib (n 38), 6, who defines ‘application’ as ‘guaranteeing that the norm addressees actually behave in 
a way that is in line with the legal norms laid down in the directives in question’; see also to that effect, 
Dimiter Toshkov, Moritz Knoll and Lisa Wewerka, ‘Connecting the Dots: Case Studies and EU 
Implementation Research’ (2010) Institute for European Integration Research Working Paper 10/2010, 
6 and 17, who use the term ‘administrative implementation’ to what is referred here as application and 
which comprises ‘actions that the public administration undertakes in order to ensure compliance’. The 
authors use the term ‘law application’ to refer to ‘societal compliance with the legislation … [by] citizens, 
companies, NGOs, etc.’, ibid, 10. However, in this study the term ‘observance of the law’ is used instead 
of ‘societal compliance’. Some authors also use the term ‘enforcement’ to refer to measures taken by the 
national administrative or regulatory authorities to secure compliance with EU directives in the 
environmental, social policy or health and safety fields; see for example Esther Versluis, ‘Even Rules, 
Uneven Practices: Opening the “Black Box” of EU Law in Action’ (2007) 30 West European Politics, 50-
67, 62, in which the author considers that enforcement encompasses ‘the establishment of 
administrative agencies, the setting up of necessary tools and instruments, monitoring and inspecting 
by regulators’; Miriam Hartlapp, ‘Enforcing Social Europe through Labour Inspectorates: Changes in 
Capacity and Cooperation across Europe’ (2014) West European Politics, 805-824, 806, who defines 
enforcement as ‘the public or delegated bodies that act to promote compliance and to achieve regulatory 
outcomes.’  Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study, such measures are considered as falling within 
the concept of application of a directive by the national administrative authorities.  
209 Prechal (n 13) 6 points out that the expression ‘application of directives … should in principle refer 
to the application of the national measures transposing he directive. However, in some situations it is 
the directive as such which is applied, namely where it is directly effective and there are no appropriate 
transposition measures. Furthermore it must be observed that both scholars and the Community 
institutions   use the term “application of directives”, even in cases where they are actually referring to 
the application of the national measures transposing them.’ In this study, an effort will be made to use 
the terms the ‘application of directives’ and ‘application of the national implementing measures’ in their 
proper context. 
210 Toshkov, Knoll and Wewerka (n 208), 6 and 17. 
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As previously mentioned,211 the Member States have a discretion as to 
which organs of the state are tasked with application of the national 
implementing measures.  Application may therefore be entrusted to one or 
several authorities operating at central,212 federated,213 regional214 or local 
levels215 or independent government agencies in line with each Member State’s 
institutional structure. Where deemed appropriate, it may even be entrusted to 
private bodies operating under the supervision of the State, such as in relation 
to the recognition of professional qualifications.216 
Whichever authority is tasked with application of a directive, the Member 
States are required ‘to ensure that the provisions of a directive are applied 
exactly and in full’.217 In this connection, the Court of Justice has ruled that ‘the 
adoption of national measures correctly implementing a directive does not 
exhaust the effects of the directive. Member States remain bound actually to 
ensure full application of the directive even after the adoption of those 
measures.’218  
                                                  
211 See n 28 and accompanying text. 
212 See for example, Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745, which concerned a deportation 
decision of a Belgian citizen ordered by the UK’s Secretary of State for the Home Department (the 
Minister of internal affairs). 
213 See to that effect, Case C-8/88 Commission v Germany (n 17) paras 13-14. 
214 See for example, C-435/92 Association pour la protection des animaux sauvages (n 27) which 
concerned a situation where administrative application of a directive on the protection of wild birds had 
been delegated to the prefect of French departments. 
215 Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo (n 16) which concerned the application of the public procurement 
rules by the municipality of Milan. 
216 Case 246/80 Broeckmeulen [1981] ECR 2311, para 16, which concerned the Dutch medical 
registration committee. 
217 Joined Case 91/79 and 92/79 Commission v Italy [1990] ECR 1099, para 6; Case C-287/91 
Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-3515, para 7; Case C-16/95 Commission v Spain [1995] ECR I-4883, 
para 3. 
218 Case C-62/00 Marks & Spencer plc [2002] ECR I-6325, para 27. See also, AG Jacob’s Opinion in 
Case C-237/90 Commission v Germany (n 37), para 14: ‘ it is not sufficient simply to incorporate the 
terms of a directive into national legislation; in addition Member States must ensure that the legislation 
is applied in practice’.   
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Member States must accordingly apply their national implementing 
measures with the same vigour as they would apply their national legislation,219 
and ensure that they display the same diligence when handling cases of non-
observance of the EU rules as they would when dealing with a failure to observe 
their national laws.220  
Such administrative measures may involve the national authorities 
issuing decisions that apply the rules contained in the national implementing 
measures to concrete situations in respect of the persons falling within the scope 
of a directive.221  In line with the principle of national institutional autonomy,222 
national law will determine the procedure that will apply to the adoption of such 
decisions. However, EU law requires that any administrative decision that 
denies the benefit of rights granted under EU law should contain a statement of 
reasons in order to allow for its judicial review in the event such a decision is 
contested.223   
                                                  
219 Joined Cases 119 and 126/79 Lippische Hauptgenossenschaft [1980] ECR 1863, para 8 ; See also to 
that effect Declaration (19) on the Implementation of Community Law annexed to the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) OJ C 191/1 at 102, which emphasises that it is ‘essential for the proper functioning of the 
Community that the measures taken by the different Member States should result in Community law 
being applied with the same effectiveness and rigour as in the application of their national law.’  
220 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965, para 25; C-186/98 Nunes [1999] ECR I-4883, 
para 11.  
221 See to that effect, Case C-224/97 Ciola (n 48), para 32 (concerning an administrative decision 
imposing a maximum quota of boat moorings permitted on the shore of Lake Constance in respect of 
boats whose owners are resident abroad); Case C-201/02 Wells [2004] ECR I-723, para 43 (relating to 
the absence of an assessment undertaken pursuant to the environmental impact assessment directive); 
Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz [2004] ECR I-837, paras 24-27 (on the circumstances where 
administrative authorities are under an obligation to review a previous decision in order to ensure its 
compliance with a later ruling of the Court of Justice); Case C-2/06 Kempter [2008] ECR I-411, paras 
37-39 and 44-46 (idem).  
222 See n 25 and accompanying text. 
223 Case 36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219, para 52 (the competent national authority is under a duty 
immediately to inform an EU citizen against whom a restrictive measure has been adopted of the 
grounds on which the decision taken is based to enable him to make effective use of legal remedies; Case 
222/86 Heylens [1987] ECR 4097, para 15 (the competent national authority is under a duty to inform 
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Administrative measures might also consist in the actions taken to ensure 
that a specific factual situation prescribed by a directive is effectively 
attained.224 For example, a directive might lay down certain deadlines relating 
to the handling of applications lodged by individuals before the national 
administrative authorities.225 These authorities are then obliged to take the 
necessary measures to secure the processing of such applications within the 
specified deadline. In the field of environmental law, a directive might require 
Member States to ensure that water pollutants do not exceed a certain level226 
or that waste is disposed of without endangering human health or harming the 
environment.227 In such circumstances, the national authorities are obliged to 
take the necessary measures to attain the results prescribed by the directive228 
and may not plead the existence of external circumstances to justify a failure to 
meet the targets laid down in the directive.229     
Depending on the directive concerned, Member States may also need to 
take certain measures which are not explicitly required by a directive but which 
                                                  
an EU citizen of the reasons on which its decision to deny them the benefit of EU rights is based, either 
in the decision itself or in a subsequent communication made at their request). 
224 See for example, Case 56/90 Commission v United Kingdom [1993] ECR I-4109, paras 42-46 
(obligation to take all appropriate measures to ensure bathing waters comply with the limitations laid 
down in a directive concerning the quality of bathing waters); Case C-268/00 Commission v 
Netherlands [2002] ECR I-2995, paras 12-14 (idem); Joined Cases C-20/01 and C-28/01 Commission 
v Germany [2003] ECR I-3609, para 30 (failure to apply public procurement procedures in respect of 
a services contract for the treatment of waste); Case C-275/08 Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I-
168* (summary publication), Operative part, para 1 (failure to apply public procurement procedures in 
respect of the award of a contract for the supply of motor vehicle registration software).   
225 See for example, Articles 10 and 20 of Directive 2004/38 that oblige Member States to issue 
residence documents to the family members of EU citizens within six months of submitting an 
application. See also, Case C-157/03 Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I-2911, para 45 (failure to issue 
a residence card to the non-EU family member of an EU citizen within six months). 
226 Case C-337/89 Commission v United Kingdom [1992] ECR I-6103, paras 21-22. 
227 Case C‐365/97 Commission v Italy (San Rocco case) (n 191), para 111. 
228 Case C-337/89 Commission v United Kingdom (n 226), para 24; Case C-365/97 Commission v Italy 
(San Rocco case) (n 191), paras 108-109. 
229 Case C-337/89 Commission v United Kingdom (n 226), para 24; Case C-45/91 Commission v Greece 
[1992] ECR I-2509, para 21. 
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are necessary to ensure it is applied in practice.230 In the absence of any 
provisions dealing with monitoring or sanction procedures contained in a 
directive, it is up to the Member States to adopt the necessary mechanisms that 
ensure observance of the national implementing measures by the persons who 
fall within the scope of the directive concerned.231  Alternatively, a directive may 
oblige Member States to engage in public consultations, but it will leave the 
Member States the freedom as to how such consultations should be arranged, 
as in the case of projects that may affect the environment.232  
For instance, Member States may choose a sanctioning regime that 
imposes penalties for a failure to observe the rules. The Court has held in this 
regard that ‘whilst the choice of penalties remains within their discretion, 
[Member States] must ensure in particular that infringements of Community 
law are penalised under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are 
analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar 
nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.’233 In the context of the free movement of 
persons, the Court has held that it would be excessive in comparison to the 
gravity of the infringement to impose imprisonment or deportation as the 
penalty for a failure to comply with residence formalities.234  
                                                  
230 Brent (n 14) 133.  
231 Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553, para 19.  
232 See for example, Article 6 of Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment 
[2001] OJ L 197/30 and Article 6 of Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on 
the environment [2012] OJ L 26/1. 
233 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece (n 220), para 24. 
234 Case 48/75 Royer (n 33), paras 38-51; Case 118/75 Watson and Belman [1976] ECR 1185, paras 20-
21 ; Case 157/79 Pieck [1980] ECR 2171, paras 18-19; Case 265/88 Messner [1989] ECR 4209, para 14; 
Case C-193/94 Skavani [1996] ECR I-929, para 36; Case C-24/97 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR 
I-2133, para 14; Case C-378/97 Wijsenbeek [1999] ECR I-6207, para 44; Case C-408/03 Commission v 
Belgium [2006] ECR I-2647, paras 67-70. This case law is reflected in Articles 5(5), 8(2), 9(3), 20(2), 
26 and 36 of Directive 2004/38. 
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Finally, when applying the national implementing measures, the national 
authorities are under an obligation to interpret the provisions of its national law 
as far as possible in conformity with the relevant directive.235 Where national 
law or administrative measures might be in conflict with a directive, the 
administrative authorities are also under a duty to refrain from applying 
conflicting provisions of national law.236  
A summary of the obligations relating to transposition is contained in the 
following table: 





(dependent on directive) 
National authorities must fully apply national 
implementing measures (NIMs) that transpose a 
directive 
Administrative decisions relating to individual rights 
must contain statement of reasons 
National authorities must apply NIMs with same 
vigour as national law 
Administrative action must achieve specific factual 
objectives set by directive/NIMs 
National authorities must display same diligence in 
sanctioning non-observance of the NIM’s as breaches 
of national law 
Administrative action must put in place necessary 
mechanisms to ensure observance of NIMs by 
individuals 
National authorities must interpret national law
including NIMs in conformity with directive 
Administrative penalties to sanction breaches of 
NIMs must be equivalent, proportionate and, where 
relevant, dissuasive 
National authorities must uphold supremacy of EU 
law and set aside provisions of national law that are 
in conflict with directive 
 
Table 3.5 Transposition obligations 
                                                  
235 Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann (n 15), para 26; Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, 
para 8; Case C-218/01 Henkel [2004] ECR I-1725, para 60. See further, John Temple Lang, ‘The Duties 
of National Authorities under Community Constitutional Law’, (1998) 23 European Law Review, 109-
131, 114; John Temple Lang, ‘The Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Courts under Article 
10 EC: Two More Reflections’, (2001) 26 European Law Review, 84-93, 88; Stefan Kadelbach, 
‘European Administrative Law and the Law of a Europeanized Administration’ in Christian Joerges and 
Renaud Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe's Integrated Market (Oxford University Press 
2002) 167-206; Prechal (n 13), 65-72. However, there are limitations on how far administrative 
authorities should be able to interpret EU law since there is no preliminary ruling procedure that can 
bind the national authorities in their interpretation of unlike Courts, see further Prechal (n 13), 317-318; 
Michal Bobek, ‘Thou Shalt Have Two Masters: The Application of European Law by Administrative 
Authorities in the New Member States’ [2008] 1 Review of European Administrative Law 51-63, 55; 
Verhoeven (n 25) 31-34, 286-309. 
236 Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo (n 16), paras 31-33; Case C-118/00 Larsy [2001] ECR I-5063, para 
53; Case C-224/97 Ciola (n 48), 26; Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi [2003] ECR I-8055, 





Attention will now turn to the final stage of implementation, namely 
enforcement by the national courts. 
3.6 Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives 
The third stage of implementation relates to the enforcement of EU 
directives by the national courts,237 also referred to as decentralised 
enforcement,238 or judicial implementation.239  
The national courts fulfil the role of ‘Community courts of general 
jurisdiction’240 and ‘in collaboration with the Court of Justice, [fulfil] a duty 
                                                  
237 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 38) 62; Siedentopf and Hauschild (n 38) 68-72, who refer to 
‘control’ instead of ‘enforcement’; Prechal (n 13) 6; Allio and Fandel (n 208) 11, and Mellar (n 38) 2, 
who define enforcement as ‘the process whereby full compliance with EU law is monitored and secured, 
and non-compliance is systematically sanctioned by national and supranational courts’; Conant (n 38) 
27-29, who sees enforcement as another facet of ‘compliance with the “law in action”’; Treib (n 38) 6. 
Compare, Hartlapp (n 208) 806, who defines enforcement as ‘the public or delegated bodies that act to 
promote compliance and to achieve regulatory outcomes’ which is considered in this study as forming 
part of application; Toshkov, Knoll and Wewerka (n 208) 19-20, who do not refer to enforcement by the 
courts and only identify centralised enforcement by the Commission as a factor that explains differences 
in implementation outcomes. Nonetheless, one of the authors elsewhere refers to enforcement as ‘the 
process of imposing compliance by external actors (e.g. the Commission)’; see Toshkov (n 38) 3 (n 1), 
and 6. However, enforcement also involves the national courts as observed by Siedentopf and Ziller (n 
38) 200. Given that the national judiciary together with the legislature and the executive make up the 
authorities of the Member States, enforcement should also be seen as a process involving internal actors 
(i.e the national courts) and not solely external actors (i.e. the EU institutions). On the use of the term 
‘enforcement’ by national administrative or regulatory authorities in the context of the application of a 
directive by the national authorities, see n 208. For a detailed review of enforcement of directives by the 
national courts, see Brent (n 14) 135-148; Prechal (n 13) 131-179.  
238 Prechal (n 13) 9, 131-179 and 309-310; Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, ‘Opening Speech at the IVth 
Erenstein Colloquium’ in Siedentopf and Ziller (n 38) 143-150, 147-149. 
239 Prechal (n 13) 190. 
240 Case T-51/94 Tetra Pak Rausing [1990] ECR II-309, para 42. See also, David Edward, ‘How the 
Court of Justice Works’ (1995) 20 European Law Review, 539-558, 546; Olivier Dubos, Les juridictions 
nationales, juge communautaire (Dalloz 2001) 1; Roberto Baratta ‘National Courts as “Guardians” and 




entrusted to them both of ensuring that in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaties the law is observed.’241 
The Treaties require that Member States should ‘provide remedies 
sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union 
law’.242 The Court has consistently recognised the right to effective judicial 
protection243 in its case law:  
‘the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of 
Community law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
                                                  
241 Case 244/80 Foglia [1981] ECR 3045, para 16; Joined Cases C-422/93 to C-424/93 Zabala Erasun 
[1995] ECR I-1567, para 15; Opinion 1/09 European and Community Patents Court [2011] ECR I-1137, 
para 69; Case C-241/09 Fluxys [2010] ECR I-12773, para 29. See also, Case C-253/00 Muñoz [2002] 
ECR I-7289, para 28 (national courts are under a duty to apply the provisions of EU law in areas within 
their jurisdiction and ensure that they take full effect). 
242 Article 19(2) TEU. 
243 For a review of the principle of effective judicial protection, see for example Damian Chalmers, 
‘Judicial Preferences and the Community Legal Order’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review, 167-199, 184-
189; John Temple Lang, ‘The Duties of National Courts under Community Constitutional Law’ (1997) 
22 European Law Review 3-18; Mark Brearley and Mark Hoskins (n 92) 99-117; Paul Kapteyn and Pieter 
VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities (Lawrence Gormley 
(ed), 3rd edition, Kluwer Law 1998) 556-573; Takis Tridimas (n 92) 276-312; Stephen Weatherill and 
Paul Beaumont, EU Law (3rd edition, Penguin Books 1999) 932-934; Ari Afilalo, ‘Towards a “Common 
Law” of Europe: Effective Judicial Protection, National Procedural Autonomy, and Standing to Litigate 
Diffuse Interests in the European Union’ (1999) 22 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 349-404; Brent 
(n 14) 133-148; Michael Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice (Hart Publishing 2004) 
1-68; Prechal (n 13) 131-179; Anthony Arnull, ‘The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU law: 
An Unruly Horse?’ (2011) 36 European Law Review 51-75; Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds), 
European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 164-171; Sacha Prechal and Rob Widdershoven, 
‘Redefining the Relationship Between “Rewe-effectiveness” and Effective Judicial Protection’ (2011) 4 
Review of European Administrative Law 31-50;  Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman (n 104) 107-156; Lorna 
Woods and Philippa Watson, Steiner & Woods EU Law (12th ed, Oxford University Press 2014) 182-
207; Nina Półtorak, European Union Rights in National Courts (Kluwer 2015) 69-100. 
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Fundamental Freedoms … and which has also been reaffirmed by Article 
47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union.’244 
 Pursuant to the duty of sincere cooperation laid down by Article 4(3) 
TEU, Member States must take all appropriate measures ‘to ensure fulfilment 
of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the Union’. It is accordingly for the Member States to ensure that 
individuals are able to obtain effective judicial protection of their rights under 
EU law before the national courts.245  
Although a directive may contain provisions that address specific aspects 
of the right to judicial protection,246 in the absence of provisions governing 
                                                  
244 See, for example, Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, para 37. This was first laid down in Case 
222/84 Johnston  [1986] ECR 1651, para 18 and has been reaffirmed on several occasions; see for 
instance Case 222/86 Case 222/86 Heylens (n 223), para 14; Case C-97/91 Borelli [1992] ECR I-6313, 
para 14; Case C-1/99 Kofisa Italia [2001] ECR I-207, para 46; Case C-226/99 Siples [2001] ECR I-277, 
para 17; Case C-424/99 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-9285, para 45; Case C-50/00 P Unión de 
Pequeños Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6677, para 39; Case C-467/01 Eribrand [2003] ECR I-6471, para 
61; Joined Cases C‐402/05 P and C‐415/05 P Kadi [2008] ECR I‐0000, paragraph 335; Case C‐12/08 
Mono Car Styling [2009] ECR I‐6653, para 47. 
245 Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989, para 5; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, para 12; Case 106/77 
Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, para 21 and 22; Case 68/79 Just [1980] ECR 501, para 25, Case 199/82 
San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, para 14; Joined Cases 331/85, 376/85 and 378/85 Bianco and Girard 
[1988] ECR 1099, para 12; Case 104/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 1799, para 7; Joined Cases 
123/87 and 330/87 Jeunehomme and EGI [1988] ECR 4517, para 17; Case C-213/89 Factortame [1990] 
ECR I-2433, para 19; Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357, para 43; Case C-
96/91 Commission v Spain [1992] ECR I-3789, para 12; Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I-4599, 
para 12; Case C-432/05 Unibet (n 244), para 38; C-404/13 Client Earth [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2382 
(judgment of 14 November 2014), para 52; Case C-160/14 Ferreira da Silva e Brito [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:565 (judgment of 9 September 2015), para 45.   
246 See for example, Article 31 of Directive 2004/38 concerning appeal rights, discussed further at 
Chapter 6 (The Obligations Contained in Directive 2004/38); Article 3 of Directive 2014/54 on the free 
movement of workers (n 155). As regards appeal rights contained in instruments adopted in the field of 
migration law, see Article 10(2) of Council Directive 2003/109 on long-term residence (n 158); Article 
18 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification [2003] 
OJ L 251/12; Article 18(4) of Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of 
admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated 
training or voluntary service [2004] OJ L 375/12; Article 15(4) of Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 
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judicial procedure, it is up to the Member States to determine which courts have 
jurisdiction247 and what procedures apply to such proceedings,248 in accordance 
with the principle of national procedural autonomy.249 
                                                  
October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific 
research [2005] OJ L 289/15; Article 11(3) of Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment [2009] OJ L 155/17.  
247 The Court has consistently held that ‘it is for the legal system of each Member State to determine 
which court has jurisdiction to hear disputes involving individual rights derived from Community law, 
but at the same time the Member States are responsible for ensuring that those rights are effectively 
protected in each case’; see for instance Case 179/84 Bozzetti [1985] ECR 2301, para 17 (citing Case 
13/68 Salgoil [1968] ECR 453, 463); Case C-446/93 SEIM [1996] ECR I-73, para 32; Case C-54/96 
Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I‐4961, para 40; Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97 In.Co.Ge’90 [1998] ECR 
I-6307, para 14; Case C-258/97 Hospital Ingenieure [1999] ECR I-1405, para 22; Case C-462/99 
Connect Austria [2003] ECR I-5197, para 35; Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239, paras 44-45; 
Case C-12/08 Mono Car Styling [2009] ECR I-6653, para 48; and Joined Cases C-317/08 to C-320/08 
Alassini [2010] ECR I-2213, para 47; Case C-93/12 Agrokonsulting [2013] EU:C:2013:432 (judgment 
of 27 June 2013), para 35. See also, in the field of the free movement of persons, Case 98/79 Pecastaing 
[1980] ECR 691, para 11, and other case law cited at n 271.  
248 It is settled case law that ‘in the absence of Community rules governing the matter, it is for the 
domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction 
and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which 
individuals derive from Community law’ see for example, Case 33/76 Rewe (n 245), para 5; Case 45/76 
Comet (n 245), para 13; Case 68/79 Just (n 245), para 25; Case 199/82 San Giorgio (n 245), para 14; 
Joined Cases 331/85, 376/85 and 378/85 Bianco and Girard (n 245, para 12; Joined Cases 123/87 and 
330/87 Jeunehomme and EGI (n 245, para 17; Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich (n 245), 
para 43; Case C-96/91 Commission v Spain (n 245), para 12; Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck (n 245), para 
12; Case C‐453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, para 29; Case C-13/01 Safalero [2003] 
ECR I-8679, paragraph 49; Case C-224/01 Köbler (n 247), para 44; C-432/05 Unibet (n 244), para 39; 
Joined Cases C-222/05 to C-225/05 van der Weerd [2007] ECR I‐4233, para 28; Case C-268/06 
Impact (n 31), paras 44-45; Case C-567/13 Baczó [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:88 (judgment of 12 February 
2015), para 41.  
249 See for example, Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel [2010] ECR I-8301, para 123; Case C-93/12 
Agrokonsulting (n 247), para 35; Case C-567/13 Baczó (n 248), para 41. It is only recently that the Court 
of Justice has explicitly referred to this principle in such terms in its case law, even though the principle 
was established in Case 33/76 Rewe (n 245), para 5, and Case 45/76 Comet (n 245), para 13. See further, 
Verhoeven (n 25) 49-58.  
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However, the Court of Justice has placed limitations on the discretion 
that Member States enjoy in this area. According to now settled case law: 
‘while it is, in principle, for national law to determine an individual’s 
standing and legal interest in bringing proceedings, Community law 
nevertheless requires that the national legislation does not undermine 
the right to effective judicial protection … It is for the Member States to 
establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect 
for that right …. In that regard, the detailed procedural rules governing 
actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under Community law 
must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions 
(principle of equivalence) and must not render practically impossible or 
excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law 
(principle of effectiveness)’.250 
The question whether national rules of procedure renders it ‘practically 
impossible or excessively difficult’ to exercise rights under EU law ‘must be 
analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress 
and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national 
instances.’251 This involves taking into consideration ‘the basic principles of the 
                                                  
250 See for example, C-432/05 Unibet (n 244), paras 42-43. These requirements were first laid down by 
the Court in Case 33/76 Rewe (n 245), para 5, and Case 45/76 Comet (n 245), paras 13 and 16, and have 
been consistently affirmed ever since; see for instance, Joined Cases C-87/90 to C-89/90 Verholen 
[1991] ECR I 3757, para 24; Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck (n 245), para 12; Case C-231/96 Edis [1998] 
ECR I-4951, para 34; Case C-343/96 Dilexport [1999] ECR I-579, para 25; Joined Cases C-397/98 and 
C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft [2001] ECR I‐1727, para 85; Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan (n 248), 
para 29; Case C-13/01 Safalero (n 248), para 49; Case C-224/01 Köbler (n 247), para 46; Case C-467/01 
Eribrand (n 244), para 62; Case C-30/02 Recheio [2004] ECR I-6051, para 17; C-446/04 Test 
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation [2006] ECR I-11753, para 203; Case C-268/06 Impact (n 31), 
para 46; Case C-542/08 Barth [2010] ECR I-3189, para 17; Case C-310/09 Accor [2011] ECR I-8115, 
para 78; C-429/12 Pohl [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:12 (judgment of 16 January 2014), para 23; Case C-
567/13 Baczó (n 248), para 42; Case C-160/14 Ferreira da Silva e Brito [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:565 
(judgment of 9 September 2015), para 50.  
251 Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck (n 245), para 14; Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel 
[1995] ECR I-4705, para 19; Case C-473/00 Cofidis [2002] ECR I-10875, para 37; Case C-63/01 Evans 
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domestic judicial system, such as protection of the rights of the defence, the 
principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of procedure’.252  
In accordance with the principle of national procedural autonomy, claims 
brought by individuals to enforce EU rights before the domestic courts will 
therefore be governed by national rules relating to court procedure – subject to 
the dual requirements of equivalence and effectiveness – including those 
relating to the role of the courts,253 evidence,254 burden of proof,255 limitation 
                                                  
[2003] ECR I-14447, para 46; Joined Cases C-222/05 to C-225/05 van der Weerd (n 248), para 33; 
Case C-432/05 Unibet (n 244), para 54. 
252 Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck (n 245), para 14; Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel (n 
251), para 19; Case C-63/01 Evans (n 251), para 46; Joined Cases C-222/05 to C-225/05 van der Weerd 
(n 248), para 33. 
253 Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paras 21 and 22-23 (national courts need not await a 
decision of a higher court which has sole jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of a national law in 
order to give primacy to EU law in case of conflict with provisions of national law); Joined Case C-87/90 
to 89/90 Verholen [1991] ECR I-3757, para 16 (EU law does not preclude a national court from 
examining of its own motion whether national rules are in conformity with directly effective provisions 
of a directive); Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel (n 251), para 22 (EU law does not 
require national courts to raise of their own motion a breach of EU law, where this would require them 
to abandon the passive role assigned to them by going beyond the ambit of the dispute as defined by the 
parties and by relying on facts and circumstances which the parties have not put forth). On the impact 
of EU law on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the national courts, see Półtorak (n 243) 199-203.  
254 See for example, Case 199/82 San Giorgio (n 245), paras 14-15 (rules of evidence must not make it 
practically impossible or excessively difficult to prove the existence of a breach of EU law, for example 
by requiring a claimant to prove that national charges paid in breach of EU law have not been passed 
on to the claimant’s customers); Case 222/84 Johnston, 244), para 20 (a certificate issued by the 
administrative authorities that the conditions permitting derogation from the principle of equal 
treatment need not be treated by the national courts as conclusive evidence that such conditions have 
been met). On the impact of EU law on evidential jurisdiction of the national courts, see Półtorak (n 
243) 199-203. 
255 See for example, Case 109/88 Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199, para 16 (in proceedings concerning equal 
pay, it is legitimate for national rules to provide for the burden of proof to shift to the employer where 
this is necessary to avoid depriving workers alleging discrimination of an effective means of enforcing 
the principle of equal pay due to the lack of transparency of an employer’s policy on wages); Case C-
127/92 Enderby [1993] ECR I-5535, paras 13-14 (idem, where significant statistics disclose an 
appreciable difference in pay between two positions of equal value, one of which is carried out almost 




ECR I-1275, para 24 (idem, where an employer’s pay policy involves a variable element based on output 
and it is not possible to identify the factors which determined the units of measurement used to calculate 
the variable element in workers’ pay). 
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periods,256 forms of remedy257 and sanctions, 258 as well as the availability of 
legal aid.259 
                                                  
256 Case 33/76 Rewe (n 245), para 5 (national law may impose reasonable time limits on bringing claims 
for breaches of EU law); Case 45/76 Comet (n 245), paras 16-18 (idem); Case C-338/91 Steenhorst-
Neerings [1993] ECR I-5475, paras 16, 21-23 (national law may impose a one-year limitation period on 
a claim for back-payment of benefits withheld in breach of a directive on equal treatment between men 
and women in the field of social security); Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, para 52 
(national law may impose a five-year limitation period on a claim for reimbursement of charges imposed 
in breach of EU law); Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck (n 245), paras 13, 16-18 (national law may impose a 
60-day limitation period on the raising of new issues of law on appeal; provided this does not curtail 
the power of the national court to consider of its own motion a new plea of law based on EU law or its 
ability to make a reference for a preliminary ruling); Case C-261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I-4025, para 
29 (national law may impose a time limit of one year for a claim for damages for loss suffered as a result 
of the belated transposition of a directive when it runs from the date on which national implementing 
measures are adopted); Case C-228/96 Aprile [1998] ECR I-7141, paras 28-29, (it is legitimate for 
national law to reduce the limitation period from five years to three years in respect of a claim for 
reimbursement of charges imposed in breach of EU law, provided this applies equally to similar claims 
under national law); Case C-246/96 Magorrian [1997] ECR I 7153, paras 41-46 (national law cannot 
restrict retroactive membership of an occupational pension scheme to two years of service prior to a 
claim when enforcing the right of equal treatment between men and women); Case C-78/98 Preston 
[2000] ECR I-3201, paras 43-44 (idem).  
257 Case C-271/91 Marshall [1993] ECR I-4367, paras 23-26 (in absence of specific provisions of a 
directive, Member States have discretion to choose appropriate remedy for breach of rights granted 
under that directive; choice of remedy must guarantee real and effective judicial protection and have a 
real deterrent effect on the employer; where remedy chosen is financial compensation, it must be 
adequate so as to enable full reparation of loss sustained as a result of breach of directive in accordance 
with the applicable national rules); Case  C-460/06 Paquay [2007] ECR I-8511, paras 44-46 (idem); 
Case C-213/89 Factortame (n 247), para 23 (EU law requires the national courts to set aside a provision 
of national law that prevents it from granting interim relief to suspend the application of disputed 
national legislation until such time as it can deliver a judgment on the issue following its request a 
preliminary ruling); Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97 In.Co.Ge’90 (n 247), para 21 (where national rule 
is incompatible with EU law, a national court is under a duty to refrain from applying the national rule 
provided this does not restrict the court’s power to order other remedies available under national law 
which are appropriate for protecting  individual EU rights). 
258 See for example, Case C-177/88 Dekker (sanctions for breach of EU law must have a genuine 
deterrent effect); Case 68/88 Commission v Greece (n 220), para 24 (the choice of penalties remains 
within the discretion of the Member States, provided that infringements of EU law are penalised under 
procedural and substantive conditions which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of 
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In the specific context of the implementation of directives, the obligation 
to achieve the result prescribed by a directive is also binding on the courts.260 
The right to effective judicial protection implies that individuals must be able to 
have recourse to the national courts to compel observance of the national 
implementing measures.261  
It is also the duty of the national courts, when a national measure is 
contested on the basis of having exceeded the margin of discretion granted by a 
directive, to review ‘whether the competent national authorities, in exercising 
                                                  
national law of a similar nature and importance and which, make the penalty effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive); Case C-186/98 Nunes (n 220), para 10 (idem). 
259 Case C-279/09 DEB [2010] ECR I-13849, paras 59 and 60; Case C-93/12 Agrokonsulting (n 247), 
para 50; C-413/12 Asociación de Consumidores Independientes de Castilla y León [2013] 
EU:C:2013:800 (judgment of 5 December 2013), para 42; Case C-567/13 Baczó (n 248), paras 54-55. 
260 Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann (n 15), para 26; Case 79/83 Harz [1984] ECR 1891, para 26; 
Case 222/84 Johnston (n 244), para 53; Case 80/86 Kolpinhuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969, para 12; 
Case C-106/89 Marleasing (n 235), para 8;  Case C-373/90 Criminal proceedings against X [1992] 
ECR I-131, para 7; Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori [1994] ECR I-3325, para 26; Case C-334/92 Wagner 
Miret [1993] ECR I-6911, para 20; Case 72/95 Kraaijeveld [1996] ECR I-5403, para 55; Case C-54/96 
Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I‐4961, para 43; Case C-129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie [1997] ECR 
I-7411, para 40; Case C-76/97 Tögel [1998] ECR I-5357, para 25; Case C-111/97 EvoBus [1998] ECR I-
5411, para 18; Case C-131/97 Carbonari [1999] ECR I-1103, para 48; Case C-258/97 Hospital 
Ingenieure (n 247), para 25; Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I-8835, para 110; 
Case C-15/04 Koppensteiner [2005] ECR I-4855, para 33; Case C-316/04 Stichting Zuid-Hollandse 
Milieufederatie [2005] ECR I-9759, para 77; Case C-268/06 Impact (n 31), para 41; Joined Cases C-
378/07 to C-380/07 Angelidaki [2009] ECR I-3071, paragraph 106; Case C-396/07 Juuri (n 31), para 
27; Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365, para 47; Case C-227/09 Accardo [2010] ECR I-
10273, para 49; Case C-177/10 Santana [2011] ECR I-7907, para 51. 
261 Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53, para 19 (whenever a directive is correctly implemented, its effects 
reach individuals through the intermediary of the implementing measures adopted by the Member 
State concerned); Case 270/81 Felicitas Rickmers [1982] ECR 2771, para 24 (idem); Case 222/84 
Johnston (n 244), para 51 (idem); ibid, para 19 (Member States must provide for effective judicial 
control to ensure observance of EU law and of national legislation intended to give effect to a directive). 
See also to that effect, in the context of a regulation, Case C-253/00 Muñoz (n 241), para 30 (full 
effectiveness of the rules on quality standards imply that it must be possible to enforce that obligation 




the choice which is left to them as to the form and the methods for implementing 
the directive, have kept within the limits as to their discretion set out in the 
directive’.262 This duty applies even if the directive has not been transposed into 
the national legal order.263   
When a directive is invoked in judicial proceedings, the national courts 
are also required as far as possible to interpret national law in conformity with 
its provisions having due regard to its ‘wording and purpose’ in order to achieve 
the result that the directive prescribes.264 This so-called duty of ‘consistent 
                                                  
262 Case 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (n 115), paras 24 and 29; Case C-72/95 
Kraaijeveld (n 115), paras 56 and 59; Case C-127/02 Waddenvereniging and 
Vogelbeschermingsvereniging (n 115), paras 66 and 69; Case C-83/11 Rahman (n 119), para 25. On the 
judicial review of the exercise of the discretionary power of administrative authority, see further 
Półtorak (n 243) 196-199; on re-opening administrative proceedings, see ibid, 279-289. 
263 Case C-127/02 Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging (n 115), para 70. 
264 Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann (n 15), para 26; Case 79/83 Harz [1984] ECR 1891, para 26; 
Case 222/84 Johnston (n 244), para 53; Case 80/86 Kolpinhuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969, para 12; 
Case C-106/89 Marleasing (n 235, para 8;  Case C-373/90 Criminal proceedings against X (n 260), 
para 7; Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori (n 260), para 26; Case C-334/92 Wagner Miret (n 260), para 20; 
Joined Cases C-71/94 to C-73/94 Eurim-Pharm [1996] ECR I-3603, para 26; Case 72/95 Kraaijeveld 
(n 260), para 55; Case C-168/95 Arcaro [1996] ECR I-4705, para 41 ; Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult (n 
260), para 43; Case C-129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie (n 260), ECR I-7411, para 40;  Case C-
355/96 Silhouette [1998] ECR I-4799, para 36; Case C-76/97 Tögel (n 260), para 25; Case C-63/97 
BMW [1999] ECR I-905, paras 22; Case C-111/97 Rombi [2000] ECR I-3367, para 23; Case C-111/97 
EvoBus (n 260), para 18; Case C-131/97 Carbonari (n 260), para 48; Case C-185/97 Coote [1998] ECR 
I-5199, para 18; Case C-258/97 Hospital Ingenieure (n 247), para 25; Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-
244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial [2000] ECR I-4941, para 30; Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 
Pfeiffer (n 260), para 113;  Case C-408/01 Adidas-Salomon [2003] ECR I-12537, para 21; Case C-
196/02 Nikoloudi [2005] ECR I-1789, para 73; Case C-316/04 Stichting Zuid-Hollandse 
Milieufederatie (n 260), para 78; Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci (n 260), para 48; Case C-406/08 Uniplex 
(UK) [2010] ECR I-817, para 45; Case C-282/10 Dominguez [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:33 (judgment of 
24 January 2012), paras 24-25 and 27; C-428/11 Purely Creative [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:651 
(judgment of 18 October 2012), para 41; Case C-81/12 Asociaţia ACCEPT [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:275 
(judgment of 25 April 2013), para 71; C- 291/13 Papasavvas [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2209 (judgment 
of 11 September 2014), para 56. The Court has also held that ‘the courts of the Member States must 
refrain as far as possible from interpreting domestic law in a manner which might seriously 
compromise, after the period for transposition has expired, attainment of the objective pursued by that 
directive’, see Case C-212/04 Adeneler [2006] ECR I-6057, paragraph 122.  
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interpretation’265 applies even if the provisions of the directive do not have 
direct effect.266,267  
In accordance with the principle of supremacy of EU law, the national 
courts are under an obligation to refrain from applying provisions of national 
law in the event these come into conflict with provisions of a directive.268 
                                                  
265 This is also referred to as the ‘indirect effect’ of EU directives, see for example, A.I.L. Campbell, 
‘National Legislation and EC Directives: Judicial Co-Operation and National Autonomy’ (1992) 43 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 330-358; Eamonn Doran, ‘Direct Effect: Need Lawyers Read EC 
Directives?’ (1993) 4 International Company and Commercial Law Review 174-178; Gerrit Betlem, ‘The 
Principle of Indirect Effect of Community Law (1995) 3 European Review of Private Law 1-19; Chalmers 
(n 243) 189-190; John Temple Lang (n 243) 5-6;  Jon Appleton, ‘The Indirect-Direct Effect of European 
Community Directives’ (2000) 5 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 59-100; Brent 
(n 14) 283-295; Gerrit Betlem, ‘The Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation - Managing Legal Uncertainty 
(2002) 22 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 397-418; Prechal (n 13, 180-216; Sara Drake, ‘Twenty Years 
after Von Colson - The Impact of “Indirect Effect” on the Protection of the Individual’s Community 
Rights’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 329-348; Klamert (n 73) 1251; Sacha Prechal ‘Direct Effect, 
Indirect Effect, Supremacy and the Evolving Constitution of the European Union’ in Catherine Barnard 
(ed), The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited: Assessing the Impact of the Constitutional Debate 
(Oxford University Press 2007) 35-69. 
266 C-212/04 Adeneler (n 264), para 124. See also, Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann (n 15), para 28, 
where the Court intimated that the provision concerned did not have direct effect because was not 
‘unconditional’ by holding that it left the Member States free to choose the ways in which a person could 
pursue a judicial claim for reparation in cases where they had suffered discrimination; Case C-106/89 
Marleasing (n 235), concerned a situation where the direct effect of a directive could not be invoked by 
an individual against another: see para 6, where the Court confirmed that a directive cannot generate 
so-called horizontal direct effect; Case C-98/09 Sorge [2010] ECR I-5837, paras 50-51, where the Court 
explicitly held that a provision of the framework agreement on fixed-term work annexed to a directive 
in the field of employment was not capable of having direct effect, but the provision nonetheless 
required the national courts to interpret national law in conformity with it. See further, Brent (n 14) 
285-286; Prechal (n 13) 184-185.  
267 On the concept of supremacy, see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2 (Supremacy, direct effect and consistent 
interpretation). 
268 Case 106/77 Simmenthal (n 245), para 21 (national courts are obliged to give primacy to provisions 
of regulations in case these conflict with provisions of national law). See further, Case 249/85 Albako 
[1987] ECR 2345, para 17 (idem as regards decisions); Case C-262/97 Engelbrecht [2000] ECR I-7321, 
para 40 (idem as regards regulations); Case C-462/99 Connect Austria [2003] ECR I-5197, para 40 
(idem as regards directives); Case C-327/00 Santex [2003] ECR I-1877 (idem as regards directives), 
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Furthermore, in proceedings involving individuals against the State, the 
national courts are under a duty to ensure that individuals are able to rely on 
the provisions of a directive which are directly effective269 against the national 
authorities in the event that a Member State has failed to implement a directive 
correctly.270 Moreover, where a Member State has failed to implement a 
directive, individuals must also be able to claim damages for any loss they have 
suffered as a result.271  
In the field of the free movement of persons, enforcement essentially 
entails that the application of the EU rules by the administrative authorities of 
the Member States should be subject to scrutiny by the national courts by way 
of judicial review.272 The principle of effective judicial protection requires that 
                                                  
para 64; Case C-241/06 Lämmerzahl [2007] ECR I-8415, para 63 (idem as regards directives); Case C-
406/08 Uniplex (UK) [2010] ECR I-817, para 49 (idem as regards directives). 
269 On the concept of direct effect, see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2 (Supremacy, direct effect and consistent 
interpretation). 
270 Case 8/81 Becker (n 261), para 25 (where a Member State has failed to implement a directive 
correctly, individuals may assert directly effective provisions of the directive against the Member State 
concerned in proceedings before the national courts).  
271 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich (n 245), para 45 (a national court must, in accordance 
with the national rules on liability, uphold the right of individuals to obtain reparation of loss and 
damage caused to them as a result of a Member State’s failure to transpose a directive). See further 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3 (Member State Liability). 
272 Case 98/79 Pecastaing (n 247), para 11 (national law determines which courts have jurisdiction to 
hear appeals against decisions denying entry or residence to a national of the another Member State; 
national appeal procedures against must provide remedies which are no less favourable than those 
granted to nationals in respect of administrative acts); Case 131/79 Santillo [1980] ECR 1585, para 19 
(national law must provide for review of a decision to deport an EU citizen by an independent body 
before which the national benefits from rights of representation and defence); Case 222/86 Heylens (n 
223), para 14 (national law must allow a right of judicial appeal against a decisions denying an EU citizen 
access to employment); Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi [1990] ECR I-3763, para 59 
(national law must provide for an EU citizen the right to apply for a stay of execution of a deportation 
decision if this remedy is available before the ordinary courts but not the administrative courts); Joined 
Case C-65/95 and 111/95 Shingara and Radiom [1997] ECR I-3343, para 44 (national law must provide 
a right of judicial appeal against an administrative decision to deny entry to an EU citizen); Case C-
357/98 Yiadom [2000] ECR I-9265, para 43 (national law must provide a right of judicial appeal against 
an administrative decision to deny entry to an EU citizen, when the person is physically present in the 
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judicial review of administrative decisions relating to individual EU rights must 
address both the facts and the law.273 
  
                                                  
host Member State); Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591, paras 101-103 (national law must 
provide right to an effective judicial remedy against an administrative decision refusing entry to an 
individual claiming to be the family member of an EU citizen); Case C-83/11 Rahman (n 119), para 25 
(where the provisions of a directive are not directly effective, an applicant is still entitled to judicial 
review of national measures taken in application of the directive to determine whether these have 
remained within the limits of the discretion set by that directive). The right of judicial appeal is further 
provided by Article 31 of Directive 2004/38, whose recital (26) explains should be available in ‘all 
events’. 
273 See to that effect Joined Case C-65/95 and 111/95 Shingara and Radiom (n 248), paras 34-35 
(national remedies against an administrative decision refusing entry or residence must entail either an 
appeal before a court that involves a review of the substance and an exhaustive examination of all the 
facts and circumstances, or, where such an appeal is limited to the legality of the national decision or 
there is no appeal, the intervention of an independent review authority that engages in an exhaustive 
examination of all the facts and circumstances before a final administrative decision is taken); Joined 
Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri [2004] ECR I-5257, para 82 (incompatibility 
of German system of judicial review which did not allow national courts to consider new facts that have 
arisen after an administrative decision was taken to deport an EU citizen on public policy grounds); 
ibid, paras 106 and 110-111 (incompatibility of German system of judicial review which only provided 
for the control of legality of an administrative decision to deport an EU citizen on public policy grounds); 
Case C-136/03 Dörr and Ünal [2005] ECR I-4759, paras 47 and 57 (incompatibility of Austrian system 
of judicial review which only provided for the control of legality of an administrative decision ending a 
right of residence on public policy grounds); Case C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-8613, para 60 (appeal 
against a refusal to allow lawyer registered in the UK to be admitted to practice in Luxembourg); Case 
C-69/10 Diouf [2011] ECR I-7151, para 57 (appeal against a refusal to grant refugee status under 
accelerated procedure). See further Półtorak (n 243) 199-201. 
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The obligations relating to enforcement can be summarised as follows: 
Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives 
 
 
Obligations relating to judicial procedure 
 
Obligations relating to judicial decision-
making 
Member States must provide for access to national 
courts to compel observance with the national 
implementing measures 
National courts must review whether national 
authorities have kept within the margin of discretion 
granted to them under a directive 
National proceedings relating to the enforcement of 
EU rights must be no less favourable than those 
governing similar domestic actions (equivalence) 
National courts must interpret national law in 
conformity with a directive’s objectives 
National proceedings must not render practically 
impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of 
rights (effectiveness) 
National courts must uphold directly effective 
provisions of a directive for the benefit of individuals 
against a Member State which has failed to 
implement directive fully and correctly 
Judicial review of administrative application of a 
directive which grants individual rights must extend 
to both law and facts  
National courts must set aside national law that is in 
conflict with a directive 
Adequate remedies must be available for breaches of 
EU law including damages where a Member State 
fails to implement a directive correctly 
 
Table 3.6 Enforcement obligations 
 
 
Following on from this investigation of the obligations that are 
incumbent upon the Member States when they implement an EU directive, the 
next chapter will examine the different outcomes in implementation and the 
consequences of a failure to abide with the obligations relating to the 
implementation of directives. 
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CHAPTER 4. IMPLEMENTATION OUTCOMES 
 
Contents:  
4.1 Compliance and Implementation Outcomes – 122 
4.2 Transposition Outcomes – 124   
4.3 Application Outcomes – 129 
4.4 Enforcement Outcomes – 136 
4.5 Motivations of the Member States Towards Non-Compliance – 145 
4.6 Factors Affecting Non-Compliance – 155 
  
4.1 Compliance and Implementation Outcomes 
 
When a Member State implements a directive this may result in different 
outcomes that reflect the extent to which a Member State has achieved the result 
prescribed by the directive and is therefore in conformity with EU law. The 
categorisation of implementation outcomes can serve as an indication of the 
degree to which a Member State has implemented a directive in compliance1 
with the objectives laid down by that instrument.2  
When the implementation of a directive by the Member States complies 
with EU law, this is generally referred to as ‘compliant implementation’.3 In 
                                                  
1 The term ‘compliance’ is used here to refer to implementation by a Member State that is in conformity 
with the directive concerned. See further, Michael Zürn, ‘Introduction: Law and compliance at different 
levels’ in Michael Zürn and Christian Joerges (eds), Law and Governance in Postnational Europe 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) 1-39, 8, using the term compliance to refer to ‘the extent to which 
rules are complied with by their addressees’; Stine Andersen, The Enforcement of EU Law: The Role of 
the European Commission (Oxford University Press 2012) 39-40, who uses the term to refer to ‘conduct 
in conformity with a specified rule’. 
2 Thomas König and Lars Mäder, ‘Non-conformable, Partial and Conformable Transposition: A 
Competing Risk Analysis of the Transposition Process of Directives in the EU15’ (2013) 14 European 
Union Politics, 46-69, 47. 
3 This is the term used by the Commission, see for example, Commission, ‘Report from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament on implementation of Council Directive 91/676/EEC 
concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources based 
on Member State reports for the period 2004-2007’, COM(2010) 47 final, 9; Commission, ‘Staff 
Working Document – Situation in the Different Sectors – Accompanying document to the Report from 
the Commission 27th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law (2009)’, SEC(2010) 1143 
final, 199. However, König and Mäder (n 15) 47, use the term ‘conformable transposition’ to refer to 
compliant transposition.  
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situations where implementation does not comply with EU law, this is 
designated as ‘non-conformity’ or ‘non-compliant implementation’.4 Therefore, 
for the purpose of this study, a distinction is made between ‘compliant’ or ‘non-
compliant’ implementation outcomes.5 
It will be recalled that the obligation to implement a directive is binding 
upon all the authorities of a Member State.6 A failure to comply with the 
obligation to implement directives can therefore result from action or inaction 
by the legislature, the executive or the judiciary at any stage of the 
implementation process.7 Wherever transposition, application or enforcement 
                                                  
4 This is the terminology in use by the Commission, see for example, Commission, ‘Staff Working 
Document Accompanying the Document “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and to the Council on the Follow-up to 2013 Discharge”’, SWD(2015)194 final 5. See also Tanja Börzel, 
‘Non-compliance in the European Union: pathology or statistical artefact?’ (2001) 8 Journal of 
European Public Policy, 803–824, 805; Angelova, Dannwolf and König (n 11) 1274. However, König 
and Mäder (n 15) 47, use the term ‘non-conformable transposition’ when referring to non-compliant 
transposition. 
5 Diana Panke, ‘The European Court of Justice as an Agent of Europeanization? Restoring Compliance 
with EU Law’  (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 847-866, 849 distinguishes between three 
outcomes, namely ‘complete legal change (domestic norms allow for correct and complete reproduction 
of the European norm), incomplete legal change (domestic norms are highly ambiguous or overlapping 
in scope and content, which facilitates incorrect and incomplete reproduction of the European norm), 
and continued non-compliance (no legal changes are undertaken despite a misfit between domestic and 
European norms)’. Given that the Court of Justice has ruled that Article 288(3) requires full and 
effective implementation, incomplete implementation and the absence of any implementation would 
both be considered as constituting ‘non-compliance’ in this study. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this 
study, Panke’s distinction between absolute and partial non-compliance has been used to inform the 
categorisation of motivations of the Member States towards non-compliance, see further Section 4.5 
(Motivations of the Member States Towards Non-Compliance).  
6 See Chapter 3, Section 3.1 (General Obligations to Implement Directives). 
7 Samuel Krislov, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Joseph Weiler 'The Political Organs and the Decision-
Making Process in the United States and the European Community', in Cappelletti, Seccombeand 
Weiler (n 12) 3-112, 62-64; Alberto Gil Ibañez, The Administrative Supervision & Enforcement of EC 
Law (Hart 1999) 16 ; Sacha Prechal, Directives in EC Law (2nd edition, Oxford University Press 2005) 
6-7. See also Ulf Sverdrup, ‘Implementation and European Integration: A Review Essay’ (2005) ARENA 
Working Paper 25/2005, 9. 
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fails to ensure its complete execution in the national legal order,8 this will result 
in non-compliant implementation 9 in breach of Article 288(3) TFEU.  
It therefore follows that implementation outcomes can be further 
categorised according to the three stages of implementation, namely outcomes 
relating to transposition (section 4.2), application (section 4.3) and 
enforcement (section 4.4). Furthermore, determining the motivations of 
Member States (section 4.5) enables further explanation of what factors affect 
non-compliance (section 4.6).  
4.2 Transposition Outcomes 
Transposition involves the incorporation of a directive in the national 
legal order through the adoption of national implementing measures.10  The 
failure by a Member State to adopt its national implementing measures within 
the deadline set by a directive for transposition11 or to notify its national 
implementing measures12 to the European Commission will constitute non-
compliant transposition.13 
                                                  
8 See Chapter 3, Section 3.1 (General Obligations to Implement Directives). 
9 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 62-63; Prechal (n 20) 6-7. See also Tanja Börzel  ‘Environmental 
Leaders and Laggards in Europe. Why there is (not) a “Southern Problem”’ (Ashgate 2003), 60; See also 
Angelova, Dannwolf and König (n 11) 1286 (n 7). 
10 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2 (Obligations Relating to the Form of Transposition). 
11 See for example, Case 10/76 Commission v Italy [1976] ECR 1359, para 12, where the Court 
emphasised that the obligation on Member States to implement directives within the deadline is to 
ensure the uniform implementation of EU law. See for example, in the context of Directive 204/38, Case 
C-294/07 Commission v Luxembourg [2007] ECR I-192, para 11. The delay appears to have been caused 
by the decision of the Luxembourg authorities to choose to repeal is existing consolidated law on 
immigration to reflect several legal developments resulting from four directives relating to third country 
national migration in addition to EU Directive 2004/38, see Projet de loi portant sur la libre circulation 
des personnes et l'immigration, No 580 Session 2007-2008 (bill for a law on the free movement of 
persons and immigration) 2-10 <http://www.asti.lu/media/asti/pdf/projet5208.pdf> accessed 29 
December 2015. 
12 See further, Chapter 3, Section 3.3 (Obligations Relating to the Methods of Transposition). 
13 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 62; Francesco Capotorti, ‘Legal Problems of Directives, 
Regulations and their Implementation’ in Heinrich Siedentopf and Jacques Ziller (eds), Making 
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When transposition had been achieved, it is also necessary to determine 
whether the national implementing measures comply with the directive to 
which they are intended to give effect. In this regard, the Court has held that ‘it 
is important in each individual case to determine the nature of the provision, 
laid down in a directive, to which the action for infringement relates, in order to 
gauge the extent of the obligation to transpose imposed on the Member 
States’.14 As a result, when analysing the implementation of directives, it is 
necessary to examine the conformity of the transposition of each individual 
provision (or sub-provision) of the directive.15 
This involves undertaking a comparison between each provision of the 
directive and the corresponding provision of the national implementing 
measures. This is the practice currently followed by the European Commission 
when it undertakes conformity assessments of directives or assigns their 
performance to external consultants.16 
When reviewing the conformity of the provisions of the national 
implementing measures, it is also necessary to examine the interpretation given 
                                                  
European Policies Work, Volume 1: Comparative Syntheses (Sage 1988) 151-168, 162; Prechal (n 20) 
45; Börzel (n 17) 805.  
14 Case C-233/00 Commission v France [2003] ECR I-6625, para 77; Case C-6/04 Commission v UK 
[2005] ECR I-9017, para 22. 
15 Robert Thomson, ‘Opposition through the back door in the transposition of EU directives’ (2010) 11 
European Union Politics, 577-596, 578-579; Asya Zhelyazkova and René Torenvlied, ‘The Successful 
Transposition of European Provisions by Member States: Application to the Framework Equality 
Directive’ (2011) 18 Journal of European Public Policy, 690-708, 691. 
16 Commission, ‘Better Regulation Toolbox’ (2015) 236 <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/guidelines/docs/br_toolbox_en.pdf> accessed on 27 November 2015 (hereafter ‘Better 
Regulation Toolbox’): ‘The concept of completeness of transposition measures in terms of substantive 
scope means that every obligation of a directive should find a counterpart in the national transposition 
measures. Therefore, a complete screening of all articles and subarticles is necessary should fall under 
the scope of the transposition check as well. For example, if a provision contains an obligation, and the 




to them by the national courts.17 Likewise, the existence of administrative 
practices or circulars should be taken into account when assessing the 
conformity of the national implementing measures, since such administrative 
measures are intended to provide direction as to how the national authorities 
should apply the national implementing measures.18 
In circumstances where a specific provision contains ‘unequivocal 
wording which would give the persons concerned a clear and precise 
understanding of their rights and obligations and would enable the courts to 
ensure that those rights and obligations are observed’,19 transposition of the 
corresponding provision of the directive concerned will be correct and therefore 
comply with the objective pursued by the directive.     
On the contrary, transposition may not be compliant because the national 
implementing measures fail to provide legal certainty, enable effective legal 
protection of individual rights or breach the principle of proportionality. There 
may be several reasons for this. It could be that the form of transposition is not 
legally binding or given adequate publicity, in which case there will be a failure 
to transpose.20 Alternatively, the content of the national implementing 
measures may fail to attain the necessary specificity, clarity and precision, in 
which case transposition will be considered ambiguous.21 It can also be that a 
                                                  
17 The Court of Justice has consistently held that ‘[t]he scope of national laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions must be assessed in the light of the interpretation given to them by national 
courts’; see for example, Case C-382/92 Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435, para 36; 
C-300/95 Commission v United Kingdom [1997] ECR I-2649, paragraph 37; Case C-372/99, 
Commission v Italy, [2002] ECR I-819, para 20; Case C-129/00 Commission v Italy [2004]  ECR I-
14637 para 30; Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Katsikas and Others [1992] ECR I-6577, 
para 39. 
18 ibid, see reference to ‘administrative provisions’. For further discussion, see Chapter 3, Section 3.2 
(Obligations Relating to the Form of Transposition). 
19 See for example, Case 143/83 Commission v Denmark [1985] ECR 427, para 10. See further Chapter 
3, Section 3.4 (Implications for the Drafting of National Implementing Measures). 
20 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2 (Obligations Relating to the Form of Transposition). 
21 See Chapter 3, Section 3.3 (Obligations Relating to the Methods of Transposition).  
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Member State has exercised its discretion in a disproportionate way22, for 
example by imposing excessive penalties.23 In addition the choice of drafting 
techniques in the transposition of a directive may also lead to the national 
implementing measures not being in conformity with the result prescribed by 
the directive concerned24 because of so-called ‘under-implementation’ 
stemming from ambiguous or incomplete transposition, or ‘over-
implementation’ characterised by incorrect transposition. Needless to say, the 
failure to transpose a provision of the directive within the deadline fixed for 
transposition will also result in non-compliant transposition.25 Likewise, partial 
transposition of some but not all the provisions of a directive will also constitute 
non-compliant transposition.26 
Whatever its origin, non-compliant transposition will automatically 
result in non-compliant implementation27 and therefore constitute a breach of 
Article 288(3) TFEU. The fact that non-transposition causes no adverse effects 
is irrelevant.28 However, although transposition may be compliant, this will not 
automatically result in compliant implementation because Article 288(3) TFEU 
                                                  
22 See Chapter 3, Section 3.3 (Obligations Relating to the Methods of Transposition). 
23 See to that effect, Case C-276/91 Commission v France [1993] ECR I-4413, para 28 (imposition of 
penalties for breach of VAT directive); Case C-230/97 Awoyemi [1998] ECR I-6781, paras 24-26 
(imposition of penalties relating to directive on driving licences). 
24 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4 (Implications for the Drafting of National Implementing Measures).  
25 See for example, Case C-185/98 Commission v Greece [1999] ECR I-3047, paras 9-10; Case C-151/00 
Commission v France [2001] ECR I-625, paras 8-9. 
26 Case C-350/02 Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I-6213, para 41. 
27 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 62-63; Prechal (n 20) 6-7. 
28 See for example, Case C-209/88 Commission v Italy [1990] ECR I-4313, para 14; Case C-392/96 
Commission v Ireland [1999] ECR I-5901, paras 60 and 61; Case C-150/97 Commission v Portugal 
[1999] ECR I-259, para 22; Case C-349/97 Commission v Germany [2000] ECR I-4429, para 62; Case 
C-233/00 Commission v France (n 27), para 62; Case C-177/04 Commission v France [2006] ECR I-
2461, para 52; Case C-61/05 Commission v Portugal [2006] ECR I 6779, para 32. 
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also requires Member States to effectively apply and enforce the directive 
concerned.29 
These different transposition outcomes may be illustrated by the 
following graphic: 








NIMs are specific, clear, precise and legally 




Implementation will only be compliant if 




Non-compliant transposition Non-compliant implementation 
 
Failure to notify transposition 




Failure to transpose 








NIMs do not achieve result or undermines 
effectiveness of directive  
Incomplete transposition 




NIMs contain obligations not permitted by 
directive 
 





NIMs impose additional requirements not 
permitted by directive 
 
 
Table 4.2 Transposition outcomes 
 
 
 Having examined transposition outcomes, attention can be turned to 
the next stage of implementation. 
 
                                                  
29 Case C-62/00 Marks & Spencer plc [2002] ECR I-6325, para 27. See further Krislov, Ehlermann and 
Weiler (n 20) 62-63; Prechal (n 20) 6-7. 
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4.3 Application Outcomes 
 
Once a directive has been transposed, the national implementing 
measures should not remain dead-letter law. A Member State will therefore 
remain under a continuous obligation to ensure the ‘full application of the 
directive even after the adoption of those measures’.30  
The national authorities primarily do so by taking actions and making 
decisions in application of the national implementing measures. Application is 
therefore intended to give practical effect to a directive.31 The national 
authorities are required to ‘ensure that the provisions of a directive are applied 
exactly and in full’32 and to take the necessary measures to ensure the 
attainment of any legal or factual results prescribed by the directive.33  
Where application ensures that the results prescribed by a directive are 
achieved, application can be said to be compliant. This occurs when ‘the 
provisions of a directive are applied exactly and in full’34 by a Member State. 
This requires that Member State should take all necessary measures to ensure 
the directive is applied in practice35 and the results which it prescribes are 
attained.36 
                                                  
30 Case C-62/00 Marks & Spencer plc [2002] ECR I-6325, para 27. 
31 See further Chapter 3, Section 3.5 (Obligations Relating to the Application of Directives). 
32 Joined Case 91/79 and 92/79 Commission v Italy [1990] ECR 1099, para 6; Case C-287/91 
Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-3515, para 7; Case C-16/95 Commission v Spain [1995] ECR I-4883, 
para 3. 
33 See Chapter 3, Section 3.5 (Obligations Relating to the Application of Directives). 
34 Joined Case 91/79 and 92/79 Commission v Italy [1990] ECR 1099, para 6; Case C-287/91 
Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-3515, para 7; Case C-16/95 Commission v Spain [1995] ECR I-4883, 
para 3. 
35 Richard Brent, Directives: Rights and Remedies in English and Community Law (Informa Law / 
Routledge 2001) 133.  
36 Case C-337/89 Commission v United Kingdom [1992] ECR I-6103, para 24; Case C-365/97 
Commission v Italy (San Rocco case) [1999] ECR I-7773, paras 108-109. 
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There may be several reasons to consider that the application of the 
national implementing measures by the national authorities fails to comply with 
the underlying directive. Firstly, where the transposition of a directive has been 
ambiguous, incorrect or incomplete, the application of a non-compliant 
provision of the national implementing measures is likely to lead to a situation 
where application itself is not compliant because it fails to achieve the objectives 
laid down by the directive.37 Even if the national implementing measures are 
subsequently amended to rectify their incompatibility with the directive in 
question, non-compliant application can still result from administrative 
decisions that were taken before the national implementing measures were 
rectified in the event they continue to produce their effects after the date upon 
which the corrected national implementing measures came into force.38  
                                                  
37 See for example, Case C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-6241. This case concerned several judicial 
appeals against a refusal by the Irish Minister of Justice to issue residence cards to the family members 
of EU citizens residing in Ireland on the basis that the family members had not been resident in a 
Member State prior to their move to Ireland, ibid, paras 21, 26, 30 and 35. The Irish authorities had 
incorrectly transposed the Directive by way of the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) 
(No 2) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/626, whose regulation 3(2), at the time these cases were brought, 
provided that the transposing measures ‘shall not apply to a family member unless the family member 
is lawfully resident in another Member State’, ibid, para 16. This added a requirement not found in the 
Directive, ibid, paras 49-54. The Court of Justice went on to hold that ‘Directive 2004/38 precludes 
legislation of a Member State which requires a national of a non-member country who is the spouse of 
a Union citizen residing in that Member State but not possessing its nationality to have previously been 
lawfully resident in another Member State before arriving in the host Member State, in order to benefit 
from the provisions of that directive’, ibid, para 80.  As a result of his judgment, Ireland adopted 
European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/310 to bring its 
national implementing measures into line with the ruling. The Minister of Justice also reviewed all 
decisions which were refused on the basis that the family member was not lawfully resident in another 
Member State before moving to Ireland, see Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, Press 
release, August 2008 <http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/print/PR08000027> accessed 23 December 
2015.  
38 See to that effect C-376/13 Commission v Bulgaria [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:266 (judgment of 23 
April 2015), para 49, in which the Court held that ‘the alleged disregard of the provisions of the 
“authorisation” and “competition” directives as well as the framework directive [on electronic 
communications networks and services] is likely to have continued for the whole duration of the validity 
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Secondly, a failure to apply the national implementing measures will also 
result in non-compliant application.39 This might arise because the national 
authorities have failed to achieve a factual result prescribed by a directive.40 
There may several causes for such a failure. For example, it could be the result 
of a Member State having failed to allocate sufficient resources and equip the 
administrative authorities with the necessary capabilities to apply a directive in 
practice.41 
Non-compliant application might also occur where the national 
authorities incorrectly apply the national implementing measures that have 
                                                  
of the rights of use of the broadcasting frequencies which were allocated in breach thereof’ (author’s 
translation), even though the Bulgarian authorities had argued that the national implementing 
measures had already been amended to comply with the directives in question, ibid, para 46. 
39 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 63; Prechal (n 20) 6-7; Börzel (n 17) 805. 
40 Case C-157/03 Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I-2911, para 45 (individual failure to issue a 
residence card to the non-EU family member of an EU citizen within six months); Case C-456/08 
Commission v Ireland [2010] ECR I-859, paras 39-41 (individual failure to notify a decision concerning 
the award of a public contract to unsuccessful applicant). See also, Case C-365/97 Commission v Italy 
(San Rocco case) (n 49), para 68 and Case C-135/05 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I-3475, para 37, 
which both concerned waste disposal in Italy. The Court held that the ‘significant deterioration in the 
environment over a protracted period without any action being taken by the competent authorities … 
may be an indication that the Member States have exceeded the discretion conferred on them by [the] 
provision’ of a directive on waste management, which requires Member States to take the necessary 
measures to recover or dispose of waste without endangering human health and without harming the 
environment, ibid, paras 68 and 37 respectively.  
41 See to that effect, Case C-331/07 Commission v Greece [2009] ECR I-60* (summary publication), 
Operative part, para 1 (shortage of staff assigned to veterinary controls). See further, Miriam Hartlapp, 
‘Enforcing Social Europe through Labour Inspectorates: Changes in Capacity and Cooperation across 
Europe’ (2014) West European Politics, 805-824, 819: ‘enforcement capacity in the EU multi-level 
system still seems at some distance from providing what is necessary to make application possible in 
cases of non-compliance with binding EU social standards’; Gerda Falkner, Miriam Hartlapp , Simone 
Leiber & Oliver Treib, ‘Non-Compliance with EU Directives in the Member States: Opposition through 
the Backdoor?’ (2004) 27 West European Politics, 452-473, whose study of infringement cases in the 
area of labour law found that ‘administrative shortcomings can also play an important role in non-
compliance. Sufficient financial or personnel resources are crucial for efficient implementation.’ See 




been fully and correctly transposed.42 This might, for example, be caused by 
contrary administrative practices43 or guidelines44 that impose additional 
administrative requirements which are not foreseen by the directive 
concerned45 or which give an incorrect interpretation to terms that are 
contained (but not defined) in a directive.46  
The application of a directive might also be considered non-compliant in 
circumstances where the national administrative authorities fail to interpret 
national law in conformity with a directive.47 Likewise, application could also be 
                                                  
42 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 63; Prechal (n 20) 6-7; Börzel (n 17) 805. 
43 The Court has consistently held that ‘[a] failure to fulfil obligations may arise due to the existence of 
an administrative practice which infringes Community law, even if the applicable national legislation 
itself complies with that law’; see for example, Case C-278/03 Commission v Italy [2005] ECR I-3747, 
para 13; Case C-441/02 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I-3449, para 47; Case C-342/05 
Commission v Finland [2007] ECR I-4713, para 22; Case C-489/06 Commission v Greece [2008] ECR 
I-1797, paras 46-47. See also, Case C-212/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-4923, para 31. See 
further, Alicja Sikora, ‘Administrative Practice as a Failure of a Member State to Fulfil its Obligations 
under Community Law’ (2012) 2 Review of European Administrative Law 5-27. 
44 See for example, Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591, paras 2, 33-34, 78 and 90 (administrative 
guidelines imposed an obligation on family members of EU citizens applying for a residence card to 
present a valid visa constitutes an excessive administrative measure not foreseen by the residence 
directives pre-dating Directive 2004/38). 
45 ibid. 
46 See for example, Case C-423/12 Reyes [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:16 (judgment of 14 January 2014). 
This case concerned a restrictive interpretation of the term ‘are dependants’ in Article 2(2) of Directive 
2004/38, ibid, 16. The Swedish authorities unsuccessfully argued that the concept of dependence 
requires proof that ‘dependants’ have been receiving material support from an EU relative for a 
reasonable period, but also to establish that the ‘dependants’ have tried without success to find work or 
obtain subsistence support from the authorities of their country of origin or otherwise tried to support 
themselves, ibid paras 24-25. A further example relates to the requirement that EU citizens who do not 
work must be in possession of ‘comprehensive sickness insurance’ in order to enjoy a right of residence 
under the Directive. As will be seen in Chapter 11, such problems affect Italy and the UK, as well as 
France, Spain and Sweden for different reasons. 
47 See for example, Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891, para 26; Case C-106/89 
Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, para 8; Case C-218/01 Henkel [2004] ECR I-1725, para 60. See further, 
Temple Lang (1998) (n 6), 114; idem (2001) (n 6) 88; Prechal (n 20) 65-72 and 317-318; Verhoeven (n 
6) 31-34.  
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non-compliant as a result of a failure by the national administrative authorities 
to uphold the supremacy of EU law in situations where a conflict with national 
law arises.48  
Non-compliant application can be the result of individual failures to 
achieve the result prescribed by a directive.49 Failures that are more systematic 
may be rooted in contrary administrative practices or guidelines50 or may be the 
result of non-compliant transposition.51 The Court has previously observed in 
this connection a finding of infringement based on administrative practices of 
‘a consistent and general nature’52 requires ‘sufficiently documented and 
                                                  
48 See for example, Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839, paras 31-33; Case C-118/00 Larsy 
[2001] ECR I-5063, para 53; Case C-224/97 Ciola [1999] ECR I-2517, para 26; Case C-198/01 Consorzio 
Industrie Fiammiferi [2003] ECR I-8055, para 49. See also, Temple Lang (1998) (n 6) 113; Verhoeven 
(n 6) 14-18 and 79-121. 
49 See for example, Case C-157/03 Commission v Spain (n 53), paras 12 and 46 (two individual 
complaints concerned, firstly, the imposition of a non-compliant obligation on family members of EU 
citizens to obtain a long-term family reunification visa in order to obtain a residence card; and, secondly, 
the failure to issue a residence card within six months and instead taking ten months to process the 
application). See also Joined Cases C-20/01 and C-28/01 Commission v Germany [2003] ECR I-3609, 
para 30 (failure to apply public procurement procedures in respect of a services contract for the 
treatment of waste); Case C-275/08 Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I-168* (summary 
publication), Operative part, para 1 (failure to apply public procurement procedures in respect of the 
award of a contract for the supply of motor vehicle registration software);  Case C-456/08 Commission 
v Ireland (n 53), paras 39-41 (failure to apply public procurement procedures in respect of public works 
in respect of a motorway). The Court of Justice has also previously ruled that ‘any infringement of the 
Treaty, irrespective of its gravity, may be the subject of an action under’ Article 258 TFEU, see Case C-
456/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-10517, para 22  
50 Case C-459/99 MRAX (n 57), paras 2 and 33-34 (administrative guidelines imposed an obligation on 
family members of EU citizens applying for a residence card to present a valid visa).  
51 Case C-157/03 Commission v Spain (n 53), paras 10, 35-38 (national implementing measures 
imposed an additional obligation on family members of EU citizens applying for a residence card to 
present a valid visa, which was not foreseen by the residence directives pre-dating Directive 2004/38); 
Case C-127/08 Metock (n 50), paras 49-54 (national implementing measures contained an additional 
condition imposed on family members to have previously lawfully resided in another Member State 
before residing with their EU relative in Ireland, which is not foreseen by Directive 2004/38). 
52 Case 21/84 Commission v France [1985] ECR 1355, paras 13 and 15; Case C-387/99 Commission v 
Germany [2004] ECR I-3751, para 42; Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland [2005] ECR I-3331, para 
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detailed proof of the alleged practice’ to be adduced.53 This involves adducing 
evidence as to the scale of infringements, their gravity and duration.54 The Court 
has held that a ‘generalised failure on the part of the administrative authorities 
to comply with the directive cannot be inferred from a few defective cases in 
practice.’55 In this connection, for example, evidence of eleven infringements 
spread out over five years or seventeen infringements over a period of seven 
years would not suffice to establish a ‘general and consistent practice’56, nor 
would eight infringements in a year appear to be sufficient either.57  
Non-application may also consist in a ‘general and persistent’ 
infringement58 ‘where the remedy … lies not merely in taking action to resolve 
                                                  
28; Case C-287/03 Commission v Belgium [2005] ECR I-3761, para 29; Case C-160/08 Commission v 
Germany [2010] ECR I-3713, para 107.  
53 See for example, Case C-287/03 Commission v Belgium (n 65), para 28; Case C-441/02 Commission 
v Germany [2006] ECR I-3449, paras 49-50; Case C-156/04 Commission v Greece [2007] ECR I-4129, 
para 50; Case C-489/06 Commission v Greece (n 56), para 48. See also to that effect Case C-416/07 
Commission v Greece [2009] ECR I-7883, paras 45-49.  However, the Court appears to have sometimes 
accepted the existence of an administrative practice without requiring such proof, see Case C-393/05 
Commission v Austria [2007] ECR I-10195, para 32; C-546/07 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-
439, para 40. 
54 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland ECR I-3338, paras 
43-46. 
55 Case C-229/00 Commission v Finland [2003] ECR I-5725, para 53. The Court noted that the ‘data 
supplied by the Finnish Government, which have not been challenged by the Commission, [showed] 
that whilst, in 1999, 3 266 decisions were taken by the Commission for Medicine Prices, only 133 
contained an inadequate statement of reasons’, namely 4.1% of decisions taken in that year.  
56 C-441/02 Commission v Germany (n 66), paras 99 and 124, in which the Court held that ‘eleven 
decisions mentioned by the Commission were taken … over a period of almost five years’ and ‘the 17 
orders mentioned by the Commission were made … over a period of seven years. The Court cannot in 
any event therefore find that there is a general and consistent practice contrary to Community law’. 
57 Case C-156/04 Commission v Greece (n 66), para 51, where the Court held that ‘given the very large 
number of Community nationals and Greek nationals established in other Member States who go to 
Greece by car each year, the eight individual cases to which the Commission refers – even if its 
allegations were sufficiently established in each case – constitute a substantially inadequate 
percentage’. 
58 Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland [2007] ECR I-9261, para 136, in which the Court noted that the 
Commission had supplied sufficient evidence of ‘a general and persistent approach of tolerance towards 
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a number of individual cases which do not comply with the [EU] obligation at 
issue, but where … non‐compliance can only be redressed by a revision of the 
general policy and administrative practice of the Member State in respect of the 
subject governed by the [EU] measure involved’.59 
The different application outcomes outlined above may be depicted by 
the following table: 








NIMs are fully and correctly applied, necessary 
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Failure to apply 
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numerous situations betraying a breach’ of a waste directive. This evidence consisted in furnished 
‘newspaper articles published between 8 December 2001 and 9 April 2002 and a report dated 7 
September 2001 from Wicklow County Council attest inter alia that, around the time when the period 
set in the 2001 reasoned opinion expired, close to 100 illegal sites were recorded in the county, some of 
which were of a considerable size and contained hazardous waste originating in particular from 
hospitals’, ibid para 135.  The Court appears to use the terms ‘general and persistent’ and ‘structural and 
general’ interchangeably to refer to such infringements, see for example, Case C-135/05 Commission v 
Italy (n 53), paras 22 and 45. 
59 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland (n 67), para 48. See 
also to that effect, Case C-376/13 Commission v Bulgaria (n 51), para 52. 
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Following consideration of outcomes in the application of a directive by 
the national authorities, enforcement by the national courts will now be 
contemplated. 
4.4 Enforcement Outcomes 
In their capacity as the EU’s ‘courts of general jurisdiction’,60 the national 
courts are under a duty to provide effective legal protection of EU rights.61  
In the context of the implementation of directives, like other organs of the 
State, the national courts are under a duty to ensure that the results of the 
directive are achieved.62 Some directives may explicitly lay down an obligation 
on Member States to provide for judicial redress.63 This is notably the case in 
the area of the free movement of persons.64 This entails that individuals should 
have a right to seek judicial review of the practical application of the national 
implementing measures by the national administrative authorities,65 so as to 
ensure that the latter have kept within the margin of the discretion permitted to 
them under the directive concerned.66 
Enforcement will be considered compliant if individuals are able to have 
recourse to the national courts to compel observance with the national 
                                                  
60 Case T-51/94 Tetra Pak Rausing [1990] ECR II-309, para 42.  
61 See for example, Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989, para 5; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, 
para 12. See further Chapter 3, Section 3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives).  
62 See for example, Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann (n 60), para 26. See further Chapter 3, Section 
3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives). 
63 See further, Chapter 3, Section 3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives).  
64 Article 31 of Directive 2004/38 provides that ‘judicial … redress procedures’ shall be made available 
to EU citizens and their family members in order to appeal against or seek review of any decision taken 
against them’ which, according to recital (26), should be available in ‘all events’. 
65 See for example, Joined Case C-65/95 and 111/95 Shingara and Radiom [1997] ECR I-3343, para 44. 
See further Chapter 3, Section 3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives).  
66 See for example, Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, para 52. See further Chapter 3, Section 3.6 
(Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives). 
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implementing measures 67 and, where appropriate, set aside national law that 
runs into conflict with a directive or other sources of EU law.68 National rules of 
procedure will apply to such court proceedings, provided they are ‘no less 
favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of 
equivalence) and [do] not render practically impossible or excessively difficult 
the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of 
effectiveness)’.69 
In proceedings relating to the enforcement of a directive, the national 
courts are under a duty to achieve the results prescribed by the directive 
concerned.70 Firstly, the national courts must as far as possible interpret the 
national implementing measures in conformity with a directive.71 Secondly, if 
consistent interpretation is not feasible, the national courts are under a duty not 
to apply rules of national law that run contrary to provisions of EU law.72 
Moreover, in situations where a directive has not been transposed or is the 
subject of ambiguous, incorrect or incomplete transposition, the national courts 
must enforce those provisions of a directive which are directly effective and 
create rights for individuals in proceedings against the State.73 Thirdly, in the 
                                                  
67 See for example, Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53, para 19. See further Chapter 3, Section 3.6 
(Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives). 
68 See for example, Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, para 21. See further Chapter 3, Section 
3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives) and Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2 (Supremacy, 
direct effect and consistent interpretation).    
69 See for example, Case 33/76 Rewe (n 74), para 5, and Case 45/76 Comet (n 74), paras 13 and 16. See 
further, Chapter 3, Section 3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives).  
70 See for example, Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann (n 60), para 26. See further Chapter 3, Section 
3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives) and Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1 (Enforcement 
before the national courts).  
71 Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann (n 60), para 26. See further Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2 (Supremacy, 
direct effect and consistent interpretation). 
72 See for example, Case C-462/99 Connect Austria [2003] ECR I-5197, para 40. See further Section 3.6 
(Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives) and Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2 (Supremacy, direct 
effect and consistent interpretation).  




event that a Member States has failed to implement a directive, the national 
courts must be empowered to award damages to individuals who have suffered 
loss as a result.74 Where there is doubt as to the interpretation to be given to a 
provision of a directive, the national courts have the power – and in certain 
circumstances the duty – to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court of 
Justice.75  
As a result, enforcement will be considered non-compliant where there is 
either a failure by the national courts to uphold these obligations or a mistake 
is made in interpreting the national implementing measures and/or the 
directive.  
A failure in enforcement occurs where the ‘courts disregard … the 
substance of [EU] law’.76 For example, in circumstances where a directive has 
not been fully and correctly implemented, a Member State’s domestic courts 
might refuse to recognise the direct effect of provisions of a directive.77 Likewise 
                                                  
74 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357, para 45. Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3 
(Member State liability). 
75 Article 267 TFEU. See further Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4 (Reference for a preliminary ruling). 
76 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 63. 
77 A good example is provided by the position of the French Conseil d’Etat (Council of State, the court 
of final appeal in administrative proceedings), which initially refused to recognise that directives could 
be invoked by individuals against administrative measures in the notorious Cohn-Bendit case, Conseil 
d’Etat, 22 décembre 1978, Ministre de l'Intérieur c/ Cohn-Bendit, Rec Lebon p 524 (22 December 1978), 
[1980] 1 Common Market Law Reports 543, thereby putting it at odds with the Cour de Cassation 
(Supreme Court with jurisdiction in in civil and criminal proceedings) which had previously upheld . 
This case concerned the absence of transposition of Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 
on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals 
which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health [1964] Spec Ed 1963-
1964 I-117. In 1975, Daniel Cohn-Bendit had sought to challenge an expulsion order issued by the 
French authorities for his involvement in the events of May 1968, on the basis that the order was in 
breach of Directive 64/221/EEC. At first instance, the administrative tribunal referred the issue to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling and suspended proceedings to await the Court’s opinion. The 
French Minister of the Interior appealed the matter to the Council of State, which took the position that 
‘directives cannot be invoked by the citizens of these states in support of a challenge to an individual 
administrative measure’. The Council of State consequently quashed the order of the administrative 
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judicial practices may make it excessively difficult or practically impossible to 
enforce a directive,78 or may require such claims to be adjudicated on the basis 
of rules of procedure which are less favourable than those which apply to similar 
domestic claims.79 This would make it impossible to enforce the directive80 and 
result in a breach both Article 4(3) TEU81 and Article 288(3) TFEU82 by the 
national courts. 
Non-compliant enforcement might also occur where there is a failure to 
make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice under Article 
267 TFEU.83 For example, this might occur where a final court of appeal fails to 
                                                  
tribunal. In doing so, it held that ‘the Minister of the Interior [was] justified in arguing that the tribunal 
administratif of Paris wrongly made a reference to the European Court of Justice on questions of the 
interpretation of this Directive and in ordering the suspension [of the administrative decision] until a 
decision of that Court’ (translation John Bell). It took more than a decade for the Council of State to 
reverse its approach and recognise that directives could be invoked in the Rothman/Philipp Morris 
cases (Conseil d’Etat, Ass 28 février 1992, SA Rothmans International France & SA Philipp Morris 
France, Rec Lebon p 81 (28 February 1992), [1993] 1 Common Market Law Reports 253). For a review 
of the initial resistance to and later acceptance of the supremacy of EU law by the French courts, see 
further, Karen Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International 
Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford University Press 2003) 124-181. 
78 Case C-268/06 Impact [2008] ECR I-2483, paras 51 and 53 (where national law does not confer 
jurisdiction on a specialised labour court to hear a claim relating to the enforcement of a directive in the 
field of employment, the obligation to bring parallel proceedings before the ordinary courts may lead to 
procedural complications that enders the enforcement of the directive excessively difficult). See further 
Chapter 3, Section 3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives). 
79 See to that effect, Case 98/79 Pecastaing [1980] ECR 691, para 11. See further Chapter 3, Section 3.6 
(Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives). 
80 See for example, Reinhard Slepcevic, ‘The Judicial Enforcement of EU Law through National Courts: 
Possibilities and Limits’ (2009) 16 Journal of European Public Policy, 378-394, 382. 
81 C-404/13 Client Earth [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2382 (Judgment of 14 November 2014), para 52. 
82 Case C-282/10 Dominguez [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:33 (judgment of 24 January 2012), para 24. 
83 See to that effect, Case C-396/03 P Killinger [2005] ECR I-4967 (Order of the Court of 3 June 2005), 
para 28, where the Court held that ‘[i]n the system of legal remedies provided for by the Treaty, an 
infringement of Community law by the national authorities, including an infringement of the third 
paragraph of Article [267 TFEU], may be brought before the Community courts by the Commission or 
by another Member State, or may be brought before the competent national courts by any natural or 
legal person.’ The Commission considers that ‘infringement proceedings in respect of such judgments 
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make a reference when confronted by a provision of a directive which is unclear 
and has not been the subject of a previous ruling by the Court of Justice, which 
has given rise to contradictory domestic judgments and which is the cause of 
difficulties of interpretation in several Member States.84 This might also occur 
                                                  
can only be considered when a judgment by a court of last instance shows clearly that that court is 
systematically and deliberately unprepared to comply with Article 177 of the EEC Treaty’ (now Article 
267 TFEU), see Written Question No 526/83 by Mr Alan Tyrrell [MEP] (ED - GB) to the Commission 
of the European Communities [1983] OJ C 268/25.  Although the Commission began infringement 
proceedings against Sweden in 2003 in view of the country’s supreme court to comply with its obligation 
to refer under Article 267(3) TFEU, the case was closed in July 2006; see Commission Staff Working 
Document, ‘Annex to the 24th Annual Report from the Commission on Monitoring the Application of 
Community Law (2006)’, SWD (2007) 976, 127, ‘Manquement de la Cour Suprême Suédoise: Refus de 
présenter [une] question prejudicielle devant la CJCE’ (case 2003/2161). See also, Koen Lenaerts, 
Ignace Maselis and Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law (Janek Tomasz Nowak ed, Oxford University 
Press 2014) 102, n 282, where the authors observe that ‘[i]f a national court of first instance does not 
refer under circumstances where it is under an obligation to do so in accordance with the third para of 
Art 267 TEFU, then this constitutes an infringement of Union law, and often national law as well.’  
Morten Broberg and Niels Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (2nd ed, 
Oxford University Press 2014) 443, also appear to support this view: ‘[e]xamples of non-compliance are 
rare and so to the extent that there is a genuine enforcement problem related to the preliminary ruling 
procedure this does not lie in failure to comply with the Court’s preliminary ruling in those cases where 
a question has been referred; rather it stems from those cases where EU law is being ignored without 
the national court making a preliminary reference’. See further Peter Wattel, ‘Köbler, CILFIT and 
Welthgrove: We Can’t Go On Meeting Like This’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 177-190; 
Andersen (n 14) 64-66. 
84 See for example, Case C-160/14 Ferreira da Silva e Brito [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:565 (judgment of 
9 September 2015), para 45, in which the Court held that where ‘there are conflicting decisions of lower 
courts or tribunals regarding the interpretation of [a] concept [contained in a directive] and by the fact 
that that concept frequently gives rise to difficulties of interpretation in the various Member States, the 
third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU must be construed as meaning that a court or tribunal against 
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is obliged to make a reference to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of that concept’. See also, Case C-224/01 
Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239, para 118. However, it should be noted that in this case the Court of Justice 
found that the failure of the Austrian Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court) to refer 
the matter to the Court of Justice did not constitute a manifest breach of EU law that could render the 
Austrian state liable in damages, ibid, paras 120-126. Note also that a refusal to make a reference under 
Article 267 TFEU by a final court of appeal may also constitute a breach of Article 6 ECHR on the right 
to a fair hearing if there is a failure by that court to give reasons for refusing the reference, see 
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where judicial practices prevent the national courts from referring questions to 
the Court of Justice.85 
Even if a directive has been implemented correctly, the national courts 
may also ‘misapply the procedures and/or the substance’ of the directive 
concerned in breach of Article 288(3) TFEU.86 This then takes the form of 
incorrect enforcement rather than a failure to enforce. For instance, when 
interpreting the national implementing measures, it may be that the national 
courts fail to interpret them in conformity with the directive.87 This leads to a 
situation where the national courts ‘choose one of the possible options for 
interpretation and, subsequently the latter leads to a result inconsistent with 
the underlying directive.’88 As a result, non-compliant enforcement may occur 
in a situation where the national courts interpret the provisions of a directive in 
a restrictive way that undermines its objectives.89 
                                                  
Vergauwen v Belgium, App No 4832/04 (ECHR, 10 April 2012), paras 89-90; Dhahbi v Italy App No 
17120/09 (ECHR, 8 April 2014), paras 31-34. 
85 The Court has previously held that a rule of national law must be set aside where it prevents the 
procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU from being followed; see Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen II [1974] 
ECR 33, para 4; Case 146/73 Rheinmühlen [1974] ECR 139, para 3; Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] 
ECR I-4599, para 13; Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel [1995] ECR I-4705, para 18. 
However, some suggest that this case law is far from clear and a source of legal uncertainty, see for 
example Lorna Woods and Philippa Watson, Steiner & Woods EU Law (12th ed, Oxford University Press 
2014) 193: ‘[i]t is not possible to say that the national courts must have the right to refer questions to 
the CJ of their own motion or, on the other hand that they need not. Instead, the answer to whether 
national rules limiting national courts’ rights to refer questions of EU law to the CJ of their own motion 
are acceptable is, “it depends”.’   
86 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 63; Andersen (n 96) 62-64.   
87 See for example, Damian Chalmers, ‘The Application of Community Law in the United Kingdom, 
1994–1998’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 83–128, 95-96, for examples where ‘English courts 
had qualified their otherwise relatively unreserved acceptance of EC law by adopting only a qualified 
acceptance of the doctrine on the indirect effect of directives’ also known as the duty of consistent 
interpretation. 
88 Prechal (n 20), 188. 
89 For an example of the failure of the UK Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) to have 
due regard to Articles 15 and 31 of Directive 2004/38 on appeal rights which should apply in all cases, 
see R (on the application of Bilal Ahmed) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (EEA/s 10 
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 There is some uncertainty as to whether individual instances of 
misinterpretation of the provisions of a directive will constitute non-compliant 
enforcement by the national courts.90 However, the Court of Justice appears to 
have settled the issue in a case involving charges levied in breach of EU law: 
‘In that regard, isolated or numerically insignificant judicial decisions in 
the context of case-law taking a different direction, or still more a 
construction disowned by the national supreme court, cannot be taken 
into account. That is not true of a widely-held judicial construction which 
                                                  
appeal rights: effect) (IJR) [2015] UKUT 00436 (IAC). For commentary, see Eslpeth Guild, ‘Reflecting 
EU law faithfully? R (Bilal Ahmed) v SSHD IJR [2015] UKUT 00436 (IAC)’ (Free Movement, 14 
September 2015) <https://www.freemovement.org.uk/reflecting-eu-law-faithfully-r-bilal-ahmed-v-
sshd-ijr-2015-ukut-00436-iac/> accessed 23 December 2015, who comments ‘Judges Storey and Lane, 
both senior and experienced members of the Upper Tribunal, came to a rather odd decision: where the 
Secretary of State claims a reasonable suspicion that the third country national spouse of an EEA 
national (exercising Treaty rights in the UK) has entered into a sham marriage he or she is no longer a 
spouse under the EEA regulations and thus gets no in country appeal right. The exclusion is apparently 
based on Reg 2 EEA Regulations which states that a ‘spouse’ does not include a party to a marriage of 
convenience. … This is clearly mistaken. Someone who is appealing against a decision by the Home 
Office refusing his or her status as a spouse is obviously covered by the appeal right[s] [provided by 
Articles 15 and 31 of Directive 2004/38]. … The correct course of action for the UT if it was in doubt 
about the in country appeal right for someone whom the Home Office held was only the spouse of an 
EEA national as a result of a marriage of convenience … would have been to refer the question to the 
Court of Justice.’  
90 See for example, Brent (n 48) 99, who remarks that ‘it should be noted that the fact that a national 
court commits an error in a judgment in relation to the application of a directive is unlikely to amount 
to a breach of a Member State’s obligation to implement a directive’ citing Advocate General Warner in 
Case 30/77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, 2020, who opined that ‘[i]t is obvious on the other hand that 
a Member State cannot be held to have failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty simply because one 
of its Courts has reached a wrong decision. Judicial error, whether due to the misapprehension of facts 
or to misapprehension of the law, is not a breach of the Treaty. In the judicial sphere, Article [258 TFEU] 
could only come into play in the event of a court of a Member State deliberately ignoring or disregarding 
Community law.’ Compare Andersen (n 96) 63, who takes the view that ‘Advocate General Warner’s 
argument is sympathetic. However, it may not be sustainable in view of subsequent case law which 
establishes that judgments under Article 258 TFEU are declaratory. Thus, they are confined to the 
finding that a member state has not fulfilled an obligation under EU law. Moreover, although not 




has not been disowned by the supreme court, but rather confirmed by 
it.’91 
On this basis, it would follow that instances of misinterpretation of a 
directive by the lower courts will not constitute non-compliant enforcement 
unless such judicial practice is widespread among the lower courts or has been 
confirmed by a decision from a supreme court.92  
                                                  
91 Case C-129/00 Commission v Italy [2004] ECR I-14637 para 32 (breach of EU law resulting from 
judicial interpretation of Italian law on the implementation of EU obligations that made it excessively 
difficult for taxpayers to obtain the repayment of charges levied in breach of EU law); Case C-154/08 
Commission v Spain [2009] ECR I-187, para 126 (breach of VAT directive resulting from judicial 
interpretation by national supreme court). See also to that effect, Case C-156/04 Commission v Greece 
(n 66), paras 50 and 52 (a failure to fulfil obligations on account of a judicial practice requires 
sufficiently documented and detailed proof of the alleged practice). 
92 See to that effect Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-129/00 Commission v Italy [2003] 
ECR I-14637, paras 63-64:  
‘an individual incorrect judgment of a lower court does not necessarily result in the 
undermining of the practical effect of the provision of Community law concerned … . At the 
other end of the spectrum, such consequences are probable if there is contrary national case-
law of the supreme national court from which the lower courts will derive guidance within the 
national legal system. Such effects can arise also where there is disagreement within the 
national judiciary. Moreover, it should not be ruled out that where, in structural terms, lower 
courts interpret and apply certain parts of Community law incorrectly, this can have the effect 
of discouraging individuals from bringing an action or lodging an appeal. In spite of the 
somewhat lower status of such case-law in the national legal order, such a situation might be 
regarded as grounds for a declaration that the Treaty has been infringed. … In my view, it is also 
relevant as to whether or not the failure to fulfil Community obligations by the national courts 
constitutes a structural phenomenon. Is it an incidental or isolated case or can it be said 
precisely that it is a trend in national case-law which is at odds with Community obligations in 
a particular respect? In this regard it will also be relevant whether it constitutes a new 
development or case-law that has been maintained over a longer period. In the former case it is 
possible to envisage that the national legal system has an opportunity to correct itself before it 
is possible to speak of a breach of the Treaty. If such a development is confirmed in an appeal 
and/or an appeal in cassation, in which case whether or not the legal issue in question has been 
referred to the Court of Justice by way of an order for reference can also be relevant, it may be 
concluded that it constitutes a structural phenomenon.’ 
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Where there is a pattern of misinterpretation of a directive by the national 
courts, it is possible that the existence of non-compliant enforcement will find 
its roots in non-compliant transposition.93 This could arise, for example, where 
‘the national courts systematically construe provisions of national law aimed at 
transposing a directive in a way which causes the provisions to be a variance 
with the directive’ and might therefore indicate that ‘the directive has not been 
correctly transposed’.94    
 The following table illustrates these various outcomes in the enforcement 
of a directive by the national courts:  








Effective judicial protection enables NIMs to be 
enforced and interpreted in compliance with 
directive   
 
? 
Implementation will only be compliant if 




Non-compliant enforcement Non-compliant implementation 
 
Failure to enforce 
Enforcement of NIMs/directive is subject to less 
favourable rules than similar domestic actions 
 
Enforcement of NIMs/directive is excessively 
difficult or practically impossible  
 
Non-recognition of direct effect of directive 
 
Non-recognition of supremacy of EU law 
 
Unjustified refusal or inability to make reference 










NIMs not interpreted consistently with directive 
 









93 See to that effect, Case C-129/00 Commission v Italy (n 104), para 33: ‘Where national legislation 
has been the subject of different relevant judicial constructions, some leading to the application of that 
legislation in compliance with Community law, others leading to the opposite application, it must be 
held that, at the very least, such legislation is not sufficiently clear to ensure its application in 
compliance with Community law.’  
94 Prechal (n 20), 187.  
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 Having analysed the different possible outcomes in the transposition, 
application and enforcement of directives, it is appropriate to examine the 
motivations of the national authorities to implementation.     
4.5 Motivations of the Members States Towards Non-Compliance 
The motivations of the national authorities not only affect 
implementation outcomes95 they also determine how a Member State reacts to 
accusations of infringements by the Commission or judicial findings of an 
infringement of EU law by the Court of Justice.96 Such motivations can affect 
how a Member State’s level of compliance can change over time.97 It therefore 
follows that non-compliance can therefore be unintentional or result from wilful 
conduct98 that is undertaken as part of a Member State’s intentional strategy.  
                                                  
95 See Sonja Bugdahn, ‘Of Europeanization and Domestication: The Implementation of the 
Enviromental Information Directive in Ireland, Great Britain and Germany’ (2005) 12 Journal of 
European Public Policy, 177-199, 194, which identifies ‘various forms of domestication (business as 
usual, conservative or progressive interpretation, organizational initiatives and broader reforms) that 
limit, mediate or accompany adaptation to Europe’.  
96 See to that effect, Zürn (n 14) 9: ‘Compliance, therefore, comprises, in addition to the (perceived) 
differences between obligation and actual behaviour [sic], the way those differences are dealt with once 
they are on the table. Compliance is thus assessed by dealing with two related questions: (1) What are 
the demands made on the behaviour [sic] of the addressees and to what extent do the addressees comply 
with these demands (the first dimension of compliance)? (2) How are accusations of non-compliance 
handled (the second dimension of compliance)?’ 
97 Panke (n 18) 849, deplores how ‘instances of prevailing domestic resistance to European demands for 
change are often under-theorized’ and calls for  theorize how member states’ non-compliance can be 
transformed into compliance in the longer run, although the absence or incomplete legal transposition 
of European into national legal acts (non-compliance) is an instance of delayed Europeanization.’ 
However, the argument can cut both ways; although compliance may improve over time it can also get 
worse. 
98 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 63-64. For a similar approach, see Zürn (n 14) 9 and Christian 
Joerges, ‘Compliance research in legal perspectives’ in Zürn and Joerges (n 14) 218-261, 228. The 
authors operate a distinction between ‘“good compliance” (only minor divergence from the 
prescriptions of a norm, with discomfort not publicly voiced), “recalcitrant compliance” (negligible 
disregard but publicly voiced discomfort with a rule), “initial non-compliance” (significant difference 
and a change in behavior [sic] due to allegations and/or the decision of an authorized dispute settlement 
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A failure to implement can be benign or unintentional. For example, it 
may result from ‘objective parliamentary and administrative difficulties in the 
legislative process’99 or misconception due to ambiguity found in the 
directive.100 Nonetheless, it should be noted that the absence of specific intent 
by a Member State that explains a failure to implement a directive will not affect 
a finding from the Court of Justice that it has failed to fulfil its obligations under 
EU law.101 In such cases, a Member State which is found to have unintentionally 
                                                  
body), and a “compliance crisis” (significant difference, but no change in behavior [sic] even though the 
practice has been detected, alleged and/or outlawed)’, ibid, 228. 
99 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 64. See also n 24 for the background to Luxembourg’s delay in 
transposing Directive 2004/38. 
100 See for example, Case C-392/93 British Telecoms [1996] ECR I-1631, para 42, in which the Court of 
Justice considered that the Utilities Procurement Directive 90/531 [1990] OJ L 297/1 was ‘imprecisely 
worded and was reasonably capable of bearing, as well as the construction applied to it by the Court in 
this judgment, the interpretation given to it by the United Kingdom in good faith and on the basis of 
arguments which are not entirely devoid of substance’. As a result the UK’s failure to transpose the 
directive correctly did not constitute a sufficiently serious breach of EU law that could engage that 
Member State’s liability to compensate the contracting entity for any damages it might have suffered as 
a result of incorrect transposition.  
101 The Court of Justice has consistently held that ‘a Member State may not plead provisions, practices 
or circumstances in its own legal order to justify failure to implement a directive within the prescribed 
period’; see for example Case 52/75 Commission v Italy [1976] ECR 278, para 14; Case 163/78 
Commission v Italy [1979] ECR 771, paras 4-5; Case 42/80 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR 3635, paras 
3-4; Case 100/81 Commission v Netherlands [1982] ECR 1837, paras 3-4; Case 390/85 Commission v 
Belgium [1987] ECR 761, paras 6-7; Case 419/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2115, paras 10-11; 
Case C-42/89 Commission v Belgium [1990] ECR I-2821, paras 22 and 24; Case C-259/94 Commission 
v Greece [1995] ECR I-1947, paras 4-5; Case C-312/95 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR I-5143, 
paras 8-9; Case C-297/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-6739, paras 8-9; Case C-107/96 
Commission v Spain [1997] ECR I-3193, paras 9-10; Case C-208/96 Commission v Belgium [1997] ECR 
I-5375, paras 8-9; Case C-144/97 Commission v France [1998] ECR I-613, paras 7-8; Case C-274/98 
Commission v Spain [2000] ECR I-2823, paras 18-19; Case C-276/98 Commission v Portugal [2001] 
ECR I-1699, para 20; Case C-78/00 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-8195, para 38; Case C-352/01 
Commission v Spain [2002] ECR I-10263, paras 5 and 8; Case C-22/02 Commission v Italy [2003] 
ECR I 9011, paras 4-6 and 9; Case C-282/08 Commission v Luxembourg [2009] ECR I-13, paras 8-9; . 
For a discussion, see Prechal (n 20) 23-28; while ‘no excuses for delayed implementation have as yet 
been accepted by the Court of Justice’, the author concedes that ‘in certain situations a Member State 
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failed to comply with a directive can be expected to take corrective action to 
address non-compliance since there is no intention to infringe EU law.102  
However, non-compliance can also result from an intentional strategy to 
flout EU law.103 For example, non-compliant application may be the result of a 
policy to turn a blind eye to instances of non-observance of a directive in order 
to give precedence to competing interests,104 or could be attributable to the fact 
that the policy field which is regulated by a directive is not politically salient105 
                                                  
could invoke particular circumstances which could free it, at least for a certain period, from the 
obligation to implement a directive’, ibid, 24. 
102 See to that effect, Zürn (n 14) 9, who points out that ‘charges of non-compliance can, for instance, 
arise out of the ambiguity of a rule, without any desire of either side to cheat or to challenge the validity 
of the rule. In such cases, it is to be expected that compliance is no longer problematic once any 
differences about the correct interpretation of the rule have been settled.’ See Joseph Weiler (n 13) 2465, 
n 177, who points out that ‘As far as directives are concerned, in most cases, nonincorporation is a result 
of objective constitutional and procedural difficulties at the national level (especially in Italy and 
Belgium) and not from an evasive or defiant strategy by a Member State.’ 
103 See for example, Weiler (n 115) 2464-24655, who warns of the ‘selective application’ of EU law by 
Member States. 
104 See for example, Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland (n 71), para 53 where the Court noted that 
the evidence produced by the Commission showed ‘to the required legal standard that in 1997 the 
competent local authority tolerated unauthorised depositing of construction and demolition waste on 
wetlands in Limerick, that such depositing continued in the area in question, in particular in the course 
of the present proceedings, and that other depositing also took place on two further wetlands very close 
by’. Commission, ‘Industry: Commission refers Germany to the Court of Justice of the EU over failure 
to apply Directive on mobile air conditioning’, Press release IP/15/6290 (10 December 2010), in which 
the Commission notes that ‘The German authorities did not take the necessary action to ensure that the 
vehicles were brought back in conformity with EU law by ordering Daimler AG to recall the vehicles and 
make the necessary technical adaptations to ensure full compliance with the MAC Directive. … The 
European Commission considers that in doing so, the German authorities have allowed Daimler AG to 
circumvent the application of the MAC Directive, which would have required the use of the new 
[refrigerant] R-1234yf.’ See also to that effect, as regards the Treaty provisions on the free movement of 
goods, Case C-265/95 Commission v France (Spanish strawberries case) [1997] ECR I-6959 which 
concerned ‘the passivity of the French authorities in face of violent acts committed by private 
individuals and by protest movements of French farmers directed against agricultural products from 
other Member States’ which had ‘taken place regularly for more than 10 years’, ibid, paras 2 and 40.   




and is therefore not considered a priority by the national administrative 
authorities concerned.106 Such forms of intentional non-compliance can further 
be categorised as defiant, evasive or selective depending on how a Member State 
will react when its non-compliance is discovered.  
At one extreme lies ‘defiant non-compliance’ which takes ‘the form of a 
deliberate failure to implement [EU] law (especially directives); a decision not 
to apply [EU] law in force; or a failure – especially by the courts – to enforce 
[EU] law’.107 What characterises non-compliance as defiant is that the Member 
State concerned is unlikely to rectify its behaviour even if the practice concerned 
is challenged by the European Commission or is the subject of an adverse 
judgment from the Court of Justice.108 Whether this happens is likely to be 
influenced by factors such as the political power that a Member State enjoys in 
                                                  
online Papers No 19, 10, defines ‘salience in general terms refers to the visibility of and the importance 
attached to a topic’ and considers ‘the main indicator of salience is attention: an issue is salient when it 
receives much attention, i.e. news coverage. So what makes that an issue receives attention or is covered 
in the news? There potentially can be many elements that trigger attention, but in the case studies 
analyzed in this article, especially two elements seem to be of importance: risks and focusing events.’ 
106 See for example, Esther Versluis, ‘Even Rules, Uneven Practices: Opening the “Black Box” of EU Law 
in Action’ (2007) 30 West European Politics, 50-67, 62-63, who found that ‘[t]he Safety Data Sheets 
Directive seems to indicate the importance of issue salience. While solutions to explain the lack of 
practical implementation would not be found in the complexity of the directive, administrative 
incapabilities, misfit or opposition, issue salience does seem to provide an explanation. Member states 
do not enforce or comply with the SDS Directive, simply because it is not considered to be important 
enough. This case study suggests that for salient topics the central question remains why enforcement 
and compliance do not occur.’ 
107 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 63. Defiant non-compliance would broadly correspond to a 
‘compliance crisis’ within the categorisation developed by Zürn (n 14) 9 and Joerge (n 111) 228 
108 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 63 citing the example of the initial reaction of the Italian 
Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice’s judgment in Case 106/77 Simmenthal (n 81). See further 
Giorgio Gaja, 'Constitutional Court (Italy), Decison No. 176 of 26 October 1981, S.p.a. Comavicola v. 
Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato' (1982) 19 Common Market Law Review 455-461; Marta 
Cartabia, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship between the Italian Legal System and 
the European Community’ (1990) 12 Michigan Journal of International Law 173-203;  Giorgio Gaja, 
'New Developments in a Continuing Story: The Relationship between EEC Law and Italian Law' (1990) 
27 Common Market Law Review 83-95;  
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the EU relative to the other Member States in resisting enforcement by the 
European Commission,109 as well as the existence of domestic actors which can 
bring pressure on the national authorities to amend non-compliant 
implementation.110  
Intentional non-compliance may also consist in ‘evasive non-
compliance’.111 This occurs where a Member State deliberately seeking to evade 
implementation of a directive ‘but [it] will not defy an open challenge by the 
Commission – or eventually the Court – if discovered’.112 As a result, where non-
compliance is discovered and triggers an investigation by the Commission, 
evasive non-compliance is likely to be resolved informally following discussions 
with the defaulting Member State.113 It may also be possible that evasive non-
                                                  
109 See for example, Tanja Börzel, Tobias Hofmann, Diana Panke and Carina Sprungk ‘Obstinate and 
Inefficient: Why Member States Do Not Comply With European Law’ (2010) 43 Comparative Political 
Studies, 1363-1390, 1365: ‘The best compliers are member states that have ample administrative 
capacity and lack the political power to withstand the compliance pressure of enforcement authorities. 
Conversely, the countries with the worst compliance records are those with limited capacity but enough 
power to resist the European Commission’s enforcement efforts. Member states with weak capacity and 
limited power are not very good compliers either, but they still fare better than their powerful 
counterparts. Finally, powerful member states with strong capacity comply better than powerful 
member states with weak capacity. In short, although power has a negative impact on compliance, the 
impact is reduced by the interaction with capacity’; 
110 Susanne Schmidt, ‘Beyond Compliance. Europeanization through Negative Integration and Legal 
Uncertainty’ (2008) 10 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 299-308, 304 
who suggests that ‘[t]he higher the legal uncertainty arising from a Treaty rule and its interpretation, 
the more opportunities it offers for domestic actors to turn to the European courts in order to press for 
Europeanization’.  
111 This would correspond to ‘initial non-compliance’ within the categorisation developed by Zürn (n 14) 
9 and Joerge (n 111) 228. 
112 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 64.  
113 See further, Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1 (Direct supervision by the Commission). An example is provided 
by the former practice of the Belgian immigration authorities which refused to recognise the status of a 
‘worker’ to EU citizens working in Belgium under cover of a measure to facilitate access to employment 
under Article 60 of the law on social assistance centres (Loi organique des centres publics d'action 
sociale du 8 juillet 1978, MB 05-08-1976, p 9876) on the basis that such work created a ‘burden on 
social assistance’ under Directive 2004/38. Following the opening of an investigation by the 
Commission, the Belgian authorities amended their practice from the end of April 2014 so that persons 
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compliance by a Member State comes nonetheless to be examined by the Court 
of Justice. For example, a Member State may breach the deadline in transposing 
a directive due to the low priority it accords to its transposition.114 Given the 
Commission’s avowed enforcement strategy to combat late transposition,115 the 
Commission may well proceed to bring a case before the Court for failure to 
notify the national implementing measures.116 This will result in a finding of 
infringement despite assurances given by a Member State that national 
implementing measures will be shortly adopted117 or even if such measures have 
                                                  
working under such a measure are now considered workers under the Directive, see Chambre des 
Représentants de Belgique, ‘Note de Politique Générale – Asile et Migration’, Doc 54 0588/026 
(Chamber of Representatives, ‘General Policy Note – Asylum and Migration), 28 November 2014, 27-
28 <http://www.lachambre.be/flwb/pdf/54/0588/54K0588026.pdf> accessed 29 December 2015. 
For background, see Marco Martiniello et al, ‘Les expulsions de citoyens et citoyennes européens. Un 
phénomène qui nous alarme, et nous mobilise’ (Université de Liège, 26 May 2014) 
<http://blogs.ulg.ac.be/marcomartiniello/2014/05/26/les-expulsions-citoyens-citoyennes-
europeens/> accessed 29 December 2015. 
114 Aneta Spendzharova and Esther Versluis, ‘Issue Salience in the European Policy Process: What 
Impact on Transposition? (2013) Journal of European Public Policy 1499-1516, 1512-1513, who found 
that ‘[h]igh salience of environmental issues for a government initially speeds up transposition, but we 
found that this effect diminishes over time and 191 days after the deadline, it actually slows down 
transposition.’ The authors found some support for the hypothesis advanced by Christoph Knill, 
‘Implementing European Policies: The Impact of National Administrative Traditions’ (1997) EUI 
Working Paper 97/56, 11, in which he postulated that ‘[i]f political salience is low, we assume that 
perception of adaptation pressure shifts from a moderate to a low level. Due to political indifference, 
policy problems addressed by supranational legislation are either overlooked, neglected, or taken as 
being satisfactorily resolved by given administrative arrangements’. 
115 Commission, Communication ‘Better Monitoring of the Application of Community Law’, COM(2002) 
725 final, 12 and 17; Commission, Communication ‘A Europe of Results - Applying Community Law’, 
COM(2007) 502 final, 9; Commission, ‘Report from the Commission - Monitoring the application of 
Union law 2014 Annual Report’ COM(2015) 329 final, 17 (hereafter ‘Annual Report on the Application 
of EU Law for 2014’). See further Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1 (Direct supervision by the Commission). 
116 See further Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2 (Infringement action by the Commission).  
117 The Court of Justice has consistently held that ‘question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil 
its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the 
end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion’, see for example Case C-173/01 Commission v 
Greece [2002] ECR I-6129, para 7. In that case, the Court found that Greece had ‘not adopted the 
measures necessary to comply with the reasoned opinion within the period prescribed for that purpose’ 
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been adopted by the time the case comes before the Court.118 In such 
circumstances, an adverse ruling from the Court119 is likely to lead the Member 
State to desist from evading its obligations and take the necessary measures to 
correct its non-compliant implementation. 
Nonetheless, there may also be circumstances where, without being 
outright defiant, a Member State’s non-compliance in implementing a directive 
will persist despite its discovery. In salient policy fields, a Member State may 
adopt a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude whenever its non-compliance becomes the 
subject of judicial intervention.120 The level of precision displayed by the Court 
of Justice in its resulting decision will then influence how a Member State 
reacts.121 Where a ruling contains ambiguities that can be exploited to its 
advantage, a Member State which does not agree with the judicial outcome may 
                                                  
and therefore it was therefore irrelevant that ‘the measures necessary to implement the Directive in 
national law ha[d] been drafted by the competent department and that the draft presidential decree 
enacting them [would], as soon as it [was] published, be forwarded to the Court and the Commission in 
its definitive version’ ibid, 6-8. The Commission’s reasoned opinion defines the subject-matter of the 
proceedings and is an essential procedural requirement in infringement proceedings under Article 258 
which precedes a formal application to the Court of Justice, see Case C-152/89 Commission v 
Luxembourg [1991] ECR I-3141, para 9.  
118 See for example Case C-110/00 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-7545, paras 11-14, the Court 
dismissed Austria’s argument that following ‘the adoption of certain legislative amendments, the 
directive [had] been fully implemented at federal level’ and ‘that several implementing regulations have 
been adopted with regard to the Länder’ on the basis that ‘it had not adopted, prior to the expiry of the 
period of two months set by the reasoned opinion, the measures necessary to implement the directive 
fully in national law’. 
119 Alternatively, it could be that a Member State’s evasive non-compliance is challenged before the 
national courts which then make a reference for a preliminary ruling that leads to the Court of Justice 
issuing an judgment that is unfavourable for the Member State concerned. See further Chapter 5, 
Section 5.3.4 (Reference for a preliminary ruling).  
120 See to that effect, Tracy Slagter, ‘National Parliaments and the ECJ: A View from the Bundestag’ 
(2009) 47 Journal of Common Market Studies 175-197, 190-191.   
121 Fabio Wasserfallen, ‘The Judiciary as Legislator? How the European Court of Justice Shapes Policy-
Making in the EU’ (2010), 1128-1146, 1133: ‘the clarity of judicial doctrines determines how strictly 
national administrations and governments should implement case law.’ 
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take the form of a strategy of ‘contained compliance’122 where limited action123 
is taken to achieve compliance in the immediate context of the finding of non-
compliance by the Court of Justice,124 but without amending its wider non-
compliant policy.125 Alternatively, a Member State may compromise by taking 
action to forestall future legal challenges that may be generated by a ruling by 
the Court of Justice,126 albeit this may be done reluctantly.127 What will 
                                                  
122 Lisa Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union (Cornell University Pres 
2002) 38, who defines a policy of ‘contained compliance’ that consists in Member States ‘neglecting the 
policy implications of judicial decisions while simultaneously respecting individual judgments.’ The 
author also observes that, based on her interviews, ‘contained compliance constitutes standard 
administrative practice’ in France, Germany and the UK, ibid, 69. Aside from ‘contained compliance’, 
another strategic response may include ‘restrictive application’ that occurs ‘when Member States place 
limits and exceptions on judicial principles in secondary legislation (European directives and 
regulations or domestic legislation) and treaty provisions’ ibid, 32. 
123 Michael Blauberger, ‘National Responses to European Court Jurisprudence’, (2014) 37 West 
European Politics 457-474, 471, who notes that ‘member state governments may opt for a strategy of 
contained compliance, i.e. they use loopholes in ECJ rulings to minimise their domestic impact’. 
124 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 64, citing the UK government’s persistent non-compliance 
with the tachograph regulation, following its condemnation by the Court in Case 128/78 Commission v 
United Kingdom [1979] ECR 419, and noting that ‘Britain has only partly complied with the decision’. 
A further example is given of the UK Court of Appeal’s contained compliance in R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex parte Santillo [1981] 2 All England Reports 917 that ‘paid lip service to 
the preliminary ruling made by the European Court’ in Case 131/79 Santillo [1980] ECR 1585. 
125 See n 135.  
126 See for example, Blauberger (n 136) 471, who refers to ‘a strategy of anticipatory obedience, i.e. 
[Member States] engage in encompassing reforms to reduce the pressure from interested litigants; 
Conant (n 135) 32, who identifies this as ‘preemption’ which arises ‘when Member States carefully 
construct European or domestic law to avoid future judicial interference in particular areas’.  
127 One example involves the UK’s response to the Court of Justice’s judgment in Case C-127/08 Metock 
(n 50) and the amendments it made to its national implementing measures that transposes Directive 
2004/38. It took three years from the date of the judgment for the UK to adopt the Immigration 
(European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1247, which removed the 
requirement in reg 8(2)(a) and 10(1)(b) for direct family members to have been lawfully resident in 
another EEA State before moving to the UK to join their EU relative. The Home Office justified this 
approach on the basis that the Metock judgment only concerned close family members under Article 
2(2) of the Directive, but did not affect ‘other family members’ falling within the scope of Article 3(2). 
It took another year and another judgment – Case C-83/11 Rahman [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:519 
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determine a Member State’s strategy is likely to depend on the domestic 
repercussions128 of the legal uncertainty129  that is generated by a European 
ruling.130  
A Member State may also be indirectly affected by cases concerning non-
compliance in other States131 and may pursue similar strategies based on the 
                                                  
(judgment of 5 September 2012) – for the UK to eventually comply  fully with principle laid down in 
Metock.  
128 According to Blauberger (n 136) 460 ‘legal uncertainty … is inefficient in a rule of law system and, 
therefore, costly for those affected. Hence, if legal uncertainty persists despite the court’s jurisprudence 
and unless the parties to a conflict reach a stable compromise by themselves, they have to carry 
uncertainty costs’. The way that Member State respond to rulings of the Court of Justice then ‘depend[s] 
on how the costs of legal uncertainty are distributed between supporters and challengers of the 
regulatory status quo (i.e. of existing domestic rules before their adjustment to ECJ jurisprudence). 
Time constraints, the population of similar cases and each party’s worst case scenario for an eventual 
ECJ ruling affect the distribution of uncertainty costs. If the challengers of the regulatory status quo 
have to carry the main burden of legal uncertainty, national policy-makers are likely to pursue a strategy 
of “contained compliance”. By contrast, if legal uncertainty is particularly costly for the supporters of 
the regulatory status quo, a strategy of “anticipatory obedience” with ECJ jurisprudence is more likely.’ 
The author found that ‘when member state governments are able to play for time, when they do not face 
the risk of financial sanctions in the short or medium term, and when challengers have to fight for their 
cause individually, a logic of contained compliance is likely to prevail … . By contrast, when legal 
uncertainty undermines political planning capacity or even involves great financial risks, and when the 
spectrum of potential litigants becomes too vast, member state governments anticipate future legal 
challenges by adjusting domestic regulation’ ibid, 471-472. 
129 Schmidt (n 123) 300 defines legal uncertainty as ‘the lack of predicting law, which is one central 
element of the term, next to procedural safeguards. … Legal uncertainty arising in the course of negative 
integration has important consequences for Europeanization: member states have to devise domestic 
policies in the absence of certainty concerning their precise obligations under European law’, if it is 
considered that ‘[n]egative integration normally occurs in a specific way – through judicial and not 
through legislative policy making’.  
130 Michael Blauberger and Susanne Schmidt, ‘Welfare Migration? Free Movement of EU Citizens and 
Access to Social Benefits’ (2014) Oct–Dec Research & Politics 1-7, 2, who argue that ‘interaction of EU 
legislation and Court re-interpretation … results in significant legal uncertainty. … Legal uncertainty 
poses a challenge for member states’ administrations in terms of workload and rule-of-law procedures. 
Domestic legislative reforms shift this uncertainty to EU citizens by raising the burden of proof required 
for these citizens to successfully claim social benefits.’  
131 See for example, Conant (n 135) 69; Blauberger (n 136) 459; It should also be noted here that, where 
the outcome of a judgment overturns non-compliant practices that are common to a large number of 
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outcome of judicial intervention against non-compliant implementation in 
other Member States that are comparable to its own non-compliant practices.132 
These strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is not 
inconceivable to imagine situations where a Member State may combine these 
strategies as part of a wider policy that aims to give priority to countervailing 
domestic political interests. In this respect, it has been observed that, in 
treading ‘the fine line “between law and political truth”’,133 a Member State may 
seek to take full advantage of the ambiguities contained in Directive 2004/38 
and other instruments relating to EU free movement rights in order to pursue a 
policy intended to ‘change or limit the present legal effects of the free movement 
of persons … while remaining broadly compliant with its responsibilities under 
the Treaties’.134 For the purposes of this study, such non-compliance strategies 
will be termed ‘selective non-compliance’ to distinguish it from evasive and 
defiant non-compliance. 
                                                  
Member States, the resulting political fallout may well lead the Member States to concentrate their 
efforts to effect legislative changes through the Council in order to overturn contested judicial decisions. 
Wasserfallen (n 134) 1130-1131, provides the example of the exportability of hybrid benefits which, 
following judicial intervention, led to the amendment of the regulation on the coordination of social 
security. 
132 See n 140 concerning the UK’s response to the judgment in Case C-127/08 Metock (n 50). See also, 
in respect of Ireland’s response to the ruling in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177, whose 
facts concerned Belgium, Susanna Schmidt, ‘Judicial Europeanisation: The Case of Zambrano in 
Ireland’, (2014) 37 West European Politics 769-785. The author also summarises the impact of the 
judgment in other Member States, ibid, 779-781. 
133 Jo Shaw, ‘Between Law and Political Truth? Member State Preferences, EU Free Movement Rules 
and National Immigration Law’ (2015) 17 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 247-286, 
248.  
134 ibid. The author provides the example of the UK which pursues three overlapping strategies that 
tread ‘the fine line “between law and political truth”’ by ‘exploiting the internal resources of EU law; 
importing new resources into EU law, for example, by making use of the proximity between free 
movement law and national immigration law; and attempting to change the resource base by bringing 
about amendments to existing EU law’, ibid 248. 
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The different motivations that Member States may adopt towards non-
compliance can be illustrated by the following graphic: 













Directive is correctly transposed, applied 
and enforced by a Member State 
Unintentional non-compliance: 
non-compliance is due to objective difficulties or 
ambiguity in the directive, which will be 
corrected by MS if challenged 
 
Evasive non-compliance: 
non-compliance is due to an intentional failure 




non-compliance is due to intentional failure to 
implement, which will only be selectively 
corrected by MS when challenged 
 
Defiant non-compliance:  
non-compliance is due to intentional failure to 
implement, which will continue if challenged 
and will not be addressed by MS 
 
 
Table 4.4 Motivations of the Member States Towards Non-Compliance 
 
 Having examined implementation outcomes and the motivations of the 
Member States, attention will now be turned to a review of the variables that 
can affect non-compliance.  
4.6 Factors Affecting Non-Compliance 
The established legal scholarship on the implementation of EU directives 
has been primarily concerned with the scope of the legal obligation that is 
incumbent upon the Member States to give effect to directives under Article 288 
TFEU and has tended to follow judicial developments in the case law of the 
Court of Justice.135 As a result, scholarly interest has focused on the obligation 
                                                  
135 For the sake of completeness, a reference should also be made to legal scholarship that has examined 
the drafting of EU legislation, see for example Richard Wainwright, ‘Techniques of drafting European 
Community legislation: Problems of interpretation’, (1996) 17 Statute Law Review, 7-14; E Donelan, 
‘The Role of the Office of the Parliamentary Draftsman in the Implementation of European Union 
Directives in Ireland’ (1997) 18 Statute Law Review, 1-20. 
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to give effect to directives in the legal order136 and the jurisprudential constructs 
that have been developed over time by the Court of Justice to address failures 
by the Member States to implement directives, namely the doctrine of direct 
effect, the duty of consistent interpretation and the principle of Member State 
liability,137 which find their basis in the supremacy of EU law.138 A significant 
proportion of the scholarship is devoted to the role of the national courts,139 
while it is only fairly recently that attention has turned to the obligation of the 
national administrative authorities to apply EU law.140  In addition, there is also 
                                                  
136 For a detailed analysis of Member States’ obligations to give effect to directives, see further Chapter 
3 (The Implementation of EU Directives: Transposition, Application and Enforcement).  
137 See Chapter 5 (Supremacy, direct effect and consistent interpretation). 
138 See for example, Koen Lenaerts, Dirk Arts and Ignace Maselis, Procedural Law of the European 
Union, (Robert Bray ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, 84-85. 
139 See for example, Mark Brearley and Mark Hoskins, Remedies in EC Law, (2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1998); Sacha Prechal, ‘Community Law in National Court: The Lessons from Van Schijndel’ (1998) 35 
Common Market Law Review 681-706; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and Joseph Weiler 
(eds), The European Court and National Courts—Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing, 1998); 
Walter Van Gerven, ‘On Rights, Remedies and Procedures’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 
501-536; Karen Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International 
Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford University Press 2003) 33-63; Johanna Engström, ‘National Courts’ 
Obligation to Apply Community Law Ex Officio – The Court Showing new Respect for Party Autonomy 
and National Procedural Autonomy?’ (2008) 1 Review of European Administrative Law 67-89; Sacha 
Prechal and Sybe De Vries, ‘Seamless Web of Judicial Protection in the Internal Market?’(2009) 34 
European Law Review, 5-24; Johanna Engström, ‘The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection after 
the Lisbon Treaty - Reflection in the light of case C-279/09’ (2011) 4 Review of European Administrative 
Law, 53-68; Sacha Prechal and Rob Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the Relationship between ‘Rewe-
effectiveness’ and Effective Judicial Protection’ (2011) 4 Review of European Administrative Law, 31-5. 
140 John Temple Lang, ‘The Duties of National Authorities under Community Constitutional Law’, 
(1998) 23 European Law Review 109-131; Kurt Riechenberg, ‘Local Administration and the Binding 
Nature of Community Directives: A Lesser Known Side of European Legal Integration’ (1999) 22 
Fordham International Law Journal 696-767; John Temple Lang, ‘The Duties of Cooperation of 
National Authorities and Courts under Article 10 EC: Two More Reflections’ (2001) 26 European Law 
Review 84-93; Allan Rosas, ‘Ensuring Uniform Application of EU Law in a Union of 27: The Role of 
National Courts and Authorities’, in Jean-Paul Delevoye and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros (eds), 
Rethinking Good Administration in the European Union – Sixth Seminar of the National Ombudsmen 
of EU Member States and Candidate Countries, (Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities 2008) 16-20; Michal Bobek, ‘Thou Shalt Have Two Masters: The Application of European 
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a wealth of scholarship providing an assessment of the conformity of 
transposition of specific directives by the Member States.141  
Nonetheless, there are relatively few examples of legal scholarship going 
beyond transposition,142 that is to say the process by which directives are 
incorporated into the national legal order143 by way of a binding legal 
framework.144 Instead, empirical explorations into the implementation of 
                                                  
Law by Administrative Authorities in the New Member States’ (2008) 1 Review of European 
Administrative Law 51-63; Alija Sikora, ‘Administrative Practice as a Failure of a Member State to Fulfil 
its Obligations under Community Law’ (2009) 2 Review of European Administrative Law 5-27; Maartje 
Verhoeven, The Costanzo Obligation – The Obligations of National Administrative Authorities in the 
Case of Incompatibility between National Law and European Law (Intersentia 2011). 
141 See for example, Michael Kaeding, ‘Legal Borders in the EU? : Transposition of European Transport 
Directives in France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom (2007) 9 European Journal of 
Law Reform (2007) 619-639; Barbara Pozzo, The Implementation of the Seveso Directives in an 
Enlarged Europe (Wolters Kluwer 2009); Ulrish Stelkens, Wolfgang Weiß and Michael Mirschberger 
(eds), The Implementation of the EU Services Directive: Transposition, Problems and Strategies (TMC 
Asser 2012). The EU institutions often have recourse to external contractors to produce transposition 
studies, for example, in the case of Directive 2004/38, Milieu Ltd. and Edinburgh University’s Europa 
Institute were contracted by the Commission to produce the 2008 Conformity Study, ‘Conformity 
studies of Member States’ national implementation measures transposing Community instruments in 
the area of citizenship of the Union’ (Report for Commission, 2008), and the European Parliament’s 
Legal Affairs Committee also commissioned a study: ECAS, ‘Comparative study on the application of 
Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the Right of Citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’, (PE 410.650, European Parliament 
2009). 
142 See for example, Stuart Bell and Laurence Etherington, ‘Out of sight, Out of Mind : A Study of the 
Transposition and Implementation of the Groundwater Directive in the United Kingdom’, (2007) 9 
Environmental Law Review, 6-24; Efthymis Zagorianakos, ‘A qualitative evaluation of current 
Transposition and Implementation Practice of the SEA Directive in EU Member States’, (2006) Journal 
for European Environmental and Planning Law, 535-548. 
143 See further Chapter 3 (The Implementation of EU Directives: Transposition, Application and 
Enforcement).  
144 The Court has consistently held that mere administrative practices, which by their nature may be 
changed at will by the national authorities and are not given appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded 
as constituting correct implementation; see for example, Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] 
ECR 1473, para 11. As regards the fulfilment of Treaty obligations in general see: Case C‐465/05 
Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I‐11091, para 65; Case C-490/09 Commission v Luxembourg [2011] 
[158] 
 
European directives that goes beyond transposition has tended to be the 
purview of scholars of political science, social science and interdisciplinary 
studies in public administration.145 
Since the challenge to fill the ‘black hole’ of implementation was first laid 
down, there has been significant growth146 in what has come to be known as ‘EU 
compliance research’.147 Scholars have sought to identify the factors that might 
affect implementation outcomes and develop theories to explain them. These 
efforts have been categorised into four phases of research,148 with current 
research encompassing institutional features, political factors and substantive 
factors. 
                                                  
ECR I-247, para 47. See further Chapter 3, Section 3.2 (Obligations Relating to the Form of 
Transposition). 
145 For a comprehensive review of the existing literature, see also Ellen Mastenbroek, ‘EU Compliance: 
Still a “Black Hole”?’ (2005) 12 Journal of European Public Policy, 1103-1120; Ulf Sverdrup, 
‘Implementation and European Integration: A Review Essay’ (2005) ARENA Working Paper 25/2005; 
Heather Mbaye, ‘Assessing Competing Explanations for Compliance and Non-Compliance with 
European Union Policies’, (2009) 10 Midsouth Political Science Review 63-82; Dimiter Toshkov, Moritz 
Knoll and Lisa Wewerka, ‘Connecting the Dots: Case Studies and EU Implementation Research’ (2010) 
Institute for European Integration Research Working Paper 10/2010; Mariyana Angelova, Tanja 
Dannwolf and Thomas König, ‘How Robust Are Compliance Findings? A Research Synthesis’ (2012) 19 
Journal of European Public Policy 1269-1291; Oliver Treib, ‘Implementing and Complying with EU 
Governance Outputs’ (2014) 9(1) Living Reviews in European Governance, 6 
<http://www.europeangovernance-livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2014-1/> accessed on 2 June 2015. 
On public administration as an academic discipline see, Dion Curry, Steven Van de Walle and Stefanie 
Gadellaa, ‘On Public Administration as an Academic Discipline: Trends and Changes in the COCOPS 
Academic Survey of European Public Administration Scholars’ (2014) Coordinating for Cohesion in the 
Public Sector of the Future Report Work Package 8,  
<http://www.cocops.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/COCOPS_PAasadiscipline_report_09.02.pdf> accessed 13 June 2015. 
146 For reviews of the existing literature, see n 11. 
147 Toshkov, Knoll and Wewerka (n 11). Other related terms include ‘EU-related implementation 
research’, see Treib (n 11); ‘compliance with EU law’, see Lisa Conant, ‘Compliance and What EU 
Member States Make of It’ in Marise Cremona (ed), Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law 
(Oxford University Press 2012); ‘EU compliance’: Mastenbroek (n 11).  
148 Treib (n 11) 7. 
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The impact of EU decision-making on implementation outcomes has been 
the subject of a number of studies.149 These have examined whether opposition 
voiced by the Member States during the negotiation preceding the adoption of 
a directive affects transposition outcomes.150 One study151 concluded that 
‘disagreement [by a Member State] with an outcome [in the final text of a 
directive] plays a strategic role in the transposition process. The risk of delay for 
conformable transposition increases significantly when a state has a strong 
incentive to deviate from the outcome of a directive. … In the case of non-
conformable transposition, disagreeing member states seem to follow a ‘quick 
and dirty’ strategy and notify non-conformable measures earlier’.152 Other 
studies have found limited evidence of such a link 153 or have even concluded 
                                                  
149 See for example Robert Thomson, René Torenvlied and Javier Arregui, ‘The Paradox of Compliance: 
Infringements and Delays in Transposing European Union Directives’(2007) 37 British Journal of 
Political Science 685-709; Thomas König and Lars Mäder, ‘Non-conformable, Partial and Conformable 
Transposition: A Competing Risk Analysis of the Transposition Process of Directives in the EU15’ (2013) 
14 European Union Politics 46–69. For a more extensive review of the results of these studies, see Treib 
(n 11) 20. 
150 For example, Thomson, Torenvlied and Arregui, n 151, use the concept of ‘incentive to deviate’ to 
represent the difference between a Member State’s policy position in the Council and the actual outcome 
in the adopted text of the directive. 
151 König and Mäder, n 151. This study identifies three levels of transposition outcomes: ‘fully 
conformable … partially conformable and non-conformable transposition according to the extent to 
which the goals of a directive are correctly transposed into domestic law’, ibid, 47. However, the study 
only focused on 37 contested issues raised during negotiations on 21 directives, which the authors 
concede, ‘is distinct from more qualitative approaches, which may provide a somewhat deeper measure 
of transposition conformity by considering and evaluating the whole content of a directive’, ibid, 56. 
The project used data developed within the context of the Decision-Making in the European Union 
(DEU) project: Robert Thomson, Frans Stokman, Christopher Achen and Thomas König, The European 
Union Decides (Cambridge University Press 2006); see further Robert Thomson, Javier Arregui, Dirk 
Leuffen, Rory Costello, James Cross, Robin Hertz and Thomas Jensen, ‘A New Dataset on Decision-
Making in the European Union before and after the 2004 and 2007 Enlargements (DEUII)’ (2012) 19 
Journal of European Public Policy 604-622. 
152 König and Mäder, n 151, 64.  
153 Gerda Falkner, Oliver Treib, Miriam Hartlapp, Simone Leiber, Complying with Europe - EU 
Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States (Cambridge University Press 2005) 278: ‘our cases 
revealed some instances of this pattern, the pattern clearly could not account for a major part of all the 
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that opposition in the Council does not affect the timeliness or correctness of 
transposition.154  
Institutional constraints at the national level have also been examined.155 
Scholars have argued that the timeliness and correctness of transposition is 
affected by the number of ‘veto players’ who are able to exert their influence 
during the transposition process.156 While some confirm the validity of such an 
                                                  
transposition problems observed. It has to be noted, however, that establishing which governments 
actually resisted individual provisions of a draft Directive at some point in the negotiations is not an 
easy task. The final voting behaviour is not a very good indicator of support or opposition. Especially 
under the qualified majority rule, which forms the basis of most of our Directives, governments may 
preventively discard certain policy options which they might have pursued under unanimity. Hence, 
there may very well be a certain amount of concealed opposition during the EU-level negotiations. On 
the other hand, it is by no means necessary that a government should resist the transposition of a 
provision whose adoption it regards with a certain scepticism.’ 
154 Asya Zhelyazkova and René Torenvlied, ‘The Time-Dependent Effect of Conflict in the Council on 
Delays in the Transposition of EU Directives’ (2009) 10 European Union Politics, 35-62, 57: ‘conflict in 
the Council leads to shorter delays in the transposition of EU directives’; Asya Zhelyazkova, ‘Complying 
with EU Directives' Requirements: The Link Between EU Decision-Making and the Correct 
Transposition of EU Provisions’ (2012) 20 Journal of European Public Policy, 702-721, 718: ‘Conflict in 
the Council does not influence transposition success [i.e. correctness] with regard to the provisions of 
four directives.’ 
155 Angelova, Dannwolf and König (n 11) 1276-1278. 
156See for example, Markus Haverland, ‘National Adaptation to European Integration: The Importance 
of Institutional Veto Points’ (2000) 20 Journal of Public Policy, 83-103, 100, who argues that ‘veto 
points tend to shape the timing and quality of implementation’. See further Michael Kaeding, Better 
Regulation in the European Union: Lost in Translation or Full Steam Ahead? The Transposition of EU 
Transport Directives across Member States (Leiden University Press 2007); Miriam Hartlapp, 
‘Implementation of EU Social Policy Directives in Belgium: What Matters in Domestic Politics?’ (2009) 




approach,157 it has also been contested,158 because it has tended to ‘presume that 
transposition follows the same process, independent of the directive at stake’.159 
Research on institutional constraints has also considered administrative 
                                                  
157 Toshkov, Knoll and Wewerka (n 11) 27, ‘for several variables we have relatively strong evidence that 
they influence the timeliness of formal implementation: administrative efficiency, coordination 
strength, and parliamentary scrutiny have positive effects while federalism/regionalism, corruption 
levels, veto players, the number of ministries involved, and domestic conflict have negative effects on 
compliance’. See also Angelova, Dannwolf and König (n 11) 1283. 
158 See for example, Falkner et al (n 155) 296-298: ‘some countries apparently do seem to correspond to 
the expectations of the veto player theory, like the UK and Italy. But many of the other countries do not 
fit in nicely. Hence, Greece has as few veto players as the UK, but nevertheless emerges much worse 
than the latter. Luxembourg, Germany, Portugal, and France are also examples of countries whose 
performance is far poorer than one would have expected on the basis of their moderate numbers of veto 
players. Denmark, on the other hand, is clearly better than its institutional reform capacity would 
suggest. Altogether, therefore, the world seems to be more complicated than implied by such 
parsimonious hypotheses’; Treib (n 11) 26: ‘Some of these findings are open to criticism since they 
establish statistical effects for factors that may not be causally relevant for the cases analysed. For 
example, federalism is not relevant for transposition in cases where central government is responsible 
for adopting transposing laws and federal chambers do not hold veto power. … Similarly, most veto 
player indices cover aspects of political systems that may be relevant for cases where directives are 
transposed by formal legislation adopted by parliaments, but they do not seem relevant if directives can 
be transposed by ministerial orders’.  
159 Bernard Steunenberg and Mark Rhinard, ‘The Transposition of European Law in EU Member States: 
Between Process and Politics’ (2010) 2 European Political Science Review 495–520, 499. They propose 
a ‘procedural veto player index, which measures the number of veto players depending on the process 
of transposition. The index counts the number of players at each relevant stage of this process: the 
preparations of a measure by one or more ministries (which is sufficient for the adoption of a ministerial 
order), decision-making within the cabinet (which, together with the first stage, is sufficient for the 
adoption of a government decree), and decision-making within parliament (which is necessary for the 
adoption of a bill). Depending on the kind of instrument used or needed to transpose, the index reflects 
the number of players involved at each stage of the process’, ibid, 517. Such an approach has ‘turned out 
to be a powerful predictor of transposition timing’ according to Treib (n 11) 26.   
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capabilities,160 such as administrative capacity161 or coordination.162 The results 
of such investigations have also been contested.163   
Political considerations have also been taken into account. Studies have 
sought to determine whether transposition outcomes are affected by party 
politics164 or public support for the EU.165 The impact of social partners on 
                                                  
160 For a review of studies on administrative capabilities, see Treib (n 11) 26-27.  
161 See for example, Tanja Börzel, Tobias Hofmann, Diana Panke and Carina Sprungk ‘Obstinate and 
Inefficient: Why Member States Do Not Comply With European Law’ (2010) 43 Comparative Political 
Studies 1363-1390, 1382: ‘states with high capacities and low political power [as represented by their 
share of votes in the Council] violate European law less frequently than other member states. 
Conversely, the combination of constrained government capacity and great political power brings 
together the inability to comply and the necessary political weight to be obstinate in the face of looming 
sanctions’, namely the opening of infringement proceedings by the Commission; Falkner et al (n 155) 
302-303: ‘case studies have revealed that a shortage of administrative resources does play a certain role 
in delaying transposition’ but warn that ‘a reference to inadequate administrative resources may always 
be treated as a façade to conceal a political decision not to comply’. For a view to the contrary as regards 
the timeliness of transposition, see König and Mäder (n 151) 60-62: ‘the positive effect of bureaucratic 
efficiency on the risk of transposition is non-significant, except for the stage of the first four weeks of 
transposition delay’. 
162 Antoaneta Dimitrova and Dimiter Toshkov, ‘Post-accession Compliance between Administrative Co-
ordination and Political Bargaining’ (2009) 13 European Integration online Papers, Special Issue 2 No. 
19 <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2009-019.pdf > accessed on 29 June 2015. The authors conclude that 
‘good administrative capacity, in the sense of good co-ordination of EU policy making is a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for transposition’, ibid, 12.  
163 Angelova, Dannwolf and König (n 11) 1283-1284: ‘Administrative efficiency, as well as national 
monitoring and enforcement, are robust only across qualitative studies. … Our research synthesis shows 
that administrative efficiency is consistent only across case studies, which analyse this argument in 
Greece, Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and Spain.’  
164 See for example, Falkner et al (n 155) 309-313. For a review of research on political factors the 
influence implementation outcomes, see Treib (n 11) 22-23. 
165 See for example, Börzel, Hofmann, Panke and Sprung (n 163) 1379-1381: ‘more public support for 
the EU apparently increases the positive effect of the power of obstinacy on the number of violations of 
European law. In other words, it seems that support for the EU makes obstinate member states even 
more, not less, obstinate. … we rather find a positive correlation between public support and violations 
of European law than the negative effect that our second legitimacy hypothesis predicts. Countries such 
as Italy and Belgium, in which the population is supportive of European integration, violate legal acts 
more frequently than EU-skeptic [sic] member states such as Denmark and the United Kingdom. This 
counterintuitive finding may be explained by a strong direct and negative relation between capacity and 
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transposition166 and the role which civil society can play in decentralised 
enforcement have also been explored.167  
Another political factor affecting implementation is ‘issue salience’, 168 
namely the political importance attached by a Member State to the issue which 
a directive may touch upon. Studies have found that the saliency of a directive 
will affect the timeliness and correctness of transposition.169 Following 
transposition, a directive that is considered highly salient is also likely to result 
in changes to the enforcement practices of the administrative authorities.170 
                                                  
legitimacy … Citizens of states with weak capacities turn to the EU as an institution that may be more 
effective in providing public goods. As a consequence, those member states most supportive of the EU 
may be among the worst compliers because even if the EU produces rules for the provision of public 
goods, governments still lack the capacity to effectively implement them on the ground.’ For an overview 
of research on this factor, see Treib (n 11) 24.   
166 See for example, Falkner et al (n 155) 303-309. For a review of studies on the effect of interest groups 
on implementation, see Treib (n 11) 24-25. 
167 See for example, Panke (n 18); Slepcevic (n 93). 
168 Leonard Ray, ‘Measuring Party Orientation Towards European Integration: Results from an Expert 
Survey’ (1999) 36 European Journal of Political Research 283-306.  
169 Saliency can cut both ways. On the one hand, politically sensitive issues might hinder transposition, 
see Dimitrova and Toshkov, n 164, 12: ‘The transposition and implementation of these directives [i.e. 
the Racial Equality Directive 2000/43 (2000) OJ L 180/22 and other legislation that prohibits 
discrimination] is clearly a question of politics, a result that can be explained with the high salience of 
this legislation and with high levels of politicization. On the other hand, saliency might facilitate 
transposition, see Aneta Spendzharova and Esther Versluis, ‘Issue Salience in the European Policy 
Process: What Impact on Transposition?’(2013) 20 Journal of European Public Policy, 1499-1516, 1513: 
‘We conceptualized issue salience as the relative importance of one issue vis-à-vis others and 
operationalized what we consider to be its main components relevant for the transposition of 
environmental directives – salience of directives regulating high-risk materials, salience for political 
parties in government and salience for the general public. We found that Green parties in government 
speed up the transposition process and so does public opinion assigning a top priority to environmental 
issues. High salience of environmental issues for a government initially speeds up transposition, but we 
found that this effect diminishes over time and 191 days after the deadline, it actually slows down 
transposition.’ 
170 Esther Versluis, ‘Explaining Variations in Implementation of EU Directives’ (2004) 8 European 
Integration online Papers, No 19: <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-019.htm> accessed 2 July 2015, 
14: ‘A salient directive appears to facilitate domestic change [in terms of its practical application] and a 
non-salient directive seems to impede this. … issue salience might be taken into account as a 
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Likewise, a Member State is less likely to monitor, apply or enforce a directive 
that is considered of low importance.171 
Attention has also been directed to substantive policy-based aspects. 
Transposition outcomes can differ according to the level of alignment between 
EU policy goals and existing domestic policy. This has led to the emergence of a 
theory of ‘goodness-of-fit’ that suggests that the higher the degree of misfit 
between the EU rules and the domestic framework, the more likely problems 
are to arise in the implementation of directives.172 The ‘goodness-of-fit’ 
approach has found support in a fair proportion of both quantitative and 
qualitative studies,173 although it is far from meeting with universal approval.174 
                                                  
complementary factor that emerges and interacts with the existing mediating factors, especially with 
‘change agents’; it seems to function as a constraining or impeding factor in case of low salience and as 
a stimulating or strengthening factor in case of high salience. Further operationalization and application 
is required to test this hypothesis.’  
171 Esther Versluis, ‘Even Rules, Uneven Practices: Opening the “Black Box” of EU Law in Action’ (2007) 
30 West European Politics, 50-67, 62. 
172 See for example, Francesco Duina, ‘Explaining legal implementation in the European Union’ (1997) 
25 International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 155-179; Ian Bailey, ‘National Adaptation to 
European Integration: Institutional Vetoes and Goodness-of-Fit’ (2002) 9 Journal of European Public 
Policy, 791–811. For a review of other studies, see Treib (n 11) 23-24. 
173 Angelova, Dannwolf and König (n 11) 1278. 
174 See for example, Mastenbroek, n 11, 1109, acknowledging the ‘advantage of the goodness of fit 
literature is its strong theoretical character … [and] empirical diligence’ but pointing out that ‘the results 
for the goodness of fit hypothesis have turned out to be rather disappointing. Various studies showed 
that a good fit is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for smooth compliance, and vice versa’; 
Ellen Mastenbroek and Michael Kaeding, ‘Europeanization Beyond the Goodness of Fit: Domestic 
Politics in the Forefront’ (2006) 4 Comparative European Politics, 331-354, 337: ‘the problem is that it 
is too deterministic, as it presupposes that national governments and parliaments want to maintain the 
status quo … Thus, the problem is that the goodness of fit is an essentially apolitical concept that is not 
geared to explaining the domestic politics of compliance. We hence need to bring domestic politics back 
in’; Toshkov, Knoll and Wewerka (n 11) 19 and 27: ‘[f]our variations of the misfit argument can be found 
in the literature: institutional, legal, normative and policy misfit … Although most of the studies 
comment on the degree of misfit, few of them find that it played a significant role for compliance. … The 
information about the degree of misfit between new European and old national policies is often purely 
descriptive and not linked to any causal argument to explain the implementation process.’; ibid, 27: 
‘The findings about the influence of misfit, corporatism, political constraints, type of government and 
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Nonetheless, legal studies appear to suggest some support for this approach, at 
least in the field of the free movement of persons.175 
Problems in misfit might however be mitigated by the level of discretion 
that a directive grants to the Member States. As a result, some studies have 
shown that directives which grant more leeway to the Member States increase 
the likelihood of correct transposition176, although this may increase the 
likelihood of transposition delay.177  
Significantly less research has been devoted to the substantive legal factors 
that might affect implementation. Aside from institutional differences resulting 
from the national constitutional order178 or the range and complexity of existing 
                                                  
number of parties in government, bargaining power, country disagreement with a directive, EU level 
conflict, discretion, and the directive voting rule are mixed and inconclusive.’   
175 This is arguably the case for the UK; see Robin White ‘Conflicting Competences: Free Movement 
Rules and Immigration Laws’ (2004) 29 European Law Review, 385-396; Steve Peers, ‘Free Movement, 
Immigration Control and constitutional conflict (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 173-
196; Jo Shaw and Nina Miller, ‘When Legal Worlds Collide: An Exploration of What Happens When EU 
Free Movement Law Meets UK Immigration Law’ (2012) 38 European Law Review 137-166. As regards 
EU migration law, see Boštjan Zalar, ′Constitutionalisation of the Implementing Act of the Procedures 
Directive: The Slovenian Perspective′ (2008) 10 European Journal of Migration and Law 187-217. 
176 Zhelyazkova, n 156, 718: ‘provisions granting discretion to member states are more likely to be 
successfully transposed than provisions that constrain the actions of policy-makers. This finding 
supports the theory that discretion facilitates compliance’; however, discretion does not always result 
in better transposition outcomes, see Asya Zhelyazkova and René Torenvlied, ‘The Successful 
Transposition of European Provisions by Member States: Application to the Framework Equality 
Directive’ (2011) 18 Journal of European Public Policy, 690-708, 704: ‘discretion facilitates member 
states’ transposition success for medium levels, but not for low levels of technical fit’.    
177 Thomson, Torenvlied, and Arregui, n 151, 706: ‘Discretion does not appear to have a direct effect on 
the likelihood of infringements, as suggested by our second hypothesis. Nonetheless, in line with the 
third hypothesis, discretion is a key variable in gauging the impact of states’ incentives to deviate. States 
with high incentives to deviate are less likely to have infringements if the directives grant them high 
levels of discretion. Discretion also affects transposition delays. Delays tend to be longer on directives 
that grant high levels of discretion. Neither states’ incentives to deviate nor the interaction between 
incentives and discretion significantly affect delays.’ 
178 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 80; Dyonissis Dimitrakopoulos, ‘The Transposition of EU Law: 




national legislation that needs to be adapted to transpose a directive,179 a 
handful of studies have discussed other substantive factors that may affect the 
transposition process. 
In some cases the directive’s features might affect its implementation, such 
as the level of detail, precision and quality in the drafting of the directive180 or 
the margin of discretion it gives to the Member States.181  
The national legal culture182 has also been identified as a factor that might 
affect implementation outcomes.183 One notable approach has sought to 
identify similarities in Member States’ legal cultures when researching 
implementation outcomes of social policy directives in the EU’s then fifteen 
                                                  
179 Ken Collins and David Earnshaw, n 182, 217. 
180 Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (n 20) 82: ‘[a] vague and open-ended directive gives a Member State 
wide latitude for wrongful application … [and] prevents the possibility of invoking it by an individual 
before a national court, a possibility which is central to the system of judicial review. The tendency 
toward the detailed directive becomes thus at least partially explicable. … But … it also increases the 
potential for non-implementation. A detailed directive which is poorly drafted may itself constitute an 
obstacle to implementation.’ See also Ken Collins and David Earnshaw, ‘The Implementation and 
Enforcement of European Community Environmental Legislation’ (1992) 1(4) Environmental Politics 
213-249, 217: ‘concepts contained in many directives are “bound to result in different definitions when 
given effect in each member state”’; Dimitrakopoulos (n 180) 446: ‘as national policy traditions are not 
necessarily compatible with each other, conflict [in Council negotiations] can lead to compromise which 
rests on unclear texts.’ 
181 See n 178 and n 179 above. 
182 James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira, ‘The Legal Cultures of Europe’ (1996) 30 Law and Society 
Review 55-85, 80: ‘given the new impetus toward decentralization, we fully expect that differences in 
legal cultures will play an even greater role in the ways in which EC law gets implemented within each 
of the member states.’ On the different uses of the concepts of ‘legal culture’, see for example Roger 
Cotterrell, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Culture’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 709-737; David Nelken, 
‘Legal Culture’ in Jan Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar 2012), 480-
490. 
183 Ken Collins and David Earnshaw, n 182, 217: ‘member states' “legislative culture” may also prevent 
early compliance with Community legislation. Member states may have a tradition of lengthy 
consultation aimed at building consensus; a concern for constitutional rectitude requiring time-




Member States.184 This study sought to categorise Member States according to 
different ‘worlds of compliance’ based upon their common approaches to 
implementation.185 Proponents of quantitative research have been critical of 
this approach186 and ‘raised doubts about the explanatory leverage of the 
typology’.187 
Contrary to transposition, empirical research on the application and 
enforcement remains relatively uncharted waters. Several scholars have 
reported the relative lack of information that could provide reliable indicators 
of the state of application and enforcement of directives.188 Given that such 
research generally proves more laborious than studying transposition, there has 
                                                  
184 Falkner et al (n 155). 
185 Falkner et al (n 155), 339-340. Member States were initially grouped into three categories: the ‘world 
of law observance’ comprising the Nordic countries where transposition is generally on time and 
correct; the ‘world of domestic politics’ comprising Austria, Belgium, Germany, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK, where the timeliness and correctness of transposition depends on 
political and interest-group preferences; the ‘world of neglect’ consisting of France, Greece, 
Luxembourg and Portugal, where transposition tends to be apolitical but bureaucratic inefficiency leads 
to problems in transposition. Ireland and Italy both bridged the typology: they were included in the 
‘world of domestic politics’ in terms of transposition but in the ‘world of neglect’ in terms of overall 
implementation. Following research on the new Member States, a fourth category, the ‘world of dead 
letters’ was subsequently created that comprised countries where the transposition process is 
politicised, resulting in timely and correct transposition but weak application and enforcement.  This 
grouped together the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungry and Slovenia, to which were also added Ireland 
and Italy. See Gerda Falkner and Oliver Treib, ‘Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU15 
Compared to New Member States’ (2008) 46 Journal of Common Market Studies, 293-313.   
186 Dimiter Toshkov, ‘In search of the worlds of compliance - culture and transposition performance in 
the European Union’ (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy, 933-959.  
187 Treib (n 11) 12. 
188 Mastenbroek, n 11, 1113: ‘Unfortunately, data on these dimensions are tremendously 
hard to gather, which is why they have received only scant attention so far’;  Treib (n 11) 15-16: ‘as more 
and more scholars have turned to quantitative approaches, enforcement and application issues have 
taken a back seat since there is simply no appropriate quantitative data for analysing the practical 
aspects of implementation’.  
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been relatively little research devoted to the application and enforcement of 
directives. 189 
As regards the administrative application of directives, several studies 
have enquired into the same factors that might affect transposition, namely 
                                                  
189Mastenbroek, n 11, 1115-1116: ‘we should not lose sight of administrative and legal problems. This is 
also where the importance of methods comes in. Rather than continuing along the path of small-n 
comparative or statistical analyses on easy-to-measure indicators, the time seems ripe for multi-method 
research. This way, we can control for important administrative and legal variables … Finally, let us not 
forget that compliance is more than transposition. Even though the laws in the books are a useful 
starting point for research, the really interesting question is to what extent these are given effect.’  See 
also Dimiter Toshkov, ‘The Quest for Relevance: Research on Compliance with EU Law’ (2011) 6 
<http://www.dimiter.eu/articles/Compliance%20review.pdf>  accessed on 30 May 2015: ‘Despite 
repeated calls to study the real application of rules rather than formal transposition and administrative 
implementation, analyzing real application remains the holy grail of compliance studies - very few 
studies can claim to investigate actual compliance with EU rules at the street level’; Conant (n 149) 2: 
‘this type of research requires labour-intensive field research and case law analysis, qualitative case 
studies and small ‘n’ comparisons (2–4 cases) of member states and/or policy areas are likely to be the 
most productive. Careful research design in selecting cases should yield results that are ultimately more 
informative than quantitative studies of formal indicators of dubious validity or very limited variation’; 
Treib (n 11) 19-20: ‘Compared to transposition performance, measuring enforcement and application 
has been almost exclusively restricted to qualitative studies, which usually rely on interviews with 
enforcement actors, independent experts or representatives of affected societal groups as well as on 
analysing media reports and official documents to learn about the extent to which EU rules are actually 
complied with by norm addressees and the ways in which member states ensure that violations are 
sanctioned and redressed … This may lead to findings with a relatively high degree of internal validity, 
although qualitative techniques have more problems establishing the extent to which certain rules are 
actually complied with in practice than with finding out whether a given legal provision is fulfilled by 
the laws of a country. At the same time, collecting the wealth of data necessary to assess application and 
enforcement on a qualitative basis is of course a cumbersome task which reduces the number of cases 
that can be studied and thus, again, has a negative effect on the external validity of findings generated 
through such qualitative procedures. 
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issue saliency,190 goodness-of-fit191 and the role of veto players,192 and 
administrative capabilities.193  
Other studies have examined the existence of monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms at the national level.194 A distinction has been made between 
‘police patrol’ and ‘fire alarm’ approaches to the supervision of administrative 
application of directives,195 with the former involving government oversight of 
the national administrative authorities196 and the latter relying on oversight by 
                                                  
190 Versluis, n 172; Versluis, n 173. 
191 Duina n 174; Bailey, n 174. Treib (n 11) 30, suggests that ‘[i]t is [application] where the misfit 
argument is most plausible, since it is much easier to find a coalition of political actors to support the 
enactment of a major piece of new legislation than to make a large state machinery fundamentally 
change its bureaucratic routines or to ensure that economic actors comply with unfamiliar and costly 
new regulations.’  
192 Haverland, n 158. 
193 Francesco Duina and Frank Blithe, ‘Nation-states and common markets: the institutional conditions 
for acceptance’ (1999) 6 Review of International Political Economy, 6(4), 494–530;  Peter Hille and 
Christoph Knill, ‘“It’s the Bureaucracy, Stupid”: The Implementation of the Acquis Communautaire in 
EU Candidate Countries, 1999–2003’, (2006) 7 European Union Politics, 531-552. 
194 See for example, Tanja Börzel, 2000, ‘Why There Is No “Southern Problem”: On Environmental 
Leaders and Laggards in the European Union’ (2000) 7 Journal of European Public Policy 141-162; 
Christian Jensen, ‘Implementing Europe: A Question of Oversight’ (2007) 8 European Union Politics 
451-477. 
195 Jensen, n 196, 454-456: ‘Police patrol oversight relies on constant monitoring for problems by the 
law-makers in an effort to identify problems and correct them. With fire alarm oversight, lawmakers 
rely on constituents to complain about the implementation of laws. … Police patrol oversight 
emphasizes centralized government control. In contrast, fire alarm oversight emphasizes cooperation 
between interest groups and government. In particular, fire alarm oversight makes governments 
dependent upon organized interests for the information they need to monitor administrative activities. 
… Under police patrol oversight, the government monitors the implementation process constantly. 
Under fire alarm oversight, the government receives disproportionate information about those aspects 
of implementation that most concern constituents.’ 
196 Jensen, n 196, 460: ‘McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) defined police patrol oversight mechanisms as 
emphasizing Congress’s ability constantly to look for problems and rectify them on its initiative, without 
requiring the cooperation of constituents. The examples they provide include “reading documents, 
commissioning scientific studies, conducting field observations, and holding hearings to question 
officials and affected citizens’ citing Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, ‘Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms’, 28 American Journal of Political Science, 
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civil society.197 A Member State that places ‘heavy reliance on police patrol 
oversight will be more likely to resolve infringement cases before the 
Commission refers the cases to the ECJ’,198 whereas reliance on ‘fire alarm 
oversight at the national level actually hinders member state governments’ 
ability to resolve those  failures’ before the Commission opens an 
investigation.199  However, the existence of civil society organisations with 
strong substantive expertise in the relevant policy area can enhance conformity 
in overall implementation outcomes.200 
In addition, the attitudes of the national authorities towards 
implementation may present ‘various forms of domestication (business as 
                                                  
165-179, 166. This would also include oversight by ‘ministry officials [who] inspect the local inspectorate 
offices regularly to ensure that they are implementing laws according to the government’s priorities … 
[or] where senior ministerial officials conduct annual assessments of inspectors’ enforcement activities 
and adjust inspectors’ pay based on those reports … [or] prior approval requirements’, ibid, 461. 
197 Jensen, n 196, 462: ‘McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) defined fire alarm oversight as those 
mechanisms that rely on constituents’ complaints to Congress. They characterized fire alarms as: “a 
system of rules, procedures and informal practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest 
groups to examine administrative decisions (sometimes in prospect), to charge executive agencies with 
violating congressional goals, and to seek remedies from agencies, courts and Congress itself.”’ citing 
McCubbins and Schwartz, n 198, In the European context, this would extend to ‘all those mechanisms 
that involved some sort of complaint or appeal to a senior government official [and] … any oversight 
mechanism that depended on the action of a constituent or organized interest group to activate it.’ but 
excluding appeals to courts, ibid. 
198 Jensen, n 196, 466. 
199 Ibid, n 196, 471. 
200 Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Post-accession Compliance with EU Gender Equality Legislation in 
Postcommunist New Member States’ (2009) 13 European Integration online Papers No 23, 14 
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-023a.htm> accessed 4 July 2015: ‘The other path to compliance is 
the combination of strong social democratic governments and NGOs specialising in EU gender equality 
legislation. Neither is sufficient by itself. NGOs are powerless when faced with unfavourable 
governments. Conversely, even favourable governments need the expertise and support of NGOs to 
devise adequate legislation and equality bodies’.  See also, Falkner and Treib (n 187) 299: ‘the prevailing 
weakness of civil society’ in Central and Eastern European countries ‘suggests that less cases of non-
compliance will be detected and pursued by collective actors (such as trade unions) which could, in 
principle, more easily and effectively fight for social rights than individuals’.  
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usual, conservative or progressive interpretation, organizational initiatives and 
broader reforms) that limit, mediate or accompany adaptation to Europe’.201 
These studies provide diverse theoretical explanations for situations 
where, even though transposition might be compliant with a directive, ‘what is 
written on the statute books simply does not become effective in practice’.202 
Such studies all point to various ‘[s]hortcomings in the court systems, the labour 
inspections [i.e. administrative enforcement] and finally also in civil society 
systems […] among the detrimental factors accounting for this.’203 
Turning to judicial enforcement of EU law, it will be recalled that under 
the EU legal order, individuals are only able to enforce their EU rights against 
the national authorities before the national courts.204 In cases where a party in 
proceedings may claim there is a conflict between a directive and national 
law,205 Article 267 TFEU allows the national courts to refer questions on the 
                                                  
201 Sonja Bugdahn, ‘Of Europeanization and Domestication: The Implementation of the Enviromental 
Information Directive in Ireland, Great Britain and Germany’ (2005) 12 Journal of European Public 
Policy, 177-199, 194. The author describes domestication as ‘a situation in which actors at the member 
state level choose non-EU recommended and non-EU prescribed domestic policy/administrative 
options in policy areas that have previously been europeanized [sic]. These options can be innovative, 
transferred from other states or familiar to the member state. … A member state that does not see an 
obvious need for changing its legislation may adopt a strategy of domestication according to ‘business 
as usual’. … Administrative decision makers later interpret the transposing legislation, followed up by 
the courts and Ombudsmen, which may be called upon to take supervisory decisions. In most cases, the 
institutions involved have room for interpretation that can be used for conserving national patterns … 
or changing domestic patterns beyond EU requirements (conservative or progressive interpretation). 
Where domestic organizations charged with the implementation develop special initiatives there is a 
clear bias for change. Furthermore, member state policy-makers may implement broader reforms in 
the europeanized [sic] policy area that also influence the application of the transposing legislation’ 
(emphasis added), ibid 180-181. 
202 Falkner and Treib (n 187) 308-309. 
203 Ibid. 
204 See further, Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1 (Enforcement before the national courts). 
205 For a recent case involving Directive 2004/38, see case C-202/13 McCarthy [2014] ECR not yet 
reported (judgment of 18 December 2014), which concerned a conflict between Article 5 of the Directive 
and regulation 11 of Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/1003 
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interpretation of an EU directive to the Court of Justice.206 Aside from questions 
of whether determining whether a claim engages EU law, several factors may 
influence the ability of individuals to have recourse to the preliminary reference 
procedure. These might be due to procedural issues, judicial attitudes or even 
the preferences of civil society. 
In situations where individuals intend to seek redress for a breach of a 
directive, they have the option of bringing proceedings before the national 
courts. Should they chose to do so, their claim will need to comply with national 
rules of procedure in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy that 
provides that EU claims are subject to national rules of procedure.207 However, 
such actions enjoy some protection under EU law through the principle of 
equivalence, which means the procedural rules that apply to EU claims must be 
no less favourable than those governing similar actions under national law, and 
the principle of effectiveness, which requires that such rules should not make it 
virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise EU rights.208 In addition, 
given in such cases the Member States are implementing EU law, the EU 
Charter will generally provide additional safeguards209 such as the right to an 
effective remedy.210 Subject to these requirements, the national rules of 
procedure will govern matters related to deadlines and court costs, as well as 
access to legal representation, legal aid and interpretation. 
 Court costs, the availability of legal representation and other factors 
relating to access to justice may affect recourse to the national courts by 
                                                  
(exemption from the obligation to hold a visa for family members of EU in possession of a residence 
card). 
206 See further, Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4 (Reference for a preliminary ruling).  
207 See further, Chapter 3, Section 3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives). 
208 ibid. 
209 Article 51 EUCFR.  
210 Article 47 EUCFR. 
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individuals or civil society groups.211 As a result, it has been observed that ‘[t]he 
EU’s legal institutions only increase opportunities for participation for those 
individuals and groups who possess court access and sufficient resources to use 
it.’212 
Research has also shown that the national courts may be unwilling to make 
references for a preliminary ruling even if there is a legitimate question of 
interpretation of a directive that is put before them.213 This may be due to the 
absence of a ‘judicial review tradition’ in the Member State in question,214 or a 
reticence to refer an issue for a preliminary ruling in cases where this might 
interfere with a Member State’s control over sensitive policy areas such as 
criminal law, immigration law, the exercise of private property, or 
                                                  
211 Karen Alter ‘The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?’ (2000) 
54 International Organization, 489-518, 502-503 and 516; Tanja Börzel, ‘Participation Through Law 
Enforcement: The Case of the European Union’ (2006) 39 Comparative Political Studies, 128-152. 
212 Tanja Börzel, ‘Patricipation Through Law Enforcement: The Case of the European Union’ (2006) 39 
Comparative Political Studies, 128-152, 147.  
213 Broberg and Fenger (n 96) 443: ‘Examples of non-compliance are rare and so to the extent that there 
is a genuine enforcement problem related to the preliminary ruling procedure this does not lie in failure 
to comply with the Court’s preliminary ruling in those cases where a question has been referred; rather 
it stems from those cases where EU law is being ignored without the national court making a 
preliminary reference.’  
214 Marlene Wind, ‘The Nordics, the EU, and Reluctance towards Supranational Judicial Review’, 
(2010) 48 Journal of Common Market Studies, 1039-1063, 1057-1058: ‘the lack of familiarity in the 
Nordic countries with the judicial review tradition plays an important role when explaining why the 
national courts in these Member States have made less use of the preliminary ruling system in the EU. 
Generally, judicial review implies that an independent judiciary has the right to assess the constitutional 
legitimacy of any legislative act adopted by parliament or any law implemented by the executive. In 
relation to the EU judicial review mechanism, this means that national courts can (and in some cases 
must) review whether the implementation of legislation carried out by their own government 
corresponds with EU legal acts and fundamental principles. Due to the supremacy of EU law over 
national law, this sometimes forces national judges to put an international treaty before the acts of their 
own government and parliamentary majorities. In countries with a strong dualist and majoritarian 
tradition such as the Nordic countries, this is a very radical move to make – in particular for a judge 
who sees him/herself most of all as a loyal civil servant’. 
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environmental policy.215 It may also be due to a desire not to undermine the 
referring court’s own authority, which may result in higher courts or specialised 
courts being more reticent to refer matters to Luxembourg than the ordinary 
courts.216 It may even come down to a form of defiance that manifests itself in 
                                                  
215 Damian Chalmers, ‘The Much Ado about Judicial Politics in the United Kingdom’ (2000) Harvard 
Jean Monnet Working Paper No 1/00, 25-27: ‘A far more powerful centrifugal pressure, and one that 
seemed to be central to explaining variations in judicial behaviour across different sectors, was that 
there was a greater resistance to the application of EC law wherever it was perceived as disrupting the 
capacity of the central institutions within the British political economy to secure societal conformity. … 
[I]n applying the law, judicial identity becomes suffused into identification with protection of these 
institutions. As this association exists essentially at the level of a belief system, it can not be displaced 
by the formal process of giving precedence to EC law. The consequence is that there is a greater 
unreceptiveness to application of EC law where it disrupts these institutions’ capabilities to ensure 
conformity. … There is a positive view to EC law where it builds up the State's capacity to secure 
repressive conformity and extend sanctions, even if this is at the cost of allowing EC law to determine 
the normative content of that conformity. There is, however, an extremely resistant approach to EC law 
and the Court of Justice where, in narrow institutional terms, EC law hinders the capacity to impose not 
just sanctions, but collective ties. There is further evidence for this hypothesis in the figures on free 
movement of persons.’ See also Damian Chalmers, The positioning of EU judicial politics within the 
United Kingdom (2000) 23(4) West European Politics, 169-210; Damian Chalmers, The application of 
Community law in the United Kingdom, 1994-1999  (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review, 83-128; 
Jonathan Golub, ‘Sovereignty and Subsidiarity in EU Environmental Policy’ (1996) 44 Political Studies, 
686-703. 
216 Alter n, 504-505: ‘A significant amount of evidence indicates that the more EU law and the ECJ are 
seen as undermining the influence, independence, and autonomy of a national court, the more reluctant 
the national court will be to refer far-reaching and legally innovative cases to the ECJ. … [L]ower courts 
are often more willing to make references because a reference bolsters their authority in the national 
legal system and allows the court a way to escape national legal hierarchies and challenge higher court 
jurisprudence. ...  Last instance courts are often more reluctant to make a referral to the ECJ, especially 
when they are threatened by the existence of the ECJ as the highest court on questions of European law 
or are upset at how EU law undermines their own influence and the smooth operation of the national 
legal process. Indeed, courts with constitutional powers have made virtually no references to the ECJ, 
and doctrinal analyses reveal clear efforts by national high courts to position themselves vis-à-vis the 
ECJ to protect their independence, authority, and influence.’ 
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reaction to instances of controversy generated by the case law of the Court of 
Justice.217 
Individuals seeking to uphold their EU rights before the national courts 
might turn to civil society groups for assistance. The preferences of the civil 
society group in question will further affect the possibility of the matter being 
taken before the courts or resolved through negotiation as part of a wider aim 
to engender changes in policy. The involvement of civil society organisations in 
national policy policy-making may reduce their desire to effect policy change 
through litigation.218 Where a case results in a favourable decision in 
Luxembourg, civil society groups can help to pursue wider policy changes 
depending on their resources or capabilities.219 
                                                  
217 Ibid, 505-506: ‘Judges do take into account the political implications of their decisions. Some ECJ 
decisions have created a divergence in the levels of legal protection and in legal remedies available under 
national law and under EU law, advantaging citizens who can draw on EU law over those who must rely 
on national law alone. ECJ jurisprudence has also resulted in great complexities for national legal 
systems and problematic outcomes. The seeming perversities created by the ECJ and EU law, as well as 
interpretations with which national courts simply disagree, can sap the willingness of national 
judiciaries to support the ECJ. … Controversial ECJ decisions have led to rebukes by judges as well as 
attempts to avoid references to the ECJ and the application of EU law.’ 
218 Ibid, 498: ‘Another important factor was whether an interest group enjoyed influence in and access 
to policymaking. In political negotiation, groups can usually strike a deal that will leave them at least 
better off than before. With legal decisions, groups could well end up with a policy that is more 
objectionable and harder to reverse than the previous policy. For this reason, and because of the risk 
and relative crudeness of litigation as a means of influencing policy, organized interests generally prefer 
to work through political channels. The greater the political strength of a group, and the more access 
the group has to the policymaking process, the less likely a group is to mount a litigation campaign. In 
Belgium, for example, neither unions nor women's groups use litigation to pursue equality issues, 
preferring instead to use their access to the policymaking process to influence Belgian policy.’ 
219 Ibid: 507: ‘Just because the ECJ decides in favor of the plaintiff challenging national policy, one 
should not assume that the government will change its policy. The government may simply compensate 
the litigant while leaving the legislation in effect and administrative policy unchanged. … In many cases, 
however, translating a legal victory into a policy victory will take follow-through – a second strategy to 
show a government that there will be costs (financial, political, or both) to not changing its policy. … 
Combining a legal victory with a political strategy shows the government that the legal case will not be 
isolated and that faced with a legal challenge, the government would likely lose.’ 
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Based on the above, it can be concluded that, while a significant amount of 
literature has been devoted to factors affecting transposition outcomes, it 
appears that EU implementation studies would benefit from further 
investigation of the legal factors that affect ‘the practical application of EU law 
by domestic implementing authorities and national judges’.220 This is in 
particular true as regards factors that affect the institutional autonomy221 that 
Member States enjoy when implementing directives that may be more 
amenable to intervention than political or institutional factors.222 
                                                  
220 Conant (n 149) 2. 
221 Dimitrakopoulos, n 180, 458: ‘the transposition of EU law takes place on the basis of the principle of 
institutional autonomy… the similarities and differences between the mechanisms [illustrates that] a 
European style of transposition has been identified. This, it has been argued, isn’t [sic] the result of a 
process of convergence. Rather, despite pressure stemming from the EU, member states have 
essentially preserved their institutional autonomy. Both conclusions are preliminary. Additional work 
based on case studies is necessary if we are better to understand a stage of the EU policy process that 
political scientists have largely neglected.’ 
222 Toshkov (n 191) 16: ‘even if scholars can increase the reliability and validity of their causal inferences 
about the determinants of compliance, the research will still remain of limited practical significance if 
the variables we study cannot be subject to intervention. Even if research convincingly shows that 




CHAPTER 5. THE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE 
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5.1 Supervision of Implementation 
The supervision of implementation at the EU level has been described as 
consisting in ‘both centralized, active, and direct “police-patrol” supervision, 
conducted by the EU’s supranational institutions, and decentralized, reactive, 
and indirect “fire-alarm” supervision, where national courts and societal 
watchdogs are engaged to induce state compliance.’1  
As a result, instances of non-compliant implementation of directives may 
come to light as a result of the Commission’s monitoring of implementation 
(section 5.2.1) or their discovery might result from complaints by individuals 
and interest groups (section 5.2.2) or when citizens have recourse to one of 
several EU assistance services (section 5.2.3). The different ways in which non-
compliant implementation might be exposed calls for some comments. 
5.1.1 Direct supervision by the Commission 
As ‘guardian of the Treaties’,2 the European Commission has the 
responsibility of monitoring and supervising compliance by the Member States 
                                                  
1 Jonas Tallberg, ‘Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union’ (2002) 
56 International Organization 609-643, 610; Mariyana Angelova, Tanja Dannwolf and Thomas König, 
‘How Robust Are Compliance Findings? A Research Synthesis’ (2012) 19 Journal of European Public 
Policy, 1269-1291, 1276 who suggest that ‘supranational monitoring should be distinguished from 
national activities. (Supranational) Monitoring by the Commission is a crucial part of the centralized 
compliance system in the EU … In contrast, national monitoring points to fire-alarm mechanisms that 
alleviate compliance, such as access to courts … and interest group activities’. See also Christian Jensen, 
‘Implementing Europe: A Question of Oversight’ (2007) 8 European Union Politics 451-477, 453-454. 
2 The term ‘guardian of the Treaties’ has been used by the Court of Justice to describe the Commission’s 
role in supervising the application of EU law by the Member States; see for instance Case C-431/92 
Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2189, para 22; Case C- 365/97 Commission v Italy (San Rocco 
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in implementing EU directives and investigate infringements of EU law.3 The 
Commission exercises this role in the general interest of the European Union.4 
In order to supervise compliance by the Member States, the Commission 
has several tools at its disposal. The Commission may undertake an assessment 
of the transposition of directives to determine whether the national 
implementing measures have been adopted and whether they comply with the 
directive. The Commission will initially ensure that national implement 
measures have been communicated.5 It will be recalled that Member States are 
                                                  
case) [1999] ECR I-7773, para 60; Joined Cases C-20/01 and C-28/01 Commission v Germany [2003] 
ECR I-3609, para 30. The term ‘custodian of Community legality’ has also been used in this connection, 
see Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851, para 26. 
3 Article 17(1) TEU provides that ‘‘[The Commission] shall ensure the application of the Treaties, and of 
measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them. It shall oversee the application of Union law 
under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union.’ See further, Francesco Capotorti, 
‘Legal Problems of Directives, Regulations and their Implementation’ in Heinrich Siedentopf and 
Jacques Ziller (eds), Making European Policies Work, Volume 1: Comparative Syntheses (Sage 1988) 
151-168, 165-166; Maria Mendrinou, ‘Non‐compliance and the European commission's role in 
integration’(1996) 3 Journal of European Public Policy 1-22; Jacquelyn MacLennan, ‘Decentralized 
Enforcement of EC Law: Is the European Commission Still the Guardian of the Treaties? (1997) 91 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 165-172; Alberto Gil 
Ibañez, The Administrative Supervision & Enforcement of EC Law (Hart 1999) 23-26; Stefan 
Kadelbach, ‘European Administrative Law and the Law of a Europeanized Administration’ in Christian 
Joerges and Renaud Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe's Integrated Market (Oxford 
University Press 2002) 167-206, 175-176; Melanie Smith, Centralised Enforcement, Legitimacy and 
Good Governance in the EU (Routledge 2010) 111-114; Stine Andersen, The Enforcement of EU Law: 
The Role of the European Commission (Oxford University Press 2012) 13-43.    
4 See for example, Case 167/73 Commission v France [1974] ECR 359, para 15; Case C-431/92 
Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2189, para 21; Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy (n 2), para 26; 
Case C-476/98 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-9855, para 38; Joined Cases C-20/01 and C-
28/01 Commission v Germany (n 2), para 29. 
5 The Commission uses the term ‘transposition check’ to refer the supervision of the communication of 
national implementing measures; see Commission, ‘Better Regulation Toolbox’ (2015) 236 
<http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/br_toolbox_en.pdf> accessed on 27 
November 2015 (hereafter ‘Better Regulation Toolbox’). The Commission has developed a database 
‘Asmodée II’ to track the progress in the transposition of directives for which the deadline has expired. 
This has ‘substantially cut the time taken to issue letters of formal notice, which are now all within the 
rule of one month after the transposal deadline provided for by the Commission’s internal rules for 
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under an obligation to communicate ‘clear and precise information’ on their 
national implementing measures as part of their duty of sincere cooperation.6 
This will then be followed by scrutiny of the correctness of transposition, 
also known a ‘conformity check’.7 This will often be based upon ‘conformity 
studies’ undertaken by external consultants.8 The monitoring of transposition 
                                                  
operation infringement proceedings’, see Commission, ‘Eighteenth Annual Report on Monitoring the 
Application of Community Law (2000)’, COM(2001) 309 final, 9; Commission, Communication ‘Better 
Monitoring of the Application of Community Law’, COM(2002) 725 final, 17-18. See also Deidre Curtin, 
‘Directives: The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of Individual Rights (1990) 27 Common Market 
Law Review, 703-739, 710-711, who notes this has led to ‘the immediate initiation of infringements 
procedures as soon as the deadlines are reached’. Sacha Prechal, Directives in EC Law (2nd edition, 
Oxford University Press 2005) 7, also notes this makes it ‘relatively simple to initiate infringement 
procedures more or less automatically as soon as the period provided for implementation has expired 
if no national implementing measures have been notified’. 
6 See for example, Case 272/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 4875, para 32 (failure to provide 
documents requested by Commission constitutes breach of Article 4(3) TFEU); Case C-65/91 
Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-5245, para 17 (idem); Case C-421/12 Commission v Belgium [2004] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2064 (judgment of 10 July 2014), para 34. See further Chapter 3, Section 3.3 
(Obligations Relating to the Methods of Transposition). 
7 The Commission uses this term in its Better Regulation Toolbox (n 5) 237. See also Marta Ballasteros, 
Rostane Mehdi, Mariolina Eliantonio and Damir Petrovic, ‘Tools for Ensuring Implementation and 
Application of EU Law and Evaluation of their Effectiveness’, (PE493.014, European Parliament, 2013), 
43-45: ‘As the Guardian of the Treaties, the Commission checks compliance of the Member States’ 
transposition measures (when they have been communicated) with EU law. The assessment is done 
horizontally for all Member States and is usually presented jointly through studies which serve to 
highlight possible inconsistencies in the way Member States have transposed EU law. Often these 
studies are undertaken by subcontractors. Conformity checking studies are only occasionally made 
available to the public on a cases by case basis.’ See also Sibylle Grohs, ‘Article 258/260 TFEU 
Infringement Procedures: The Commission Perspective in Environmental Cases’ in Marise Cremona 
(ed), Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 57-73, 63. However 
other terms in use include ‘conformity study’, ‘conformity assessment’ and ‘compliance assessment’, see 
for example, Milieu and Edinburgh University, ‘Conformity studies of Member States’ national 
implementation measures transposing Community instruments in the area of citizenship of the Union’ 
(December 2008);  
8 ibid. Other terms used include ‘conformity assessment’, see Better Regulation Toolbox (n 5) 237. 
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will usually take place following expiry of the deadline for transposition9 and 
will serve as the basis for the Commission fulfilling its reporting obligations 
under a directive.10 Conformity studies are not usually published by the 
Commission.11 
In case a conformity check reveals a problem in transposition by a 
Member State, the Commission will first raise the matter informally.12 These 
discussions will be initiated by the Commission13 as part of the so-called ‘EU 
Pilot’ scheme.14 A Member State will be required to respond to the 
Commission’s enquiries as part of its general duty of sincere cooperation.15 
Where the Commission is unable to resolve the matter through discussion, the 
Commission may then proceed to open an infringement case.16 
                                                  
9 Better Regulation Toolbox (n 5) 236-237, but the Commission notes that ‘it may even start before (to 
be decided by the competent service) if national transposition measures for individual Member States 
have been received in advance’. 
10 See further Chapter 3, Section 3.3 (Obligations Relating to the Methods of Transposition). 
11 Better Regulation Toolbox (n 5) 237: ‘Given that conformity studies may feed into infringement 
proceedings, they should not be published or disclosed’. In this connection, the General Court has held 
that conformity studies ‘are targeted documents, the purpose of which is the analysis of the 
transposition by a specific Member State of a specific directive, which are intended to form part of a 
Commission file relating to that transposition. Where infringement proceedings have already 
commenced, it cannot be held that those studies are not part of the file relating to those proceedings, 
since those studies are among the material on which the Commission based its decision to commence 
those proceedings. As regards studies in respect of which the Commission has not yet initiated 
infringement proceedings, it is equally necessary to maintain their confidentiality, since once 
information is in the public domain it cannot be withdrawn when the proceedings are commenced, as 
the Commission rightly submits.’, see Case T-111/11, ClientEarth v European Commission [2013] 
ECLI:EU:T:2013:482 (judgment of 13 September 2013), para 79. 
12 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission - Monitoring the application of Union law 2014 Annual 
Report’ COM(2015) 329 final, 4 and 7 17 (hereafter ‘Annual Report on the Application of EU Law for 
2014’). 
13 ibid.  
14 Andersen (n 3) 19, 47. See for example, Annual Report on the Application of EU Law for 2014 (n 12), 
5. See further Section 5.2.1 (Referral to EU Pilot scheme).  
15 See n 6. 
16 See further Section 5.2.2 (Infringement Action by the Commission). 
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However, the Commission does not benefit from a general power to 
undertake inspections or seize evidence in order to investigate suspected non-
compliance.17 The Commission only derives such powers from specific legal 
instruments,18 for example in the case of the EU competition rules19 or the EU 
air transport safety rules.20 The Council may also grant it such powers.21 
Moreover, there is no general obligation on Member States to provide statistics 
on the application or enforcement of EU directives, as this also requires specific 
legislation.22  
The supervision of timely and correct transposition can be considered as 
forming part of the Commission’s enforcement priorities.23 However, non-
                                                  
17 Ballasteros, Mehdi, Eliantonio and Petrovic (n 7) 53-55. 
18 For other examples, see Ballasteros, Mehdi, Eliantonio and Petrovic (n 7) 53. 
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1, which provides the 
Commission with extensive powers to investigate suspected breaches of the EU competition rules 
contained in what are now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
20 Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on 
common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 [2008] 
OJ L 97/72, which empowers the Commission to make unannounced inspections. 
21 In the absence of a more specific legal basis, this is possible under Article 337 TFEU, which provides 
that ‘The Commission may, within the limits and under conditions laid down by the Council acting by a 
simple majority in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties, collect any information and carry out 
any checks required for the performance of the tasks entrusted to it.’  This has been used as a legal basis 
several times, see for example, Council Regulation (EC) No 1035/97 of 2 June 1997 establishing a 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia [1997] OJ L 151/1.  
22 Article 338(1) TFEU provides that ‘the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures for the production of statistics where 
necessary for the performance of the activities of the Union’. For example, this has been used to adopt 
Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on 
Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers [2007] OL L 199/23. 
23 See for example, Commission, Communication ‘Better Monitoring of the Application of Community 
Law’ (n 5) 12 and 17; idem, Communication ‘A Europe of Results - Applying Community Law’, 
COM(2007) 502 final, 9. For criticism of the Commission’s approach, see Smith (n 3) 123-131. It would 
appear that the non-communication of national implementing measures would also fall within this 
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compliant transposition or enforcement is only likely to warrant further 
investigation by the Commission where non-compliance falls within its other 
enforcement priorities. In the case of the application of a directive, this would 
include ‘systematic incorrect application detected by a series of separate 
complaints by individuals’ or ‘[c]ross-border infringements, where this aspect 
makes it more complicated for European citizens to assert their rights’.24 In the 
case of the enforcement of a directive this would encompass ‘systemic 
infringements that impede the procedure for preliminary rulings … or prevent 
the national courts from acknowledging the primacy of Community law, or 
provide for no redress procedures in national law’. A failure to ‘comply with a 
judgment given by the Court of Justice’25 also constitutes an enforcement 
priority which could occur at any stage of the implementation process.  As a 
result, not all instances of non-compliance will necessarily rise to the level of 
what the Commission considers are its enforcement priorities.26 The Court of 
Justice has repeatedly recognised that the Commission enjoys a wide discretion 
in the exercise of its supervisory powers.27 
Aside from investigating the implementation of directives of its own 
motion, the Commission might also receive complaints from the public and civil 
society groups. Such indirect supervision is the main way in which the 
Commission will learn about non-compliant application and enforcement,28 as 
will be examined next. 
                                                  
category of enforcement priorities, see to that effect Commission, ‘Communication from the 
Commission - Implementation of Article 260(3) of the Treaty’ [2001] OJ C 12/1, para 17. 
24 Communication ‘Better Monitoring of the Application of Community Law’ (n 5) 11. 
25 Communication ‘Better Monitoring of the Application of Community Law’ (n 5) 11-12. 
26 See to that effect Andersen (n 3) 19. 
27 See for example, Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-5449, para 37; Case T-155/99 
Dieckmann & Hansen [2001] ECR II-3143, para 54. 
28 See to that effect Prechal (n 5) 7, who notes that if national implementing measures have been notified 
‘nothing is said about … their application and enforcement in practice. … Without much exaggeration it 
can be said that there is a large area of ‘hidden failures’ by the Member States … In this respect, 
especially individual complaints … play an important role in discovering the (potential) failures’; 
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5.1.2 Complaints by individuals and interest groups 
The Court of Justice recognised from an early stage that individuals have 
a full role to play in the enforcement of EU law.29 The Treaty provides that 
individuals and businesses who feel that their EU rights are not being respected 
by the national authorities have a right to complain directly to the 
Commission.30  
Complaints may be sent directly to the Commission. The Commission 
regularly receives complaints from the public about the implementation of 
directives by the Member States which it is alleged does not comply with EU 
law.31 The application of a directive by the national administrative bodies and 
the national courts might also be monitored at the domestic level by civil society 
                                                  
Tallberg (n 134) 616, who remarks that ‘the Commission operates an informal procedure through which 
it records and examines complaints lodged by citizens, firms, nongovernmental organizations, and 
national administrations. The complaint procedure offers a form of monitoring that is more resource-
efficient than systematic in-house inquiries, provides access to information otherwise unobtainable, 
and points to areas of EU legislation that may be particularly ambiguous and in need of clarification.’. 
29 In Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR English special edition 1, 13 held that ‘[t]he vigilance of 
individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the 
supervision entrusted by Articles [258] and [259 TFEU] to the diligence of the Commission and of the 
Member States’. See also Joseph Weiler (1991) ‘The Transformation of Europe’ 100 Yale Law Journal 
2403-2483, 2421 who considers that individuals become ‘decentralized agent[s] for monitoring 
compliance by Member States with their Treaty obligations’ 
30 Article 24(4) TFEU provides that ‘[e]very citizen of the Union may write to any of the institutions or 
bodies referred to in this Article [namely the Commission, Council and European Parliament] or in 
Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union in one of the languages mentioned in Article 55(1) of the 
Treaty on European Union and have an answer in the same language’.  This provision was introduced 
into by the Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 9 March 1999, 2700 UNTS 161 Article 2, para 11. 
31 Richard Brent, Directives: Rights and Remedies in English and Community Law (Informa Law / 
Routledge 2001) 162-164. See also Annual Report on the Application of EU Law for 2014 (n 12) 7 in 
which the Commission notes that ‘members of the public, businesses, NGOs and other organisations 
remained very active in reporting potential breaches of EU law’. 
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organisations.32 As part of their advocacy strategies, civil society groups might 
therefore also address complaints to the Commission.33  
The Commission has adopted guidelines on the handling of complaints34 
and has established a dedicated computerised system (CHAP)35 in which all 
complaints are recorded. The Commission will send an acknowledgement to the 
complainant within two weeks.36 Details of complaints held on the CHAP 
database are not accessible37 but some statistical data is disclosed in the 
Commission’s annual reports on the application of EU law.38  
The Commission aims to investigate complaints and take a decision 
whether to initiate formal infringement proceedings or to close the case within 
twelve months from when a complaint is registered.39  
The Commission enjoys a wide discretion in what action it takes following 
receipt of a complaint. It can decide to deal with the complaint as a possible 
infringement under the EU Pilot scheme.40 Alternatively, where the 
                                                  
32 See to that effect, Tallberg (n 1) 616; Diana Panke, ‘The European Court of Justice as an Agent of 
Europeanization? Restoring Compliance with EU Law’  (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 
847-866, 852; Reinhard Slepcevic, ‘The Judicial Enforcement of EU Law through National Courts: 
Possibilities and Limits’ (2009) 16 Journal of European Public Policy, 378-394, 381. 
33 Annual Report on the Application of EU Law for 2014 (n 12) 5. 
34 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European parliament - 
Updating the handling of relations with the complainant in respect of the application of Union law’ 
COM(2012) 154 final (hereafter ‘Communication on the Handling of Complaints’). 
35 CHAP refers to the ‘Complaints handling/Acceuil des plaignants’ registration system, ibid, 1. See also 
Ballasteros, Mehdi, Eliantonio and Petrovic (n 7) 62-63. 
36 Communication on the Handling of Complaints (n 34) 5. 
37 Ballasteros, Mehdi, Eliantonio and Petrovic (n 7) 62. 
38  See for example, Annual Report on the Application of EU Law for 2014 (n 12) 7-10. 
39 Communication on the Handling of Complaints (n 34) 6. 
40 In 2010, 4,035 complaints were registered on CHAP, 17% of which were allocated to the EU Pilot 
scheme, see Commission, ‘28th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law (2010), 
COM(2011) 588 final, 7-8. See also Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Studies, ‘SOLVIT Evaluation 
Report’ (November 2011) 7 <http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/_docs/2011/2011_solvit-assesses-
relevance_en.pdf> accessed 31 December 2015. In 2015, 3,715 new complaints were received by the 
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Commission considers the complaint might be capable of informal resolution, 
it may refer the matter to the SOLVIT network (with the complainant’s 
consent).41  
The Commission also has the discretion to decide whether or not to 
commence infringement proceedings42 and whether or not to refer a case to the 
Court.43 The Commission is not required to adopt a specific position on 
individual complaints.44 Therefore no action for failure to act will lie in in the 
event the Commission decides not to pursue the matter further.45 Nonetheless, 
                                                  
Commission, 423 (11%) were the subject of an EU Pilot case, see Annual Report on the Application of 
EU Law for 2014 (n 12) 8-9. 
41 Annual Report on the Application of EU Law for 2014 (n 12) 23, where it is reported that ‘in 2014 the 
Commission connected up the problem solving service SOLVIT with the internal tool for registering 
complaints, CHAP’. See also Commission, Single Market Scoreboard (SOLVIT governance tool), 
October 2015 edition (hereafter ‘SMS SOLVIT 10/2015’), see ‘Achievements’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/solvit/index_
en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015, where it is reported that ‘[b]etter coordination between SOLVIT and 
the EC complaint handling mechanism has been achieved by establishing a technical link for 
transferring cases from the Commission to SOLVIT.’ See further, Section 5.1.3 (Recourse to EU 
Assistance Services). 
42 Case C-200/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR I-4299, para 9; Case C-207/97 Commission v 
Belgium [1999] ECR I-275, para 24; Case C-209/88 Commission v Italy [1990] ECR I-4313, para 16; 
Case C-212/98 Commission v Ireland [1999] ECR I-8571, para 12;  Case C-236/99 Commission v 
Belgium [2000] ECR I-5657, para 28; Case C-474/99 Commission v Spain [2002] ECR I-5293, para 
25; Case C-233/00 Commission v France [2003] ECR I-6625, para 31; Case C-383/00 Commission v 
Germany [2002] ECR I-4219, para 19; Case C-394/02 Commission v Greece [2005] ECR I-4713, para 
16; Case C-33/04 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-10629, paras 66-67.  
43 Case C-562/07 Commission v Spain [2009] ECR I-9553, paras 18-20. 
44 Case 247/87 Star Fruit [1989] ECR 291, para 11; Case C-72/90 Asia Motor France [1990] ECR I-2181 
(Order of the Court of 23 May 1990), para 11; Case C-445/06 Danske Slagterier [2009] ECR I-2119, 
para 44. 
45 Case C-87/89 Sonito [1990] ECR I-1981, para 7; Case T-84/94 Bundesverband der Bilanzbuchhalter 
[1995] ECR II-101 (Order of the Court of 23 January 1995), paras 23-24 (upheld on appeal in Case C-
107/95 P [1997] ECR I-947);  Case C-422/97 P Société Anonyme de Traverses en Béton Armé [1998] 
ECR I-4913 (Order of the Court of 17 July 1998), para 36. 
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they may complain to the European Ombudsman in the event of delay or 
maladministration of their complaint46 under Article 228 TFEU.47  
Individuals and interest groups may also file a petition to the European 
Parliament48 at the same time they formulate a complaint to the Commission.49 
The European Parliament also enjoys a wide discretion in this area in how to 
handle the petition,50 which often results in the Parliament formally requesting 
the Commission to explain what it has done to resolve the complaint.51 
                                                  
46 See for example, Decision of the European Ombudsman concerning complaint 
953/2009/(JMA)MHZ against the European Commission, 14 June 2010, in which the Ombudsman 
found that the Commission ‘failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for closing the infringement 
complaint concerning the non-implementation of Article 8 of the Directive [on the protection of 
employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer] by Spain’ which amounted to 
maladministration. The Ombudsman also found the Commission had committed maladministration by 
taking fifteen months to close the case without taking further action in breach of its one-year target set 
out in its Communication on the Handling of Complaints (n 34). 
47 Article 228 TFEU provides that ‘European Ombudsman, elected by the European Parliament, shall 
be empowered to receive complaints from any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person 
residing or having its registered office in a Member State concerning instances of maladministration in 
the activities of the 
Union institutions’. This is further implemented by Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom of the 
European Parliament of 9 March 1994 on the regulations and general conditions governing the 
performance of the Ombudsman's duties  [1994] OJ L 113/15. 
48 Article 227 TFEU provides that ‘Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or 
having its registered office in a Member State, shall have the right to address, individually or in 
association with other citizens or persons, a petition to the European Parliament on a matter which 
comes within the Union's fields of activity and which affects him, her or it directly.’ 
49 European Parliament, Draft Report on the activities of the Committee on Petitions 2014, 
2014/2218(INI), recital L, notes that ‘a petition is often filed at the same time as a complaint to the 
Commission’.  
50 See Case C-261/13 P Schönberger [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2423 (judgment of 9 December 2014), 
paras 22-25. 
51 European Parliament Rules of Procedure, 8th Parliamentary term, July 2014, 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sipade/rulesleg8/Rulesleg8.EN.pdf> accessed 31 December 2015. 
Rule 216(6)   provides that ‘[t]he [Petitions] committee may request assistance from the Commission 
particularly in the form of information on the application of, or compliance with, Union law and 
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Complaints may also be sent directly to one of the EU assistance services 
which aim to assist citizens and businesses in resolving an issue of non-
compliant application of EU law, as will now be discussed.  
5.1.3 Recourse to EU assistance services 
In order to help resolve disputes about the application or enforcement of 
EU directives without going to court, several legal information and alternative 
dispute resolution networks have been established at EU level to inform citizens 
of their EU rights and try to informally resolve disputes about their application. 
These are referred to collectively as ‘EU assistance services’.52 Two of the main 
services include Your Europe Advice and the SOLVIT network, which are the 
most relevant in the context of the implementation of Directive 2004/38. 
The ‘Your Europe Advice’ service allows citizens and businesses to obtain 
information about their EU rights.53 This advisory service aims to explain and 
confirm rights under EU law, but it does not have a mandate to intervene 
directly with the national authorities.54 The services handles over 20,000 
enquiries per year,55 of which approximately 10% relate to potential problems 
of non-compliance.56 Where issues of non-compliance are raised, the service 
                                                  
information or documents relevant to the petition. Representatives of the Commission shall be invited 
to attend meetings of the committee.’ 
52 Commission, EU Information and Assistance Services (Office for Official Publications of the 
European Union 2009). A full list of these services can be found on the Europa portal 
<http://ec.europa.eu/services/index_en.htm> accessed 31 December 2015. 
53Your Europe Advice website <http://europa.eu/youreurope/advice/index_en.htm> accessed 9 May 
2015. The service is administered on behalf of the Commission by the European Citizen Action Service 
(ECAS), a non-governmental organisation <http://ecas.org/services/your-europe-advice-yea/> 
accessed 9 May 2015. It was formerly known as the ‘Citizen Signpost Service’. 
54 Your Europe Advice website <http://europa.eu/youreurope/advice/about_en.htm> accessed on 9 
May 2015; Commission (n 52) 6.  
55 Commission, Single Market Scoreboard (Your Europe Advice governance tool) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/youreurope_a
dvice/index_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015 (hereafter Your Europe Advice Reports). 
56 Interview, YEA legal expert, June 2015. These are identified as ‘interesting cases’ and include 
‘infringement, misapplication or ignorance of EC law’, see for example, ECAS, ‘2008 Report on the 
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can refer them to national non-governmental groups that may be able to assist 
them in enforcing their rights before the national authorities.57 Where 
appropriate, it can also refer a case to SOLVIT.58 Although potential cases of 
non-compliance that the service has identified are relayed to the Commission 
through feedback reports,59 there is no automatic referral of such cases for 
assessment under the EU Pilot scheme.  
 The SOLVIT network was established by the Commission in 200160 and 
‘aims to deliver fast, effective and informal solutions to problems [which] 
individuals and businesses encounter when their EU rights in the internal 
market are being denied by public authorities’ provided such problems are not 
the subject of legal proceedings.61 It comprises a network of officials from the 
national administrative authorities based in every EEA State.62  
 Problems which are referred to the network will be taken up by the ‘home 
centre’ which has the closest links with the complainant.63 The ‘home centre’ 
will then contact the ‘lead centre’ in the Member State where the problem 
                                                  
functioning and development of the Citizen Signpost Service’ (2009) 20 
<http://europa.eu/youreurope/advice/docs/annual_report_2008_en.pdf> accessed 9 May 2015, .   
57 Xavier Le Den and Janne Sylvest, ‘Understanding Citizens' and Businesses' Concerns with the Single 
Market: a View from the Assistance Services’ (Report for Commission, Ramboll 2011), Supplement 1, 2 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/20concerns/feedback_report_en.pdf> accessed 
26 May 2015. 
58 ibid. 
59 Annual reports for Your Europe Advice (2007-2010) 
<http://europa.eu/youreurope/advice/about_en.htm> accessed 9 May 2015. See for example, ECAS, 
‘Difficulties Experienced by Citizens When Exercising their Mobility Rights in Single Market A Citizens 
Signpost Service feedback report’ (2007)  <http://europa.eu/youreurope/advice/about_en.htm> 
accessed 9 May 2015.  
60 Commission, ‘Recommendation of 7 December 2001 on principles for using ‘SOLVIT’ –- the Internal 
Market Problem Solving Network’ [2001] OJ L 331/79. 
61 Commission, ‘Recommendation of 17 September 2013 on the principles governing SOLVIT’, C(2013) 
5869 final, 5 (hereafter ‘2013 SOLVIT Recommendation’).  
62 SOLVIT website <http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/contact/index_en.htm> accessed 9 May 2015. 
63 2013 SOLVIT Recommendation (n 61) 5. This will be ‘based on for example nationality, residence, 
establishment or the place where the applicant acquired the rights at stake’, ibid.  
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occurred, which will contact the public authority that is the source of the 
problem. Together they will try to resolve the matter by negotiating an outcome 
that is in conformity with EU law64 within a target deadline of 10 weeks.65 The 
Commission does not intervene directly in cases handled by the SOLVIT 
network66 and only provides administrative and technical support.67  
 The SOLVIT network tends to address problems in the application of EU 
law,68 and its caseload will therefore include instances of the non-compliant 
application of directives.69 The number of cases have been rising almost every 
year with the network handling almost 2400 cases in 2014,70 12% of which were 
referred by Your Europe Advice.71  
Despite its overall relatively high resolution rate of 85%,72 there are 
limitations to what SOLVIT can achieve in respect of non-compliant 
application. This is notably the case as regards ‘structural problems’73 where 
achieving resolution of the problem in compliance with EU law would ‘entail 
amendments to national laws’.74 In such cases, the resolution rate in SOLVIT 
                                                  
64 ibid, 7. 
65 ibid 5. 
66 Micaela Lottini, ‘From “Administrative Cooperation” in the Application of European Union Law to 
“Administrative Cooperation” in the Protection of European Rights and Liberties’ (2012) 18 European 
Public Law 127-147, 139-140. 
67 2013 SOLVIT Recommendation (n 61) 8. 
68 Mogens Hobolth and Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, ‘Transgovernmental networks in the European 
Union: improving compliance effectively?’ (2013) 20 Journal of European Public Policy 1406-1424, 
1407. 
69 ibid, who emphasise that ‘the disputes dealt with in this type of network concern administrative 
decisions in concrete instances. Studying Solvit thus contributes to taking compliance research beyond 
transposition into the ‘black box’ of practical application of EU law’. 
70 SMS SOLVIT 10/2015 (n 41), see ‘Overall caseload’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/solvit/index_
en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015. 
71 ibid. 
72 SMS SOLVIT 10/2015 (n 41), see indicator 4 ‘Resolution rate by country’. 
73 This is defined as ‘a breach caused by a national rule running counter to Union law’ 
74 SMS SOLVIT 10/2015 (n 41), see ‘Structural cases - by area of legislation’.  
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cases drops to 47%.75 Such structural cases are likely to comprise instances of 
non-compliant application originating in non-compliant national 
implementing measures or administrative guidelines.76 The SOLVIT database 
allows problems that remain unresolved to be flagged so they can be directly 
addressed by the Commission.77 At present unresolved SOLVIT cases do not 
automatically trigger the opening of an EU Pilot case.78  
 Recourse to Your Europe Advice and the SOLVIT network does not limit 
the ability of those affected by non-compliance to make an official complaint to 
the Commission. In the event their intervention proves unsuccessful, those 
affected have the possibility to send a complaint directly to the Commission, 
which would follow the process described. However, as noted above unresolved 
cases do not systematically result in the opening of an EU Pilot case. 
Having seen how various modes of supervision may disclose instances of 
non-compliant implementation, attention will now be turned to the 
consequences which non-compliant implementation can have at both EU and 
national level respectively. 
5.2 Consequences of Non-Compliant Implementation at EU Level 
As discussed above, the Commission has the responsibility of monitoring 
the application of EU law. Wherever a complaint is received that might 
constitute non-compliant implementation of directives, the Commission will 
first try to resolve infringements informally by referring the matter to its ‘EU 
Pilot’ scheme (section 5.2.1).  In the event these informal endeavours prove 
unsuccessful, the Commission will initiate formal infringement action by 
sending a formal written warning to the Member State in question (section 
                                                  
75 SMS SOLVIT 10/2015 (n 41), see ‘Structural cases - by area of legislation’ which reports that 33 out 
of 70 cases were resolved in 2014. For 2013, the resolution rate for structural problems was 40% based 
on 19 cases resolved out of 47 structural cases. 
76 See further Chapter 4, Section 4.3 (Application Outcomes). 
77 2013 SOLVIT Recommendation (n 61) 8. 
78 Interview, Commission official, December 2015. 
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5.2.2). Where the issue remains unresolved despite this warning, the 
Commission can then initiate infringement proceedings before the EU Court of 
Justice which has final jurisdiction over the matter (section 5.2.3).  
5.2.1 Referral to EU Pilot scheme 
The Commission may seek to resolve non-compliant implementation by 
engaging in discussions with the Member State concerned. These take the form 
of bilateral discussions with Member States under the so-called ‘EU Pilot’ 
scheme.79 There is no specific Treaty basis for the process, but its origins can be 
traced to the ‘Sutherland Report’80 which called for enhanced administrative 
cooperation for the enforcement of Single Market legislation.81 
The EU Pilot scheme aims to resolve problems concerning the conformity 
of national legislation with EU law or the correct application of EU law through 
collaboration between the Commission and the Member State concerned,82 in 
order to ‘to correct infringements of EU law at an early stage … without the need 
for recourse to infringement proceedings’.83 It was ‘intended to replace sending 
of administrative letters by the Commission services (so-called "pre-226 letter") 
to Member States’.84 
                                                  
79 The EU Pilot Scheme was introduced in order as an exercise to improve the Commission’s working 
methods, see Communication ‘A Europe of Results - Applying Community Law’ (n 23) 7-8. See further 
Ballasteros, Mehdi, Eliantonio and Petrovic (n 7) 63-84; Smith (n 3) 152-160; Andersen (n 3) 46-47, 72-
75.  
80Andersen (n 3) 73. 
81 Peter Sutherland, ‘The Internal Market after 1992: Meeting the Challenge. Report presented to the 
Commission by the High Level Group on the functioning of the Internal Market’ (1992), 
recommendation 32 
82 Commission, ‘EU Pilot Evaluation Report’, SEC(2010) 182 (hereafter ‘First Evaluation Report on EU 
Pilot‘), 4. 
83 ibid, 2. 
84 First Evaluation Report on EU Pilot (n 82) 2; Commission, Staff Working Document ‘Facts on the 
functioning of the system up to beginning of February 2010 accompanying document to the 
Commission's EU pilot evaluation report’, SEC(2010) 182 (hereafter ‘Accompanying Document to First 
Evaluation Report on EU Pilot’), 8. 
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The scheme is facilitated by a computerised database that allows for 
secure communication between the Commission and the authorities of the 
Member States.85 When an issue of non-compliance is discovered either 
following a complaint or on the Commission’s own initiative, an EU Pilot case 
file will be opened.86 A description of the alleged non-compliance and questions 
from the Commission are uploaded to the database.87 The EU Pilot file will then 
be sent to the central contact point appointed by each Member State88 which 
acts as a channel for managing the process, and attributes incoming files from 
the Commission services to the responsible national authority. The Member 
State concerned is expected to respond within ten weeks.89 The Commission 
then has a further ten weeks to consider the Member State’s response.90 In case 
the Commission considers the Member State’s response is incomplete it may 
request further clarification.91 
The EU Pilot scheme may be supplemented by ‘package meetings’92 
involving officials from the Commission and the Member States to discuss 
selected instances of non-compliant implementation.93 The Commission may 
also organise meetings with national civil society groups to obtain their views 
on non-compliance.94  
                                                  
85 First Evaluation Report on EU Pilot (n 82) 2; Accompanying Document to First Evaluation Report on 
EU Pilot (n 84) 4. 
86 Ballasteros, Mehdi, Eliantonio and Petrovic (n 7) 66. 
87 Commission report 'Second Evaluation Report on EU Pilot', COM(2011) 930 final (hereafter ‘Second 
Evaluation Report on EU Pilot’), 3. 
88 Accompanying Document to First Evaluation Report on EU Pilot (n 84) 2-4. 
89 Accompanying Document to First Evaluation Report on EU Pilot (n 84) 17; Second Evaluation Report 
on EU Pilot (n 87) 3. 
90 Second Evaluation Report on EU Pilot (n 87) 2. 
91 Accompanying Document to First Evaluation Report on EU Pilot (n 84) 19; Second Evaluation Report 
on EU Pilot (n 87) 4. 
92 Ballasteros, Mehdi, Eliantonio and Petrovic (n 7) 51-52; Smith (n 3) 131.  
93 Alberto Gil Ibañez, ‘The “Standard” Administrative Procedure for Supervising and Enforcing EC Law: 
EC Treaty Articles 226 and 228’ (2004) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 135-159, 146-147 (n 49). 
94 ibid 51. 
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At the end of this process, two outcomes are likely.95 The Member State 
might agree to correct its non-compliance in accordance with EU law. In such a 
case, the Commission will close the file and consider the matter resolved.96 
Alternatively, the Member State may contest the existence of non-compliance 
in which case the Commission will reject the Member State’s response and 
provide justification for its position, while reserving the possibility to launch a 
formal infringement action.97  In either case, prior to closure of the file, the 
Commission will inform any complainant of the proposed closure and provide 
them with four weeks to submit their comments.98 The Commission has 
stressed that the entire process from the date of registration of the complaint or 
initiation of an EU Pilot case of its own motion until closing of the file should 
take no more than twelve months.99 
Where dialogue between the Commission and the Member States does 
not lead to resolution of the alleged state of non-compliance, the Commission 
may initiate formal infringement proceedings as will be discussed in the next 
section. Given that the opening of an EU Pilot case will usually precede any 
formal infringement action,100 it can therefore be considered a precursor to the 
pre-litigation phase under Article 258 TFEU101 but does form part of it.102  
                                                  
95 Accompanying Document to First Evaluation Report on EU Pilot (n 84) 19; Second Evaluation Report 
on EU Pilot (n 87) 4. 
96 Accompanying Document to First Evaluation Report on EU Pilot (n 84) 19. 
97 Accompanying Document to First Evaluation Report on EU Pilot (n 84) 19; Second Evaluation Report 
on EU Pilot (n 87) 3-4. 
98 Communication on the Handling of Complaints (n 34) 7. 
99 Second Evaluation Report on EU Pilot (n 87) 4. This also corresponds to the period set out in its 
Communication on the Handling of Complaints (n 34) 6. 
100 Second Evaluation Report on EU Pilot (n 87) 2; Annual Report on the Application of EU Law for 
2014 (n 12) 5. 
101 Andersen (n 3) 19, 47. See also, Tallberg (n 134) 616, who highlights the advantage that ‘[t]hese 
consultations weed out cases that may have arisen due to legal uncertainty and misunderstandings.’ 
102 See to that effect, Case C-211/08 Commission v Spain [2010] ECR I-5267, paras 21-22 in respect of 
correspondence preceding a ‘letter of formal notice’. 
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5.2.2 Infringement action by the Commission 
 Where the Member State’s non-compliance persists, the Commission has 
the power to bring an action for infringement of EU law before the Court of 
Justice under Article 258 TFEU.103 The decision whether or not to commence 
infringement proceedings104 rests with the Commission.105 The purpose of such 
proceedings is to obtain a declaration by the Court of Justice that a Member 
State has infringed EU law with a view to the termination of non-compliance.106 
The proceedings comprises a pre-litigation stage of an administrative 
nature that precedes the contentious stage before the Court.107 The purpose of 
the pre-litigation phase is threefold: it provides the Member State an 
opportunity to remedy its non-compliance, enables it to put forward a defence 
to the Commission’s allegations108 and defines the subject matter of the dispute 
                                                  
103 Article 258 TFEU provides that:  
‘If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the 
Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the 
opportunity to submit its observations. 
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the 
Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union.’  
104 For a detailed discussion of infringement proceedings, see Gil Ibañez (n 3) 89-134; Brent (n 31) 161-
183; Ian Harden, ‘What Future for the Centralized Enforcement of Community Law?’ (2002) 55 Current 
Legal Problems 495-516; Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis and Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law 
(Janek Tomasz Nowak ed, Oxford University Press 2014) 159-214; Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, 
EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6th ed, Oxford University Press, 2015) 429-463.  
105 See for example, Case C-33/04 Commission v Luxembourg (n 42), paras 66-67, and other case law 
cited at n 42. For an overview of the Commission’s enforcement priorities, see Section 5.1.1 (Direct 
supervision by the Commission). 
106 Joined Case 15/76 & 16/76 Commission v France [1979] ECR 321, para 27; Case C-247/98 Greece v 
Commission [2001] ECR I-2001, para 13; Case C-456/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-10517, 
para 25; Case C-292/11 P Commission v Portugal [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:3 (judgment of 15 January 
2014), para 39. 
107 Case C-362/01 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-11433, para 15 See also Tallberg (n 1) 616. 
108 Case C-74/82 Commission v Ireland [1984] ECR 317, para 13; Case 293/85 Commission v Belgium 
[1988] ECR 305, para 13; Case C-96/95 Commission v Germany [1997] ECR I-1653, para 22; Case C-
152/98 Commission v Netherlands [2001] ECR I-3463, para 23; Case C-439/99 Commission v Italy 
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before the Court.109 The pre-litigation stage consists in an essential procedural 
requirement for the proper conduct of infringement proceedings.110 
The procedure under Article 258 TFEU is formally initiated by the 
Commission sending a ‘letter of formal notice’111 to the Member State putting it 
on notice that it is breaching EU law. This will be sent to the permanent 
representation of the Member State concerned.112 The letter of formal notice 
need only contain ‘an initial brief summary’ of the Commission’s complaints,113 
but this must specify how the Member State has breached its obligations under 
the Treaties.114  
In the context of the implementation of a directive, this effectively 
requires the Commission to identify which specific provisions of the directive 
                                                  
[2002] ECR I-305, para 10; Case C-287/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-5811, para 16; Case 
C-522/09 Commission v Romania [2011] ECR I-2963, para 15.  
109 Case C-362/01 Commission v Ireland (n 107), para 18. 
110 Case 124/81 Commission v United Kingdom [1983] ECR 203, para 6; Case C-152/89 Commission v 
Luxembourg [1991] ECR I-3141, para 9; Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany (n 27), para 55, and 
Case C-340/96 Commission v United Kingdom [1999] ECR I-2023, para 36; Case C-422/05 
Commission v Belgium [2007] ECR I-4749, para 25; Case C-186/06 Commission v Spain [2007] ECR 
I-12093, para 15; Case C-457/07 Commission v Portugal [2009] ECR I-8091, para 55. 
111 Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman (n 104) 186-188. This is also known as a ‘letter before action’, ibid, 
187. See also Brent (n 31) 165-166. 
112 See in the context of Directive 2004/38, Commission, Letter of formal notice sent to Italy, 
SG(2011)D/18350, C(2011)7523, 28 October 2011 (Information from Commission dated 3 August 2015 
(GestDem 2015/2901)). 
113 Case 274/83 Commission v Italy [1985] ECR 1077, para 21; Case C-135/94 Commission v Italy [1995] 
ECR I-1805, para 7; Case C-289/94 Commission v Italy [1996] ECR I-4405 para 16; Case C-279/94 
Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-4743 para 15; Case C-225/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-
7445, para 70; Case C-221/04 Commission v Spain [2006] ECR I-4515, para 36. 
114 Case C-341/97 Commission v Netherlands [2000] ECR I-6611 (Order of the Court of 13 September 
2000), para 18; Case C-230/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1169, para 32; C-23/05 
Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-9535, para 7. 
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have been breached and identify the specific national measures which are the 
source of non-compliance.115  
The letter of formal notice must also provide a reasonable period of time 
within which the Member State should provide its observations.116 It appears 
that it is the Commission’s standard practice in this connection to provide a 
deadline of two months,117 although in urgent cases the period might be 
shorter.118  
Where the Commission considers that the Member State has failed to 
remedy the non-compliance in the letter of formal notice, it may proceed to 
issue a ‘reasoned opinion’.119 This constitutes the second-step in the pre-
litigation stage.120 The reasoned opinion must provide a ‘cogent and detailed 
exposition of the reasons’ that lead the Commission to consider the Member 
State has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty,121 based on the 
complaints contained in the original letter of formal notice.122 The reasoned 
opinion may provide further details on the nature of the Commission’s 
                                                  
115 See in the context of Directive 2004/38, Commission, Letter of formal notice sent to Spain, 
SG(2011)D/3991, C(2011)1455, 15 March 2011 (Information from Commission dated 3 August 2015 
(GestDem 2015/2901)). 
116 Case 293/85 Commission v Belgium (n 108) para 14; Case C-473/93 Commission v Luxembourg 
[1996] ECR I-3207, para 20; Case C-1/00 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-9989, para 65.  
117 See in the context of Directive 2004/38, Commission, Letter of formal notice sent to Austria 
SG(2007)D/206353, C(2007)4953, 23 October 2007 (Information from Commission dated 3 August 
2015 (GestDem 2015/2901)); idem, Letter of formal notice sent to Malta SG(2011)D/4011, C(2011)1453, 
15 March 2011 (Information from Commission dated 3 August 2015 (GestDem 2015/2901)). See also 
Letters of formal notice sent to Italy (n 112) and Spain (115). 
118 Case C320/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-9871, paras 33-34. 
119 Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman (n 104) 188-191; Brent (n 31) 166-168. 
120 Tallberg (n 1) 616. 
121 Case 7/61 Commission v Italy [1961] Spec Ed 317, 327; Case C-207/96 Commission v Italy [1997] 
ECR I-6869, para 18; C-439/99 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-305, para 12; Case C-340/02 
Commission v France [2004] ECR I-9845, para 27.  
122 Case C-145/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-5585, para 18. 
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complaints that were made more generally in its letter of formal notice123 or 
focus on some but not all of the complaints which the letter contained.124 
However, the inclusion of new complaints in the reasoned opinion that were not 
included in the letter of formal notice will not be examined by the Court.125 The 
reasoned opinion must also take account of the Member State’s observations to 
its letter of formal notice, otherwise the application may be declared 
inadmissible by the Court.126 The reasoned opinion may propose corrective 
measures, but there is no obligation on the Member State to do so.127  
In essence, this means that in cases involving the implementation of 
directives, the reasoned opinion must provide a precise and detailed 
explanation of the nature of the Member State’s non-compliance.128 In cases 
relating to a failure to communication the national implementing measures that 
transpose a directive, the reasoned opinion will contain a warning to the 
Member State concerned that it will lodge a request for the imposition of 
                                                  
123 Case 74/82 Commission v Ireland [1984] ECR 317, para 20; Case C-279/94 Commission v Italy (n 
113), para 15; Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany (n 27), para 54; Case C-152/05 Commission v 
Germany [2008] ECR I-39, para 10. 
124  Case C-365/97 Commission v Italy (San Rocco case) (n 2), para 25; Case C-20/09 Commission v 
Portugal [2011] ECR I-2637, para 22. 
125 Case 51/83 Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 2793, paras 6-8; Case C-159/99 Commission v Italy 
[2001] ECR I-4007, para 54. This may even lead to the Commission’s application being declared 
inadmissible by the Court Case C-522/09 Commission v Romania (n 108), paras 15-20.  
126 Case C-266/94 Commission v Spain [1995] ECR I-1975 (Order of the Court of 11 July 1995), paras 
16-26 (failure to take into account Member State’s response to letter of formal notice constitutes a 
procedural defect in the pre-litigation stage). Compare Case C-362/01 Commission v Ireland (n 107), 
paras 14-22 (absence in reasoned opinion of an assessment of Member State’s response will not render 
the application inadmissible if this absence did not make it impossible for the Member State to put an 
end to its infringement, did not compromise its rights of defence and had no effect on the definition of 
the subject-matter of the dispute). 
127 Case C-247/89 Commission v Portugal [1991] ECR I-2963, para 22; C-376/13 Commission v 
Bulgaria [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:266 (judgment of 23 April 2015), para 42. 
128 See further, Chapter 4, Section 4.1 (Compliance and Implementation Outcomes) for discussion and 
example of what forms such non-compliant implementation might take. 
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pecuniary sanctions under Article 260(3) in the event that the matter is referred 
to the Court.129 
The letter of formal notice and the reasoned opinion fix the parameters 
of the Commission’s case against the Member State, so that the Commission’s 
application cannot be extended or altered during the course of the proceedings 
by going beyond the complaints set out in its letter of formal notice and the 
reasoned opinion.130  
The reasoned opinion will also lay down a time limit for the Member State 
to take the necessary measures to comply with the opinion, which must be 
reasonable in the circumstances.131 The standard period of time allowed in this 
connection Commission appears to be two months,132 but the urgent nature of 
a case may justify a shorter period.133 
In the absence of any corrective measures taken by the Member State to 
remedy its non-compliance, the Commission may proceed to lodge an 
                                                  
129 See to that effect, Commission ‘Communication from the Commission - Implementation of Article 
260(3) of the Treaty’ (n 23), para 31. 
130 Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany (n 27), para 55; Case C-139/00 Commission v Spain [2002] 
ECR I-6407, para 18; Case C-365/97 Commission v Italy (San Rocco case) (n 2), para 25; Case C-185/00 
Commission v Finland [2003] ECR I-14189 para 80; Case C 147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR 
I 5969, paragraph 23; Case C-105/02 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I-9659, paras 47 and 48; 
Case C-156/04 Commission v Greece [2007] ECR I-4129, para 66. 
131 Article 258(2) TFEU. Case 74/82 Commission v Ireland (n 123), para 12 (five days is not a reasonable 
period of time to require a Member State to amend legislation which has been applied for more than 40 
years); Case 293/85 Commission v Belgium (n 108), para 14 (very short periods may be justified where 
there is an urgent need to remedy a breach or where the Member State is fully aware of the 
Commission’s views long before the procedure starts). 
132 Case C-473/93 Commission v Luxembourg (n 116), para 21. See also in the context of Directive 
2004/38,Commission, Reasoned opinion sent to Cyprus SG(2013)D/9533, C(2013)3569, 21 June 2013 
(Information from Commission dated 3 December 2015 (GestDem 2015/2901)). 
133 See for example, Case C-320/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-9871, paras 33-34, where a 
period of one week was deemed sufficient by the Court due to the urgency of the matter in question 
(prohibition on heavy vehicles of over 7.5 tonnes carrying certain goods from travelling along a road 




application at the Court of Justice, but it is not obliged to do so.134 Indeed, the 
Commission may withdraw its action at any point during the proceedings 
without the need to give reasons.135 In the event it decides to proceed to the 
contentious stage, the Commission has sole discretion as to when to refer a case 
to the Court.136 The Court has also recognised that ‘even where the default has 
been remedied after the time-limit given in the reasoned opinion has expired, 
there is still an interest in pursuing the action in order to establish the basis of 
liability which a Member State may incur, as a result of its default, towards other 
Member States, the Community or private parties’.137   
                                                  
134 Case C-233/00 Commission v France (n 42), para 31. For an overview of the Commission’s 
enforcement priorities, see Section 5.1.1 (Direct supervision by the Commission). 
135 Article 148 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice [2012] OJ L 265/1 as amended by [2013] 
OJ L 173/65, which provides that ‘If the applicant informs the Court in writing or at the hearing that he 
wishes to discontinue the proceedings, the President shall order the case to be removed from the register 
and shall give a decision as to costs in accordance with Article 141.’ See for example Case C-545/12 
Commission v Cyprus [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:329 (Order of the Court of 22 May 2013) discussed in 
Craig and De Búrca (n 104) 455. However, it may issue a press release to explain its reasons to the 
public, see for example Commission, ‘Energy: Commission withdraws Court case against Poland for 
failing to transpose EU rules’, Press release IP/15/4499, 26 February 2015, in which it states that ‘in 
cases where the Commission has asked for a daily penalty, the Commission withdraws its action if the 
Member State notifies the transposition measures required to put an end to the infringement.’ 
136 See for example, Case C-317/92 Commission v Germany [1994] ECR I-2039, para 4; Case C-35/96 
Commission v Italy (n 2), para 27; C 490/04 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I 6095, para 26; Case 
C-562/07 Commission v Spain (n 43), paras 18-20; Case C-546/07 Commission v Germany [2010] 
ECR I-439, paras 21-22; Case C-306/08 Commission v Spain [2011] ECR I-4541, para 66. An exception 
would be ‘where the excessive duration of the pre-litigation procedure in that provision is capable of 
making it more difficult for the Member State concerned to refute the Commission’s arguments and of 
thus infringing the rights of the defence’, ibid. 
137 Case C-29/90 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-1971, para 12; Case C-207/00 Commission v Italy 
[2001] ECR I-4571, para 28; Case C-166/00 Commission v Greece [2001] ECR I-9835, para 9; Case C-
233/00 Commission v France (n 42), para 31. 
[200] 
 
5.2.3 Infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice 
 The contentious stage138 of infringement proceedings is triggered by the 
Commission making an application before the Court of Justice.139 The 
Commission need not demonstrate a specific interest in making an 
application.140  
The application must indicate in a coherent and intelligible fashion the 
essential points of law and fact on which the Commission’s case is based and set 
out the heads of claim in unambiguous terms.141 The application will include the 
letter of formal notice and reasoned opinion as annexes,142 together with 
correspondence received from the Member State and any other evidence it 
relies upon.143 In cases relating to the failure by a Member State to notify its 
national implementing measures to transpose a directive, the Commission will 
also specify in its application the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment 
                                                  
138 Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman (n 104) 191-198. 
139 Under Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Protocol (No 3), 
Consolidated Versions of the TFEU [2012] OJ C 326/210, as further given effect by Articles 120-123 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (n 135), a case is brought before the Court of Justice by a 
written application addressed to the Registrar. See also Case C-490/09 Commission v Luxembourg 
[2011] ECR I-247 para 52. 
140 See Joined Cases C-20/01 and C-28/01 Commission v Germany (n 2), para 29, and other case law 
cited at n 4. 
141 Case C-195/04 Commission v Finland [2007] ECR I-3351, para 22; Case C-412/04 Commission v 
Italy [2008] ECR I-619, para 103; Case C-211/08 Commission v Spain [2010] ECR I-5267, para 32; 
Case C-508/08 Commission v Malta [2010] ECR I-10589, para 16; Case C-490/09 Commission v 
Luxembourg (n 139) para 50. 
142 Article 122 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (n 135). 
143 See for example Commission, ‘Application submitted pursuant to Article 258 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union’ (4 April 2013) in Case 172/13 Commission v UK [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:50 (judgment of 3 February 2015) 




which it is requesting the Court to impose pursuant to Article 260(3) TFEU.144 
The Member State concerned then has two months to serve its defence.145  
  The Commission has the burden of proving that the Member State 
concerned has failed to fulfil its obligations.146 The relevant point in time for 
determining whether an infringement has taken place is the end of the period 
laid down in the reasoned opinion,147 and therefore the Commission must 
adduce evidence to the Court that the Member State’s non-compliance persisted 
beyond the period fixed in the reasoned opinion.148 Where the allegations are 
denied by the Member State concerned, it cannot merely deny the existence of 
non-compliance149 and is required ‘to contest substantively and in detail’ the 
Commission’s case.150 Where reliance on a derogation contained in a directive 
                                                  
144 Under Article 260(3) TFEU, as inserted by Article 1, para 212) of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission 
can now request the imposition of financial penalties when a Member State has failed to notify its 
national implementing measures.  See also Commission ‘Communication from the Commission - 
Implementation of Article 260(3) of the Treaty’ (n 23). See further, Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman (n 
104) 170-171. 
145 Article 124 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (n 135). 
146 Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands [1982] ECR 1791, para 6; Case 141/87 Commission v Italy 
[1989] ECR para 15; Case C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699, para 59; C-404/00 
Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-6695, para 26; C-434/01 Commission v United Kingdom [2003] 
ECR I-13239, para 21; Case C-135/05 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I-3475, para 26; C-438/07 
Commission v Sweden (n 150), para 49. To this end the Commission cannot merely rely on an expert 
opinion, Case 141/87 Commission v Italy, cited above, para 17. 
147 Case C-110/00 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-7545, para 13; Case C-423/00 Commission v 
Belgium [2002] ECR I-593, para 14; Case C-104/06 Commission v Sweden [2007] ECR I-671, para 28; 
Case C-156/04 Commission v Greece (n 130), para 66. 
148 Case 298/86 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 4343, para 15; Case C-289/94 Commission v Italy 
(n 113), para 20; C-348/99 Commission v Luxembourg [2000] ECR I-2917, para 8; C-183/05 
Commission v Ireland [2007] ECR I-137, para 17; Case C-196/07 Commission v Spain [2008] ECR I-
41, para 25. 
149 Andersen (n 3) 59. 
150 Case 272/86 Commission v Greece (n 6), para 21. See also Case C-365/97 Commission v Italy (San 
Rocco case) (n 2), paras 84 and 86; Case C-438/07 Commission v Sweden (n 146), para 50; C-297/08 
Commission v Italy [2010] ECR I-01749, para 102 
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is invoked by a Member State in its defence, it will bear the burden of proving 
the existence of circumstances that justify recourse to the derogation.151  
In the context of the implementation of a directive, the evidence which 
the Commission will need to adduce will depend on the nature of the alleged 
non-compliance152 by the Member State. For example, where a failure to 
transpose is being alleged,153 the Commission will need to show that by the end 
of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion no national implementing 
measures had been adopted154 or that the national measures are not legally 
binding.155 In case the Commission alleges incorrect or incomplete 
transposition of directives156, it must specify the national provisions which are 
the source of this non-compliance157 and how they fail to achieve the result 
prescribed by the specific provision of the directive in question.158 Where non-
compliant application is being alleged,159 the Commission will need to provide 
concrete proof of the administrative measures160 or practices161 which result in 
non-compliance and explain how they do not comply with the directive.162 
Similarly, allegations of non-compliant enforcement would require the 
necessary proof to be adduced.163  
                                                  
151 See for example, Case 199/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 1039, para 14. See also Case 8/81 
Becker [1982] ECR 53, para 19, paras 36-40. 
152 See further Chapter 4, Section 4.1 (Compliance and Implementation Outcomes). 
153 See further, Chapter 4, Section 4.2 (Transposition Outcomes). 
154 See for example, Case C-383/00 Commission v Germany (n 42), para 17. 
155 See for example, Case C-29/84 Commission v Germany, [1985] ECR 1661, paras 18-21, 27-28, 30-31 
and 36-38. 
156 See further, Chapter 4, Section 4.2 (Transposition Outcomes). 
157 See for example, Case C-274/93 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR I-2019, paras 10-12.  
158 See for example Case C-157/91 Commission v Netherlands [1992] ECR I-5899, paras 10-12. 
159 See further, Chapter 4, Section 4.3 (Application Outcomes). 
160 See to that effect, Case 298/86 Commission v Belgium (n 148), paras 15-16 (no concrete evidence of 
measures relating to the pricing of tobacco contrary to the directive on the taxation of tobacco products)  
161 See to that effect, Case 321/87 Commission v Belgium [1989] ECR 997, para 16.  
162 See to that effect, Case C-431/92 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2189, para 45. 
163 See further, Chapter 4, Section 4.4 (Enforcement Outcomes). 
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There is no requirement on the Commission to ascertain the reasons of 
the Member State’s non-compliance.164 As a result, the Commission need not 
prove that a Member State has engaged in ‘inertia or opposition’165 or adduce 
evidence to establish the ‘gravity of the infringement’.166  
 The Court will thus invited to determine whether the Member State 
has failed to fulfil its obligations167 on the basis of the Commission’s pleadings 
and the evidence it presents. The Court will determine of its own motion if the 
conditions for bringing infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU are 
met.168 
Where the Court finds that the Member State has failed to fulfil its 
obligations under the Treaties, it will make a declaration that the Member State 
has failed to fulfil is Treaty obligations. Such a judgment does not compel the 
Member State to follow any particular course of action.169 The declaratory 
nature of the judgment means that the national legislative, administrative or 
judicial measures that are the source of non-compliance are not automatically 
annulled as a result of a finding of infringement.170 Instead, the Member State 
is obliged to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the 
                                                  
164 Gil Ibañez (n 3) 213, who observes that infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU do not 
require ‘proof of any resistance on the part of the Member State … In other words, it is not necessary to 
assess why a Member State does not comply with its obligations, since it is enough to prove that a lack 
of compliance exists.’ 
165 Case 301/81 Commission v Belgium [1983] ECR 467-481, paras 7-8.  
166 Case C-456/05 Commission v Germany (n 106), para 22. 
167 Case C-209/89 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-1575, para 6. 
168 Case C-362/90 Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-2353, para 8; Case C-439/99 Commission v Italy 
( 108), para 8; Case C-98/04 Commission v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-4003, para 16; Case C-
195/04 Commission v Finland (n 141) para 21; Case C-487/08 Commission v Spain [2010] ECR I-4843, 
para 70. 
169 Case 70/72 Commission v Germany [1973] ECR 813, para 10.  
170 Prechal (n 5) 26. 
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Court171 as soon as possible.172 Where national measures have been found 
contrary to a directive, Member States are under a duty to amend them in order 
to ensure their compliance with EU law.173 Moreover the national 
administrative authorities and the national courts are prohibited from applying 
national measures that have been found the subject of a declaration of 
infringement by the EU Court of Justice.174  
Having discussed the possible consequences at the EU level, it is 
appropriate to consider what action may be taken by individuals to enforce 
directives at the national level.  
5.3 Consequences of Non-Compliant Implementation at National 
Level 
In addition to making complaints and petitions to the EU authorities, 
individuals and non-governmental organisations may take action at national 
level aiming at the enforcement of rights conferred on them by directive.  
 
Individuals and interest groups may therefore seek to bring proceedings 
before the national courts to enforce EU rights arising under a directive. More 
specifically, individuals who are affected by the application of a directive may 
seek judicial review of the decision taken by the national administrative 
authorities.175 NGOs may also engage in strategic litigation before the national 
courts aiming to overturn non-compliant national implementing measures or 
                                                  
171 Article 260(1) TFEU provides that ‘If the Court of Justice of the European Union finds that a Member 
State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, the State shall be required to take the necessary 
measures to comply with the judgment of the Court.’  See also Case 48/71 Commission v Italy [1972], 
para 8. 
172 Case 131/84 Commission v Italy [1985] ECR 353, para 7; Case 160/85 Commission v Italy [1986] 
ECR 3245, para 9; Case C-101/91 Commission v Italy [1993] ECR I-191, para 20. 
173 See to that effect, Joined Case 314 to 316/81 and 83/82 Waterkeyn [1982] ECR 4337, para 14. 
174 Case C-101/91 Commission v Italy (n 172), para 24. 
175 Tallberg (n 134) 622.  
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obtain clarification of unclear legal concepts.176 These issues relate to the 
enforcement of directives.177 
For the sake of completeness, it should also be mentioned that individuals 
may also avail themselves of various non-judicial mechanisms in existence at 
the national level. Individuals may try to obtain the reconsideration of 
administrative decisions that fail to recognise their EU rights in line with 
national administrative procedures. They may be able to complain to national 
ombudsmen where such bodies have been established under national law. 
While these measures might not arguably constitute legally-binding forms of 
decentralised enforcement, they should nonetheless be taken into account when 
considering what forms of redress exist at national level to ensure compliance 
with EU directives. Finally, advocacy efforts may also be conducted by interest 
groups in order to persuade a Member State to address its non-compliance.178 
The remainder of this section will consider the consequences of non-
compliance from the perspective of the decentralised enforcement of directives 
by the national courts. When national courts discharge their duty to uphold the 
rights that individuals may derive under a directive,179 the national courts 
(section 5.3.1) will be guided by the principles of supremacy, direct effect and 
consistent interpretation (section 5.3.2).180 In the event that non-compliance 
causes loss to individuals, they must also be able to obtain reparation from the 
Member State (section 5.3.3). Wherever a question on the interpretation of 
directives arise during the course of such proceedings, the national courts may 
refer these to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling (section 5.3.4). 
                                                  
176 Slepcevic (n 32) 381. 
177 See Chapter 3, Section 3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives).  
178 Panke (n 32) 852. 
179 See Chapter 3, Section 3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives). 
180 See further Prechal (n 5) 180-216. 
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5.3.1 Enforcement before the national courts 
When considering a matter that falls within the scope of the Treaties, the 
national courts are bound to uphold the supremacy of EU law181 by refraining 
from applying conflicting provisions of national law.  
When it comes to the enforcement of EU rights before the national courts, 
in Arcaro182 the Court of Justice has previously ruled that [t]here is no method 
of procedure in Community law allowing the national court to eliminate 
national provisions contrary to a provision of a directive which has not been 
transposed where that provision may not be relied upon before the national 
court.’ The verbs ‘éliminer’, ‘eliminare’, ‘eliminar’ and  in the French, Italian, 
Portuguese and Spanish versions of the judgment of the Court of Justice would 
have greatly benefitted from  having been rendered as to ‘disapply’ in English 
version of the Court’s judgment.  
As a result, the ability to invoke the supremacy of EU law before the 
national courts is, for individuals, is dependent on which specific provision of 
the directive meet the conditions for having direct effect under EU law.183 
                                                  
181 See John Temple Lang, ‘The Duties of National Courts under Community Constitutional Law’, (1997) 
22 European Law Review, 3-18.  See further Chapter 3, Section 3.6 (Obligations Relating to the 
Enforcement of Directives) and Chapter 4, Section 4.4 (Enforcement Outcomes). 
182 Case C-168/95 Arcaro [1996] ECR I-4705, para 43.  
183 See further Michael Dougan ‘When Worlds Collide! Competing Visions of the Relationship Between 
Direct Effect and Supremacy’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review, 931-963, 934, who suggests that 
‘the practical remedy afforded by supremacy is available in those individual cases involving a conflict 
between Community law and national law; but that remedy can only be invoked when Community law 
has been rendered cognizable before the domestic courts, by satisfying the threshold criteria for 
enjoying direct effect. Under this model, direct effect encompasses not only the creation and 
enforcement of subjective individual rights, but any situation in which Community norms produce 
independent effects within the national legal systems.’   
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5.3.2 Supremacy, direct effect and consistent interpretation 
When directives are invoked in national proceedings, it has been 
proposed that national courts should consider three guiding principles184 that 
can be briefly restated as follows: the national courts should interpret national 
law in conformity with the provisions of a directive; if this is not possible they 
should examine whether the provisions under consideration have direct effect 
and refrain from applying any conflicting provisions of national law; if this is 
not possible, national law must entertain the ability for individuals to claim 
reparation for loss suffered as a result of non-compliant implementation. 
When applying national law to situations covered by a directive, the 
national courts are under a duty to interpret national implementing measures 
and other provisions of national law in conformity with the directive. 185 This is 
known as the duty of consistent interpretation.186  
                                                  
184 See further Sacha Prechal ‘Direct Effect, Indirect Effect, Supremacy and the Evolving Constitution of 
the European Union’ in Catherine Barnard (ed), The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited: Assessing the 
Impact of the Constitutional Debate (Oxford University Press, 2007), 35-69. Maartje Verhoeven, The 
Costanzo Obligation – The Obligations of National Administrative Authorities in the Case of 
Incompatibility between National Law and European Law (Intersentia 2011) 39 refers to this as the ‘ 
three step model’ as elaborated by Prechal.  
185 See for example, Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891, para 26; Case C-106/89 
Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, para 8; Case C-218/01 Henkel [2004] ECR I-1725, para 60. See further 
Chapter 3, Section 3.6 (Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives). 
186 See further, Brent (n 31) 283-296; Prechal (n 5) 180-216. This is also referred to as the ‘indirect effect’ 
of EU directives, see for example Gerrit Betlem, ‘The Principle of Indirect Effect of Community Law 
(1995) 3 European Review of Private Law 1-19; Jon Appleton, ‘The Indirect-Direct Effect of European 
Community Directives’ (2000) 5 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, 59-100; 
Gerrit Betlem, ‘The Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation - Managing Legal Uncertainty (2002) 22 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 397-418; Sara Drake, ‘Twenty Years after Von Colson - The Impact of 
“Indirect Effect” on the Protection of the Individual’s Community Rights’ (2005) 30 European Law 
Review, 329-348; Marcus Klamert, ‘Judicial Implementation of Directives and Anticipatory Indirect 
Effect’ (2005) 43 Common Market Law Review, 1251-1275. 
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In the recent case of Dominguez,187 the Court has explained what this 
obligations entails:  
‘when national courts apply domestic law they are bound to interpret it, 
so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the 
directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive 
and consequently comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU. 
This obligation to interpret national law in conformity with European 
Union law is inherent in the system of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, since it permits national courts, for the matters 
within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of European 
Union law when they determine the disputes before them. 
It is true that this principle of interpreting national law in conformity with 
European Union law has certain limitations. Thus the obligation on a 
national court to refer to the content of a directive when interpreting and 
applying the relevant rules of domestic law is limited by general 
principles of law and it cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of 
national law contra legem’. 
The Court added that where the national court is unable to interpret 
national law consistently with a directive, the national court should consider 
whether the specific provision of the directive has direct effect so that the 
individual claimant may rely on it against the State.188  
In accordance with the doctrine of direct effect,189 where a directive has 
not been transposed into national law or the national implementing measures 
                                                  
187 Case C-282/10 Dominguez [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:33 (judgment of 24 January 2012), paras 24-25, 
citing Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I 8835, para 114; Joined Cases C-378/07 
to C-380/07 Angelidaki [2009] ECR I 3071, paras 197-199; Case C 555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I 
365, para 48; [2008] ECR I-2483, para 100. 
188 Case C-282/10 Dominguez (n 187), para 32. 
189 See further, JA Winter, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct Effect – Two Distinct and Different Concepts 
in Community Law’ (1972) 9 Common Market Law Review 425-438; Pierre Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of 
“Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community Law’ (1983) 8 European Law Review 155-177 
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contain incorrect or incomplete provisions, the Court of Justice has recognised 
that individuals can rely directly upon the provisions of a directive. The Court 
did so with a view to securing the effective enforcement of EU law in the national 
legal order.190 
However, only certain specific provisions of directives can have such 
direct effect.191 In order to produce direct effect the provisions must impose a 
                                                  
(reprinted (2015) 40 European Law Review, 135-153); Josephine Steiner, ‘Coming to Terms with EEC 
Directives’ (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review 144-159; Deirdre Curtin, ‘The Province of Government: 
Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives in the Common Law Context’ (1990) 15 European Law Review 
195-223; Paul Craig, ‘Once Upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalisation of EEC Law’ 
(1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 453-479; Eamonn Doran, ‘Direct Effect: Need Lawyers Read 
EC Directives?’ (1993) 4 International Company and Commercial Law Review 174-178; Klaus Lackhoff 
and Harold Nyssens ‘Direct Effect of Directives in Triangular Situations’ (1998) 23 European Law 
Review 397-413; Christopher Hilson and Antony Downes, ‘Making Sense of Rights: Community Rights 
in EC Law’ (1999), 24 European Law Review 121-138; Miriam Lenz, ‘Horizontal What? Back to basics’ 
(2000) 25 European Law Review 502-522; Sacha Prechal, ‘Does Direct Effect Still Matter?’ (2000) 37 
Common Market Law Review 1047-1069; Takis Tridimas, ‘Black, White and Shades of Grey: 
Horizontality of Directives Revisited’ (2001) 21 Yearbook of European Law 327-354; Steven Weatherill, 
‘Breach of Directives and breach of contract’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 177-186;  Daniel Colgan, 
'Triangular Situations: The Coup de Grâce for the Denial of Horizontal Direct Effect of Community 
Directives' (2002) 8 European Public Law 545-568; 'Editorial Comments: Horizontal direct effect – A 
law of diminishing coherence?' (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1-8; Alan Dashwood, ‘From 
Van Duyn to Mangold via Marshall: Reducing Direct Effect to Absurdity’ (2006-7) 9 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 81-109; Dougan (n 183); Paul Craig, ‘The Legal Effect of Directives: 
Policy, Rules and Exceptions’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 349-377; Richard Král, ‘Questioning the 
Limits of Invocability of EU Directives in Triangular Situations’ (2010) 16 European Public Law 239-
247; Lorna Woods and Philippa Watson, Steiner & Woods EU Law (12th ed, Oxford University Press 
2014) 105-136. 
190 See for example, Steiner (n 189) 144-145: ‘the Court of Justice extended the principle of direct effects 
to Directives for much the same reason as it introduced that principle for Treaty Articles in Van Gend 
en Loos, namely to secure an effective means of enforcement of EEC law within national legal systems’ 
(emphasis in original); Curtin (n 5) 196: ‘endowing directives with direct effect promotes the practical 
operation of Community law insofar as it casts the citizens of the Community in the role of vigilants’.   
191 Compare recommendations which do not have direct effect, but national courts are required to 
interpret national law in the light of them, without prejudice to their interpretation by the Court of 
Justice itself, see Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v Fonds des Maladies Professionelles [1989] ECR 4407, 
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particular course of conduct which is sufficiently clear, precise and 
unconditional. In Van Duyn,192 the European Court of Justice held that: 
‘where the Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on 
Member States the obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, 
the useful effect [effet utile] of such an act would be weakened if 
individuals were prevented from relying on it before their national courts 
and if the latter were prevented from taking into consideration as an 
element of [EU] law. Article [267 TFEU], which empowers national 
courts to refer to the Court questions concerning the validity and 
interpretation of all acts of the [EU] institutions, without distinction, 
implies furthermore that these acts may be invoked by individuals in the 
national courts. It is necessary to examine, in every case, whether the 
nature, general scheme and wording of the provisions in question are 
capable of having direct effects on the relations between Member States 
and individuals.’ 
Moreover, the direct effect of directives can only be invoked against the 
State193 or bodies under its control.194 As a result, individuals cannot usually 
invoke directly effective provisions of a directive in disputes against other 
private parties.195 
In accordance with the principle of supremacy of EU law, where national 
law conflicts with directly effective provisions of a directive, the national courts 
                                                  
para 18, and Case C-188/91 Deutsche Shell AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg [1993] ECR 1-363, 
para . 
192 Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, para 12; Case 48/78 Ratti [1979] ECR 1629, paras 20-23. 
See also Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497, para 23; Case 8/81 Becker (n 151), para 25; Joined Cases C-
165/09 to C-167/09 Stichting Natuur en Milieu [2011] ECR I-4599, paras 93-100. 
193 Case 152/84 Marshall (No 2) [1986] ECR 723, paras 46-47; Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori [1994] ECR 
I-3325, paras 24-25. This is also referred to as horizontal direct effect, see n 189. 
194 Case C-188/89 Foster [1990] ECR I-3313, paras 17-20. 




are then under an obligation to refrain from applying provisions of national 
law.196  
In addition, wherever a Member State has failed to implement a directive, 
individuals must also be able to claim damages for any loss they have suffered 
as a result.    
5.3.3 Member State liability 
The Court of Justice has recognised that ‘[t]he principle of State liability 
for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of [EU] law for 
which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the 
Treaty.’197 As a result, in situations where an individual suffers loss as a result 
of the non-compliant implementation, EU law requires that they must be able 
obtain reparation.198  
Claims relating to the liability of member states for breaches of EU law 
must be brought before the national courts under the national law relating to 
                                                  
196 Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, para 21 (national courts are obliged to give primacy to 
provisions of regulations in case these conflict with provisions of national law). See further, Case 249/85 
Albako [1987] ECR 2345, para 17 (idem as regards decisions); Case C-262/97 Engelbrecht [2000] ECR 
I-7321, para 40 (idem as regards regulations); Case C-462/99 Connect Austria [2003] ECR I-5197, para 
40 (idem as regards directives); Case C-327/00 Santex [2003] ECR I-1877 (idem as regards directives), 
para 64; Case C-241/06 Lämmerzahl [2007] ECR I-8415, para 63 (idem as regards directives); Case C-
406/08 Uniplex (UK) [2010] ECR I-817, para 49 (idem as regards directives). See further, Woods and 
Watson (n 189) 85-104. 
197 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357, para 35. 
198 ibid, para 39. See further, James Hanft, ‘Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy; EEC Member State 
Liability for Failure to Implement Community Directives’ (1991) 15 Fordham International Law Journal 
1237-1274; Christiaan Timmermans, ‘Rapport Communautaire’ in XVIII FIDE Congress Report, 
Volume 1, ‘Les Directives Communautaires: Effets, Efficacité, Justiciabilité’ (Stockholm, 3-6 June 1998) 
15-37, 33,35; Brent (n 31) 211-228; Peter Wattel, ‘Köbler, CILFIT and Welthgrove: We Can’t Go On 
Meeting Like This’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 177-190,; Prechal (n 5) 271-304; Andrea 
Biondi and Martin Farley, The Right to Damages in European Law (Kluwer 2010) 11-84; Tobias Lock, 
‘Is Private Enforcement of EU Law through State Liability a Myth? – An Assessment 20 Years after 
Francovich’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1675-1702; Woods and Watson (n 189) 203-204; 
Nina Póltorak, European Union Rights in National Courts (Kluwer 2015), 323-338. 
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reparation.199  Claimants have to demonstrate that the EU rule which has been 
breached by the national authorities confers rights on individuals,200 the breach 
of EU law is sufficiently serious,201 and the claimant suffered loss which was 
directly caused by the breach of EU law.202  The reparation must be 
commensurate to the loss suffered so as to ensure effective protection for the 
individuals who have been harmed.203 
The liability of Member States may be engaged where non-compliance 
results not only from problems in transposition, but also in cases relating to its 
application by the administrative authorities204 or its enforcement by the 
national courts.205 
                                                  
199 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich (n 197), para 42. See further Chapter 3, Section 3.6 
(Obligations Relating to the Enforcement of Directives). 
200 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich (n 197), para 40; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 
Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I 1029, para 74. 
201 The Court of Justice has set a relatively high threshold in order to establish that a breach of EU law 
is sufficiently serious. In Case C-278/05 Robins [2007] ECR I-1053, para 72, the Court held that ‘[t]he 
discretion enjoyed by the Member State thus constitutes an important criterion in determining whether 
there has been a sufficiently serious breach of Community law.’ In respect of the transposition of 
directives, the claimant would have to demonstrate that ‘a breach is sufficiently serious’ which entails 
that ‘in the exercise of its legislative powers, an institution or a Member State has manifestly and gravely 
disregarded the limits on the exercise of its powers’, see Case C-392/93 British Telecoms [1996] ECR I-
1631, para 42.  
202 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame (n 200), para 74. 
203 Case C-261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I-4025, para 26. 
204 See to that effect Case C-302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099, para 62 (individuals must be able to 
obtain reparation for damage caused to them by non-compliance with EU law, whichever public 
authority is responsible for the breach and whichever public authority is responsible for effecting 
reparation under national law); Case C-424/97 Haim [2000] ECR I-5123, para 31 (individuals must be 
able to obtain reparation for damage caused to them by measures taken by territorial or other public-
law bodies benefiting from a certain degree of autonomy in the carrying out of the legislative or 
administrative tasks entrusted to them). 
205 Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239, para 36. 
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Where a Member State has failed to transpose a directive, the Court held 
in Dillenkofer206 that ‘failure to take any measure to transpose a directive in 
order to achieve the result it prescribes within the period laid down for that 
purpose constitutes per se a serious breach of Community law and consequently 
gives rise to a right of reparation for individuals suffering injury if the result 
prescribed by the directive entails the grant to individuals of rights whose 
content is identifiable and a causal link exists between the breach of the State' s 
obligation and the loss and damage suffered’.  
The position is not so clear cut in respect of incorrect or incomplete 
transposition. In particular, the Court has recognised that an error of law may 
allow a national authority to escape liability.207 As a result, where a provision of 
a directive is ‘imprecisely worded’ and is reasonably capable of bearing different 
interpretations,208 the fact that a Member State may have interpreted that 
provision incorrectly will not be considered a ‘sufficiently serious breach’209 if 
such incorrect interpretation was made in ‘good faith’ and was ‘not manifestly 
contrary to the wording of the directive or to the objective pursued by it’.210   
 Wherever doubts arise as to the meaning of concepts contained in a 
directive, the Member States have the possibility to refer the matter to the Court 
of Justice, as will now be briefly discussed.  
5.3.4 Reference for a preliminary ruling 
In situations where national proceedings raise a question as to the 
interpretation of the directive, the national courts may refer the matter to the 
                                                  
206 Joined Cases C-178/94 Dillenkofer [1996] ECR I-4845, para 29. See also Case C-261/95 Palmisani 
[1997] ECR I-4025, para 31 
207 Case C-392/93 British Telecoms (n 201), paras 43-45.  See also Case C-319/96 Brinkmann [1998] 
ECR I-5255, paras 27-32. 
208 ibid, para 43 
209 ibid, para 45. 
210 ibid, para 43. 
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Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU.211,212 The 
purpose of such a procedure is to ensure the uniform application of EU law in 
the Member States,213 which is a fundamental requirement of the EU’s legal 
order.214 This is particularly the case as regards the interpretation of directly 
                                                  
211 Article 267 TFEU provides that: 
‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of the Treaties; 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the 
Union. 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or 
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon. 
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member 
State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or 
tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court. 
If such a question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State with 
regard to a person in custody, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall act with the 
minimum of delay.’  
212 See further Brent (n 31) 297-318; Morten Broberg, ‘The Preliminary Reference Procedure and 
Questions of International and National Law’ (2009) Yearbook of European Law, 362-389; Albertina 
Albors-Llorens, ‘Judicial protection before the Court of Justice of the European Union’ in Catherine 
Barnard and Steve Peers (eds), European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 255-299, 284-
299; further, Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman (n 104) 215-249; Woods and Watson (n 189) 222-262. See 
further, Morten Broberg and Niels Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice 
(2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2014).  
213 See for example, Joined Cases 28/62, 29/62 and 30/62 Da Costa [1963] ECR 31, 38; Case 62/72 
Bollmann [1973] ECR 269, para 4; Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen II (n 219), para 2; Case 61/79 Denkavit 
[1980] ECR 1205, para 15; Case 66/80 International Chemical Corporation [1981] ECR 1191, para 11; 
Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415, para 7; Case C-192/89 Sevince [1990] ECR I-3461, para 11; Case 
C-461/03 Gaston Schul Douane-expediteur [2005] ECR I-10513, para 21; Case C-344/04 IATA and 
ELFAA [2006] ECR I-403, para 27;  C-404/06 Quelle [2008] ECR I-2685, para 22. 
214 See for example, Joined cases 66, 127 and 128/79 Meridionale Industria Salumi [1980] ECR 1237, 
para 11; Joined Cases C‐143/88 and C‐92/89 Zuckerfabrik [1991] ECR I‐415, para 26; Joined cases C-
453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04 ABNA Ltd [2005] ECR I-10423, para 104.  
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effective provisions of a directive215 and their effects on individuals.216  Article 
267 TFEU also aims ‘to prevent a body of national case-law that is not in accord 
with the rules of [EU] law from coming into existence in any Member State’.217 
It is through this system that the Court of Justice is able to exercise indirect 
supervision of the implementation of directives.218 
The national courts have the freedom to determine the appropriateness 
of making a reference to the Court of Justice219 on the interpretation of a 
                                                  
215 See also, as regards directly effective provisions of the Treaty, Case 61/79 Denkavit (n 213), para 15; 
Joined cases 66, 127 and 128/79 Meridionale Industria Salumi (n 214), para 8. 
216 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR English special edition 1, 11 (the Court of Justice has 
jurisdiction to interpret the scope of EU law with reference to its effects on individuals). 
217 Case 107/76 Hoffman-La Roche [1977] ECR 957, para 5; Joined Cases 35/82 and 36/82 Morson and 
Jhanjan [1982] ECR 3723, para 8; Case C-337/95 Christian Dior [1997] ECR I-6013, para 25; 
218 See further, Capotorti (n 3) 166-167. 
219 Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen II [1974] ECR 33, paras 3-5 (a national court has the power, or the 
obligation if it is a court of last resort, to make a request for a preliminary ruling either of its own motion 
or at the request of the parties; national courts have discretion to determine appropriateness of making 
a reference; national rules that bind a lower court by the rulings of a higher court on points of law cannot 
prevent the lower court from making a preliminary ruling); Case 223/78 Grosoli [1979] ECR 2621, para 
3 (the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to provide the national court with a ruling on the interpretation 
of EU law so as to enable that court to determine whether a national measure is compatible with EU law 
and decide the case before it); Case 283/81 CILFIT (n 213), para 15 (national courts and tribunals 
remain entirely at liberty to make a reference for a preliminary ruling if they consider it appropriate to 
do so); Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi [1990] ECR I-6763, paras 13 and 16-19 (national 
courts may also make a request for a preliminary ruling where, in order to prevent reverse 
discrimination, a Member State enacts a national law that extends the benefit of EU rights of residence 
to their own nationals and their family members); Case C-378/08 ERG [2010] ECR I-1919, para 32 (a 
lower court must be free to make a request for a preliminary ruling if it considers that following a higher 
court’s judgment could lead it to give a ruling contrary to EU law); Joined cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 
Melki and Abdeli [2010] ECR I-5667, para 57 (courts must be free to make a request for a preliminary 
ruling on whether a national law is compatible with EU law, even if the law is the subject of a pending 
review before the constitutional court or that court has already ruled on the review of constitutionality); 
Case C-26/11 Belgische Petroleum Unie [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:44 (judgment of 31 January 2013) 
(requests for a preliminary ruling are not limited to cases where one or other of the parties has taken 
the initiative of raising a point concerning the interpretation of EU law, but also extend to cases where 




directive. However, the courts of last resort have a duty to make a reference to 
the Court of Justice220 as to the interpretation of the provisions of a directive, 
unless the issue is substantially the same as that raised in a previous preliminary 
ruling221 (acte éclairé)222 or it is ‘so obvious as to leave no scope for any 
reasonable doubt’223 (acte clair).224 
Where a reference has been made to the Court of Justice, the resulting 
judgment is binding not only on the court which made the reference,225 but on 
all other national courts.226   
                                                  
220 Article 267(3) TFEU provides that ‘Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a 
court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national 
law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court’. See also Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen 
II (n 119), para 3. A court of last resort includes supreme courts, see Case C-224/01 Köbler (n 205), 
paras 34-35, which concerned Austria’s Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court). It 
would not cover an appellate court whose decisions are conditional upon a preliminary declaration of 
admissibility by the supreme court (or the appellate court itself), see (Case C‐99/00 Lyckeskog [2002] 
ECR I‐4839, paras 16-17. See also Brent (n 31) 306; Woods and Watson (n 189) 234-235.  
221 Joined Cases 28/62, 29/62 and 30/62 Da Costa (n 214), 38; Case 283/81 CILFIT (n 213), para 13. 
222 Wattel (n 198)178. See further, Brent (n 31) 309; Woods and Watson (n 189) 237. 
223 Case 283/81 CILFIT (n 213), para 16; Case C-495/03 Intermodal Transports [2005] ECR I-8151, 
paras 35-39. In the latter case, the Court of Justice clarified that before deciding an issue is ‘acte clair’, 
a court of last resort ‘must in particular be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of 
the other Member States and to the Court of Justice’, ibid, para 39. 
224 Brent (n 31) 307; Woods and Watson (n 189) 238. 
225 Case 29/68 Milch-, Fett- und Eierkontor [1969] ECR 165, para 3; Case 52/76 Benedetti [1977] ECR 
163, para 26; Case 69/85 Wünsche [1986] ECR 947 (Order of the Court of 5 March 1986), para 13; and 
Case C‐446/98 Fazenda Pública [2000] ECR I‐11435, para 49; Case C-173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR 
163, para 26.  
226 See to that effect, Case 68/74 Alaimo [1975] ECR 109, paras 5-8; Case 66/80 International Chemical 
Corporation (n 213), para 13. See further, Brent (n 31) 278-279; Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman (n 104) 
243-246; Broberg and Fenger, (n 212) 450-453. This has been the subject of some contention, see for 
example Alberto Trabucchi, ‘L’effet erga omnes des décision préjudicelles rendues par la Cour de justice 
des Communautés européennes’ (1974) 10 Revue Trimestrielle de droit européen 56-87; AG Toth, ‘The 
Authority of Judgments of the European Court of Justice: Binding Force and Legal Effects’ (1984) 4 
Yearbook of European Law 1-77; David Anderson and Marie Demetriou, References to the European 
Court (2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2002), 331-334; Giuseppe Martinico, ‘The interpretative rulings of the 
ECJ as a legal source in the EC law’ (2008) St Anna Legal Studies Research Paper 2/2008.  
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The Free Movement Directive2 was adopted to replace the previous 
piecemeal approach to residence rights and consolidate several directives into 
one.3  
Directive 2004/38 provides for rights of entry and residence and creates 
a new right of permanent residence for the benefit of EU citizens and their 
family members.4 It also places limitations on the restrictions which Member 
States can impose on these rights.5 The instrument also addresses associated 
                                                            
1 This chapter incorporates content previously published by the author in ‘Five Years of the Citizens 
Directive - Part 1’ (2011) 25 Journal of Immigration, Asylu m and Nationality Law, 217-244, and ‘Five 
Years of the Citizens Directive - Part 2’ (2011) 25 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality 
Law, 331-357. 
2 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158/77 (hereafter the Free Movement Directive, Directive 2004/38 and the 
Directive). 
3 Recital 4. 
4 Article 1(b). 
5 Article 1(c). 
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rights to work6 and the right of its beneficiaries to enjoy equal treatment with 
nationals of the host Member State.7 It also provides citizens with procedural 
and judicial review safeguards against measures taken to restrict rights granted 
under the Directive.8  It therefore provides further expression to the rights of 
EU citizens contained Articles 18, 20 and 21 TFEU. 
The Directive is not intended to diminish the rights granted under the 
previous residence directives, but to simplify formalities, codify case law and 
strengthen the rights of EU citizens and their family members.9 
6.2 Legislative history 
Discussions on the introduction of a general directive right of residence 
can be traced back to the 1970’s,10 but the current Directive started out as a 
                                                            
6 Article 23. 
7 Article 24. 
8 Articles 15, 27-33, 35. 
9 Recital 3. See also Case C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-6241, para 59. 
10 It was during this time that the Commission issue its first proposal on the creation of European 
citizenship and its first proposal for a directive on the right of residence that extended beyond the 
‘market citizen’: ‘Towards European Citizenship’, Report from the Commission to the Council, COM(75) 
321 and Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Rights of Residence for Nationals of Member 
States in the Territory of another Member State, COM(79) 215; see further Andrew Evans, ‘European 
Citizenship’(1982) 45 Modern Law Review 497-515, 502, who notes that ‘while the Treaty authors 
apparently approached free movement merely as a means of ensuring that national immigration 
barriers would not prevent Community nationals moving to those areas of the Community where they 
were most in demand, the Community institutions saw this freedom as a basis for European citizenship’. 
For an overview of developments on the concept of European citizenship prior to the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty, see Weiss and Wooldridge (n Error! Bookmark not defined.) 164-168; see also R
obin White, Workers, Establishment, and Services in the European Union (Oxford University Press 
2004) 121-122; Espen Olsen, ‘The Origins of European Citizenship in the First Two Decades of European 
Integration’ (2008) 15 Journal of European Public Policy 40-57.   
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proposal from the Commission unveiled in 200111 and subsequently amended 
in 200312 to reflect comments from the Council and European Parliament.  
While the proposal generated some resistance from the Member States, 
it was only Austria that voted against.13 However, as the proposal was subject to 
qualified majority voting,14 the measure passed. 
The Directive was adopted on 29 April 2004 and had to be transposed by 
30 April 2006.15 It comprises 42 Articles which, for the purposes of the 
Commission’s conformity assessment have been further broken down into 144 
separate sub-provisions.16 
6.3 Territorial Scope  
The Directive applies to entry and residence within the entire territory of 
the Member States in furtherance of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’s case law.17 In addition, by virtue of a decision of the EEA Joint 
Committee,18 the Directive is incorporated into the EEA Agreement and 
therefore applies to the European Economic Area comprising all 27 Member 
                                                            
11 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2001] OJ 
C270 E 150, COM(2001) 257 final, 15-16. 
12 Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States COM(2003) 199 final. 
13 Council, ‘2525th meeting of the Council of the European Union (Competitiveness - Internal 
Market/Industry/Research) held in Brussels on 22 September 2003’, ST 12773 2003 INIT, 21 October 
2013. 
2525ème session du Conseil de l'Union européenne "Compétitivité" (marché intérieur, industrie et 
recherche), tenue à Bruxelles le 22 septembre 200 
14 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - 
Effects of the entry into force of the Nice Treaty on current legislative procedures’, COM(2003) 61 final, 
2. 
15 Article 40. 
16 Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508). 
17 Case 36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219, paras 46-48. 
18 Decision 158/2007 of the EEA Joint Committee [2008] OJ L 124/10. 
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States as well as the three European Free Trade Association states that are 
parties to the EEA Agreement, namely Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.  In 
consequence, the Directive applies to nationals from all EEA States and governs 
their right to reside with their family members in the EU. Whilst citizens from 
the EFTA states enjoy the same rights of residence under the Directive as EU 
citizens do, it should be emphasised that they do not benefit from EU citizenship 
and therefore would not necessarily benefit from the CJEU’s case law on EU 
citizenship. However, the EFTA Court has ruled that it is of no consequence on 
that the Directive was partly adopted on the basis of EU Citizenship provisions, 
since the rights of free movement of economically inactive citizens was 
established in legal instruments that predated the creation of EU Citizenship.19 
The Directive does not apply to Switzerland since free movement between 
the EU and Switzerland is instead regulated by the Agreement on the free 
movement of persons.20  
6.4 Beneficiaries of the Directive 
The Directive is intended to benefit both EU citizens and their family 
members whatever their nationality. This poses a number of questions as to how 
EU citizenship is determined, the situation of dual nationals, whether EU 
                                                            
19 Case E-26/13 Gunnarsson [2014] (judgment of 14 June 2014), paras 79 and 80, in which the EFTA 
Court ruled that ‘it is of no consequence that the rights of economically inactive  persons in Directive 
2004/38 were adopted by the Union legislature on the basis  of Article 21 TFEU on Union Citizenship. 
… However, the rights of economically inactive persons in Directive 90/365, and also Directives 
90/366/EEC (students) and 90/364/EEC (other economically  inactive persons), were adopted on the 
basis of Article 235 EEC prior to the  introduction of the concept of Union citizenship. … When Directive 
90/365 as well as Directives 90/364/EEC and  90/366/EEC were made part of the EEA Agreement in 
1994, these directives  conferred rights on economically inactive persons. … However, individuals 
cannot be deprived of rights that they have already acquired under the EEA Agreement before the  
introduction of Union Citizenship in the EU. These established rights have been maintained in Directive 
2004/38.’ 
20 Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss 
Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons [2002] OJ L114/6 
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citizens can benefit from the Directive when they move to a Member State 
having previously lived outside the EU. 
6.3.1 EU citizens 
In order to avail themselves of the Directive’s provisions, individuals 
must first demonstrate that they are EU citizens or the family member of such 
a citizen. Article 2(1) defines an EU citizen as ‘any person having the nationality 
of a Member State’. This provision is based upon Article 20 TFEU, which 
specifies that ‘[e]very national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. 
Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship and shall not 
replace it.’  
This raises the question as to who can be considered a ‘national’ of a 
Member State The answer is to be found in a declaration on nationality of a 
annexed to the Maastricht Treaty21 which explains that ‘the question whether 
an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely 
by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned.’  Some Member 
States have issued declarations on their nationality laws22, including the UK23.   
As a practical matter, therefore, proof of nationality can be established by 
presenting a valid passport or identity card issued by one of the Member States. 
The situation of dual nationals has been the subject of several judgments 
from Luxembourg.24 While a person holding the nationalities of both a Member 
                                                            
21 Declaration (No 2) on nationality of a Member State annexed to the Final Act of the Maastricht Treaty 
[1992] OJ C 191/98.  
22 For example, Denmark’s position is set out in a unilateral declaration annexed to the so-called 
‘Edinburgh Decision’ concerning certain problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty of European Union 
[1992] OJ C 348/1.  
23 Declaration as to the meaning of the term ‘national’ under the British Nationality Act 1948 annexed 
to the UK’s Accession Treaty ([1973] OJ L 73/196), as amended by the Declaration on the definition of 
“nationals” following the entry into force of the British Nationality Act 1981 ([1983] OJ C 23/1). The 
latter remains a valid statement of the UK’s position following entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty by 
virtue of Declaration 63 annexed to the Final Act of the Lisbon Treaty [2007] OJ C 306/2, 270. 
24 See for example, C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239; C-179/98 Mesbah [1999] ECR I-7955. 
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State and a third country will be able to rely on their EU citizenship to claim the 
benefit of the EU free movement rules, the situation of a person holding the 
nationalities of two Member States has proved more of a challenge for the Court 
of Justice. The recent ruling in McCarthy,25 makes it clear that a dual national 
will only be able to rely on his second nationality in either country of nationality 
if he has previously exercised his right to free movement. The correctness of this 
approach has been questioned26 because it appears at odds with cases such as 
Zhu and Chen,27 in which the Court of Justice ruled that a child born in the UK 
with Irish citizenship who had never exercised free movement rights could rely 
on EU free movement rights. 
Although the Member States remain competent to determine who is a 
national, the creation of EU Citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty has had 
implications for EU citizens living in European territories not forming part of 
the EU. In Eman and Sevinger,28 the European Court of Justice was provided 
the opportunity to examine the situation of Dutch citizens living in Aruba, an 
overseas territory of the Netherlands.  Messrs Eman and Sevinger were Dutch 
nationals residing in Aruba and were seeking to register on the Dutch register 
of electors concerning the European Parliament elections in 2004. The Dutch 
authorities sought to argue that Dutch citizens inhabiting Aruba could not rely 
on the Treaty while they remained in Aruba because it was a territory subject 
only to the special arrangements for the association of overseas countries and 
territories (OCTs).  The CJEU unequivocally rejected this argument and held at 
paras 27 & 29 that for the purposes of art 20 TFEU:  
                                                            
25 Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375, in which the Court held that ‘directive [2004/38] is not 
applicable to a Union citizen who has never exercised his right of free movement, who has always 
resided in a Member State of which he is a national and who is also a national of another Member State’, 
ibid, para 43. 
26 See further Elspeth Guild, Steve Peers and Jonathan Tomkin, The EU Citizenship Directive - A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2014) 49-54 
27 Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925. 
28 Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] ECR I-8055. 
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‘It is irrelevant, in that regard, that the national of a Member State resides 
or lives in a territory which is one of the OCTs ….   
[P]ersons who possess the nationality of a Member State and who reside 
or live in a territory which is one of the OCTs referred to in Article 
[355(2)] may rely on the rights conferred on citizens of the Union in Part 
Two of the Treaty [which concerns non-discrimination and citizenship of 
the EU].’ 
As a result, the fact that an EU citizen and their family members may be 
residing in a European overseas country or territory immediately prior to 
exercising their rights to reside within the EU under art 20 TFEU should not in 
any way affect their right to reside in another Member State under the Directive. 
6.3.2 Direct Family members  
Directive 2004/38 potentially applies to all family members whatever 
their nationality and whatever the nature of their personal ties to the EU citizen.  
However, the Directive operates a distinction between close ‘family members’29 
and ‘other family members’.30 Although the Directive clearly grants an 
automatic right of entry and residence to EU citizens and their close family 
members,31 the Member States are only required to facilitate the entry or 
residence of other family members,32 such as unmarried partners,33 and enjoy 
some discretion in this matter.34  
                                                            
29 Article 2(2). 
30 Article 3(2). 
31 Article 3(1). 
32 Article 3(2) which provides that ‘the host Member State shall, in accordance with its national 
legislation, facilitate entry and residence’ of other family members based on ‘an extensive examination 
of [their] personal circumstances’. 
33 Article 3(2)(b). 
34 Case C-83/11 Rahman [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:519 (judgment of 5 September 2012), para 24, where 
the Court held that ‘each Member State has a wide discretion as regards the selection of the factors to 
be taken into account’ when examining an applicant’s personal circumstances. 
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Direct family members enjoy an automatic right to reside with the EU 
citizen in the host Member State. Under the Directive, ‘family members’ are 
limited to the citizen’s spouse35 or registered partner,36 the citizen’s or 
spouse/partner’s ascendants who are under the age of 21 or who are dependent 
on the citizen,37 as well as the dependent parents and other ascendants of the 
citizen or his spouse/partner,38 although the dependent parents do not enjoy 
such an automatic right in the case of students.39   
Children over the age of 21 who are dependants are also considered as 
‘family members’ if they are dependent upon the EU citizen or his 
spouse/partner40.  According to the Commission’s guidance41, the definition of 
‘family member’ extends to adopted children, ‘minors who are in custody of a 
permanent legal guardian’ and foster children ‘depending upon the strength of 
the ties in the particular case’. In the case of students, it is only their dependent 
children (or those of their spouse or registered partner) who enjoy such an 
automatic right of residence.  
According to the Court of Justice ‘the status of dependent member of a 
worker’s family is the result of a factual situation, to be assessed in each specific 
                                                            
35 Article 2(2)(a). 
36 Article 2(2)(b). 
37 Article 2(2)(c). 
38 Article 2(2)(d). 
39 Article 7(4). 
40 The Commission’s original and revised proposals, COM (2001) 157 and COM (2003) 199, included a 
right of residence for all parents of the citizen or his spouse or registered partner, not just those who are 
dependent. However, the final text of the Directive as agreed by the Council restricted the scope of art 
2(2) to dependent parent, (Council Common Position (EC) No 6/2004 [2004] OJ C 54E/12 adopted by 
the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, with a view to adopting a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States, at p 30). 
41 Commission Communication on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 
2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, COM (2009) 313 (2 July 2009), at part 2.1.2. 
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case’.42  As explained by the Court in Jia,43 albeit in the context of a former 
directive on residence of workers and their family members44, dependence 
constitutes a situation where family members ‘need the material support of that 
Community national or his or her spouse in order to meet their essential needs’.   
As to the means of proving such dependence, the Directive merely 
requires furnishing ‘documentary evidence that the conditions laid down 
therein’45 are met’.46  Guidance has previously been given by the Court on the 
concept of dependence:  
‘the status of dependent member of a worker’s family does not 
presuppose the existence of a right to maintenance …. The person having 
that status is a member of the family who is supported by the worker and 
there is no need to determine the reasons for recourse to the worker’s 
support or to raise the question whether the person concerned is able to 
support himself by taking up paid employment.47’   
In Jia, the CJEU indicated further that ‘proof of the need for material 
support may be adduced by any appropriate means, … while a mere undertaking 
from the Community national or his or her spouse to support the family 
members concerned need not be regarded as establishing the existence of the 
family members’ situation of real dependence.’48     
It should also be noted that the Directive does not require a family 
member to have already been in a relationship with the EU citizen prior to 
moving to the host Member State. In Metock, the Court held at para 87 that 
                                                            
42 Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] 2811 at para 17 
43 Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] ECR I-1 at para 43. 
44 Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families [1968] OJ Spec Ed 
Series I Volume 1968-II 485, which was drafted in more restrictive terms than the Directive. 
45 Namely, Article 2(2)(d). 
46 Article 8(5)(d). 
47 Case 316/85 Lebon (n 42), paras 21-22, 
48 Case C-1/05 Jia (n 43), paras 41-42. 
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‘none of those provisions [of the Directive] requires that the Union citizen must 
already have founded a family at the time when he moves to the host Member 
State in order for his family members who are nationals of non-member 
countries to be able to enjoy the rights established by that directive.’49   
The immigration status of a family member seeking to exercise the right 
of residence under the Directive is also of no concern. Thus, in, the Court has 
confirmed that it is irrelevant ‘at the time the family member acquires that 
status [under the Directive] or starts to lead a family life, he resides temporarily 
in the host Member State pursuant to that State’s asylum laws.’50 
The definition of ‘family members’ in the Directive includes ‘the partner 
with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the 
basis of the legislation of a Member State if the legislation of the host Member 
State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage’.51 If national law 
does not recognise registered partnerships, then such partners may still claim 
the benefit of provisions on ‘other family members’ 
6.3.3 Other family members 
 This category of ‘other family member’ applies to all relatives whatever 
their degree of kinship and therefore extends to siblings, uncles and aunts, 
nephews and nieces, cousins, etc. What matters is that they must fall within the 
scope of the distinct situations enumerated in Article 3(2), namely that they are 
other family members who, in the country they have come from, are either 
dependent on the EU citizen concerned, or members of the citizen’s household, 
or reliant on the EU citizen for their personal care due to serious health 
grounds.52 Alternatively, unmarried partners need to demonstrate that they are 
in ‘a durable relationship, duly attested’.53 
                                                            
49 Case C-127/08 Metock (n 3). 
50 Case C-551/07 Sahin [2008] ECR I-453 (Order of the Court of 19 December 2008), at para 33. 
51 Article 2(2)(b). 
52 Article 3(2)(a). 
53 Article 3(2)(b). 
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As the Court has previously ruled in Rahman,54 that ‘the Member States 
are not required to grant every application’55 submitted by other family 
members and enjoy a wide discretion in considering such applications.56 
Nonetheless, the Court went on to specify it is ‘incumbent upon the Member 
States’57 when they transpose Article 3(2) ‘to ensure that their legislation 
contains criteria which enable those persons to obtain a decision on their 
application for entry and residence that is founded on an extensive examination 
of their personal circumstances and, in the event of refusal, is justified by 
reasons’.58 
When selecting such criteria, ‘the Member States have a wide discretion’ 
but their choice of ‘criteria must be consistent with the normal meaning of the 
term “facilitate” and of the words relating to dependence … and must not 
deprive that provision of its effectiveness’.59 
These various provisions and the sub-provisions they contain can be 
presented in tabular form as follows: 






1 Subject  
1(a) right of residence Ancillary Not applicable  
1(b) permanent residence Ancillary Not applicable  
1(c) Limitations Ancillary Not applicable  
2 Definitions  
2(1) EU citizen Substantive No  
  Family member  
2(2)(a) Spouse 
Substantive No  
2(2)(b) 
registered partnership (equivalent 
to marriage) 
Substantive No  
2(2)(c) 
direct descendants (under the age of 
21) 
Substantive No  
                                                            
54 Case C-83/11 Rahman (n 34). 
55 ibid, para 18. 
56 ibid, para 24.  











2(2)(c) direct descendants (dependants) 
Substantive No  
2(2)(d) 
direct relatives in the ascending line 
(dependants) 
Substantive No  
3 Beneficiaries  
3(1) 
EU citizens and family members in 
terms of Art. 2 
Substantive No  
3(2)(1)(a) 
facilitation for dependants in the 
country of origin 
Substantive Yes  
3(2)(1)(a) 
facilitation for members of the 
household 
Substantive Yes  
3(2)(1)(a) 
facilitation for family members on 
serious health grounds 
Substantive Yes  
3(2)(1)(b) 
facilitation for partners (durable 
relationship duly attested) 
Substantive Yes  
3(2)(2) 
procedure (extensive examination, 
justification) 
Substantive No  
 
Table 6.4: Transposition obligations for beneficiaries (Articles 2-3 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508)
 
6.5 Entry and Exit 
EU citizens have a right to enter a Member State upon simple 
presentation of their passport or their national identity card.60  
Whilst it does not appear EU citizens and their family members are being 
routinely subjected to systematic questioning, it should be observed that the 
Court of Justice has previously held that ‘the only precondition which Member 
States may impose on the right of entry into their territory of the persons 
covered by [the Directive] is the production of a valid identity document or 
passport.’61. The Court went on to specify that ‘the carrying out of such [border] 
controls upon entry into the territory of a Member State may, depending on the 
circumstances, constitute a barrier to the free movement of persons within the 
Community, a fundamental principle of the [TFEU] to which the [Directive is] 
intended to give full effect. That would be the case in particular if it were found 
that the controls in question were carried out in a systematic, arbitrary or 
unnecessarily restrictive manner.’62 
                                                            
60 Article 5(1). 
61 Case 321/87 Commission v Belgium [1989] ECR 997, para 11. 
62 ibid, para 15 
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Furthermore, in another case,63 the Court held that ‘the obligation to 
answer questions put by frontier officials cannot be a precondition for the entry 
of a national of one Member State into the territory of another.’ Moreover in 
that case, the Court was quick to dismiss the UK government’s argument that ‘it 
is necessary [for officials] to ask questions in order to verify the validity of the 
identity documents produced’ by remarking that the ‘lawfulness of controls as 
to the validity of the document produced derives from the requirement laid 
down in Article [4] of [the Directive] that the identity card or passport should 
be “valid” ’ suggesting that questions as to the purpose of a person’s entry to 
another Member State are not in any way related to determining that a travel 
document is valid.64   
In case EU citizens present themselves at the border without such travel 
documents, the Directive also requires the national authorities to enable 
citizens to prove by all available means that they benefit from the free 
movement rules.65 In practice, this is unlikely to happen for EU citizens trying 
to travel by airplane due to the carrier liability rules that in effect require airlines 
to check travel documents of all their passengers.66 As a result, in such 
circumstances, citizens without travel documents wanting to travel by air will 
need to be in possession of an emergency travel document or a laissez-passer. 
                                                            
63 Case C-68/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR I-2637, para 13, 
64 ibid, para 15 
65 Article 5(4). As regards entry without visas, in Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591, paras 61-
62, where the Court held ‘it is in any event disproportionate and, therefore, prohibited to send back a 
third country national married to a national of a Member State where he is able to prove his identity 
and the conjugal ties and there is no evidence to establish that he represents a risk to the requirements 
of public policy, public security or public health within the meaning of Article 10 of Directive 68/360 
and Article 8 of Directive 73/148 [now replaced by Directive 2004/38]. … a Member State may not send 
back at the border a third country national who is married to a national of a Member State and attempts 
to enter its territory without being in possession of a valid identity card or passport or, if necessary, a 
visa, where he is able to prove his identity and the conjugal ties and there is no evidence to establish 
that he represents a risk to the requirements of public policy, public security or public health within the 
meaning of Article 10 of Directive 68/360 and Article 8 of Directive 73/148.’ 
66 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, Article 26 (carrier liability). 
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Member States can only impose restrictions on entry or exit on grounds 
of public policy, public order or public health,67 as well as fraud or abuse.68 EU 
citizens or their family members who have previously been banned from 
entering a Member State have a procedural right to request reconsideration of 
an entry ban where their material circumstances change.69 






4 Right of exit  
4(1) 
right of exit for EU citizens (ID or 
passport) 
Substantive No  
4(1) 
right of exit for TCN family 
members (passport) 
Substantive No  
4(2) no visa or equivalent formality 
Substantive No  
4(3) 
ID or passport stating the 
nationality of the holder 
Substantive No  
4(4) 
territorial validity of the passport (5 
years if MS do not issue ID cards 
Substantive No Yes – validity of 
passport 
5 Right of entry  
5(1)(1) 
right of entry for EU citizens (ID or 
passport) 
Substantive No  
5(1)(1) 
right of entry for TCN family 
members (passport) 
Substantive No  
5(1)(2) no visa or equivalent formality 
Substantive No  
5(2)(1) 
obligation to hold entry visa for TCN 
members (Reg. No. 539/2001) 
Substantive No  
5(2)(2) residence card exemption 
Substantive No  
5(2)(3) facilitation to obtain entry visa 
Substantive No Yes – procedure 
must be simpler 
5(2)(4) 
accelerated procedure for issuing 
visa, free of charge 
Substantive No Yes – procedure 
must be free  
5(3) 
entry or exit stamp (passport TCN 
family member carrying residence 
card) 
Substantive No Yes – no stamp in 
passport 
5(4) 
all opportunities to enter without 
valid travel documents 
Substantive No Yes – entry 
cannot be denied 
5(5) presence report (optional) 
Substantive Yes  
 
Table 6.5: Transposition obligations for entry and exit (Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 
2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508)
 
6.6 The Right of Residence 
The Directive distinguishes between an initial unconditional right of 
residence of up to three months and a right of residence beyond three months 
                                                            
67 Articles 27-28. 
68 Article 35. 
69 Aricle 32(1). 
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which is conditional upon citizens being able to support themselves and 
members of their family. 
6.5.1 Residence for first three months 
The Directive provides that EU citizens and their family members have a 
right to residence in any EU state for up to three months without the need to 
fulfil any conditions,70 aside from complying with the formalities relating to 
entry discussed above. 
Member States cannot require EU citizens and their family members to 
register their residence during this period.71 Member States can only impose 
restrictions on residence in the first three months on grounds of public policy, 
public order or public health72 as well as fraud or abuse.73 In addition, Member 
States can take action against EU citizens and their family members to prevent 
them becoming an unreasonable burden on social assistance.74  
6.5.2 Residence beyond three months 
Beyond the initial three months of unconditional residence following 
entry, for EU citizens to have a right of residence, they must work,75 study76 or 
be self-sufficient.77 Workers include all those engaged in genuine and effective 
work to the exclusion of marginal and ancillary work78 and includes anyone who 
performs services under the supervision or control of another in exchange for 
                                                            
70 Article 6. 
71 Article 6(1) read in conjunction with Article 8(1). 
72 Articles 27-28. 
73 Article 35. 
74 Article 14(1). See further 6.9 (Restrictions on Entry and Residence). 
75 Article 7(1)(a). 
76 Article 7(1)(c). 
77 Article 7(1)(b). 
78 See for example, Case C-413/01 Ninni-Orasche [2003] ECR I-13187, paras 26. 
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remuneration.79 Students must be enrolled on an accredited course.80 Those 
who do not work, including students,81 must have sufficient resources at their 
disposal not to become a burden on social assistance.82 They must also hold 
comprehensive sickness insurance.83 For students, a declaration to that effect 
suffices.84 Proof of sufficient resources can be adduced by any appropriate 
means and Member States may not impose a fixed amount in his regard.85  
Family members, whatever their nationality, have a right to reside with their 
EU relative.86   
It should be noted that the Directive leaves it to the Member States to 
decide whether they require EU citizens and their family members to obtain 
residence documentation.87 Member States may therefore require EU citizens 
and their family members intending to stay beyond three months to register 
within three months of their arrival.88 
To achieve its stated objective of simplifying formalities,89 the Directive 
attempts to lays down the formalities governing the issue of registration 
certificates, residence cards and documents attesting to permanent residence.90 
                                                            
79 The Court of Justice has consistently held that the status of ‘worker’ under EU law must be given a 
wide meaning. The status of ‘worker’ applies to any person who for a certain period of time performs 
services for the benefit and under the direction of another person in return for remuneration, provided 
that these activities are genuine and effective, rather than being on such a small scale as to be considered 
merely marginal and ancillary, see for example case C-53/81 Levin [1982] ECR 1035; para 17; Case C-
66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121, para 21; Case C-337/97 Meeusen [1999] ECR I-3289, para 13.  
80 Article 7(1)(c), which requires a student to be ‘enrolled at a private or public establishment, accredited 
or financed by the host Member State on the basis of its legislation or administrative practice’. 
81 Article 7(1)(c). 
82 Article 7(1)(b). 
83 Article 7(1)(b) and (c). 
84 Articles 7(1)(c) and 8(3) 
85 Article 8(4). 
86 Article 7(2). 
87 Article 8(1). 
88 Article 8(2). 
89 Recital 3. See also Case C-127/08 Metock (n 3), para 59. 
90 Articles 8, 10, 19 and 20. 
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The Member States are precluded from requiring documents which are not 
specified in the relevant provisions of the Directive.91 EU citizens and their 
family members must be able to prove their rights by all appropriate means.92 
Following their application, EU citizens must immediately be issued with a 
registration certificate,93 whereas non-EU family members must be issued with 
a residence card within six months of submitting their application.94 
The Directive allows beneficiaries who cease to fulfil the conditions for 
residence to retain their right of reside in certain circumstances. First, it allows 
EU citizens who have ceased work to retain the status of a worker.95 It also gives 
family members the right to retain residence following the death or departure 
of the EU citizen96 or in the event of divorce or termination of a registered 
partnership.97  
                                                            
91 Recital (14), which specifies that ‘[t]he supporting documents required by the competent authorities 
for the issuing of a registration certificate or of a residence card should be comprehensively specified in 
order to avoid divergent administrative practices or interpretations constituting an undue obstacle to 
the exercise of the right of residence by Union citizens and their family members.’ This was also 
confirmed by the Court Case C-127/08 Metock (n 3), para 53. 
92 See for example, Case C-215/03 Oulane [2005] ECR I-1215, paras 25 and 53, where the Court held 
that where ‘the person concerned is able to provide unequivocal proof of his nationality by means other 
than a valid identity card or passport, the host Member State may not refuse to recognise his right of 
residence on the sole ground that he has not presented one of those documents’ and ‘where it is not 
specified which means of evidence are admissible for the person concerned to establish that he comes 
within one of the categories referred to in Articles 1 and 4 of Directive 73/148, it must be concluded that 
evidence may be adduced by any appropriate means’. 
93 Article 8(2). 
94 Article 10(1). 
95 Article 7(3) gives workers and the self-employed whose occupational activity has ended a right to 
retain their status in a number of different circumstances. In addition Case C-507/12 St Prix [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2007 (judgment of 19 June 2014), para 47, the Court  also recognised that a woman 
who temporarily gives up work to take care of her new born child retains the status of ‘worker’ under 
Article 45 TFEU if she returns to work within a reasonable period of time. 
96 Article 12. 
97 Artice 13. 
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Member States can only impose restrictions residence beyond three 
months on grounds of public policy, public order or public health98 as well as 
fraud or abuse.99  
The Directive specifies that EU citizens and their family members have a 
right of residence as long as they fulfil the conditions found in Article 7.100  This 
essentially means that, until they have acquired a right to permanent residence, 
the Directive requires EU citizens to be able to support themselves and their 
family members: they must either work, or, in the event they do not work, they 
must have sufficient resources so as not to become an unreasonable burden on 
the social assistance system in the host Member State.101  In this regard, a 
Member State may take action against EU citizens and their family members in 
the event they become an unreasonable burden on social assistance.102 






6 Residence (up to three months)  
6(1) EU citizens Substantive No  
6(2) TCN family members Substantive No  
7 Residence (more than three months)  
7(1)(a) workers or self-employed persons Substantive No  
7(1)(b) 
sufficient resources and 
comprehensive sickness insurance 
cover 
Substantive No  
7(1)(c) 
study (comprehensive sickness 
insurance +assurance of sufficient 
resources) 
Substantive No  
7(1)(d) Family member Substantive No  
7(2) TCN family members Substantive No  
7(3)(a) retention in case of illness or accident Substantive No  
7(3)(b) 
involuntary unemployment after 1 
year of employment 
Substantive No  
7(3)(c) 
involuntary unemployment after 
fixed-term contract (less than 1 year) 
Substantive No  
7(3)(d) 
vocational training (after previous 
employment) 
Substantive No  
                                                            
98 Articles 27-28. 
99 Article 35. 
100 Article 14(2). 
101 See further, Section 6.9 (Restrictions on Entry and Residence) and Section 6.10 (Procedural 
Safeguards and Rights of Appeal). 











special rules concerning family 
members of students 
Substantive No  
8 
Administrative formalities for EU 
citizens 
 
8(1) option: register Substantive Yes  
8(2) deadline to register Substantive No  
8(2) 
immediate issue of registration 
certificate 
Substantive No Yes – immediate 
issue of reg. 
certificate 
8(2) Sanctions Substantive Yes  
8(3) 
documents required from workers or 
self-employed persons 




documents required from self-
sufficient persons 
Substantive No Yes – no other 
documents can 
be requested 
8(3) documents required from students 




no fixed amount with regard to 
‘sufficient resources’ 
Substantive No Yes – no min. 
limit can be fixed 
8(5) 
documents required from EU family 
members 




Administrative formalities for family 
members who are not EU citizens 
 
9(1) issue a residence card  Substantive No  
9(2) deadline for submission Substantive No  
9(3) Sanctions Substantive Yes  
10 Issue of residence cards  
10(1) title of the residence card Substantive No  
10(1) issue deadline of six months 
Substantive No Yes – issue of res. 
card within six 
months 
10(1) certificate of application 
Substantive No Yes – immediate 
issue of cert. of 
application 
10(2) 
documents required from TCN family 
members 
Substantive No Yes – no other 
documents can 
be requested 
11 Validity of the residence card  
11(1) period of validity Substantive No  
11(2) temporary absences Substantive No  
12 
Retention of the right of residence in 




retention of residence of EU family 
members - death/departure 
Substantive No  
12(1) 
conditions for the right of permanent 
residence 
Substantive No  
12(2) 
retention of residence of TCN family 
members - death of the EU citizen 
Substantive No  
12(3) 
child in education and parent having 
custody - departure of the EU citizen 
Substantive No  
13 
Retention of the right of residence in 
the event of divorce, annulment of 
the marriage or termination of 
registered partnership 
 
13(1) EU family members Substantive No  
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conditions for the right of permanent 
residence 
Substantive No  
13(2) TCN family members Substantive No  
13(2)(a) 
3 years of marriage, including 1 year 
in the host MS 
Substantive No  
13(2)(b) custody of the EU citizen's children Substantive No  
13(2)(c) domestic violence Substantive No  
13(2)(d) 
right of access to a minor child in the 
host MS 
Substantive No  
13(2) 
conditions for the right of permanent 
residence 
Substantive No  
13(2) exclusively on personal basis Substantive No  
14 Retention of the right of residence  
14(1) 
retention of the right of residence 
under Art. 6 
Substantive No  
14(2) 
retention of the right of residence 
under Art. 7, 12, 13 
Substantive No  
 
Table 6.6: Transposition obligations for residence (Article 6-14 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508)
 
6.7 The Right of Permanent Residence 
One of the notable innovations of the Directive was that it created a right 
of permanent residence for the benefit of all EU citizens, not just for former 
workers or the self-employed as was previously the case.103 Recital (17) explains 
the basis for such a novelty: 
‘Enjoyment of permanent residence by Union citizens who have chosen to 
settle long term in the host Member State would strengthen the feeling of 
Union citizenship and is a key element in promoting social cohesion, which 
is one of the fundamental objectives of the Union. A right of permanent 
residence should therefore be laid down for all Union citizens and their 
family members who have resided in the host Member State in compliance 
                                                            
103 The right of permanent residence was previously only granted under EU law to workers and the self 
employed under Regulation (EEC) No 1251/70 on the right of workers to remain in the territory of a 
Member State after having been employed in that State, OJ English special edition: Series I Chapter 
1970 (II), 402, art 3(2), and Council Directive 75/34/EEC concerning the right of nationals of a Member 
State to remain in the territory of another Member State after having pursued therein an activity in a 
self-employed capacity, [1975] OJ L14/10, art 3(2). These provisions have now been incorporated into 
Article 17 of Directive 2004/38. 
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with the conditions laid down in this Directive during a continuous period 
of five years without becoming subject to an expulsion measure.’ 
In order to claim permanent residence under the Directive, EU citizens104 
and their non-EU family members105 must have been ‘legally’ residing in the 
host Member State for at least five years. During this time, they must not have 
been absent from the host for more than 6 months, or for a longer period in the 
event of compulsory military service.106 A permitted absence of a maximum of 
twelve consecutive months is also allowed for important reasons.107 
While family members of an EU citizen who are not EU citizens must 
demonstrate that they have resided with the EU citizen in the host Member 
State, this does not necessarily mean that the family members must have 
resided under the same roof as the EU citizen.108   
 Following the submission of an application, EU citizens must be issued 
with a document attesting to permanent residence as soon as possible,109 
whereas non-EU family members must be issued with a permanent residence 
card within six months.110 
                                                            
104 Article 16(1). 
105 Article 16(2). 
106 Article 16(3). 
107 Ibid. This would include such as pregnancy and childbirth, serious illness, study or vocational 
training, or a posting as a worker in another Member State or a third country. It is also clear from the 
travaux préparatoires that such temporary absences should not affect continuity of residence under 
Article 21 from the Commission’s original proposal (n 11) 17: ‘The duration of permitted absences not 
affecting continuity of residence has been extended to six months or more than six months where there 
are special reasons, such as compulsory military service, pregnancy and childbirth, study or work away.’ 
108 Case 267/83 Diatta [1985] ECR 567, paras 18 and 22, where the Court held that ‘[a] requirement 
that the family must live under the same roof permanently cannot be implied’  and that family members 
‘are not necessarily required to live permanently with [the EU citizen] in order to qualify for a right of 
residence’. See also Case C-244/13 Ogieriakhi [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2068 (judgment of 10 July 
2014), paras 37 and 47. 
109 Article 19(2). 
110 Article 20(1). 
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The Directive also foresees circumstances where workers or the self-
employed are able to acquire permanent residence before having resided in the 
host Member State for a continuous period of five years, for example upon 
reaching retirement age.111 Once acquired permanent residence can only be lost 
after absence from the host Member State of more than two years.112 







General rule for EU citizens 
and their family members  
 
16(1) legal residence during 5 years Substantive No  
16(1) 
not subject to the Chapter III 
conditions 
Substantive No  
16(2) TCN family members Substantive No  
16(3) temporary absences Substantive No  
16(4) 
only lost through absences 
exceeding 2 years 
Substantive No  
17 
Exemptions for persons no 




worker who reaches retirement 
age after working at least a year 
Substantive No  
17(1)(a)(2) 
retirement age (60) in case 
national law is silent 
Substantive No  
17(1)(b) 
worker permanently incapable 
of working (min. 2 prior years 
of residence) 
Substantive No  
17(1)(c) 
worker who has worked at least 
three years but then becomes 
cross-border worker 
Substantive No  
17(1)(c)(1) 
periods of employment under 
(a) and (b) 
Substantive No  
17(1)(c)(2) 
periods of involuntary 
unemployment etc. count as 
employment 
Substantive No  
17(2) 
exemption from periods under 
(a) or (b) if citizen's spouse or 
partner is national or ex-
national 
Substantive No  
17(3) 
right of permanent residence of 
family members 
Substantive No  
17(4)(a) 
family members acquire PR 
upon death of worker (if worker 
resided for min. 2 years) 
Substantive No  
17(4)(b) 
family members acquire PR 
upon death of worker (if of 
worker's death result accident 
at work) 
Substantive No  
                                                            
111 Article 17. These incorporate the former provisions of Regulation 1251/70 (n 103) and Directive 
75/34/EEC (n 103). 
112 Article 16(4). 
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family members acquire PR 
upon death of worker (if worker 
spouse is ex-national) 
Substantive No  
18 
Acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence by 
certain family members who 
are not EU citizens 
 
18 
permanent residence of family 
members having retained right 
of residence under Art. 12 or 13  
Substantive No  
19 
Document certifying 





permanent residence for EU 
citizens 
Substantive No  
19(2) 
Document certifying 
permanent residence to be 
issued as soon as possible 
Substantive No Yes – doc to be 
issued as soon 
as possible 
   
   
   
   
   
20 
Permanent residence card for 
family members who are not 
nationals of a Member State 
 
20(1) 
issue deadline six months; 
automatic renewability 
Substantive No Yes – issue of 
res. card within 
six months 
20(2)(1) 
submission before expiration of 
the residence card 
Substantive No  
20(2)(2) Sanctions Substantive Yes  
20(3) temporary absences Substantive No  
21 Continuity of residence  
21 
continuity of residence can be 
proved by any means; 
expulsion breaks continuity 
Substantive No  
 
Table 6.7: Transposition obligations for permanent residence (Article 16-21 of Directive 
2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508)
 
6.8 Equality of Treatment 
EU citizens and their family members who reside in a host Member State 
must enjoy equal treatment with nationals of that Member State under the 
Directive.113  This right is derived from art 18 TFEU that prohibits ‘any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality’. In addition, the Directive grants a 
                                                            
113 Article 24(1). 
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right to work (in an employed or self-employed capacity) to family members 
who have a right of residence irrespective of their nationality.114   
For example, these rights would allow family members who are not EU 
citizens to rely on the Professional Qualifications Directive115 in order to gain 
entry to a regulated profession in the host Member State.116 
However, the possibility of ‘other family members’ whose residence is 
facilitated under Article 3(2) to claim equality of treatment is unclear and has 
not been the subject of any ruling from the Court of Justice at present. 
The right to equal treatment under the Directive is not absolute. The 
Directive explicitly limits the scope of the right of equal treatment in relation 
to ‘social assistance’ according to the nature of the citizen’s activity and the 
length of residence and in the host Member State.117  
As a result, a distinction needs to be made according to the 
circumstances surrounding the nature and duration of residence. During the 
first three months of their residence, Member States are not obliged to grant 
social assistance to EU citizens and their family members except for workers 
and the self-employed.118 During the time they are looking for a job, Member 
States are not obliged to grant social assistance to job-seekers and their family 
members.119 Workers, the self-employed and those having retained the status 
                                                            
114 Article 23. 
115 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications [2006] OJ L255/22. 
116 See to that effect, Case C-229/07 Mayeur [2008] ECR I-8 (Order of the Court of 21 January 2008), 
para 20 a contrario; Commission, ‘FAQs on Directive 2005/36, D/3418/5/2006’ (2008), part 8. 
117 Article 24(2). 
118 Article 24(2) read in conjunction with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Union [2011] OJ L 141/1. 
119 Article 24(2) read in conjunction with Article 14(4)(b). 
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of worker, together with their family members, have a right to social assistance 
after three months of residence, including financial assistance for studies.120  
However, until such time as they have acquired permanent residence, 
students and self-sufficient persons, together with their family members, can 
obtain social assistance depending on their degree of integration in the host 
Member State but only to the extent that they do not become an unreasonable 
burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State.121 Moreover, 
Member States are not obliged to grant ‘maintenance aid for studies, including 
vocational training, consisting in student grants or student loans’ to students or 
self-sufficient persons and their family members until they have acquired 
permanent residence.122  Once permanent residence is acquired, equal 
treatment is absolute and therefore permanent residents whatever the nature of 
their activity have an absolute right to social assistance under the same 
conditions as nationals of the host Member State.123  







23 Related rights  
23 right to work Substantive No  
24 Equal treatment  
24(1) equal treatment Substantive No  
24(2) 
derogation with regard to social 
assistance 
Substantive Yes  
24(2) 
derogation with regard to 
maintenance aid for studies 
Substantive Yes  
25 




possession of residence docs cannot 
be made precondition for exercise of 
rights 
Substantive No  
25(2) 
charge for residence docs not to 
exceed charge for issuing nationals 
with similar documents 
Substantive No  
 
Table 6.8: Transposition obligations for equality of treatment (Article 23-25 of Directive 
2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508)
 
                                                            
120 Article 24(2) read in conjunction with Article 7 of Regulation 492/2011 (n 118). 
121 Article 24(1) read in conjunction with Article 14(3) .  
122 Article 24(2). See further Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] ECR I-8507. 
123 Article 24(2) read in conjunction with Article 16(1). 
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6.9 Restrictions on Entry and Residence  
Member states are entitled to take measures to remove EU citizens from 
their territory where their presence constitutes a threat to the public interest or 
they engage in abuse. 
Under the Directive, Member States may take measures to restrict the 
free movement and residence of EU citizens and their family members on 
grounds of public order or public security, where their conduct represents a 
‘genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the 
fundamental interests of society’.124   
Member States may only take measures in the first three months on 
grounds of public health if the individual is infected with a contagious disease 
as defined by the World Health Organisation.125  
Under Article 28 of the Directive before a Member State can proceed to 
deport an EU citizen (or his family member) as a result of his personal conduct, 
the national authorities must make an individual assessment of the person’s 
situation including ‘how long the individual concerned has resided on its 
territory, his/her age, state of health, family and economic situation, social and 
cultural integration into the host Member State and the extent of his/her links 
with the country of origin’.126 A citizen who is the subject of an expulsion must 
be provided with extensive procedural safeguards contained, including a right 
of appeal.127 
The mere fact that a person commits a criminal offence cannot of itself 
justify deportation of that person.128 The Court has previously held that a 
‘previous criminal conviction can therefore be taken into account only in so far 
                                                            
124 Articles 27. 
125 Article 29. 
126 Article 28(1). 
127 Articles 30-31. See further Section 6.10 (Procedural Safeguards and Rights of Appeal). 
128 Case C-50/06 Commission v Netherlands [2007] ECR I-4383 at para 41. See also Article 33(1). 
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as the circumstances which gave rise to that conviction are evidence of personal 
conduct constituting a present threat to the requirements of public policy’.129 
In Jipa,130 the Court also added that ‘measures taken on grounds of public 
policy or public security must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of 
the individual concerned, and justifications that are isolated from the 
particulars of the case in question or that rely on considerations of general 
prevention cannot be accepted.’ In all cases, the national authorities will need 
to ensure that ‘the restrictive measure envisaged is appropriate to ensure the 
achievement of the objective it pursues and does not go beyond what is 
necessary to attain it’.131   
The Directive foresees escalating levels of protection according to the 
level of integration of EU citizens and their family members in the host Member 
State. Thus, those who enjoy a permanent right of residence can only be 
deported on ‘serious grounds of public policy or public security’.132  EU minors 
cannot be deported except on ‘imperative grounds of public security or public 
policy’ and only when it is in the best interests of the child to do so (art 28(3)(b)). 
Likewise, EU citizens who have resided in the host Member State for over ten 
years can only be deported on ‘imperative grounds of public security or public 
policy’. The Court has explained what such ‘imperative grounds’ might be in and 
how the national authorities should go about determining when the deportation 
of a permanent resident may be justified Tsakouridis.133 
As has already been mentioned, Member States may take action against 
EU citizens and their family members if they become an unreasonable burden 
on social assistance. This requires the host authorities to make an individual 
                                                            
129 ibid, para 43. See also Article 33(1). 
130 Case C-33/07 Jipa [2008] ECR I-5157, para 24. 
131 Ibid, para 30. 
132 Article 28(2). 
133 Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis [2010] ECR I-11979, at paras 49-53 
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assessment of a person’s situation to determine whether or not they have 
become an unreasonable burden on the state’s social assistance system.134 
Member States are also permitted to ‘adopt the necessary measures to 
refuse, terminate or withdraw any right conferred by this Directive in the case 
of abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriages of convenience.’135 Any such 
measures must be proportionate and subject to the procedural safeguards and 
rights of appeal.136 
Any sanctions which Member States impose for breaching the national 
implementing measures adopted to give effect to the Directive must be 
proportionate and effective.137 







22 Territorial scope  
22 
right of residence extends to entire MS; 
territorial restrictions must be same as for 
nationals 
Substantive No  
26 Checks  
26(2) sanctions  
27 General principles  
27(1)(1) 
restriction based on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health 
Substantive No  
27(1)(2) not for economic ends Substantive No  
27(2)(1) principle of proportionality Substantive No  
27(2)(1) based on the personal conduct Substantive No  
27(2)(2) 
serious threat to one of the fundamental 
interests of the society 
Substantive No  
27(2)(2) no considerations of general prevention Substantive No  
27(3) 
host MS may request police record from MS 
of origin before issuing residence docs  
Substantive Yes  
27(4) 
right of re-entry of expelled citizens in 
home MS  
Substantive No  
28 Protection against expulsion  
28(1) 
obligation to take account of considerations 
relating to citizen's situation 
Substantive No  
28(2) 
persons who have permanent residence 
(only fpr serious grounds of public policy or 
public security) 
Substantive No  
28(3)(a) 
persons having resided for 10 years (only 
for imperative grounds of public security) 
Substantive No  
                                                            
134 Article 14(1) during the first three months of residence and thereafter under Article 14(2) read in 
combination with recital (16). See further, Section 6.10 (Procedural Safeguards and Residence Rights). 
135 Article 35. 
136 ibid. 
137 Article 36. 
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minors  (only for imperative grounds of 
public security) unless expulsion is in best 
interests of the child  
Substantive No  
29 Public health  
29(1) 
definition of diseases with epidemic 
potential 
Substantive No  
29(2) 
no expulsion based on diseases occuring 
after 3 months of residence 
Substantive No  
29(3) option: require of a medical examination Substantive Yes  
   
35 Abuse of rights  
35(1) Option: measure against abuse of rights Substantive Yes  
35(2) 
principle of proportionality + procedural 
safeguards 
Substantive No  
36 Sanctions  
36 Effective and proportionate sanctions Substantive Yes  
 
Table 6.9: Transposition obligations for restrictions on entry and residence (Article 22, 
27-29, 35-36 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508)
 
6.10 Procedural Safeguards and Rights of Appeal 
Whenever a Member State takes action to restrict the free movement of 
EU citizens and their family members, the latter are entitled to a certain number 
of procedural rights in all cases. 
The Directive provides that EU citizens and their family members who 
are the subject of a decision that restricts their rights on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health are ‘to be notified in writing … in such a 
way that they are able to comprehend its content and the implications for 
them.’138 This notice must set out the precise reasons for the measure in full139 
and must ‘specify the court or administrative authority with which the person 
concerned may lodge an appeal, the time limit for the appeal and, where 
applicable, the time allowed for the person to leave the territory of the Member 
State’140 which cannot be less than a month except ‘in duly substantiated cases 
                                                            
138 Article 30(1). 
139 Article 30(2). 
140 Article 30(3). 
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of urgency’.141 The Directive also provides for specific protections as regards 
expulsion142 and exclusion orders.143 
Furthermore, Article 15 further specifies that these safeguards ‘shall 
apply by analogy to all decisions restricting free movement of Union citizens 
and their family members on grounds other than public policy, public security 
or public health’.144 The Directive does not provide for any cases where EU 
citizens or their family members may be denied a right of appeal.145  
This would be the case where a Member State takes action against EU 
citizens or their family members in the event they become an unreasonable 
burden on social assistance.146 However, mere recourse to social assistance 
should not automatically result in expulsion.147 Instead, the Member State 
‘should examine whether it is a case of temporary difficulties and take into 
account the duration of residence, the personal circumstances and the amount 
of aid granted in order to consider whether the beneficiary has become an 
unreasonable burden on its social assistance system’148 before proceeding to 
expel an EU citizen or family member. Article 15 requires that in such cases the 
person is entitled to the procedural safeguards contained in Article 30 
(notification) and Article 31 (appeal rights). Moreover, in such cases the person 
                                                            
141 ibid. 
142 Article 33. 
143 Article 32. 
144 This would include decisions taken on the basis of Article 14, where the person has become an 
unreasonable burden on social assistance and Article 35 in case of abuse of rights or fraud. It would also 
cover decisions refusing an application for a residence document or withdrawing the recognition of a 
right of residence on the basis of Article 14(2) where the person no longer fulfils the conditions for 
having a right of residence under Article 7. 
145 Recital (26). 
146 Article 14(2) read in combination with recital (16). 
147 Article 14(3). 
148 Recital (16). See for example, Case C-140/12 Brey [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:565 (judgment of 19 
September 2013), para 69 
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concerned cannot be subject to a ban on entry.149 Workers and jobseekers 
benefit from enhanced protection against expulsion.150 
However, the Directive is silent on how to deal with the situation of an 
EU citizen who ceases to have a right to reside in the UK because he no longer 
fulfils the requirements of the Directive,151 but who cannot be expelled by the 
UK authorities unless and until he becomes an unreasonable burden on the 
social assistance system152 or his personal conduct constitutes a ‘genuine, 
present and sufficiently serious threat’ to public order or public security.153 The 
Court of Justice has yet to rule on this issue. 







14 Retention of right of residence  
14(2) verification of residence rights Substantive No  
14(3) 
no automatic expulsion in case of recourse 
to social assistance 
Substantive No  
14(4)(a) 
no expulsion of workers or self-employed 
persons 
Substantive No  
14(4)(b) 
no expulsion of jobseekers looking for work 
who have genuine chances of being engaged 
Substantive No  
14(4)(a) 
no expulsion of workers or self-employed 
persons 
Substantive No  
14(4)(b) 
no expulsion of jobseekers looking for work 
who have genuine chances of being engaged 
Substantive No  
14(4)(a) 
no expulsion of workers or self-employed 
persons 
Substantive No  
15 Procedural safeguards  
15(1) 
procedures provided for by Art. 30, 31 shall 
apply by analogy 
Substantive No  
15(2) 
no expulsion in case of expiry of ID or 
passport 
Substantive No  
15(3) 
no ban on entry for expulsion decision 
taken on other grounds 
Substantive No  
26 Checks  
26(1) option to carry out checks Substantive YesT  
   
   
   
                                                            
149 Article 15(3). 
150 Article 14(4). 
151 Namely the conditions set out in Article 7. 
152 Article 14(3) read in conjunction with recital (14). 
153 Article 27(2). 
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30 Notification of decisions  
30(1) notification in writing Substantive No  
30(2) 
full and precise information of the public 
policy, public security, public health 
grounds 
 
30(3) advising of legal remedies Substantive No  
30(3) 
citizen must be allowed one month for 
leaving MS, except if duly substantiated 
urgency 
Substantive No  
31 Procedural safeguards  
31(1) right to judicial review or appeal Substantive No
31(2) interim order suspends removal Substantive No  
31(3) 
redress procedure (legality and facts; 
proportionality) 
Substantive No  
31(4) right to submit defence in person (fair trial) Substantive No  
32 Duration of exclusion orders  
32(1) 
right to submit an application for lifting 
exclusion order within three years 
Substantive No  
32(1) 
decision within six months of the 
submission 
Substantive No  
32(2) 
no obligation for MS to allow entry during 
consideration of application 
Substantive No  
33 




Expulsion may not be imposed as penalty 
unless Art. 27, 2 8, 29 are respected 
Substantive No  
33(2) 
Right to re-evaluation of expulsion order 
after 2 years 
Substantive No  
35 Abuse of rights  
35(2) 
principle of proportionality + procedural 
safeguards 
Substantive No  
 
Table 6.10: Transposition obligations for procedural safeguards and rights of appeal 
(Article 14-15, 30-33, 35 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508)
 
6.11 Ancillary Provisions 
The Directive also contains a number of ancillary provisions, some of 
which impose obligations on the Member States. 
These include provisions relating to transposition. Member States were 
required to have transposed the Directive into national law by 30 April 2006 
and communicate details of the national implementing measures.  
Member States are also under an obligation to ‘disseminate information 
concerning the rights and obligations’ arising under the Directive.154 This 
presupposes that such information is accurate, consistent and available in 
different formats. 
                                                            
154 Article 34. 
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Lastly, the Directive also permits Member States to adopt rules that 








1 Subject  
1(a) right of residence Ancillary No No 
1(b) permanent residence Ancillary No No 
1(c) Limitations Ancillary No No 
34 Publicity  
34 
MS obligation to disseminate 
information on rights and 
obligations contained in Directive 
Ancillary No Yes – MS to 
inform public of 
contents of 
Directive 
38 Repeals  
38(1) [Repeal of Art Reg 1612/68] Ancillary No No 
38(2) Repeal of directives Ancillary No No 
38(3) 
References to repealed directives to 
be read as ref to Directive 
Ancillary No No 
39 Reporting  
39 
Report by Commission to EP and 
Council 
Ancillary No Not from MS
40 Transposition  
40(1) 
Deadline for transposition 30 April 
2006 
Ancillary No Yes – MS to 
adopt NIMs by 
deadline 
40(2) 
Communication of NIMs and 
correlation table 
Ancillary No Yes – MS to 
notify NIMs by 
deadline 
41 Entry into force  
41 
Entry into force on day of 
publication in OJ 
Ancillary No No 
42 Addressees  
42  Directive addressed to MS  Ancillary No No 
 
Table 6.11: Ancillary provisions (Articles 1, 38-42 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508)
 
                                                            
155 Article 37. 
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7.1 Transposition in Belgium 
7.1.1 Overview 
Belgium has implemented the Directive primarily on the basis of the Law 
of 25 April 20071 which amends Belgium’s law relating to the entry, residence, 
settlement and removal of foreigners.2 The amendments came into force on 1 
June 2008. This is further complemented by an implementing Royal Decree3 
which was amended in 2008.4 These instruments have been amended on 
several occasions.5 At the same time, a second further implementing Royal 
Decree was adopted concerning registered partnerships recognised as 
equivalent to marriage, proof of durable relationship and registration 
                                                            
1 Loi du 25 avril 2007 modifiant la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, 
l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers (MB 10-05-2007, p 25752) (Law of 25 April 2007 
amending the Law of 15 December 1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners). 
2  Loi du 15 décembre sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers 
(MB 31-12-1980, p 14584) (Law of 15 December 1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal 
of foreigners, hereafter the ‘Immigration Law’ or the ‘Law’). 
3 Arrêté royal du 8 octobre sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et l'éloignement des 
étrangers (MB 27-10-1981, p 13740) (Royal Decree of 8 October 1981 on the entry, residence, settlement 
and removal of foreigners, hereafter the ‘Royal Decree (1980 amended)’). 
4 Arrêté royal du 7 mai 2008 modifiant l’arrêté royal du 8 octobre 1981 sur l’accès au territoire, le 
séjour, l’établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers (MB 13-05-2008, p 25092) (Royal Decree of 7 
May 2008 amending the Royal Decree of 8 October 1981 on the entry, residence, settlement and 
removal of foreigners, hereafter the ‘Royal Decree (2008/I)’). 




formalities for EU citizens.6 Several Ministerial circulars have been published,7 
and some guidance has been made public.8 
Overall, the original transposition of the Directive can be categorised as 
passable when compared to other Member States, although it was slightly below 
the average across Member States as table 7.1.1 illustrates. Belgium’s 
transposition outcome have been assessed as ‘satisfactory in both quantitative 
and qualitative terms. However, some relevant provisions have been 
implemented in Belgian law by making reference to the existing practices of the 
administration which is not an appropriate implementation of the Directive per 
se.’9 
Compared to other Member States,10 Belgium’s transposition resulted in 
several provisions of the Directive being drafted on more favourable terms than 
provided the Directive, as permitted by Article 37.  
This was notably the case as regards the acquisition of permanent 
residence, which could be acquired after three years in the case of workers and 
                                                            
6 Arrêté royal du 7 mai 2008 fixant certaines modalités d’exécution de la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur 
l’accès au territoire, le séjour, l’établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers (MB 13-05-2008, p 
25090) (Royal Decree of 7 May 2008 implementing certain measures relating to Law of 15 December 
1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners, hereafter the ‘Royal Decree 
(2008/II)’). 
7 These are available on the website of the Belgian Immigration Office 
<https://dofi.ibz.be/sites/dvzoe/FR/Pages/Circulaires.aspx> accessed 1 July 2015. 
8 This is available on the website of the Belgian Immigration Office 
<https://dofi.ibz.be/sites/dvzoe/FR/Guidedesprocedures/Pages/default.aspx>  accessed 1 July 2015. 
In addition, unofficial guidance in use by municipal administrations is published, see F Duterme, 
Collection Orange, Sous-collection Etrangers (Vanden Broele 2014); idem Guide du Guichetier – 
Etrangers (Vanden Broele 2015).  
9 European Citizen Action Service, ‘Comparative study on the application of Directive 2004/38 on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States’ (PE 410.650, European Parliament 2009) (hereafter ‘ECAS comparative study’) 51. 
10 Member States transposed on average 12 provisions on more favourable terms than what is provided 
by the Directive, see Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508) 
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self-sufficient persons.11 However this provision was subsequently amended12 
and the period of residence relating to the acquisition of permanent residence 
was aligned with the Directive.13 
The approach that Belgium has chosen to transpose the Directive consists 
in the parliamentary enactment of consolidating legislation that amends the 
unitary law governing the entry and residence of non-nationals on Belgian 
territory. The drafting tends to follow an elaborative approach to 
transposition.14 







Total provisions of Directive to be transposed   144 
Provisions correctly transposed 82 94 90 
Provisions subject to more favourable transposition 15 14 12 
Provisions subject of compliant transposition 97 108 102 
Level of compliance of transposition 67% 75% 71% 
Provisions that are transposed ambiguously 14 5 8 
Provisions that are transposed incorrectly or 
incompletely 26 22 
23 
Provisions not transposed (failure to transpose) 7 9 12 
Provisions subject of non-compliant transposition 38 36 43 
Level of non-compliance of transposition 33% 25% 29% 
 
Table 7.1.1 Transposition outcomes (Belgium) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508) 
 
The European Commission opened infringement proceedings against 
Belgium for incorrect transposition of the Directive in 2011.15 As a result, several 
                                                            
11 Art 42quinquies, §1, para 1. 
12 Loi-programme du 28 juin 2013 (MB 01-07-2013, p 41480) (Framework Law of 28 June 2013), art 
18. 
13 Article 16 provides for the acquisition of permanent residence after five years of continuous lawful 
residence in the host Member State. 
14 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4 (Implications for the Drafting of National Implementing Measures). Only 
twelve provisions were identified as following a literal approach to transposition, namely Articles 
2(2)(a), 7(1)(a), 7(3)(c), 7(3)(d), 16(3), 16(4), 17(1)(c), second sentence, 27(2) (four provisions) and 
29(2). 
15 Commission, Case 2011/2033 concerning Belgium’s incorrect transposition of Directive 2004. The 
infringement action was initiated on 29 September 2011 by the sending of a Letter of Formal Notice. A 
Reasoned Opinion was issued on 21 February 2013. The case has not been closed. 
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amendments have been made which overall has led to improvements in the 
outcome of transposition of the Directive in Belgium. However, the 
infringement case officially remains open. 
7.1.2 Legislative history 
Belgium is a federal state16 in which specific competences relating to 
persons may be attributed to the federated level.17 Matters relating to the entry, 
residence, settlement and removal of foreigners are only attributed to the 
federated level insofar as integration policies are concerned.18 As a result, the 
competence to enact other measures relating to the entry, residence, settlement 
and removal of foreigners remains within the competence of the federal 
government.19 The Belgian legislative framework relating to immigration is 
contained in a unified law governing the situation of both EU citizens and non-
EU citizens.20  
A draft bill from the government is subject to mandatory review by the 
Belgian Council of State.21 The bill is then finalised and submitted by the 
government exercising the Royal prerogative22 to the Chamber of 
Representatives23 in matters relating to the fulfilment of Belgium’s EU 
                                                            
16 Article 1 of the Belgian Constitution. 
17 Article 128 of the Belgian Constitution. 
18 Loi spéciale du 8 août 1980 de réformes institutionnelles (MB 15-08-1980, p 9434) (Special Law on 
Institutional Reforms of 8 August 1980), art 5 §1, II, 3°. 
19 Serge Gutwirth, Paul de Hert and Pieter Paepe, ‘Conformity Study for Belgium’ 18, Annex to Milieu 
and Edinburgh University, ‘Conformity studies of Member States’ national implementation measures 
transposing Community instruments in the area of citizenship of the Union’ (Report for Commission, 
2008) (hereafter ‘Conformity Study for Belgium’).  
20 Immigration Law (n 2). 
21 Lois coordonnées du 12 janvier 1973 sur le Conseil D’État (MB 21-03-1973, p 3461) (Consolidated 
Law of 12 January 1973 on the Council of State), art 3. 
22 Note that according to art 37 of the Belgian Constitution, the King is vested with federal executive 
powers. Under art 36 the King exercises federal legislative powers jointly with the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. However, under art, no act may be taken by the King without being 
countersigned by a minister.  
23 Belgian Constitution, art 75, para 2, 78 §1, 3°. 
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obligations.24 Once the bill has been adopted by the Chamber of 
Representatives, it must be sent to the Senate.25 Approval of the bill from both 
Chambers of the Belgian Federal Parliament is required26 and must be 
sanctioned by the government in exercise of the Royal prerogative.27  
Belgium was late in transposing the Directive.28 Two months after 
receiving a letter of formal notice from the Commission29 concerning the failure 
to notify its national implementing measures under Article 40 of the Directive,30 
a draft proposal31 was submitted by the Belgian Ministry of the Interior for 
review by the Belgian Council of State,32 which rendered its opinion in late 
September 2006.33  
                                                            
24 ibid, art 169. See also Sénat et Chambre des Représentants, ‘Etat des lieux de la transposition des 
directives européennes en droit belge – 8 décembre 2011’ 5-13691/1, 53/1966/001 (Senate and House 
of Representatives, ‘State of play of the transposition of European Directives in Belgian law – 8 
December 2011’). 
25 ibid, art 75, para 2, 78 §1, 3°. 
26 ibid, arts 36 and 77. 
27 ibid, art 109; on the Royal prerogative, see n 22. 
28 The Belgian Immigration Office issued a circular to the municipal authorities explaining the 
administrative consequences of this delay on residence formalities, see Office des Étrangers, 
‘Circulaire relative au dépassement du délai de transposition de la Directive 2004/38 
relative au séjour des ressortissants UE et des membres de leur famille (MB 26-05-2006, 
p 26809) (Immigration Office, Circular relating to the expiry of the deadline for 
transposition of Directive 2004/38 relating to residence of EU citizens and their family 
members) 
29 See further Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2 (Infringement action by the Commission).  
30 Commission, Letter of Formal Notice, Case 2006/0371 (1 June 2006). See further Commission, ‘Staff 
Working Document – Annex to the 24th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community 
Law (2006) - COM(2007) 398 final’, SEC(2007) 976, Annex IV, Part 2, 219-220. 
31 Avant-projet de loi du 26 août 2006 modifiant la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l’accès au territoire, 
le séjour, l’établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers (Draft bill of 26 August 2008 to amend the Law 
of 15 December 1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners). 
32 Lois coordonnées du 12 janvier 1973 sur le Conseil D’État (MB 21-03-1973, p 3461) (Consolidated 
Law of 12 January 1973 on the Council of State), art 3. 




A bill to amend the law for the transposition of the Directive was sent to 
the Chamber of Representatives on 11 January 2007.34 This followed on from 
the receipt of a reasoned opinion from the Commission35 in December 2006.36 
The bill sought to transpose both Directive 2004/38 and the Long Term 
Residence Directive.37,38 The bill was approved Chamber of Representatives on 
22 March 200739 and by the Senate on 12 April 2007.40 The bill received Royal 
approval and became law on 23 April 2007.41 However, it required an enabling 
decree to bring it into force.42 
                                                            
34 Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, ‘Projet de loi modifiant la loi du 15 decembre 1980 sur 
l’accès au territoire, le séjour, l’établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers - 11 janvier 2007’, Doc 51 
2845/001 (House of Representatives, ‘Bill to amend the Law of 15 December 1980 on the entry, 
residence, settlement and removal of foreigners’, 11 January 2007). 
35See further Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2 (Infringement action by the Commission). 
36 Commission, Reasoned Opinion, Case 2006/0371 (12 December 2006) concerning Belgium’s non-
communication of national implementing measures. The case was reportedly referred to the Court of 
Justice on 17 October 2007 but withdrawn on 5 June 2008. See further Commission, ‘Staff Working 
Document –  Annex to the 26th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 
(2008) – COM(2009), SEC (2009), Annex IV, Part 2, 172-173; Royal Decree (2008/I) (n 4), first recital. 
37 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents [2003] OJ L 16/44. 
38 The bill also sought to exercise the option under Article 11(2)(d) of Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 
1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status [2005] OJ L 326/13 to search asylum applicants and the items they carry. 
39 Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, ‘Projet de loi modifiant la loi du 15 decembre 1980 sur 
l’accès au territoire, le séjour, l’établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers – Texte adopté en séance 
plénière et transmis au Sénat, 22 mars 2007’, Doc 51 2845/006 (House of Representatives, ‘Bill to 
amend the Law of 15 December 1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners – 
Text adopted in plenary session and transmitted to the Senate, 22 March 2007’) 
40 Sénat de Belgique, ‘Projet de loi modifiant la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l'accès au territoire, le 
séjour, l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers – Décision de ne pas amender, 12 avril 2007’, 
Doc 3-2345 - 2006/2007 (Belgian Senate, ‘Bill to amend the Law of 15 December 1980 on the entry, 
residence, settlement and removal of foreigners – Decision not to amend, 12 April 2007’). 
41 Law of 25 April 2007 (n 1). 
42 ibid, art 48. 
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This was delayed due to the inability to form a government following the 
holding of elections in June 2007.43  An implementing decree was finally 
adopted on 7 May 2008, 44 following a final warning from the Commission that 
a formal application would be made to the Court of Justice unless the Directive 
was transposed by 13 May 2008.45 The decree entered into force on 1 June 
2008.46 As a result, the transposition of the Directive suffered a delay of 763 
days and Belgium became the last Member State to adopt the necessary 
measures to give it effect in its national legal order.47 
7.1.3 Beneficiaries 
The provisions on direct family members are adequately transposed.48  
Belgium recognises registered partnerships.49 Royal Decree (II)50 
establishes which registered partnerships are considered as equivalent to 
marriage,51 according to the country in they were celebrated.52 However, for 
those in a partnership registered in Belgium or other countries,53 the 
Immigration Law imposes additional conditions inserted by legislative 
                                                            
43 See further, Peter Van Aelst and Tom Louwerse, ‘Parliament without Government: The Belgian 
Parliament and the Government Formation Processes of 2007–2011’ (2014) 37 West European Politics, 
475-496. It took Belgium 194 days to form a government following the federal elections held on 10 June 
2007, ibid, 476. 
44 Royal Decree (2008/I) (n 4). 
45 ibid, third recital. 
46 ibid, art 40. 
47 For a comparison of transposition delay, see further, Chapter 10 (Implementation of Directive 
2004/38 Compared). 
48 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 20-22.  
49 Civil Code, arts 1475-1479. 
50 Royal Decree (2008/II) (n 6). 
51 ibid, art 4. 
52 ibid; these countries are Denmark, Germany, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the UK. 
53 For example, a pacte civil de solidarité under French pursuant to Loi n°99-944 du 15 novembre 1999 




amendment designed to fight abuse54 which must be met by registered partners, 
which are not foreseen by the Directive.55  The requirement that the partners 
must be aged over 21 years of age56 has previously been declared 
unconstitutional,57 but the Law has yet to be amended.  
There is a further requirement that the registered partners should have 
cohabited for at least a year either in Belgium or abroad, or alternatively that 
they have known each other for at least two years and that during this time they 
have been together at least 45 days.58 In this respect, the Belgian Constitutional 
Court has recently held59  the imposition of such a requirement pursues a 
                                                            
54 Loi du 8 juillet 2011 modifiant la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, 
l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers (MB 12-09-2011, p 58915) (Law of 8 July 2011 amending 
the Law of 15 December 1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners) amended 
art 40bis to incorporate the conditions previously found in Royal Decree (2008/II) (n 6), art 3.  The 
original proposal was designed to combat abuse relating to family reunification by non-EU citizens, see 
Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, ‘Proposition de loi modifiant la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur 
l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers en ce qui concerne les 
conditions dont est assorti le regroupement familial’, Doc 53 0443/001 (House of Representatives, 
‘Parliamentary Bill to amend the Law of 15 December 1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and 
removal of foreigners’) 1. However, it was extended to cover the situation of EU citizens and their family 
members following an amendment to the proposal; see Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 
‘Proposition de loi modifiant la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, 
l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers en ce qui concerne les conditions dont est assorti le 
regroupement familial – Amendements, 4 mai 2011’) , Doc 53 0443/016 (House of Representatives, 
‘Parliamentary Bill to amend the Law of 15 December 1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and 
removal of foreigners – Amendments, 4 May 2011’), Amendment No 168 and commentary, 23-26, 32-
36 respectively. 
55 Article 2(2)(b) provides that ‘the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered 
partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State 
treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid 
down in the relevant legislation of the host Member State’.  
56 40bis, § 2, 2°, c). 
57 Cour Constitutionnelle, Arrêt n° 121/2013 du 26 septembre 2013 (Constitutional Court, 26 March 
2015). 
58 Art 40bis, § 2, 2°, para 2, a). 
59 Cour Constitutionnelle, Arrêt n° 43/2015 du 26 mars 2015 (Constitutional Court, 26 March 2015). 
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legitimate aim of combating abuse.60  However, such conditions appear 
questionable in light of the Court of Justice’s ruling in McCarthy61 in which it 
held that ‘measures adopted by the national authorities, on the basis of Article 
35 of Directive 2004/38, in order to refuse, terminate or withdraw a right 
conferred by that directive must be based on an individual examination of the 
particular case.’ The Belgian law must therefore be considered as non-
compliant in this respect.62 
The Belgian Immigration Law initially failed to transpose the provisions 
of the Directive relating to ‘other family members’63 in a correct and complete 
fashion.64 However, the Law was amended in this respect65 with the insertion of 
a new chapter to cover ‘other family members’.66 This followed the issue of a 
reasoned opinion by the Commission in 2011.67 This appears to have addressed 
issues of non-compliance in this respect.68  
                                                            
60 ibid, para B.16.2. 
61 Case C-202/13 McCarthy [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2450 (judgment of 18 December 2014), para 52. 
62 This issue was identified in the conformity study as ‘durable relationships’ under Article 3(2)(b); see 
Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19), 23, but it also affects registered partnerships more broadly.  
63 Article 3(2).  
64 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 23-25; Serge Gutwirth, Paul de Hert and Pieter Paepe, 
‘Correspondence Table, Belgium’, 13, Annex to Milieu and Edinburgh University, Conformity studies of 
Member States’ national implementation measures transposing Community instruments in the area of 
citizenship of the Union - Final Report’ (December 2008) (hereafter ‘Correspondence Table for 
Belgium’). 
65 Loi du 19 mars 2014 modifiant la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, 
l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers (MB 05-05-2014, p 36137) (Law of 19 March 2014 
amending the Law of 15 December 1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners).  
66 ‘Chapitre Ibis. 1 - Autres membres de la famille d'un citoyen de l'Union’ consisting in arts 47/1-47/3. 
67 Commission, Reasoned Opinion, Case 2011/2033 (21 February 2013) concerning Belgium’s incorrect 
transposition of Directive 2004. See also Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, ‘Projet de loi 
modifiant la loi du 15 decembre 1980 sur l’accès au territoire, le séjour, l’établissement et l’éloignement 
des étrangers’, Doc 53 3239/001 (House of Representatives, ‘Bill to amend the Law of 15 December 
1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners’) 7. 
68 Immigration Law, arts 47/1, 1° and 47/3 §1 transpose Article 3(2)(b) relating to partners in a durable 
relationship; arts 47/1, 2° and 47/3 §2 transpose Article 3(2)(a) relating to other dependants; arts 47/1, 
3° and and 47/3 §3 transpose Article 3(2)(a) relating to dependants on serious health grounds; art 47/2 
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The Belgian authorities have made use of Article 37 of the Directive to 
extend the scope of its provisions to the family members of Belgian citizens as a 
way to avoid so-called ‘reverse discrimination’.69 
The transposition outcomes in respect of the provisions dealing with 
beneficiaries can be summarised as follows:  
Transposition Outcomes: Beneficiaries 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
2 Definitions 
2(1) EU citizen Correct








direct descendants (under the age of 
21) 
Correct
2(2)(c) direct descendants (dependants) 
Correct
2(2)(d) 





EU citizens and family members in 
terms of Art. 2 
Correct
3(2)(1)(a) 
facilitation for dependants in the 
country of origin 
Ambiguous Correct 
3(2)(1)(a) 




facilitation for family members on 
serious health grounds 
Ambiguous Correct 
3(2)(1)(b) 
facilitation for partners (durable 
relationship duly attested) 
Ambiguous Correct 
3(2)(2) 




Table 7.1.3: Transposition outcomes for beneficiaries (Articles 2-3 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
 
                                                            
applies the residence formalities applicable to direct family members.  The obligation to ‘undertake an 
extensive examination of the personal circumstances’ under the last sentence of Article 3(2) is given 
effect by the Royal Decree (1980 amended) (n 3), art 58 as inserted by Arrêté royal du 13 février 2015 
modifiant l'arrêté royal du 8 octobre 1981 sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et 
l'éloignement des étrangers (MB 26-02-2015, p 14396) (Royal Decree of 13 February 2015 amending 
the Royal Decree of 8 October 1981 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners). The 
amending law of Law of 19 March 2014 (n 65) also seeks to give effect to the rights of primary carers of 
EU children laid down by the Court of Justice in Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925 by 
amending art 40bis of the Immigration Law.  
69 Art 40ter. 
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7.1.4 Entry and exit 
The provisions of entry and exit have been correctly transposed and 
potential problems addressed, except as regards the obligation to grant all 
facilities to the right of family members to obtain a visa. However, the obligation 
to issue such a visa free of charge under an accelerated procedure has now been 
transposed.70 The Law has also been amended to correct the incomplete 
transposition71 on the obligation to grant all opportunities to EU citizens and 
family members to enter without adequate travel documents.72 The law of 




70 Royal Decree (1980 amended) (n 3), art 45 was amended by Royal Decree of 13 February 2015 
amending the Royal Decree of 8 October 1981 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of 
foreigners (n 68). 
71 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 27; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 20-21. Art 41 has 
now been amended by Law of 19 March 2014 (n 65). 
72 Article 5(4). 
73 Loi du 14 août 1974 relative à la délivrance des passeports (MB 21-12-1974, p 15313) (Law of 14 
August 1974 on the issue of passports) repealed by Loi du 21 décembre 2013 portant le Code consulaire 
(MB 21-01-2014, p 4987) (Law of 21 December 2013 instituting the consular code). 




Transposition Outcomes: Entry and Exit 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
4 Right of exit 
4(1) 




right of exit for TCN family 
members (passport) 
Incorrect Correct 
4(2) no visa or equivalent formality Not transposed – compliant Correct 
4(3) 
ID or passport stating the 
nationality of the holder 
Correct
4(4) 
territorial validity of the passport (5 
years if MS do not issue ID cards 
Correct
5 Right of entry 
5(1)(1) 




right of entry for TCN family 
members (passport) 
Correct
5(1)(2) no visa or equivalent formality Correct
5(2)(1) 
obligation to hold entry visa for TCN
members (Reg. No. 539/2001) 
Correct
5(2)(2) residence card exemption Correct
5(2)(3) facilitation to obtain entry visa 
Not transposed – non-
compliant  
5(2)(4) 
accelerated procedure for issuing 
visa, free of charge 
Not transposed – non-
compliant 
5(3) 
entry or exit stamp (passport TCN




all opportunities to enter without 
valid travel documents 
Incorrect
5(5) presence report (optional) Correct
 
Table 7.1.4: Transposition outcomes for entry and exit (Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 
2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
  
7.1.5 The right of residence 
The right of residence is on the whole correctly transposed. However, 
some non-compliance issues persist. 
Firstly, there is continuing ambiguity over the use of the words ‘salaried’ 
and ‘non-salaried’ in the definition of ‘worker’75 appears to suggest it refers to 
the Belgian notion of worker76 and could affect the application of the Law by 
officials of the Immigration Office and local municipalities. 
                                                            
75 Art 40, § 4  
76 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 8; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 26.  
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Secondly, the situation of self-sufficient persons is also ambiguous since 
a Circular of 23 May 200877 suggests that the level of resources indicated therein 
is a fixed amount which must be met in all cases,78 even though the Directive 
provides that no fixed amount can be imposed in this regard.79 
Thirdly, the incorrect transposition as relating to jobseekers also 
remains.80 
Fourthly, the administrative formalities are also the source of non-
compliance. The Immigration Law does not provide for EU citizens to be issued 
a registration certificate immediately81 as required by the Directive.82 The Royal 
Decree is also incorrect in this respect.83 However, previous problems84 relating 
to the six-month deadline85 for the issue of residence cards to non-EU family 
members appear to have been adequately addressed.86 The instances of non-
                                                            
77 Office des Étrangers, ‘Circulaire officieuse du 23 mai 2008 relative aux citoyens de l’Union et aux 
membres de leur famille’ (Circular (unpublished) of 23 May 2008 on EU citizens and their family 
members) (not currently available on the website of the Immigration Office. This has not been replaced 
and still appears to be in use. 
78 Ibid, para C.1, 1°. See further, Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 32; Correspondence Table for 
Belgium (n 64) 28. 
79 Article 8(4).  
80 See further Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 40; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 79-
81. The Belgian law is incorrect in not allowing jobseekers an unconditional right of residence in the 
second three months of their residence in Belgium under art 40 §4, para 1, 1° of the Law. 
81 Art 42 §1 provides for a six-month deadline. 
82 Article 8(2). 
83 Royal Decree (1980 amended) (n 3), art 50. See further, Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 29-30; 
Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 34-39. 
84 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 33-34; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 48-52. 
85 Article 10(1). 
86 Royal Decree (1980 amended) (n 3), art 52 as amended by Arrêté royal du 21 septembre 2011 
modifiant les arrêtés royaux du 8 octobre 1981 sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et 
l'éloignement des étrangers, du 17 mai 2007 fixant les modalités d'exécution de la loi du 15 septembre 
2006 modifiant la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et 
l'éloignement des étrangers et du 7 mai 2008 fixant certaines modalités d'exécution de la loi du 15 
décembre 1980 sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers (MB 
10-10-2011, p 62211) (Royal Decree of 13 21 September 2011 amending the amending the Royal Decrees 
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compliance in respect of the provisions on retention of the right of residence 
have now been addressed.87  
Transposition Outcomes: Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
6 Residence (up to three months) 
6(1) EU citizens Correct
6(2) TCN family members Correct
7 Residence (more than three months) 
7(1)(a) workers or self-employed persons Ambiguous
7(1)(b) 
sufficient resources and 




study (comprehensive sickness 
insurance +assurance of sufficient 
resources) 
Correct
7(1)(d) Family member 
Correct
7(2) TCN family members 
Correct
7(3)(a) retention in case of illness or accident 
Correct
7(3)(b) 
involuntary unemployment after 1 
year of employment 
Correct
7(3)(c) 
involuntary unemployment after 
fixed-term contract (less than 1 year) 
Correct
7(3)(d) 




special rules concerning family 
members of students 
Correct
8 
Administrative formalities for EU 
citizens 
8(1) option: register Correct
8(2) deadline to register Correct








documents required from self-
sufficient persons 
Correct
8(3) documents required from students 
Correct
8(4) 








of 8 October 1981 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners, of 17 May 2007 
implementing certain measures relating to the Law of 15 September 2006 amending the Law of 15 
December 1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners, and of 7 May 2008 
implementing certain measures relating to Law of 15 December 1980 on the entry, residence, settlement 
and removal of foreigners). 
87 Arts 42ter and 42quater were amended by Law of 8 July 2011 amending the Law of 15 December 1980 
on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners (n 54) and Framework Law of 28 June 
2013 (n 12). 
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Transposition Outcomes: Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
9 
Administrative formalities for family 
members who are not EU citizens 
9(1) issue a residence card  Correct
9(2) deadline for submission Correct
9(3) Sanctions Correct
10 Issue of residence cards 
10(1) title of the residence card Correct88
10(1) issue deadline of six months Ambiguous Correct 
10(1) certificate of application Correct
10(2) 
documents required from TCN family 
members 
Correct
11 Validity of the residence card 
11(1) period of validity Correct
11(2) temporary absences Not transposed
12 
Retention of the right of residence in 
the event of death or departure of the 
EU citizen 
12(1) 
retention of residence of EU family 
members - death/departure 
Ambiguous Correct 
12(1) 




retention of residence of TCN family 
members - death of the EU citizen 
Correct
12(3) 
child in education and parent having 
custody - departure of the EU citizen 
Correct
13 
Retention of the right of residence in 
the event of divorce, annulment of 
the marriage or termination of 
registered partnership 
13(1) EU family members Correct
13(1) 
conditions for the right of permanent 
residence 
Ambiguous Correct 
13(2) TCN family members Correct
13(2)(a) 
3 years of marriage, including 1 year 
in the host MS 
Correct
13(2)(b) custody of the EU citizen's children 
Correct
13(2)(c) domestic violence 
Correct
13(2)(d) 




conditions for the right of permanent 
residence 
Correct








88 This provision was identified as ambiguously transposed by the Commission; see Information from 
Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508). However, no such problem in transposition 
could be identified. The Belgian authorities issue a residence card labelled ‘carte de séjour de membre 
de la famille d’un citoyen de l’Union’ or ‘verblijfskaart van een familielid van een burger van de Unie’ 
in accordance with Article 10(1) of the Directive.  
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Transposition Outcomes: Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
14 Retention of the right of residence 
14(1) 
retention of the right of residence 
under Art. 6 
Correct
14(2) 
retention of the right of residence 
under Art. 7, 12, 13 
Correct
 
Table 7.1.5: Transposition outcomes for residence (Article 6-14 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
 
7.1.6 The right of permanent residence 
The ambiguity in the definition in the right of permanent residence89 have 
been addressed,90 but there is still no specific confirmation that a person who 
has acquired permanent residence is no subject to the need to meet the 
conditions of Chapter III of the Directive. 
The Immigration law also requires family members to have been living 
together91 with their EU relative. Although this requirement is no contained in 
the Directive,92 it is also not in accordance with the Court’s case law,93 the 
provision has yet to be amended.   
Although the Law is correctly drafted as regards the issue of permanent 
residence documents, the Circular instructs officials that the relevant date to be 
taken into account for calculating permanent residence is the date on which the 
citizen or his family member first registered their presence with the 
municipality.94 This creates ambiguity. The deadline for the issue of 
                                                            
89 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 41; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 86-89. 
90 Art 42quinquies was amended by Law of 19 March 2014 (n 65). 
91 This is by reference to the concept of ‘installation commune’ in art 42quinquies, §1, para 2. See further 
Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 43; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 93-94. This affects 
the correctness of transposition of Article 18.  
92 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 43; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 93-94. 
93 Case 267/83 Diatta [1985] ECR 0567, at para 20; Case C-244/13 Ogieriakhi [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2068 (judgment of 10 July 2014), paras 37 and 45. 
94 Circular of 23 May 2008 (n 77), para D.1. This affects the correctness of transposition of Articles 19(1) 




documents95 is also a problem,96 as is their period of validity.97 The 
transposition of the provisions on continuity of residence98 and loss of 
permanent residence99 also have not been addressed. 
The minor problems noted100 in transposition of the provisions giving 
workers the right in certain circumstances to acquire permanent residence 
before a period of residence of five years has been accumulated101 have not been 
addressed. 
Transposition Outcomes: Permanent Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
16 
General rule for EU citizens 
and their family members  
16(1) legal residence during 5 years Ambiguous Correct 
16(1) 
not subject to the Chapter III 
conditions 
Incorrect Correct 
16(2) TCN family members Ambiguous Correct 
16(3) temporary absences Correct
16(4) 
only lost through absences 
exceeding 2 years 
Correct
17 
Exemptions for persons no 
longer working in the host 
Member State 
17(1)(a) 
worker who reaches retirement 
age after working at least a year 
Ambiguous
17(1)(a)(2) 
retirement age (60) in case 
national law is silent 
Correct
17(1)(b) 
worker permanently incapable 




worker who has worked at least 




periods of employment under 
(a) and (b) 
Not transposed – not 
compliant 
17(1)(c)(2) 
periods of involuntary 




exemption from periods under 
(a) or (b) if citizen's spouse or 




95 Article 19(2) as regards EU citizens and Article 20(1) as regards non-EU family members. 
96 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 44; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 96. 
97 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 44; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 98. 
98 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 45; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 101. 
99 Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 100. 
100 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 41-43; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 90-93. 
101 Article 17 of the Directive. 
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Transposition Outcomes: Permanent Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
17(3) 




family members acquire PR 
upon death of worker (if worker 
resided for min. 2 years) 
Correct
17(4)(b) 
family members acquire PR 
upon death of worker (if of 




family members acquire PR 
upon death of worker (if worker 
spouse is ex-national) 
Correct
18 
Acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence by 
certain family members who 
are not EU citizens 
18 
permanent residence of family 
members having retained right 













permanent residence to be 
issued as soon as possible 
Incorrect
20 
Permanent residence card for 
family members who are not 
nationals of a Member State 
20(1) 




submission before expiration of 
the residence card 
Correct
20(2)(2) Sanctions Correct
20(3) temporary absences Incorrect
21 Continuity of residence 
21 
continuity of residence can be 
proved by any means; 
expulsion breaks continuity 
Not transposed – not 
compliant 
 
Table 7.1.6: Transposition outcomes for permanent residence (Article 16-21 of Directive 
2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 









7.1.7 Equality of treatment 
The provisions on equality of treatment have been correctly 
transposed.102 The right to work, while initially not compliant because it 
excluded certain family members,103 is now compliant as it applies to all family 
members.104 However, the right to work is conditional upon the family member 
holding a residence card in breach of Article 25 of the Directive which provides 
that the exercise of a right is not conditional upon holding a residence 
document,105 and which has not been transposed. 
  
                                                            
102 See further Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 46-47; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 
104-106. As regards access to social assistance, see SPF Intégration Sociale, Lutte contre la Pauvreté 
et Économie Sociale, ‘Circulaire du 5 août 2014 relative à l'interprétation de l'article 3, 3°, 2 e tiret, de 
la loi du 26 mai 2002 concernant le droit à l'intégration sociale et de l'article 57quinquies de la loi du 
8 juillet 1976 organique des centres publics d'action sociale’ (MB 08-08-2014, p 58165) (Ministry of 
Social Integration, Circular of 5 August 2014 relating to the interpretation of Article 3, 3°, second 
sentence, of the Law of 26 May 2002 relating to social assistance  and Article 57 of the Law of 8 July  
1976 on public social welfare centres).  
103 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 47-49; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 106-111. 
104 Arrêté royal du 9 Juin 1999 portant exécution de la loi du 30 avril 1999 relative à l'occupation des 
travailleurs étrangers (MB 26-06-1999, p 24162) (Royal Decree of 1999 implementing measures 
relating to the Law of 30 April 1999 on the employment of foreign workers), art 2. 
105 Article 25 provides that ‘[p]ossession of a registration certificate as referred to in Article 8, of a 
document certifying permanent residence, of a certificate attesting submission of an application for a 
family member residence card, of a residence card or of a permanent residence card, may under no 
circumstances be made a precondition for the exercise of a right or the completion of an administrative 




Transposition Outcomes: Equal Treatment 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
23 Related rights  
23 right to work Incorrect Correct 
24 Equal treatment  
24(1) equal treatment Correct  
24(2) 




derogation with regard to 
maintenance aid for studies 
Correct  
25 




possession of residence docs cannot 
be made precondition for exercise of 
rights 
Not transposed –  not 
correct106 
Not transposed –  not 
correct 
25(2) 
charge for residence docs not to 
exceed charge for issuing nationals 
with similar documents 
Correct  
 
Table 7.1.7: Transposition outcomes for equality of treatment (Article 23-25 of Directive 
2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
 
7.1.8 Restrictions on entry and residence 
The provisions relating to the restrictions which Member States can take 
to restrict rights of entry and residence on grounds of public interest have been 
satisfactorily transposed.  
The only major shortcoming is the incomplete transposition of the factors 
that must be taken into account when proceeding to the expulsion of an EU 
citizen and their family members.107  
There are a few minor problems relating to the right of the duty of 
Member States to admit their returning nationals where they have been 
                                                            
106 Article 25(1) was assessed as not transposed but correct, see Information from Commission dated 10 
March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 49; Correspondence Table for 
Belgium (n 64) 111. This was because, at that time, the Belgian authorities did not explicitly subject the 
exercise of a right to possession of a residence card. However, the Belgian authorities have now done so 
as regards the right of family members to work, thereby demonstrating that the failure to transpose this 
provision was a potential source of non-compliance. 
107 Article 28(1) of the Directive; see Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 52; Correspondence Table for 
Belgium (n 64) 118. 
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expelled from other Member States108 and the incomplete transposition of 
measures on restrictions on public health.109 The provision relating to the 
possibility to request information from other Member States following receipt 
of an application for residence documentation is also incomplete.110 
Transposition Outcomes: Restrictions on Entry and Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
22 Territorial scope 
22 
right of residence extends to entire MS; 





27 General principles 
27(1)(1) 
restriction based on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health 
Correct
27(1)(2) not for economic ends 
Correct
27(2)(1) principle of proportionality 
Correct
27(2)(1) based on the personal conduct 
Correct
27(2)(2) 
serious threat to one of the fundamental 
interests of the society 
Correct
27(2)(2) no considerations of general prevention 
Correct
27(3) 
host MS may request police record from MS 
of origin before issuing residence docs  
Incomplete
27(4) 
right of re-entry of expelled citizens in 
home MS  
Not transposed – not 
compliant 
28 Protection against expulsion 
28(1) 
obligation to take account of considerations 
relating to citizen's situation 
Incorrect
28(2) 
persons who have permanent residence 




persons having resided for 10 years (only 
for imperative grounds of public security) 
Correct
28(3)(b) 
minors (only for imperative grounds of 
public security) unless expulsion is in best 
interests of the child  
Correct
29 Public health 
29(1) 




no expulsion based on diseases occurring 
after 3 months of residence 
Correct
29(3) option: require of a medical examination Incomplete
35 Abuse of rights 
35(1) Option: measure against abuse of rights Correct
                                                            
108 Article 27(4) of the Directive; see Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 51; Correspondence Table for 
Belgium (n 64) 117. 
109 Article 29(3) of the Directive; see Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 53; Correspondence Table for 
Belgium (n 64) 120. 
110 Article 27(3) of the Directive; see Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 51; Correspondence Table for 
Belgium (n 64) 117.  
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Transposition Outcomes: Restrictions on Entry and Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
36 Sanctions 
36 Effective and proportionate sanctions Correct
 
Table 7.1.8: Transposition outcomes for restrictions on entry and residence (Article 22, 
27-29, 35-36 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
 
7.1.9 Procedural safeguards and rights of appeal  
This is the aspect of non-compliance in transposition which is most 
notable in the case of Belgium. 
Firstly, the Immigration Law111 still does not provide protection against 
systematic verification of the right of residence,112 nor does it explicitly provide 
that ‘expulsion … shall not be the automatic consequence of … recourse to the 
social assistance system’.113  
This instance of non-compliance appears deliberate. The Belgian 
authorities have put in place an automated system to check residence 
entitlements of EU citizens and their family members who claim benefits in 
Belgium. For example, details of those who have claimed unemployment 
benefits are routinely passed on by the Belgian National Employment Office to 
the Immigration Office,114 which then proceeds to determine if action can be 
taken to put an end to their right of residence.   
                                                            
111 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 39; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 74. Although this 
requirement is contained in the Circular of 23 May 2008 (n 77), para E.2, this cannot be considered 
complaint because a circular is not legally binding; see further Chapter 3, Section 3.1 (Obligations 
Relating to the Form of Transposition). 
112 Article 14(2) provides that ‘where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a Union citizen or his/her 
family members satisfies the conditions set out in Articles 7, 12 and 13, Member States may verify if 
these conditions are fulfilled. This verification shall not be carried out systematically.’ 
113 Article 14(3). See further Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 39; Correspondence Table for Belgium 
(n 64) 75. 
114 Comité sectoriel de la sécurité sociale et de la santé, ‘Délibération N° 13/051 du 7 mai 2013 
concernant la communication de données à caractère personnel relatives à des citoyens de l'Union 
européenne par L'Office national de l'emploi à l'Office Des Étrangers’ CSSS/13/117 (Sectorial 
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Although a Member State is entitled to take action against EU citizens 
and their family members in the event they become an unreasonable burden on 
social assistance, 115 the Immigration Law originally was silent on the factors 
that should be taken into account to determine if a person has become an 
unreasonable burden on the Belgian social assistance system.116 This has now 
been rectified117 following the infraction proceedings initiated by the 
Commission in 2011.118 
                                                            
Committee for Social Security and Healthcare, ‘Deliberation No 13/051 of 7 May 2013 concerning the 
transmission of personal data relating to EU citizens from the National Employment Agency to the 
Immigration Office’)  
<https://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/d%C3%A9lib%C3%
A9ration_SSS_051_2013.pdf> accessed 4 December 2015. In this regard the Minister for Immigration 
explained the purpose of this information exchange: ‘On a croisé les banques de données du SPF 
Intégration Sociale et de l'Office des Étrangers. Nous avons pu remarquer qui étaient ici pour profiter 
de notre système social. Il y a aussi des Français, des Hollandais, des Espagnols, mais aussi des 
Roumains et des Bulgares. C'est très important, car il faut éviter qu'il y ait des gens qui profitent de 
notre système social.’ (‘We cross referred the databases of the Ministry of Social Integration and the 
Immigration Office. We were able to notice who was here to take advantage of our welfare system. 
There are also French, Dutch, Spanish, but also Romanians and Bulgarians. It’s very important, 
because we have to avoid that people can take advantage of our welfare system.’) (author’s 
translation); see ‘ll faut éviter qu'il y ait des gens qui profitent de notre système social’, RTL, 8 December 
2013 <http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/politique/maggie-de-block-il-faut-eviter-que-des-gens-
profitent-de-notre-systeme-social-video--396658.aspx> accessed 10 December 2015.  
115 Article 14(2) read in combination with recital (16). See further, Section 6.9 (Restrictions on Entry and 
Residence). 
116 Recital (16) of the Directive specifies that: 
‘As long as the beneficiaries of the right of residence do not become an unreasonable burden on 
the social assistance system of the host Member State they should not be expelled. Therefore, 
an expulsion measure should not be the automatic consequence of recourse to the social 
assistance system. The host Member State should examine whether it is a case of temporary 
difficulties and take into account the duration of residence, the personal circumstances and the 
amount of aid granted in order to consider whether the beneficiary has become an unreasonable 
burden on its social assistance system and to proceed to his expulsion. In no case should an 
expulsion measure be adopted against workers, self-employed persons or job-seekers as 
defined by the Court of Justice save on grounds of public policy or public security.’ 
117 Art 42bis as amended by Law of 19 March 2014 (n 65). 
118 Commission, Reasoned Opinion, Case 2011/2033 (n 67). 
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Secondly, the Immigration Law does not appear to meet the standards of 
the directive as regards rights of appeal.   
It should be observed that the right to request an administrative review 
of decisions119 was removed in 2006 as part of wider reforms in the field of 
immigration120 and the establishment of an Immigration Appeals Council121 to 
judicially review decisions of the Immigration Office. 
The Immigration Appeals Council only has the power to review the 
legality of decisions taken by the Immigration Office.122 However, it has no 
power to remake decisions unlike, for example, the case of asylum decisions.123  
However, the Directive requires that judicial review should extend to ‘an 
examination of the legality of the decision, as well as the facts and circumstances 
on which [a] measure [to restrict free movement rights] is based’.124 Moreover, 
it will also be recalled that principle of effective judicial protection under EU 
law requires that judicial review of administrative decisions relating to 
individual EU rights must address both the facts and the law.125  
                                                            
119 Former arts 64-66. 
120 Loi du 15 septembre 2006 modifiant la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, 
l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers (MB 06-10-2006, p 53533) (Law of 15 September 2006 
amending the Law of 15 December 1980 on the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners).  
121 Conseil du Contentieux des Étrangers established by arts 39/1-39/85 of the Immigration Law. 
122 Arts 39/2, § 2,  39/81 
123 Art 39/2, § 1. 
124 Article 31(3) of the Directive. 
125 See to that effect Joined Case C-65/95 and 111/95 Shingara and Radiom [1997] ECR I-3343, paras 
34-35 (national remedies against an administrative decision refusing entry or residence must entail 
either an appeal before a court that involves a review of the substance and an exhaustive examination 
of all the facts and circumstances, or, where such an appeal is limited to the legality of the national 
decision or there is no appeal, the intervention of an independent review authority that engages in an 
exhaustive examination of all the facts and circumstances before a final administrative decision is 
taken); Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri [2004] ECR I-5257, para 82 
(incompatibility of German system of judicial review which did not allow national courts to consider 
new facts that have arisen after an administrative decision was taken to deport an EU citizen on public 
policy grounds); ibid, paras 106 and 110-111 (incompatibility of German system of judicial review which 
[274] 
 
Even though the Belgian Council of State has ruled that Belgian law 
complies in this respect,126 the Immigration Appeals Council’s practice does not 
appear to meet the standards of judicial review set by EU law in this respect. For 
example, in reviewing the legality of administrative decisions of the 
Immigration office, the Immigration Appeals Council bases its review as at the 
date when the decision was taken127 and does not take into account any 
pertinent facts that may have arisen after a decision was taken.128  There is 
therefore lingering doubt as to whether the Immigration Law complies with the 
provisions of the Directive on this issue. 
The prohibition on the imposition of a ban on entry on persons against 
whom a decision has been taken on grounds other than public policy, public 
security or public health129 is not transposed. The specific protections 
                                                            
only provided for the control of legality of an administrative decision to deport an EU citizen on public 
policy grounds); Case C-136/03 Dörr and Ünal [2005] ECR I-4759, paras 47 and 57 (incompatibility of 
Austrian system of judicial review which only provided for the control of legality of an administrative 
decision ending a right of residence on public policy grounds); Case C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-
8613, para 60 (appeal against a refusal to allow lawyer registered in the UK to be admitted to practice 
in Luxembourg); Case C-69/10 Diouf [2011] ECR I-7151, para 57 (appeal against a refusal to grant 
refugee status under accelerated procedure). See further Nina Półtorak, European Union Rights in 
National Courts (Kluwer 2015) 199-201. 
126 Conseil d’État, arrêt no 216.419 du 23 novembre 2011 (Council of State, 23 November 2011). 
127 See for example, Conseil du Contentieux des Étrangers, no 105.657 du 24 juin 2013 (Immigration 
Appeals Council, 24 June 2013), citing Conseil d’État, arrêt no 110.548 du 23 septembre 2002 (Council 
of State, 23 September 2002); Conseil du Contentieux des Étrangers no 140.965 du 13 mars 2015, 
(Immigration Appeals Council, 13 March 2015)  
128 This would be contrary to Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri (n 125), 
para 82, in which the Court held that ‘Article 3 of Directive 64/221 [corresponding to Article 27(2) of 
Directive 2004/38] precludes a national practice whereby the national courts may not take into 
consideration, in reviewing the lawfulness of the expulsion of a national of another Member State, 
factual matters which occurred after the final decision of the competent authorities which may point to 
the cessation or the substantial diminution of the present threat which the conduct of the person 
concerned constitutes to the requirements of public policy. That is so, above all, if a lengthy period has 
elapsed between the date of the expulsion order and that of the review of that decision by the competent 
court’. 
129 Article 15(3). Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 40; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 83. 
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concerning expulsion130 and exclusion orders131 are no adequately 
transposed.132 
The provisions which have also been incompletely transposed include 
those requiring the Belgian authorities to give full and precise reasons.133 
Transposition Outcomes: Procedural safeguards and rights of appeal 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
14 Retention of right of residence
14(2) verification of residence rights 
Not transposed – non 
compliant 
14(3) 
no automatic expulsion in case of recourse 
to social assistance 
Incomplete
14(4)(a) 




no expulsion of jobseekers looking for work 
who have genuine chances of being engaged 
Incorrect
15 Procedural safeguards 
15(1) 
procedures provided for by Art. 30, 31 shall 
apply by analogy 
Incomplete
15(2) 




no ban on entry for expulsion decision 
taken on other grounds 
Incorrect
26 Checks 
26(1) option to carry out checks Correct
30 Notification of decisions 
30(1) notification in writing Incorrect
30(2) 
full and precise information of the public 
policy, public security, public health 
grounds 
Incorrect
30(3) advising of legal remedies Correct
30(3) 
citizen must be allowed one month for 
leaving MS, except if duly substantiated 
urgency 
Correct
31 Procedural safeguards 
31(1) right to judicial review or appeal Correct
31(2) interim order suspends removal Correct
31(3) 
redress procedure (legality and facts; 
proportionality) 
Incomplete
31(4) right to submit defence in person (fair trial) Correct
32 Duration of exclusion orders 
32(1) 
right to submit an application for lifting 
exclusion order within three years 
Incorrect
32(1) 




130 Article 33. 
131 Article 32. 
132 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 53-56; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 124-137. 
133 Article 30(2); Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 55; Correspondence Table for Belgium (n 64) 
120. This also affects the transposition of Art 15(1). 
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Transposition Outcomes: Procedural safeguards and rights of appeal 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
32(2) 
no obligation for MS to allow entry during 
consideration of application 
Correct
33 
Expulsion as a penalty or legal 
consequence 
33(1) 
Expulsion may not be imposed as penalty
unless Art. 27, 2 8, 29 are respected 
33(2) 
Right to re-evaluation of expulsion order 
after 2 years 
35 Abuse of rights 
35(2) 




Table 7.1.9: Transposition outcomes for procedural safeguards and rights of appeal 
(Article 14-15, 30-33, 35 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
 
7.2 Application in Belgium 
Responsibility for the application of the Immigration Law in respect of 
EU citizens and their family members is shared between the municipalities and 
the Immigration Office.134 Municipalities will handle straightforward cases such 
as EU citizens who can show proof of work, self-employment or enrolment on a 
course of study.135 More complicated cases such as jobseekers, self-sufficient 
persons who rely on another for their means of support136 will be handled by the 
Immigration Office, as well as all applications for a residence card by non-EU 
family members.137 
As a result, the application of the rules on EU residence by the 
municipalities can vary from one region to another. In this respect the ECAS 
comparative study found that ‘in Flanders the quality of administrative services 
ranges from ‘poor’ to ‘satisfactory’ depending on the service in question. In 
general in Wallonia, the administrative service provided to Union citizens is 
                                                            
134 Conformity Study for Belgium (n 19) 19-20. 
135 Royal Decree (1980 amended) (n 3), art 51, §3; Circular of 23 May 2008 (n 77), para C.1, 1°. 
136 Circular of 23 May 2008 (n 77), para C.1, 2°. 
137 Circular of 23 May 2008 (n 77), para C.2, A) 
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poor.’138 Moreover, the report found that publicity about the Directive139 is 
‘directed more at the administration than the public’.140 
7.2.1 Application process 
Belgium has chosen to make registration compulsory for both EU 
citizens141 and their non-EU family members.142 
The available literature143 suggest that the formalities are not being 
consistently applied by municipalities.144 As regards non-EU family members, 
complaints include a lack of information, delays and excessive requests for 
documents145 in support of their applications. A petition has also been lodged 
before the European Parliament concerning Belgium’s expulsion policy.146 
                                                            
138 ECAS comparative study (n 9) ix.  
139 Article 34 requires that Member States should ‘disseminate information concerning the rights and 
obligations’ arising under the Directive. 
140 ibid, ix. 
141 Article 8(1) of the Directive corresponding to art 42 §1.  
142 Article 9(1) of the Directive corresponding to art 42 §3. 
143 Xavier Le Den and Janne Sylvest, ‘Understanding Citizens' and Businesses' Concerns with the Single 
Market: a View from the Assistance Services’ (Report for Commission, Ramboll 2011)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/20concerns/feedback_report_en.pdf> accessed 
26 May 2015, who draw on information from information on cases handled by SOLVIT and Your Europe 
Advice; see further Annual reports for SOLVIT (2004-2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/documents/index_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015; Commission, Single 
Market Scoreboard (SOLVIT governance tool) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/solvit/index_
en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015; Annual reports for Your Europe Advice (2007-2010) 
<http://europa.eu/youreurope/advice/about_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015; Commission, Single 
Market Scoreboard (Your Europe Advice governance tool) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/youreurope_a











The application process has been the subject of a comparative study that 
assesses outcomes in the application process.147 The results for Belgium are 
summarised in the table that follows. 
  
                                                            
147 Astrid Henningsen, Maylis Labayle, Camino Mortera and Rossella Nicoletti ‘Evaluation of EU rules 
on free movement of EU citizens and their family members and their practical implementation’ (Report 




Application of the Directive in Belgium 
 
Factual outcome Criteria 




Art 34: information 
dissemination – consistency 
Consistency of information provision (all sources 
provide the same information, there is a natural link 
from general to specific information) 
2.5 0.5 2
Art 34: information 
dissemination to EU citizens 
– accuracy 
Quality and comprehensiveness of the information 
related to EU citizens (main sources) 
5 2 3
Art 34: information 
dissemination to family 
members – accuracy   
Quality and comprehensiveness of the information 
related to non-EU family members of EU citizens (main 
sources) 
5 2 3
Art 34: information 
dissemination – availability 
Availability of different sources of information (web, 
print, hotline) 
5 3 3
 Overall rating information provision 17.5 7.5 11




Art 8(3) and recital (14): 
documents comprehensively 
listed 
Supporting documentation requested by hosting MS–
EU citizens 
5 2 3
Art 9(2) and recital (14): 
documents comprehensively 
listed 
Supporting documentation requested by hosting MS – 
TCN family members of EU citizens 
5 2 3
 Overall rating preparation of applications 10 4 5




Art 8(2) and recital (14): 
undue administrative burden 
to be avoided 
Nature of the lodging system. Ease of lodging and 
requirements for leaving of documents with the 
competent authority 
5 2 3
Case C-424/98: proof by any 
appropriate means 
Flexibility in terms of acceptance of alternative 
appropriate means of proof 
5 2 3
Art 25(2): charge not 
exceeding that imposed on 
nationals for similar 
documents 
Application fees 5 3 3
 Overall rating submission of applications 15 7 9




Art.8(2): immediate issue of 
registration certificate 
 
Time needed from the successful lodging to effectively 
receiving the residence documents – EU citizens 
10 2 6
Art.10(1): issue of residence 
card no later than six months 
from date of application 
Time needed from the successful lodging to effectively 
receiving the residence documents – family members 
10 2 6
 Overall rating issuance of the residence 
document  
20 4 13
  Total rating 62.5 22.5 39




Table 7.2.1 Application outcomes (Belgium) 




The above would tend to confirm that application of the EU residence 
rules by the Belgian authorities is beset by problems in practice despite the 
relatively satisfactory transposition of the Directive. 
7.2.2 Refusal rates 
Regrettably, no information was provided by the Immigration Office 
despite specific requests for information.148 
7.2.3 Expulsion rates 
As the graph below shows, the number of EU citizens and their family 
members who are being ordered to leave the Belgian territory by the 
Immigration Office has been rising steadily.  
The drop in expulsion orders in 2014 may be attributable to a change in 
practice of the Belgian authorities in April of that year. Prior to that date the 
Immigration Office refused to recognise the status of a ‘worker’ to EU citizens 




148 Information requests dated 3 December 2014 and 4 August 2015. 
149 Belgian Immigration Office used to refuse to recognise the status of a ‘worker’ to EU citizens working 
in Belgium under cover of a measure to facilitate access to employment under Article 60 of the law on 
social assistance centres (Loi organique des centres publics d'action sociale du 8 juillet 1978, MB 05-
08-1976, p 9876) on the basis that such work created a ‘burden on social assistance’ under Directive 
2004/38. Following the opening of an investigation by the Commission, the Belgian authorities 
amended their practice from the end of April 2014 so that persons working under such a measure are 
now considered workers under the Directive, see Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, ‘Note de 
Politique Générale – Asile et Migration’, Doc 54 0588/026 (House of Representatives, ‘General Policy 
Note – Asylum and Migration), 28 November 2014, 27-28 
<http://www.lachambre.be/flwb/pdf/54/0588/54K0588026.pdf> accessed 29 December 2015. For 
background, see Marco Martiniello et al, ‘Les expulsions de citoyens et citoyennes européens. Un 
phénomène qui nous alarme, et nous mobilise’ (Université de Liège, 26 May 2014) 
<http://blogs.ulg.ac.be/marcomartiniello/2014/05/26/les-expulsions-citoyens-citoyennes-




Expulsion rates in Belgium 
 
Graph 7.2.3(a) Number of expulsions orders served on EU citizens and family members 
in Belgium (2008-2014)  
Source Belgian Immigration Office 
 
The fourfold increase in expulsions in 2011 compared to the previous year 
can be attributed to the fact that the Belgian authorities started having recourse 
to systematic verification of the right of residence of EU citizens and their family 
members using data collated from the Belgian social security institutions.150  
  
                                                            
150 Office des Étrangers, Rapport Annuel 2011 (2012) (Immigration Office, Annual Report 2011) which 
reports that ‘[i]l a ainsi été mis fin à 989 autorisations de séjour grâce aux informations fournies par la 
Banque Carrefour de la Sécurité sociale’ (residence rights were withdrawn in 989 cases as a result of 
information provided by the social security information exchange) (author’s translation) representing 
64% of 1,542 expulsion orders served that year. For background to information exchange see also n 114. 
See further, Centre Fédéral Migration, ‘2015 - La Migration en Chiffres et en Lettres’ (Federal 







2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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Those affected include citizens from all Member States, although the 
most affected have been Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, as is the case in other 
Member States.151  
Top 5 Nationalities Affected 
2014  2013  2012 2011  2010 
Romania 21% Romania 30% Romania 17% Bulgaria 17% Slovakia 26% 
Bulgaria 6% Bulgaria 14% Bulgaria 10% Slovakia 7% Spain  21% 
Spain  5% Spain  12% Spain  9% Netherlands 7% Netherlands 17% 
Italy 4% Netherlands 11% Netherlands 7% Spain  6% Romania 12% 
Netherlands 4% Italy 10% France 5% Romania 6% Bulgaria 9% 
 
Graph 7.2.3(b) Main nationalities affected by expulsions orders served on EU citizens 
and family members in Belgium (2010-2014) 
Source Belgian Immigration Office 
 
This systemic verification practice could arguably amount to a ‘general 
and consistent practice’ capable of constituting a failure to fulfil Treaty 
obligations.152 
It should be noted however that very few expulsion orders have been 
enforced by the Belgian authorities.153 Nonetheless, the Court of Justice has 
already held in a previous infringement case relating to Belgium that ‘it is of no 
relevance that there is in practice no immediate enforcement of orders for 
deportation’.154 
 
7.3 Enforcement in Belgium 
EU citizens and their family members may avail themselves of either 
administrative or judicial redress mechanisms in order to enforce their rights 
under the Immigration Law or under the directly effective provisions of 
Directive 2004/38 as the case may be.  
 
                                                            
151 See further, Chapter 10 (Implementation of Directive 2004/38 Compared). 
152 See further, Chapter 4, Section 4.3 (Outcomes in Application). 
153 Correspondence from the Belgian Immigration Office dated 1 June 2015. 
154 Case C-408/03 Commission v Belgium [2006] ECR I-2663, para 70. 
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7.3.1 Alternatives to judicial proceedings 
As previously mentioned, the former procedure to request 
reconsideration of an administrative decision was repealed in 2006.155  
Nonetheless, it is possible to address complaints to the Federal 
Ombudsman,156 which is empowered to receive complaints from the public 
concerning instances of maladministration by the Belgian federal authorities.157 
It reports annually to the Chamber of Representatives.158 
Complaints can also be made to the Federal Migration Centre,159 which 
has the mandate to provide advice to foreigners on how they can exercise their 
rights.160 It submits annual reports to the Prime Minister161 drawing its 
attention to possible breaches of the law by the Belgian authorities.162 
Alternatives to court 





Ombudsman Yes No 
 





155 See further, Section 7.1.9 (Procedural safeguards and rights of appeal). 
156 Médiateur Fédéral established by Loi du 22 mars 1995 instaurant des médiateurs fédéraux (MB 07-
04-1995, p 8741) (Law of 22 March 1995 creating the Federal Ombudsmen).  
157 Law of 22 March 1995 (n 153), art 8. 
158 ibid, art 15. 
159 Centre Fédéral Migration (Myria) established by Loi du 15 février 1993 créant un Centre fédéral 
pour l’analyse des flux migratoires, la protection des droits fondamentaux des étrangers et la lutte 
contre la traite des êtres humains (MB 19-02-1993, p 3764) (Law of 15 February 1993 creating a Federal 
Centre for the study of migration flows, the protection of fundamental rights of foreigners and the fight 
against human trafficking). 
160 Law of 15 February 1993 (n 156), arts 2 and 4, 2°. 
161 ibid, art 6. 
162 See for its report ‘2015 - Migration in Numbers and Words’ (n 147) 128-129. 
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7.3.2 Access to justice 
The various factors that influence access to the courts in Belgium such as 
legal representation, costs of procedure and the availability of legal aid is 
summarised in the following table: 
Access to justice 
Factor Nature Comment 
Legal representation Not mandatory Formalistic procedures means lawyer is needed 
in practice 
Appeal filing fee €186.00163 8.3% of average net earnings164 
Availability of legal 
aid 
Yes available to : 
-persons with net monthly income < €952.02165  
(42.6% of average net earnings)166 
-vulnerable persons regardless of income167 
 
Table 7.3.2 Access to justice 
 
                                                            
163 Immigration Law 1980, art 39/68-1 § 1; Arrêté royal du 19 juin 2015 adaptant les montants fixés à 
l'article 39/68-1, § 1er, de la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement 
et l'éloignement des étrangers en fonction de l'évolution de l'indice des prix à la consommation (MB 29-
06-2015, p 37236) (Royal Decree of 19 June 2015 concerning the increase of court fees contained in art 
39/68-1 § 1 of Immigration Law 1980 in relation to the evolution of the consumer prices index), art 1. 
164 This is calculated on the basis of 100% of the average monthly net earnings of a single adult in 
Belgium for 2014 (€2,232.85) as indicated in Eurostat dataset ‘Annual Net Earnings’ (net_nt_net) 
(indicator A1_100, NET): <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/labour-market/earnings/database> 
accessed on 5 December 2015. 
165 Arrêté royal du 18 décembre 2003 déterminant les conditions de la gratuité totale ou partielle du 
bénéfice de l'aide juridique de deuxième ligne et de l'assistance judiciaire (MB 24-12-2003, p 60559) 
(Royal Decree of 18 December 2003 on eligibility conditions for free or partially free second-level legal 
laid), art 1 §1; Service Public Fédéral Justice, Avis ‘Aide juridique de deuxième ligne et assistance 
judiciaire - Adaptation des montants’ (MB 18-08-2015, p 53899) (Justice Ministry, Notice ‘Eligibility 
conditions for second-level legal aid – Amendment of thresholds’). The threshold is amended to take 
account of dependants. The rules also provide for partially free legal aid for those with net monthly of 
€1.212,15, with an uplift in case of dependants, ibid, art 1 §2. See further Commission d’Aide Juridique 
de Bruxelles, ‘Conditions d'accès à l'aide juridique de deuxième ligne’ (Brussels Legal Aid Commission, 
‘Eligibility conditions for second-level legal aid’): 
<http://www.aidejuridiquebruxelles.be/index.php/conditions-d-acces-a-l-aide-juridique-de-
deuxieme-ligne> accessed 3 December 2015. 
166 Idem, n 161. 
167 Royal Decree of 18 December 2003 on eligibility conditions for free or partially free second-level 
legal laid, n 162, art 1 §2. 
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7.3.3 Nature of first instance judicial review  
In Belgium, the judicial enforcement of EU residence rights is entrusted 
to a specialised court, the Immigration Appeals Council, with a further appeal 
on points of law only to the Council of State, Belgium’s Supreme Administrative 
Court. 
The Immigration Appeals Council only has a limited mandate to control 
the legality of the decisions of the administrative authorities.168 








facts not presented 










Yes No No No 
 
Table 7.3.3 Scope of judicial review of decisions on EU residence rights 
 
7.3.4 Preliminary rulings 
Since the Directive came into force, the Belgian courts have made no 
references to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU seeking clarification 
on its provisions. This compares with 32 references made in the period 1968-
2005 when other instruments governed the right of free movement of EU 
citizens.169 
Belgian Immigration Appeals Council has never made a reference for a 
preliminary ruling since it was established in 2006,170 even though it is called 
on almost daily to interpret the Free Movement Directive and other EU legal 
instruments relating to migration and asylum. The reasons it has given include 
                                                            
168 See Section 7.1.9 (Procedural Safeguards and Rights of Appeal). 
169 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L. Brunell, ‘The European Court and National Courts: Data Set on 
Preliminary References in EC Law (Art. 234) 1961-2006’ (2007) <http://www.eu-newgov.org/EU-
Law/deliverables_detail2.asp?Project_ID=26> accessed 30 December 2015.  
170 Luc Leboeuf and Sylvie Saroléa, ‘L’invocation du droit de l’Union européenne devant le Conseil du 
contentieux des étrangers’ in Nicolas Cariat et Janek Nowak, Le droit de l’Union européenne et le juge 
belge’ 309-340, 328-330. 
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the fact that as a court of first instance, it has no obligation to make references 
under Article 267 TFEU171 or by reference to the acte clair and acte éclairé 
doctrines.172173 
This appears surprising as the Belgian Courts have been considered 
receptive to EU law and therefore would not be expected to refrain from making 
references to the Court of Justice.174  
Preliminary rulings 





Discretionary No Self-imposed refusal to make 
preliminary rulings 
Council of State Mandatory Yes Admissibility test used to 
bypass requests for 
preliminary rulings 
 
Table 7.3.4 Attitudes towards preliminary rulings 
 
7.3.5 Publicity of decisions 
The publicity of cases relating to the enforcement of the EU free 
movement rules is important in view of the fact that individuals a bearing a 
greater burden in enforcing the Directive before the national courts, given the 
Commission’s preferred strategy to negotiate compliance rather than pursue an 
enforcement policy revolving around infringement proceedings. 
Judicial decisions of the Immigration Appeals Council and the Council of 
State are published on their respective websites.175 However, these are not 
presented in such a way that would make it easy for individuals or lawyers to 
                                                            
171 Conseil du Contentieux des Étrangers, no 120.360 du 12 mars 2014 (Immigration Appeals Council, 
12 March 2014). 
172 Conseil du Contentieux des Étrangers, no 86.212 du 24 août 2012 (Immigration Appeals Council, 24 
August 2012).  
173 See further, Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4 (Reference for a preliminary ruling). 
174 See to that effect, Arthur Dyevre, ‘European Integration and National Courts: Defending Sovereignty 
under Institutional Constraints?’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 139-168. 




identify cases enforcing the national implementing measures. This is made 
more difficult by the fact that Belgium chose to amend its unitary Immigration 
Law rather than create a separate legal instrument. 
Publicity of judicial decisions 
Court level Availability 
of reports 
Visibility of EU 
residence cases  
Availability of statistics on 
EU residence cases 
Immigration Appeals 
Council  
Yes Low No 
Council of State Yes Low No 
 





7.4 Conclusions on Implementation in Belgium 
Belgium has chosen to transpose the Directive through the parliamentary 
enactment of consolidating legislation that amends the unitary law governing 
the entry and residence of non-nationals on Belgian territory. Only twelve 
provisions and sub-provisions were identified as following a literal approach to 
transposition.176  Belgium can therefore be said to have followed an elaborative 
approach to the drafting of the Free Movement Directive. 
Overall, Belgium’s transposition of the Directive was satisfactory in 
comparison to other Member States, although it was slightly below the average 
across Member States. The level of compliance in transposition was 67% 
compared to the EU average of 71%. This has improved with compliance 
reaching 75%, notably as a result of the Commission’s infringement action. The 
weakest part of transposition relates to procedural safeguards and rights of 
appeal. 
Owing to its constitutional structure, responsibility for the application of 
the rules is shared between the municipalities, which handle simple cases of 
registration of EU citizens and the federal Immigration Office which handles 
more complicated cases and all applications by non-EU family members. 
However, the inconsistent application of the rules in Belgium and the lack of 
information for EU citizens and their family members has led to the correctness 
in the practical application of the rules being rated very poorly at 33%, 
compared to an average of 62% across all Member States. This is despite 
improvements in the transposition of the Directive. Moreover, the exchange of 
information on EU benefits claimants established between the Belgian 
authorities has enabled the Immigration Office to undertake systematic 
verification of residence rights leading to expulsion orders being served on an 
                                                            
176 Article 2(2)(a), Article 7(1)(a), Article 7(3)(c), Article 7(3)(d), Article 16(3), Article 16(4), Article  
17(1)(c) (second sentence), Article 27(2) (four sub-provisions), and Article 29(2); see Correspondence 
Table for Belgium (n 64). This represents 8% of the total 144 provisions and sub-provisions that needed 
to be transposed.  
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increasing number of EU citizens. This is likely to constitute a ‘general and 
consistent practice’ capable of constituting a failure to fulfil Treaty obligations. 
The weakness of Belgium’s transposition of the Directive’s provisions on 
rights of appeal is reflected by the restricted of judicial review. Although judicial 
enforcement is entrusted to a specialised court, the Immigration Appeals 
Council has only been endowed with a limited mandate to control the legality of 
the decisions of the administrative authorities. This may be the source of 
procedural obstacle to the enforcement of rights under the Directive, but this 
would require further in-depth study. 
In Belgium, the free movement of persons is of medium political 
importance because it is associated with a wider political aim of achieving 
budgetary discipline and control over the country’s expenditures, as reflected 
by the considerations that have motivated the establishment of a system to 
verify the residence rights of EU citizens who claim benefits from the Belgian 
social assistance system. 
The motivation of the Belgian authorities towards compliance can be 
characterised as evasive non-compliance in view of the fact that it sought to 
address the allegations of non-compliance made by the European Commission 
after it issued its reasoned opinion, thereby avoiding the initiation of 
infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice for failure to fulfil treaty 
obligations under Article 258 TFEU. 
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8.1 Transposition in Italy 
8.1.1 Overview 
The Directive was transposed into Italian law by Legislative Decree No 
30/2007, 1 which came into force on 11 April 2007. The Legislative Decree has 
been amended on several occasions.2 It is also complemented by a number of 
circulars.3  
Italy’s original transposition of the Directive can be considered 
satisfactory when compared to other Member States and was only slightly better 




1 Decreto Legislativo del 6 febbraio 2007, n 30 ‘Attuazione della direttiva 2004/38/CE relativa al 
diritto dei cittadini dell'Unione e dei loro familiari di circolare e di soggiornare liberamente nel 
territorio degli Stati membri’, GU n 72 del 27-03-2007, (Legislative Decree No 30/2007 of 6 February 
2007 on implementation of Directive 2004/38, hereafter, the ‘Legislative Decree’ or ‘Legislative Decree 
No 30/2007’). For further commentary see, Alessandra Lang and Bruno Nascimbene  ‘L'attuazione in 
Italia della Direttiva 2004/38/CE sulla libera circolazione dei cittadini dell'Unione europea’ (2007) 9 
Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza 43-63; Marcello Di Filippo, ‘La libera circolazione dei cittadini 
comunitari e l'ordinamento italiano : (poche) luci e (molte) ombre nell'attuazione della Direttiva 
2004/38/CE’ (2008) 91 Rivista di diritto internazionale 420-448; Lorenzo D’Ascia, Diritto degli 
stranieri e immigrazione (Giuffrè Editore 2009) 421-458.  
2 The relevant modifications to the Legislative Decree will be subsequently referred to where 
appropriate. 
3 Ministero dell’Interno, ‘Circolari Cittadini Unione Europea’ (2007-2015) (Ministry of the Interior, 
‘Circulars on EU Citizens) <http://servizidemografici.interno.it/it/cittadini-ue/circolari> accessed 7 











Total provisions of Directive to be transposed   144 
Provisions correctly transposed 93 102 90 
Provisions subject to more favourable transposition 8 8 12 
Provisions subject of compliant transposition 101 110 102 
Level of compliance of transposition 70% 76% 71% 
Provisions that are transposed ambiguously 5 8 8 
Provisions that are transposed incorrectly or 
incompletely 30 18 
23 
Provisions not transposed (failure to transpose) 8 8 12 
Provisions subject of non-compliant transposition 43  43 
Level of non-compliance of transposition 30%  29% 
 
Table 8.1.1 Transposition outcomes (Italy) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508) 
 
The European Commission opened infringement proceedings against 
Italy for incorrect transposition of the Directive in 2011.4 As a result, several 
amendments have been made which overall has led to improvements in the 
outcome of transposition of the Directive in Italy.  
In many cases transposition has been literal and the drafting of the 
Legislative Decree has adopted a replicative approach to drafting using the same 
wording as the provisions of the Directive. 
8.1.2 Legislative history 
Italy is a parliamentary republic5 and consists in the State and 
autonomous agencies.6 The Italian Constitution of the Italian Republic provides 
that the State has exclusive legislative power in matters relating to the European 
                                                            
4 Commission, Case 2011/2053 concerning Italy’s incorrect transposition of Directive 2004. The 
infringement action was initiated on 27 October 2011 by the sending of a Letter of Formal Notice. 
Following official correspondence on the matter and amendments made to the Legislative Decree, the 
case was officially closed on 10 December 2013. 
5 Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana, Roma, 27 diccembre 1947 (Constitution of the Italian 
Republic, Rome, 27 December 1947, hereafter the ‘Italian Constitution’ or the ‘Constitution’), arts 1 and 
55. 
6 ibid, art 114. 
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Union.7 The Parliament adopts laws8 on the basis of proposals from the 
Government among others.9  
The practice which has evolved in respect of the transposition of EU 
directives in Italy is for the Parliament to enact a ‘Legge comunitaria’ 
(Community law) that delegates specific powers to the Government by way of 
legislative decree.10 A legislative decree is an instrument enacted by the 
Government which has the force of law on the basis of a delegation from the 
Parliament.11 In 2oo5, the Parliament adopted such a law to delegate powers to 
the Government for the transposition of Directive 2004/38.12  
Italy was late in transposing the Directive. In June 2006, the European 
Commission opened infringement proceedings against Italy for failure to 
                                                            
7 ibid, art 117. 
8 ibid, art 70. 
9 Ibid, art 71. 
10 Anselmo Barone, ‘Rapport Italien’ in XVIII FIDE Congress Report, Volume 1, ‘Les Directives 
Communautaires: Effets, Efficacité, Justiciabilité’ (Stockholm, 3-6 June 1998) 314-331, 314-319; Luigi 
Daniele, Diritto dell’Unione europea (2007) 172-179; Giuseppe Tesauro, Diritto Comunitario (5th ed, 
CEDAM 2008) 168-169; Ugo Villani, Istituzioni di Diritto dell’Unione europea (Cacucci Editore 2008) 
336-342. See also David Hine, ‘European Policy-Making and the Machinery of Italian Government’ 
(2000) 5 South European Society and Politics 25-46; Sergio Fabbrini and Alessia Donà 
‘Europeanisation as Strengthening of Domestic Executive Power? The Italian Experience and the Case 
of the “Legge Comunitaria”’ (2003) 25 Journal of European Integration 31-50.  
11 Article 76 of the Constitution which provides that: ‘The exercise of the legislative function may not be 
delegated to the Government unless principles and criteria have been established and then only for a 
limited time and for specified purposes’ (official translation, Italian Senate, Constitution of the Italian 
Republic (Senato della Repubblica undated). See further, Angelo Antonio Cervati, ‘Les sources et 
catégories des aces juridiques – l’Italie’ in Gerd Winter (ed), Sources and Categories of European Union 
Law (Nomos 1996) 219-234, 223-224. 
12 Legge del 18 aprile 2005, n 62, ‘Disposizioni per l'adempimento di obblighi derivanti 
dall'appartenenza dell'Italia alle Comunita' europee. Legge comunitaria 2004’ (GU n 96 del 27-04-
2005 - Suppl. Ordinario n. 76) (Law No 62 of 18 April 2005 on the fulfilment of obligations resulting 
from Italy’s membership of the European Community, hereafter ‘Legge comunitaria 2004’), art 1, paras 
1 and 2, and annex B. 
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transpose the Directive.13 This was followed by a further reasoned opinion sent 
by the Commission14 at the end of that year.15  It was not until February 2007 
that the Legislative Decree was adopted. The law came into force on 11 April 
200716 resulting in a delay of 346 days as regards the transposition of the 
Directive in Italy.17  
However, the infringement proceedings were only closed on the 27 
November 2008.18 During this time, in the aftermath of the murder of a woman 
in Rome perpetrated by a Romanian citizen,19 the Government sought to pass 
emergency legislation to strengthen measures in respect of the expulsion of 
foreign citizens from Italy. However, the measures in the form of decree-laws20 
                                                            
13 Commission, Letter of Formal Notice, Case 2006/0461 (1 June 2006). See further Commission, ‘Staff 
Working Document – Annex to the 24th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community 
Law (2006) - COM(2007) 398 final’, SEC(2007) 976, Annex IV, Part 2, 219-220. 
 
14See further Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2 (Infringement action by the Commission). 
15 Commission, Reasoned Opinion, Case 2006/0461 (12 December 2006) concerning Italy’s non-
communication of national implementing measures. The case was reportedly referred to the Court of 
Justice on 17 October 2007 but withdrawn on 5 June 2008. See further Commission, ‘Staff Working 
Document –  Annex to the 26th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 
(2008) – COM(2009), SEC (2009), Annex IV, Part 2, 172-173. 
16 Constitution, art 73 provides that laws come into force fifteen days after their publication in the 
Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica (Official Journal of the Italian Republic, hereafter the ‘GU’). 
Legislative Decree 30/2007 was published in the GU on 27 March 2006.  
17 For a comparison of transposition delay, see further, Chapter 10 (Implementation of Directive 
2004/38 Compared). 
18 Commission, ‘Staff Working Document –  Annex to the 26th Annual Report on Monitoring the 
Application of Community Law (2008) – COM(2009), SEC (2009), Annex IV, Part 2, 172-173. 
19 Michaela Latini, ‘Conformity Study for Italy’ 6, Annex to Milieu and Edinburgh University, 
‘Conformity studies of Member States’ national implementation measures transposing Community 
instruments in the area of citizenship of the Union’ (Report for Commission, 2008) (hereafter 
‘Conformity Study for Italy’) 21-22. See further, ‘Italian woman's murder prompts expulsion threat to 
Romanians’, The Guardian (London, 2 November 2007) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/nov/02/italy.international> accessed 18 July 2015.   
20 Decreto-Legge del 1 novembre 2007, n 181 ‘Disposizioni urgenti in materia di allontanamento dal 
territorio nazionale per esigenze di pubblica sicurezza’ (GU n 255 del 2-11-2007) (decaduto GU n 1 del 
02-01-2008) (Decree Law 181/2007 of 1 November 2007 on urgent measures relating to the removal of 
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lapsed due to the Parliament not converting them into law within sixty days of 
their adoption.21   
  However, the Government using its delegated powers under the Legge 
comunitaria 200422 amended the Legislative Decree in February 200823 as 
regards the grounds for expulsion24 among other matters. The Government 
then sought to introduce further measures before Parliament known as the 
‘Pachetto sicurezza’ (security package),25 which would have led to further 
amendment of the Legislative Decree in a way that contravened several of the 
Directive’s provisions.26  However, in the face of mounting criticism from 
European Parliament and the Commission among others, the security package 
                                                            
foreigners from the national territory on grounds of public security) (lapsed);  Decreto-Legge del 29 
dicembre 2007, n 249 ‘Misure urgenti in materia di espulsioni e di allontanamenti per terrorismo e 
per motivi imperativi di pubblica sicurezza’ (GU n 1 del 02-01-2008 ) (decaduto GU n 53 del 03-03-
2008) (Decree Law 249/2007 of 29 December 2007 on urgent measures relating to the expulsion and 
removal of foreigners on for reasons of terrorism and on grounds of public security) (lapsed). 
21 A Decree-Law is an act of primary legislation which the Government can adopt, of its own motion, in 
cases of necessity and urgency, according to Article 77 of the Constitution. It has the same force as a law 
and constitutes a temporary measure that the Government presents to the Parliament for conversion 
into law. Such a measure lapses retroactively if it is not converted into law by the Parliament within 
sixty days of its publication. In case the deadline is missed, a decree-law loses its validity retrospectively. 
In any event, the Parliament may by means of law regulate the effects of any legal relations that have 
arisen from unconverted decrees. 
22 Legge comunitaria 2004 (n 12). 
23 Decreto Legislativo del 28 febbraio 2008, n 32 ‘Modifiche e integrazioni al decreto legislativo 6 
febbraio 2007, n 30, recante attuazione della direttiva 2004/38/CE relativa al diritto dei cittadini 
dell'Unione e loro familiari di circolare e di soggiornare liberamente nel territorio degli Stati membri’, 
GU n 52 del 01-03-2008, (Legislative Decree No 32/2008 amending Legislative Decree 30/2007 of 6 
February 2007 on implementation of Directive 2004/38, hereafter, ‘Legislative Decree No 32/2008’), 
which inserted a new art 5bis and modified art 20. 
24 See further Section 8.1.8 (Restrictions on entry and residence). 
25 See further Massimo Merlino, ‘The Italian (In)Security Package: Security vs. Rule of Law and 
Fundamental Rights in the EU’ (2009) CEPS Challenge Research Paper No 14. 
26 ibid, 16-21. 
 [295] 
 
was withdrawn insofar as the measures related to EU citizens and their family 
members.27 
8.1.3 Beneficiaries 
The provisions on direct family members have been correctly transposed. 
It should also be noted that Ministerial Circular No 39/200728 extends the 
benefit of the Legislative Decree to citizens of Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein 
and Switzerland.   
However, the transposition of provisions relating to partners in a ‘durable 
relationship’ was initially problematic because it required that the partner’s 
Member State of origin should have attested to the durability of the 
relationship.29 This issue has now been resolved following several amendments 
of the Legislative Decree30 which were made following the initiation of 
infringement proceedings by the Commission for incorrect transposition.31  
                                                            
27 European Citizen Action Service, ‘Comparative study on the application of Directive 2004/38 on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States’ (PE 410.650, European Parliament 2009) (hereafter ‘ECAS comparative study’) 42, 
121-123. 
28 Ministero dell’Interno, Circolare del 18 luglio 2007, n 39, ‘Decreto Legislativo 6 febbraio 2007. 
Diritto di libera circolazione e soggiorno dei cittadini dell’Unione e dei loro familiari’ (Ministry of 
Interior, Circular No 39 of 18 July 2007 ‘Legislative Decree of 6 February 2007 n. 30. Right of free 
movement and residence of Union citizens and their family members, hereafter ‘Circular No 
39/2007’) 2. 
29 Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 24; Michaela Latini, ‘Correspondence Table, Italy’, Annex to Milieu 
and Edinburgh University, ‘Conformity studies of Member States’ national implementation measures 
transposing Community instruments in the area of citizenship of the Union’ (Report for Commission, 
2008) (hereafter ‘Correspondence Table for Italy’) 6. 
30 art 3, para 2, b) amended by Legge del 6 agosto 2013, n 97 ‘Disposizioni per l'adempimento degli 
obblighi derivanti dall'appartenenza dell'Italia all'Unione europea - Legge europea 2013’, GU n 194 
del 20-08-2013) (Law No 97 of 6 August 2013 on the fulfilment of obligations resulting from Italy’s 
membership of the European Community, hereafter ‘Law 97/2013’), art 1, para 1, a); new art 10, para 3, 
d-bis inserted by art 1, para 1, d) of ‘Law 97/2013.   
31 Commission, Letter of formal notice sent to Italy, SG(2011)D/18350, C(2011)7523, 28 October 2011 
(Information from Commission dated 3 August 2015 (GestDem 2015/2901)).  
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It should also be noted that, for the purposes of the Legislative Decree, 
the Italian courts have displayed a progressive interpretation of the concept of 
‘spouse’ that would also encompass the parties to a same-sex marriage, 
regardless of the fact that Italy does not recognise same-sex unions.32 It 
therefore follows that since Italy does not recognise registered partnerships as 
equivalent to marriage, such unions fall to be examined under the provisions 
relating to ‘other family members’.33 
Italy has also made use of Article 37 of the Directive to extend the scope 







32 Tribunale di Reggio Emilia, decreto 13-02-2012 (Tribunal of Reggio Emilia, judgment of 13 February 
2012) The case concerned a same-sex Italian and Uruguayan couple who sought to move to Italy after 
getting married in Spain. The appeal concerned the rejection of an application for a residence card by 
the Italian authorities (Questura). The Tribunal first noted that Legislative Decree 30/2007 governs not 
only the situation of EU citizens and their family members wishing to live in Italy, but that it also 
specifically applies to the situation of Italian citizens and their family members (art 23). After noting 
that neither the Directive nor the Legislative Decree specify whether the term ‘spouse’ should be 
interpreted according to the legislation of the host Member State - as it does in the case of the term 
‘partner’ under Article 2(2)(b) of the Directive – the Tribunal went on to decide that the term ‘spouse’ 
should be examined from the point of view of the legislation of the Member State where the marriage 
was lawfully celebrated, in this case Spain. For this purpose, the Tribunal noted it should be sufficient 
for the applicant to produce a document from the country of nationality or origin attesting to the 
existence of a family relationship (for example, a marriage certificate). However, the Tribunal specified 
that this would only serve the purpose of ensuring compliance with the right to residence of family 
members of EU citizens as required under the Directive and the Legislative Decree. For commentary 
see, Massimo Fichera and Helen Hartnell, ‘All you need is law: Italian courts break new ground in the 
treatment of same-sex marriage’ (2012) Helsinki Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No 22 
33 Article 3(2)(b) of the Directive. 
34 Article 23 of the Legislative Decree. 
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Transposition Outcomes: Beneficiaries 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
2 Definitions 
2(1) EU citizen Correct








direct descendants (under the age of 
21) 
Correct
2(2)(c) direct descendants (dependants) 
Correct
2(2)(d) 





EU citizens and family members in 
terms of Art. 2 
Correct
3(2)(1)(a) 
facilitation for dependants in the 
country of origin 
Correct
3(2)(1)(a) 




facilitation for family members on 
serious health grounds 
Correct
3(2)(1)(b) 
facilitation for partners (durable 
relationship duly attested) 
Incorrect Correct 
3(2)(2) 




Table 8.1.3: Transposition outcomes for beneficiaries (Articles 2-3 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
 
8.1.4 Entry and exit 
The rights of entry and exit have been correctly implemented and the 
initial problems in non-compliance35 have been addressed36 as part of the 
measures taken to address the infringement action pursued by the Commission 
for incorrect transposition.37 
The only element of non-compliance relates to the option of Member 
States to require EU citizens and their family members to declare their presence 
within ‘a reasonable and non-discriminatory period of time’.38 The Legislative 
Decree was amended in this respect,39 but this required the Ministry of the 
                                                            
35 Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 26; Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 10-12. 
36 Art 6, para 2 was amended by Law 97/2013, art 1, para 1, b). 
37 Commission, Letter of formal notice sent to Italy, 28 October 2011 (n 31). 
38 Article 5(5) of the Directive. 
39 A new art 5bis was inserted by Legislative Decree No 32/2008 (n 22). 
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Interior to adopt an implementing decree to specify the deadline. This has yet 
to be adopted. However, a form is available for the purposes of making a 
declaration to the Italian police force.40 The effect of not making declaration is 
that a person is presumed to be residing in Italy for more than three months, 
unless proof to the contrary is shown. This is incorrect because this 
presumption effectively adds requirements not foreseen by the Directive.  
Transposition Outcomes: Entry and Exit 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
4 Right of exit 
4(1) 




right of exit for TCN family 
members (passport) 
Correct
4(2) no visa or equivalent formality Correct
4(3) 
ID or passport stating the 
nationality of the holder 
Correct
4(4) 
territorial validity of the passport (5 
years if MS do not issue ID cards 
Correct
5 Right of entry 
5(1)(1) 




right of entry for TCN family 
members (passport) 
Correct
5(1)(2) no visa or equivalent formality 
Correct
5(2)(1) 
obligation to hold entry visa for TCN
members (Reg. No. 539/2001) 
Correct
5(2)(2) residence card exemption 
Correct
5(2)(3) facilitation to obtain entry visa Correct
5(2)(4) 
accelerated procedure for issuing 
visa, free of charge 
Correct
5(3) 
entry or exit stamp (passport TCN




all opportunities to enter without 
valid travel documents 
Incorrect Correct 
5(5) presence report (optional) Incorrect Incorrect 
 
Table 8.1.4: Transposition outcomes for entry and exit (Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 
2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 





40 Minisro dell’Interno, ‘Formulario: Dichiarazione di presenza/Déclaration de Présence/Declaration 
of presence/ Declaration de entrada/Aufenthaltserklarung’ (Ministry of the Interior, ‘Declaration of 
presence form’ <http://img.poliziadistato.it/docs/moduldich.pdf> accessed 15 August 2015. 
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8.1.5 The right of residence 
The provisions on the right of residence are on the whole correctly 
transposed by the Legislative Decree. Certain problems have been addressed as 
part of the Commission’s infringement action.41 This concerned the right of 
residence of non-EU family members for up to three months,42 the requirement 
that non-EU family members should produce a visa when applying for a 
residence card,43 and the documents needed in support of applications.44 
Nonetheless various problems remain that not yet been fully addressed. 
Crucially, the Legislative Decree still fails to transpose the six-month deadline45 
that applies to the issue of a residence card to non-EU family members.46 
In connection with residence formalities, the Legislative Decree imposes 
obligations that go beyond those contained in the Directive. The Italian rules 
require self-sufficient persons and students to hold resources in line with the 
Italian immigration rules that apply to non-EU citizens.47 Moreover Circular No 
                                                            
41 Commission, Letter of formal notice sent to Italy, 28 October 2011 (n 31). 
42 Article 6(2) of the Directive. Decreto-Legge 23 giugno 2011, n 89 ‘Disposizioni urgenti per il 
completamento dell'attuazione della direttiva 2004/38/CE sulla libera circolazione dei cittadini 
comunitari e per il recepimento della direttiva 2008/115/CE sul rimpatrio dei cittadini di Paesi terzi 
irregolari’ (GU n 144 del 23-06-2011) (Decree Law 89/2011 of 29 December 2007 on urgent measures 
relating to the additional implementation of Directive 2004/38 on the free movement of EU citizens 
and for the transposition of Directive 2008/115 on the return of third country nationals unlawfully 
present, hereafter ‘Decree Law 89/2011’) amended art 6, para 2 of the Legislative Decree. 
43 Art 10, para 3, a) as amended by Decree Law 89/2011 (n 41), art 1, para 1, d), 1). 
44 Art 10, para 3, b) was amended by Decree Law 89/2011 (n 41), art 1, para 1, d), 1) in connection with 
applications made by ‘other family members’. 
45 Article 10(1) provides that a residence card is to be issued to non-EU family members ‘no later than 
six months from the date on which they submit the application’. 
46 Art 10, para 1 of the Legislative Decree fails to transpose the six-month deadline. 
47 Art 9, para 3, b) and c) and art 9, para 4 of the Legislative Decree which requires that self-sufficient 
persons and students should have sufficient resources by reference to the criteria set out in art 29, 
para 3, b) of Legislative Decree 286/1998 of 25 July 1998 containing the consolidated law on 
immigration (Decreto Legislativo del 25 luglio 1998, n 286, ‘Testo unico delle disposizioni 
concernenti la disciplina dell'immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero’ GU n 191 del 18-
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19/200748 appears to impose minimum financial requirements which would be 
in breach of the Directive.49 Although the Legislative Decree has been amended 
to require the assessment of the sufficiency of resources must be based on the 
personal circumstances of the applicant,50 the fact remains that these are 
additional requirements create ambiguity. 
The right to retain the status of a worker in various circumstances51 has 
been incorrectly transposed52 as relating only to the retention of the right of 
residence. This matters because retaining the status of a worker (as opposed to 
a right of residence) triggers additional rights under Regulation 492/2011,53 
such as the right to equal treatment in respect of social and tax advantages.54 
The Legislative Decree contains an additional condition that must be 
fulfilled in the case of a non-EU family member who claims a right to remain in 
Italy on the basis of domestic violence by requiring that formal legal 
                                                            
08-1998 - Supplemento Ordinario n 139).  See further Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 28-29; 
Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 23-30. 
48 Ministero dell’Interno, ‘Circolare n 19 del 6 aprile 2007: Attuazione della Direttiva 2004/38/CE del 
Parlamento Europeo e del Consiglio del 29 Aprile 2004 relativa al diritto dei cittadini dell’unione e dei 
loro familiari di circolare e di soggiornare liberamente nel territorio degli Stati Membri, che modifica 
il regolamento CEE 1612/68 ed abroga le Direttive 64/221/CEE, 68/360/CEE, 72/194/CEE, 
73/194/CEE, 75/34/CEE, 75/35 (CE), 90/364/CEE, 90/365/CEE e 93/96/CEE’ (Ministry of the 
Interior, Circular No 19 of 6 April 2007 on the transposition of Directive 2004/38/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 concerning the right of Union citizens and 
their family member to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, that modifies 
Regulation EEC n. 1612/68 and repeals Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 
73/194/EEC, 75/34/EEC; 75/34 (EC), 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, hereafter ‘Circular 
No 19/2007’) 4-5. 
49 Article 8(4) provides that no fixed amount can be imposed in this regard.  
50 Art 10, 3bis as inserted by Decree Law 89/2011 (n 41), art 1, para 1, e).   
51 Article 7(3) of the Directive. 
52 Art 7(3) of the Legislative Decree. See further, Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 27; Correspondence 
Table for Italy (n 28) 16-18. 
53 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 




proceedings are on-going or have resulted in a conviction.55 The existence of 
formal legal proceedings is not specified the Directive.56   
 
Transposition Outcomes: Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
6 Residence (up to three months) 
6(1) EU citizens Correct
6(2) TCN family members Incorrect Correct 
7 Residence (more than three months) 
7(1)(a) workers or self-employed persons Correct
7(1)(b) 
sufficient resources and 




study (comprehensive sickness 
insurance +assurance of sufficient 
resources) 
Correct
7(1)(d) Family member 
Correct
7(2) TCN family members 
Correct
7(3)(a) retention in case of illness or accident Incorrect
7(3)(b) 
involuntary unemployment after 1 
year of employment 
Incorrect
7(3)(c) 
involuntary unemployment after 
fixed-term contract (less than 1 year) 
Incorrect
7(3)(d) 




special rules concerning family 
members of students 
Correct
8 
Administrative formalities for EU 
citizens 
8(1) option: register Correct
8(2) deadline to register Correct
8(2) immediate issue Correct
8(2) Sanctions Correct
8(3) 




documents required from self-
sufficient persons 
Incorrect Ambiguity 
8(3) documents required from students Incorrect Ambiguity 
8(4) 








Administrative formalities for family 
members who are not EU citizens 
9(1) issue a residence card  Correct
                                                            
55 Art 12, para 2, c) of the Legislative Decree.  
56 Article 13(2)(c) of the Directive. 
57 This provision was identified as ambiguously transposed by the Commission; see Information from 
Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508). However, no such problem in transposition 
could be identified. Moreover, no such ambiguity is identified by the Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 
28 or the Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 22. 
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Transposition Outcomes: Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
9(2) deadline for submission Correct
9(3) Sanctions Correct
10 Issue of residence cards 
10(1) title of the residence card Incorrect Correct 
10(1) issue deadline of six months 
Not transposed – non 
compliant 
10(1) certificate of application Correct
10(2) 
documents required from TCN family 
members 
Incorrect Correct 
11 Validity of the residence card 
11(1) period of validity Correct
11(2) temporary absences Correct
12 
Retention of the right of residence in 
the event of death or departure of the 
EU citizen 
12(1) 
retention of residence of EU family 
members - death/departure 
Correct
12(1) 




retention of residence of TCN family 
members - death of the EU citizen 
Correct
12(3) 
child in education and parent having 
custody - departure of the EU citizen 
Correct
13 
Retention of the right of residence in 
the event of divorce, annulment of 
the marriage or termination of 
registered partnership 
13(1) EU family members Correct
13(1) 
conditions for the right of permanent 
residence 
Correct
13(2) TCN family members 
Correct
13(2)(a) 
3 years of marriage, including 1 year 
in the host MS 
Correct
13(2)(b) custody of the EU citizen's children 
Correct
13(2)(c) domestic violence Incorrect
13(2)(d) 




conditions for the right of permanent 
residence 
Correct
13(2) exclusively on personal basis Not transposed – compliant
14 Retention of the right of residence 
14(1) 
retention of the right of residence 
under Art. 6 
Correct
14(2) 
retention of the right of residence 
under Art. 7, 12, 13 
Correct
14(2) verification of residence rights 
Not transposed – non 
compliant  
14(3) 
no automatic expulsion in case of 
recourse to social assistance 
Not transposed – non
compliant 
14(4)(a) 




no expulsion of jobseekers looking for 




Table 8.1.5: Transposition outcomes for residence (Article 6-14 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 




8.1.6 The right of permanent residence 
The provisions on the right of permanent residence has been almost all 
correctly transposed. The notable exceptions are the omission of the reference 
to the automatic renewability of permanent residence cards issued to non-EU 
citizens,58 the ambiguity concerning worker who have worked at least three 
years in Italy but then become a cross-border worker in another Member 
State,59 and incorrect drafting on the provisions relating to loss of permanent 
residence60 and continuity of residence.61 
Transposition Outcomes: Permanent Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
16 
General rule for EU citizens 
and their family members  
16(1) legal residence during 5 years Correct
16(1) 
not subject to the Chapter III 
conditions 
Correct
16(2) TCN family members Correct
16(3) temporary absences Correct
16(4) 
only lost through absences 
exceeding 2 years 
Correct
17 
Exemptions for persons no 
longer working in the host 
Member State 
17(1)(a) 
worker who reaches retirement 
age after working at least a year 
Correct
17(1)(a)(2) 
retirement age (60) in case 
national law is silent 
Correct
17(1)(b) 
worker permanently incapable 




worker who has worked at least 




periods of employment under 
(a) and (b) 
Correct
17(1)(c)(2) 
periods of involuntary 




58 Article 20(1) of the Directive corresponding to art 17, paras 1) and 2) of the Legislative Decree. See 
further, Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 36; Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 62. 
59 Article 17(1)(c) of the Directive corresponding to art 15, para 1, c) of the Legislative Decree. See 
further, Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 35; Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 55-56. 
60 Article 20(3) of the Directive corresponding to art 17, para 4 of the Legislative Decree. See further, 
Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 36; Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 63. 
61 Article 21 of the Directive corresponding to art 18 of the Legislative Decree. See further, Conformity 
Study for Italy (n 19) 36; Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 62. 
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Transposition Outcomes: Permanent Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
17(2) 
exemption from periods under 
(a) or (b) if citizen's spouse or 








family members acquire PR 
upon death of worker (if worker 
resided for min. 2 years) 
Correct
17(4)(b) 
family members acquire PR 
upon death of worker (if of 




family members acquire PR 
upon death of worker (if worker 
spouse is ex-national) 
Correct
18 
Acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence by 
certain family members who 
are not EU citizens 
18 
permanent residence of family 
members having retained right 













permanent residence to be 
issued as soon as possible 
Correct
20 
Permanent residence card for 
family members who are not 
nationals of a Member State 
20(1) 




submission before expiration of 
the residence card 
Correct
20(2)(2) Sanctions Correct
20(3) temporary absences Incorrect
21 Continuity of residence 
21 
continuity of residence can be 
proved by any means; 
expulsion breaks continuity 
Incorrect
 
Table 8.1.6: Transposition outcomes for permanent residence (Article 16-21 of Directive 
2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 







8.1.7 Equality of treatment 
The drafting of the provisions of the Legislative Decree on equality of 
treatment has been reported as incorrect.62 
There are additional problems generated by other measures running into 
conflict with these provisions. One example relates to healthcare.63 In theory, 
equal treatment should enable EU citizens to be able to access the Italian 
national health service (‘Servizio Sanitario Nazionale’ or SSN) under the same 
conditions that apply to Italian citizens.64 However, the existing rules 
guaranteeing access to healthcare for non-nationals65 do not extend non-EU 
citizens.66 The conditions under which EU citizens have instead been the subject 
of a Circular from the Health Ministry.67 These only allow EU citizens who work, 
study or produce proof of social security coverage in another Member State to 
access SSN services. Alternatively, they must hold a permanent residence card. 
This requirement represents a breach of Article 25 of the Directive, which 
provides that the exercise of a right is not conditional upon holding a residence 
document,68 which has not been correctly transposed.  
                                                            
62 Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 37-38; Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 65-68.  
63 Problems with access to healthcare have been reported in Neva Cocchi, Dana Gavril, Nicola Grigion, 
Carlos Guimaraes, Celia Mayer, Nuria Sanchez, Anna Sibley, Libor Studený, ‘Citizens Without 
Borders: Free movement and residence in the European Union a challenge for European citizenship’ 
(2013) 37-42. 
64 Article 32 of the Constitution recognises ‘health as a fundamental right of the individual and as a 
collective interest, and guarantees free medical care to the persons in need’.   
65 Legge 6 marzo 1998, n 40 ‘Disciplina dell'immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero’ 
(GU n 59 del 12-3-1998 - Suppl Ordinario n 40) (Law of 6 March 1998 regulating immigration and the 
status of foreigners), art 32. 
66 ibid, art 1, 2). 
67 Ministero della Salute, Circolare del 3 agusto 2007 ‘Diritto di soggiorno per i cittadini comunitari’ 
(Ministry of Health, Circular of 3 August 2007 ‘Right of residence for EU citizens’). 
68 Article 25 provides that ‘[p]ossession of a registration certificate as referred to in Article 8, of a 
document certifying permanent residence, of a certificate attesting submission of an application for a 
family member residence card, of a residence card or of a permanent residence card, may under no 
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The rules also create a further potential problem of discrimination, 
because EU citizens who do not work or study are prevented from accessing SSN 
services under the same conditions as Italians who do not work or study.   While 
there has not been any case law on this issue,69 it is doubtful that Italy could 
claim that healthcare amounts to social assistance which could be denied to EU 
citizens and their family members under Article 24(2) of the Directive.70  
  
Transposition Outcomes: Equal Treatment 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
23 Related rights  
23 right to work Ambiguous  
24 Equal treatment  
24(1) equal treatment Correct  
24(2) 




derogation with regard to 
maintenance aid for studies 
Ambiguous  
25 




possession of residence docs cannot 
be made precondition for exercise of 
rights 




charge for residence docs not to 
exceed charge for issuing nationals 
with similar documents 
Correct  
 
Table 8.1.7: Transposition outcomes for equality of treatment (Article 23-25 of Directive 
2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
                                                            
circumstances be made a precondition for the exercise of a right or the completion of an administrative 
formality, as entitlement to rights may be attested by any other means of proof’. 
69 However see European Parliament, Notice to Members ‘Petition 1225/2012 by A. d. A. (Italian) 
concerning refusal to allow registration with the Italian health service’, 27 June 2014. 
70 See to that effect, Case C-578/08 Chakroun [2010] ECR I-1839, para 49, in which the Court held 
that ‘[t]he concept of ‘social assistance’ in Article 7(1)(c) of the Directive must be interpreted as 
referring to assistance which compensates for a lack of stable, regular and sufficient resources, and 
not as referring to assistance which enables exceptional or unforeseen needs to be addressed’; Case C-
140/12 Brey [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:565 (judgment of 19 September 2013), para 61, where the Court 
confirmed that the concept of social assistance system ‘must be interpreted as covering all assistance 
introduced by the public authorities, whether at national, regional or local level, that can be claimed 
by an individual who does not have resources sufficient to meet his own basic needs and the needs of 
his family and who, by reason of that fact, may become a burden on the public finances of the host 
Member State during his period of residence which could have consequences for the overall level of 




8.1.8 Restrictions on entry and residence 
In Italy, the transposition of the provisions of the Directive relating to 
restrictions on EU citizens have proved to be the most controversial. 
The original Legislative Decree was not at all compliant in respect of the 
limits placed by the Directive on the ability of the host Member State to restrict 
the free movement rights of EU citizens or their family members on grounds of 
public order or public security.71 One aspect of problem has been the very wide 
scope of the relevant provision of the Legislative Decree72 meant that  ‘in 
practice the expulsion measure set out in Article 20 (3) of Decree 30/2007 could 
be applied when there is simply a risk of harm’.73 
However, following the Commission’s infringement action, it appears 
that the Legislative Decree has addressed some areas of non-compliance with 
the Directive74 although some issues remain. The most notable improvement 
has been the inclusion of a reference to expulsion measures requiring the 
personal conduct of the individual to represent a ‘sufficiently serious threat’ as 
required by the Directive. 
 
Transposition Outcomes: Restrictions on Entry and Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
22 Territorial scope 
22 
right of residence extends to entire MS; 





27 General principles 
                                                            
71 Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 38-46; Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 69-106. See also 
Bruno Nascimbene and Alessia Di Pascale, ‘Italy’ in ‘XXVI FIDE Congress Report, Volume 2: Union 
Citizenship: Development, Impact and Challenges’ (Copenhagen, 28-31 May 2014) 669-681, 673-677. 
72 Art 20. 
73 ECAS comparative study (n 27) 120. 
74 Art 20 as amended by Decree Law 89/2011 (n 41) and Legislative Decree No 32/2008 (n 22); arts 
20-bis and 20-ter inserted by Legislative Decree No 32/2008 (n 22). 
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Transposition Outcomes: Restrictions on Entry and Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
27(1)(1) 
restriction based on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health 
Incorrect Correct 
27(1)(2) not for economic ends Correct
27(2)(1) principle of proportionality Correct
27(2)(1) based on the personal conduct Incorrect Correct 
27(2)(2) 
serious threat to one of the fundamental 
interests of the society 
Incorrect Correct 
27(2)(2) no considerations of general prevention 
Not transposed – non 
compliant 
27(3) 
host MS may request police record from MS 
of origin before issuing residence docs  
Not transposed – non
compliant 
27(4) 
right of re-entry of expelled citizens in 
home MS  
Not transposed –
compliant 
28 Protection against expulsion 
28(1) 
obligation to take account of considerations 
relating to citizen's situation 
Correct
28(2) 
persons who have permanent residence 




persons having resided for 10 years (only 
for imperative grounds of public security) 
Incorrect
28(3)(b) 
minors (only for imperative grounds of 
public security) unless expulsion is in best 
interests of the child  
Incorrect
29 Public health 
29(1) 




no expulsion based on diseases occurring 
after 3 months of residence 
Correct
29(3) option: require of a medical examination Correct
35 Abuse of rights 
35(1) Option: measure against abuse of rights Correct
36 Sanctions 
36 Effective and proportionate sanctions Correct
 
Table 8.1.8: Transposition outcomes for restrictions on entry and residence (Article 22, 
27-29, 35-36 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
  
8.1.9 Procedural safeguards and rights of appeal  
The Legislative Decree also presents several instances of non-compliance 
in connection with procedural safeguards and rights of appeal. 
Firstly, although the Legislative Decree still does not provide protection 
against systematic verification of the right of residence,75 the absence of 
                                                            
75 Article 14(2) provides that ‘where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a Union citizen or his/her 
family members satisfies the conditions set out in Articles 7, 12 and 13, Member States may verify if 
these conditions are fulfilled. This verification shall not be carried out systematically.’  See further 
Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 32; Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 47. 
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transposition of the protection against automatic expulsion in case of recourse 
to social assistance has now been addressed.76 
Secondly, the obligation on the host Member State to provide full and 
precise statement of the reasons77 for taking a measure to restrict the entry or 
residence rights of EU citizens and family members is incorrectly transposed by 
the Legislative Decree.78 There is also an absence of the requirement to specify 
the time limit for an appeal79 The requirement that a person subject to an 
expulsion should be given at least a month to leave the national territory in non-
urgent cases is also missing from the Legislative Decree.80 
Thirdly, as regards the rights of appeal, the Legislative Decree also fails 
to transpose the obligation to ensure that judicial review of decisions extends to 
‘an examination of the legality of the decision as well as of the facts and 
circumstances’ on which an administrative measure that withdraws or restricts 
free movement rights is based.81 While it could be considered that the general 
principles applied by the courts fulfil this requirement,82 Article 31(3) consists 
in a precise and detailed provisions that arguably requires specific 
transposition.83  
Finally, it should also be noted that the various protections relating to 
expulsions84 are not adequately transposed. 
                                                            
76 Art 21, para 1 of the Legislative Decree as amended by Decree Law 89/2011 (n 41), art 1, para 1, h).  
77 Articles 15(1) and 30(2) of the Directive. See further, Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 47; 
Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 108-109. 
78 Art 20, para 10 of the Legislative Decree. 
79 Art 20, para 10 of the Legislative Decree as amended by Legislative Decree No 32/2008 (n 22). See 
further, Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 47; Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 109. The 
obligation to specify the time limit for an appeal is required by Article 30(3) of the Directive. 
80 This requirement is contained in Article 30(3) of the Directive. See further, Conformity Study for 
Italy (n 19) 47; Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 109-110. 
81 Article 31(3) of the Directive. 
82 See for example, Conformity Study for Italy (n 19) 48; Correspondence Table for Italy (n 28) 121. 
83 See to that effect, Case 29/84 Commission v Germany, [1985] ECR 1661, para 31. 




Transposition Outcomes: Procedural safeguards and rights of appeal 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
14 Retention of right of residence
14(2) verification of residence rights 
Not transposed – non 
compliant 
14(3) 
no automatic expulsion in case of recourse 
to social assistance 








no expulsion of jobseekers looking for work 
who have genuine chances of being engaged 
Correct
15 Procedural safeguards 
15(1) 
procedures provided for by Art. 30, 31 shall 
apply by analogy 
Incorrect
15(2) 




no ban on entry for expulsion decision 
taken on other grounds 
Correct
26 Checks 
26(1) option to carry out checks Correct
30 Notification of decisions 
30(1) notification in writing Correct
30(2) 
full and precise information of the public 
policy, public security, public health 
grounds 
Incorrect
30(3) advising of legal remedies Incorrect
30(3) 
citizen must be allowed one month for 
leaving MS, except if duly substantiated 
urgency 
Incorrect
31 Procedural safeguards 
31(1) right to judicial review or appeal Correct
31(2) interim order suspends removal Incorrect
31(3) 
redress procedure (legality and facts; 
proportionality) 
Not transposed – non 
compliant 
31(4) right to submit defence in person (fair trial) Correct
32 Duration of exclusion orders 
32(1) 
right to submit an application for lifting 
exclusion order within three years 
Incorrect
32(1) 




no obligation for MS to allow entry during 
consideration of application 
Correct
33 
Expulsion as a penalty or legal 
consequence 
33(1) 
Expulsion may not be imposed as penalty 
unless Art. 27, 2 8, 29 are respected 
Not transposed – non 
compliant 
33(2) 
Right to re-evaluation of expulsion order 
after 2 years 
Not transposed – non 
compliant 
35 Abuse of rights 
35(2) 




Table: Transposition outcomes for procedural safeguards and rights of appeal (Article 
14-15, 30-33, 35 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburg 







8.2 Application in Italy 
In Italy registration is compulsory for both EU citizens85 and their non-
EU family members.86 
The responsibility for processing of applications is shared between the 
municipalities as regards EU citizens87 and the police questura as regards non-
EU family members.88  
8.2.1 Application process 
The available literature89 suggest that there are practical problems with 
the application of the rules. As regards non-EU family members, complaints 
                                                            
85 Article 8(1) of the Directive corresponding to art 9, para 2 of the Legislative Decree.  
86 Article 9(1) of the Directive corresponding to art 10, para 1 of the Legislative Decree. 
87 Article 8(1) of the Directive corresponding to art 9, para 1 of the Legislative Decree.  
88 Article 9(1) of the Directive corresponding to art 10, para 1 of the Legislative Decree. 
89 Xavier Le Den and Janne Sylvest, ‘Understanding Citizens' and Businesses' Concerns with the Single 
Market: a View from the Assistance Services’ (Report for Commission, Ramboll 2011)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/20concerns/feedback_report_en.pdf> accessed 
26 May 2015, who draw on information from information on cases handled by SOLVIT and Your Europe 
Advice; see further Annual reports for SOLVIT (2004-2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/documents/index_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015; Commission, Single 
Market Scoreboard (SOLVIT governance tool) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/solvit/index_
en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015; Annual reports for Your Europe Advice (2007-2010) 
<http://europa.eu/youreurope/advice/about_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015; Commission, Single 
Market Scoreboard (Your Europe Advice governance tool) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/youreurope_a
dvice/index_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015.  
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include refusals to issue residence cards,90 delays and excessive administrative 
burdens.91 
The application process has been the subject of a comparative study that 
assesses outcomes in the application process.92 The results for Belgium are 
summarised in the table that follows. 
  
                                                            
90 See European Parliament, Notice to Members ‘Petition 1136/2009 by Ecaterina & Alexandru Stirbu 
(Romanian & Moldavian), on the refusal by the Italian authorities to grand Alexandru Stribu a 
residence permit in accordance with Directive 2004/38/EC’, 6 September 2011.  
91 See European Parliament, Notice to Members ‘Petition 1325/2009 by Martin Formosa (Maltese), on 
the excessive administrative burdens encountered by citizens of the EU Member States seeking to 
obtain a residence permit in Italy’, 25 March 2010. 
92 Astrid Henningsen, Maylis Labayle, Camino Mortera and Rossella Nicoletti ‘Evaluation of EU rules 
on free movement of EU citizens and their family members and their practical implementation’ (Report 




Application of the Directive in Italy 
 
Factual outcome Criteria 




Art 34: information 
dissemination – consistency 
Consistency of information provision (all sources 
provide the same information, there is a natural link 
from general to specific information) 
2.5 0.5 2
Art 34: information 
dissemination to EU citizens 
– accuracy 
Quality and comprehensiveness of the information 
related to EU citizens (main sources) 
5 2 3
Art 34: information 
dissemination to family 
members – accuracy   
Quality and comprehensiveness of the information 
related to non-EU family members of EU citizens (main 
sources) 
5 1 3
Art 34: information 
dissemination – availability 
Availability of different sources of information (web, 
print, hotline) 
5 1 3
 Overall rating information provision 17.5 7.5 11




Art 8(3) and recital (14): 
documents comprehensively 
listed 
Supporting documentation requested by hosting MS–
EU citizens 
5 3 3
Art 9(2) and recital (14): 
documents comprehensively 
listed 
Supporting documentation requested by hosting MS – 
TCN family members of EU citizens 
5 2 3
 Overall rating preparation of applications 10 5 5




Art 8(2) and recital (14): 
undue administrative burden 
to be avoided 
Nature of the lodging system. Ease of lodging and 
requirements for leaving of documents with the 
competent authority 
5 3 3
Case C-424/98: proof by any 
appropriate means 
Flexibility in terms of acceptance of alternative 
appropriate means of proof 
5 2 3
Art 25(2): charge not 
exceeding that imposed on 
nationals for similar 
documents 
Application fees 5 2 3
 Overall rating submission of applications 15 7 9




Art.8(2): immediate issue of 
registration certificate 
 
Time needed from the successful lodging to effectively 
receiving the residence documents – EU citizens 
10 2 6
Art.10(1): issue of residence 
card no later than six months 
from date of application 
Time needed from the successful lodging to effectively 
receiving the residence documents – family members 
10 2 6
 Overall rating issuance of the residence 
document  
20 4 13
  Total rating 62.5 20.5 39




Table 8.2.1 Application outcomes (Italy) 





The above would tend to confirm that EU citizens and their family 
members face considerable difficulties when applying to the Italian authorities 
for residence documents despite the relatively satisfactory transposition of the 
Directive. 
8.2.2 Refusal rates 
Regrettably, no information was provided by the Italian Ministry of the 
Interior or the Italian Statistical Agency (ISTAT) despite specific requests for 
information. 93 
8.2.3 Expulsion rates 
Likewise, unfortunately no information could be obtained from the 
Italian Ministry of the Interior or the Italian Statistical Agency (ISTAT) despite 
specific requests for information. 94 
  
                                                            
93 Information requests dated 19 May 2015 and 9 July 2015. 




8.3 Enforcement in Italy  
In order to enforce their rights under the Legislative Decree or under the 
directly effective provisions of Directive 2004/38 as the case may be, EU 
citizens and their family members may have recourse to administrative or 
judicial redress mechanisms. 
8.3.1 Alternatives to judicial proceedings 
The law on administrative proceedings allows for the possibility to 
request reconsideration of an administrative decision where new facts or 
circumstances come to light.95   
It is also possible to complain to the regional ombudsmen concerning 
instances of maladministration.96   
Alternatives to court 





Ombudsman Yes No 
 




95 Legge del 7 agosto 1990, n 241, ‘Nuove norme in materia di procedimento amministrativo e di 
diritto di accesso ai documenti amministrativi’ (GU n 192 del 18-08-1990) (Law No 241/1990 on new 
rules relating to administrative procedures and administrative documents), art 21-quinquies. 
96 See for example, ‘Roma: un difensore civico per gli immigrati’ (Stranieri in Italia, 29 November 
2007) <http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/attualita/attualita/attualita-sp-754/roma-un-difensore-civico-
per-gli-immigrati.html> accessed 31 December 2015. 
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8.3.2 Access to justice 
The various factors that influence access to the courts in Italy such as legal 
representation, costs of procedure and the availability of legal aid is 
summarised in the following table: 
 
Access to justice Nature Comment 
Legal representation Not mandatory Formalistic procedures means lawyer is needed 
in practice 
Appeal filing fee €9897+€2798 
 
7.2% of average net earnings99 
Availability of legal 
aid 
Yes available to: 
-persons with monthly taxable income of 
€960.70100 
(55.3% of average net earnings)101 
-victims of sexual violence regardless of income 
[check] 
 












97 Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 30 maggio 2002, n. 115, Testo Unico delle disposizioni 
legislative e regolamentari in materia di spese di giustizia (Presidential Decree No 115/2002 
containing the consolidated law relating to court costs) (GU n. 139, 15 June 2002, Suppl. Ordinario n. 
126), n. 115), art 13(1)(b). 
98 Italian revenue stamp (marca di bollo) payable on official act. 
99 This is calculated on the basis of 100% of the average monthly net earnings of a single adult in Italy 
for 2014 (€1,736.18) as indicated in Eurostat dataset ‘Annual Net Earnings’ (net_nt_net) (indicator: 
A1_100, NET): <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/labour-market/earnings/database> accessed on 5 
December 2015. 
100 Presidential Decree No 115/2002 containing the consolidated law relating to court costs, n 31, art 
76(1); Decreto del 7 maggio 2015, Adeguamento dei limiti di reddito per l'ammissione al patrocinio a 
spese dello Stato (GU n 186, 12-08-2015) (Decree of 7 May 2015 updating of thresholds for access to 
legal aid funded by the State). 
101 Idem, n 32. 
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8.3.3 Nature of first instance judicial review  
Judicial appeals against administrative decisions taken in application of the 
Legislative Decree are handled by the ordinary courts which review the legality 









facts not presented 








Full review  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 8.3.3 Scope of judicial review of decisions on EU residence rights 
 
8.3.4 Preliminary rulings 
Since the Directive came into force, the Italian courts have made no 
references to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU seeking clarification 
on its provisions. This compares with 22 references made in the period 1968-
2005 when other instruments governed the right of free movement of EU 
citizens.103 
Preliminary rulings 
Court level Nature References 
made? 
Comment 
Ordinary courts  Discretionary Yes Courts are open to making 
requests for preliminary 
rulings 
Supreme Court Mandatory Yes Courts are open to making 
requests for preliminary 
rulings 
 






102 Article 8 of the Legislative Decree. 
103 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L. Brunell, ‘The European Court and National Courts: Data Set on 
Preliminary References in EC Law (Art. 234) 1961-2006’ (2007) <http://www.eu-newgov.org/EU-
Law/deliverables_detail2.asp?Project_ID=26> accessed 30 December 2015.  
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8.3.5 Publicity of decisions 
The decisions of the lower courts and the appeal courts are not 
systematically reported. The decisions of the Supreme Court are reported on its 
website.104 
Publicity of judicial decisions 
Court level Availability 
of reports 
Visibility of EU 
residence cases  
Availability of statistics on 
EU residence cases 
Ordinary courts  No Low No 
Supreme Court Yes Low No 
 
Table 7.3.5 Publicity given to judicial rulings on EU residence rights  
 
8.4 Conclusions on Implementation in Italy 
Italy chose to transpose the Directive through delegated legislation in the 
form of ‘bolt-on’ legislation that is distinct from its immigration law that 
governs non-EU nationals. Almost fifty provisions and sub-provisions were 
identified as following a literal approach to transposition. Italy can therefore be 
said to have followed a mixed approach to the drafting of the Free Movement 
Directive that combines both replicative and elaborative techniques. 
The level of transposition of the Directive in Italy was satisfactory, 
although it was a fraction below the average when compared to other Member 
States. The level of compliance in transposition was 70% compared to the EU 
average of 71%. This has improved to a level of compliance of 76%, notably as a 
result of the Commission’s infringement action, which has since been closed. 
The weakest part of transposition relates to the safeguards surrounding 
restrictive measures such as expulsions. 
In Italy responsibility for the application of the rules as been shared 
between the municipalities, which handle the registration of EU citizens and the 
police questura which handles applications by non-EU family members and is 





 However, problems in the practical application of the rules by EU 
citizens and their family members in Italy has led to the correctness in the 
practical application of the rules being rated very poorly at 33%, compared to 
an average of 62% across all Member States. This is in spite of the notable 
improvements in the transposition of the Directive in Italy. Regrettably there is 
insufficient data about the practical application of the rules to be able to 
measure the scale of the problem or identify other areas of concern 
Despite the apparent weakness of Italy’s application of the rules, it 
appears that citizens are able to effectively enforce their rights. Enforcement has 
been entrusted to the ordinary courts, with a mandate that enables to control 
the legality of the decisions of the administrative authorities and remake 
decisions where need be. No procedural obstacles were identified despite the 
incomplete transposition of the provisions on appeal rights under the Directive. 
Nonetheless this warrants more investigation. 
In Italy, the free movement of persons is of relatively low importance, but 
overall the issue of immigration has high saliency with public sentiment 
becoming more polarised in Italy.  
The motivation of the Italian authorities towards compliance can be 
characterised as evasive non-compliance in view of the fact that it sought advice 
on the compatibility of its ‘security package’ from the European Commission 
and also strove to address allegations of non-compliance made by the European 
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9.1 Transposition in the UK   
9.1.1 Overview 
In the UK, Directive 2004/382 has been transposed by the Immigration 
(European Economic Area) Regulations 2006.3,4  The EEA Regulations came 
into force on 30 April 2006 thereby meeting the deadline for transposition.5 The 
                                                            
1 This chapter incorporates content previously published by the author in ‘Five Years of the Citizens 
Directive - Part 1’ (2011) 25 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 217-244, and ‘Five 
Years of the Citizens Directive - Part 2’ (2011) 25 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 
331-357. 
2 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158/77 (hereafter the Free Movement Directive, Directive 2004/38 and the 
Directive). 
3 Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, Statutory Instrument 2006/1003 
(hereafter the ‘EEA Regulations’ or the ‘Regulations’). The EEA Regulations apply to the United 
Kingdom. However, separate legislation exists for Gibraltar, through the Immigration Control 
(Amendment) Act 2008, which came into force on 26 June 2008. The rules relating to Gibraltar have 
not been reviewed here. The EEA Regulations do not apply to the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands. 
4 A consolidated version of the EEA Regulations can be consulted on the UK’s official legislation 
database <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/1003/pdfs/uksi_20061003_310515_en.pdf> 
accessed 31 December 2015. 
5 However, it appears that the UK authorities failed to notify the measures for quite some time given 
that the Commission lodged formal proceedings before the Court of Justice on 19 March 2008, although 
the proceedings were withdrawn on 17 December 2008; see Case C-122/08 Commission v UK [2008] 
OJ C 116/18. 
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Regulations have been amended on several occasions.6 The Regulations are 
supplemented by operational guidelines called ‘Modernised Guidance’7 and 
internal guidance called ‘European Operational Policy Team notices’.8    
Transposition in the UK originally performed slightly above the EU 
average, as table 9.1.1 would show. However, this belies ‘substantial conformity 
problems’9 in transposition, which ‘stem from the UK’s attempt to assert, or re-
                                                            
6 The EEA Regulations have been amended by the following instruments: the Immigration (European 
Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/1117; the Transfer of Functions of the 
Asylum and Immigration Tribunal Order 2010, SI 2010/21; the Accession (Immigration and Worker 
Registration) (Revocation, Savings and Consequential Provisions) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/544; the 
Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1247; the 
Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/1547; Immigration 
(European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No 2) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/2560; Immigration 
(European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1391; Immigration (European 
Economic Area) (Amendment) (No 2) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/3032; Immigration (European 
Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/1451; Immigration (European Economic 
Area) (Amendment) (No 2) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/1976; Immigration (European Economic Area) 
(Amendment) (No 3) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2761; the Immigration (European Economic Area) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/694. 
7 Home Office, ‘EEA, Swiss nationals and EC association agreements (modernised guidance)’ (2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/eea-swiss-nationals-and-ec-association-agreements-
modernised-guidance> accessed 15 December 2015. 
8 These are not systematically published. Some have been released under the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000 on the website of the Home Office, see for example 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/home-office-staff-guidance-issued-by-european-
policy-team-from-2013> accessed 31 December 2015. 
9 Jo Shaw, ‘Conformity Study for the United Kingdom’ 6, Annex to Milieu and Edinburgh University, 
‘Conformity studies of Member States’ national implementation measures transposing Community 
instruments in the area of citizenship of the Union’ (Report for Commission, 2008) (hereafter 
‘Conformity Study for the UK’). See further, Jo Shaw and Nina Miller, ‘When Legal Worlds Collide: An 
Exploration of What Happens When EU Free Movement Law Meets UK Immigration Law’ (2012) 38 
European Law Review 137-166; Jo Shaw, ‘Between Law and Political Truth? Member State Preferences, 
EU Free Movement Rules and National Immigration Law’ (2015) 17 Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies, 247-286. 
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assert, greater traditional immigration control in areas where EU law no longer 
allows this.’10  







Total provisions of Directive to be transposed   144 
Provisions correctly transposed 94 93 90 
Provisions subject to more favourable transposition 12 12 12 
Provisions subject of compliant transposition 106 105 102 
Level of compliance of transposition 74% 74% 71% 
Provisions that are transposed ambiguously 9 11 8 
Provisions that are transposed incorrectly or 
incompletely 24 23 
23 
Provisions not transposed (failure to transpose) 5 5 12 
Provisions subject of non-compliant transposition 38 39 43 
Level of non-compliance of transposition 26% 26% 29% 
 
Table 9.1.1 Transposition outcomes (UK) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508) 
 
The approach taken to transposition in the UK is decidedly different to 
the scheme of the Directive.11 Under the EEA Regulations, the right of residence 
is conditional upon being a ‘qualified person’12 or their family member. This 
domestic concept13 is used to encapsulate the various categories of residence 
rights set out in Article 7 of the Directive.14  
As a result, the drafting of the Regulations can be said to follow an 
elaborative approach15 to the method of transposition of the Directive by 
                                                            
10 ibid. 
11 Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 13.  
12 Reg 6. 
13 This finds it origins in the Immigration (European Economic Area) Order 1994, SI 1994/1895 and 
was carried over into the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2000, SI 2000/2326. 
14 Helen Toner, ‘New Regulations implementing Directive 2004/38’ (2006) 20 Journal of Immigration, 
Asylum and Nationality Law 158-178, 162. 
15 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4 (Implications for the Drafting of National Implementing Measures). Only 
six provisions were identified as following a literal approach to transposition, namely Articles 16(4), 
27(2) (four provisions) and 28. 
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choosing the form of ‘bolt-on transposition’16 that stands apart from national 
legislation governing immigration.17 
The European Commission opened infringement proceedings against the 
UK for incorrect transposition of the Directive in 2011, 18 but the UK has so far 
refrained from amending the Regulations to address the Commission’s 
concerns. The case remains open.  
Nonetheless, several amendments have been made since 2008 to address 
some deficiencies in transposition, notably following judgments of the Court of 
Justice handed down in preliminary rulings.19 Despite these amendments to the 
EEA Regulations, the overall level of compliance in transposition of the 
Directive has not improved.20 
9.1.2 Legislative history 
The United Kingdom is a unitary state with some powers devolved to its 
constituent nations.21 However, matters relating to the UK’s membership of the 
EU is reserved to the national Parliament in Westminster,22 as are matters 
relating to the control of immigration.23 The European Communities Act 1972 
was adopted to give effect to the EU Treaties in the UK upon the UK’s accession 
                                                            
16 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2 (Obligations Relating to the Form of Transposition). 
17 The Immigration Rules Immigration Rules, HC 395 <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-
rules> accessed 30 December 2015  
18 Commission, Case 2011/2054 concerning the UK’s incorrect transposition of Directive 2004. The 
infringement action was initiated on 16 June 2011 2009 by the sending of a Letter of Formal Notice. A 
Reasoned Opinion was issued on 26 April 2013. The case has not been closed.  
19 See n 6.  
20 These changes are discussed in the text below. 
21 Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 13. See further, Anthony Wilfred Bradley and Keith Ewing, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law (14th ed, Pearson/Longman 2007) 42-43. 
22 Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 15. See also Bradley and Ewing (n 20) 44, who specify that matters 
reserved for the Westminster Parliament include foreign affairs. This would include matters relating to 
UK membership of the European Union, see Andrew Scott, ‘The Role of Concordats in the New 
Governance of Britain: Taking Subsidiarity Seriously?’ (2000) Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 
8/00, 3-4. 
23 Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 15; Bradley and Ewing (n 20) 44. 
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to the EEC.24 Under section 2(2) of this Act, powers may be delegated to a 
designated Minister to implement EU obligations by way of regulations.25 The 
Secretary of State for the Home Department has been designated26 for the 
purpose of adopting ‘measures relating to rights of entry into, and residence in, 
the United Kingdom’.27 Such measures take the form of statutory instruments,28 
and may be the subject of annulment29 under the so-called ‘negative resolution 
procedure’.30 Under this procedure, a statutory instrument will take effect 
unless either House passes a resolution to object within forty days of the draft 
being laid before Parliament.31 In practice, once the draft statutory instrument 
is laid before Parliament, it will be reviewed by the Joint Committee on 
Statutory Instruments to determine whether special attention needs to be 
drawn to it for reasons set out in the committee’s terms of reference,32 such as 
defective drafting or where it appears ultra vires.33 
                                                            
24 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Rapport Britannique’ in XVIII FIDE Congress Report, Volume 1, ‘Les Directives 
Communautaires: Effets, Efficacité, Justiciabilité’ (Stockholm, 3-6 June 1998) 124-172, 124. See further 
Bradley and Ewing (n 20), 140-143. 
25 Weatherill (n 23) 125. 
26 The European Communities (Designation) (No. 2) Order 2000, SI 2000/1813. 
27 ibid, art 2 and Schedule 1. 
28 The European Communities Act 1972, Schedule 2, para 2(1). 
29 ibid, Schedule 2, para 2(2).  
30 House of Commons Information Office, ‘Statutory Instruments - Factsheet L7’ (2008), 4 which 
explains that statutory instruments subject to the negative resolution procedure ‘become law on the 
date stated on them but will be annulled if either House (or the Commons only, in the case of 
instruments dealing with financial matters) passes a motion calling for their annulment within a certain 
time. This time period is usually 40 days including the day on which it was laid.’  
31 Statutory Instruments Act 1946, section 5(1). 
32 Standing Orders of the House of Commons Relating to Public Business, No 151; 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmstords.htm> accessed 31 December 2015; 
Standing Orders of the House of Lords Relating to Public Business, No 73 
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/house-of-lords-publications/rules-and-guides-
for-business/the-standing-orders-of-the-house-of-lords-relating-to-public-business/>  accessed 31 
December 2015. 
33 See further, Richard Macrory, ‘Sources and categories of legal acts – Britain’ in Gerd Winter (ed), 
Sources and Categories of European Union Law (Nomos 1996) 69-93, 83-84. 
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Following the adoption of Directive 2004/38, a draft of the Regulations 
was made by the Home Office on 30 March 2006 and subsequently laid before 
Parliament on 4 April 2006.34  It was considered by the Joint Committee on 
Statutory Instruments, which determined that special attention need not be 
drawn to them.35  The Regulations subsequently came into force on 30 April 
2006. 
9.1.3 Beneficiaries 
The EEA Regulations apply to all EEA nationals (EU nationals and 
nationals from Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein).36 The Regulations have 
broadened the scope of the Directive to include nationals of Switzerland,37 even 
though Swiss nationals do not benefit from the Directive and are instead 
covered by the EU-Swiss Agreement of Free Movement of Persons.38 
The definition of EEA nationals was amended39 to address the situation 
of dual nationals following the Court of Justice’s ruling in McCarthy.40 The 
                                                            
34 Note that Parliament also scrutinises Commission proposals before their adoption; see Digby Jones, 
UK Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Legislation (Foreign Policy Centre 2005), 3-4. The revised proposal 
for the Directive (COM(2003) 199) was considered by the European scrutiny committees of both 
Houses and was cleared in the House of Commons on 7 September 2003 and in the House of Lords in 
17 September 2003; see further European Scrutiny Committee, Thirty-second Report (2002-03, HC 
42) 90; House of Lords, European Union Committee, Progress of Scrutiny Thirteenth Report (2002-
03) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldeucom/013/01310.htm> 
accessed 31 December 2015. 
35 Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, Twenty-fifth Report (2005-06, HL 181, HC 35) 11.  
36 Reg 2(1).  
37 The EEA Regulations achieve this by including Switzerland in the definition of an ‘EEA State’, reg 
2(1).  
38 Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss 
Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons [2002] OJ L114/6. 
39 SI 2012/1547 (n 6), Sched 1, para 1(d). 
40 Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375, in which the Court held that ‘directive [2004/38] is not 
applicable to a Union citizen who has never exercised his right of free movement, who has always 
resided in a Member State of which he is a national and who is also a national of another Member State’, 
ibid, para 43.  
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result of this change is to exclude from the definition of ‘EEA national’41 any 
person who also holds British citizenship, even if they have previously exercised 
free movement rights, which would appear to go beyond what the Court held in 
McCarthy.42 This amendment now makes the UK’s transposition of Article 2(1) 
of the Directive non-compliant.  
Another problem in transposition was the incorporation of an additional 
requirement not foreseen by the Directive43 that required non-EU family 
members to demonstrate they had previously lawfully resided in another 
Member State prior to moving to the UK in order to benefit from the rights of 
the Directive.44 This was highlighted as a serious problem of conformity’.45   
This requirement was eventually challenged before the Court of Justice 
in Metock46 on a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Irish High Court. 
                                                            
41 Reg 2(1). 
42  See further Elspeth Guild, Steve Peers and Jonathan Tomkin, The EU Citizenship Directive - A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2014) 49-54, who note that McCarthy (n 39) ‘does no exclude 
all dual citizens of two Member States from the scope of the Directive’ (emphasis in original), ibid 49. 
43 Case C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-6241, paras 49-54. See further Guild, Peers and Tomkin (n 41) 
54-58. 
44 The effect of regs 8(2)(a) and 10(1)(b) was to require ‘family members’ and ‘extended family members’ 
covered by Articles 2(2) and 3(2) of the Directive respectively to have been lawfully resident in another 
EEA State before moving to the UK to join their EEA relative. Reg 8(2) had the effect of requiring 
extended family members to be lawfully resident in an EEA State in order to be able to invoke the right 
to the ‘facilitation’ of entry and reside in the UK. Reg 12(1) contained a similar restriction on the ability 
of all family members to apply for an EEA family permit, which is a special visa that enables family 
members of EEA national to join their EEA relative in the UK or accompany them there. 
45 Milieu and Edinburgh University, ‘Conformity studies of Member States’ national implementation 
measures transposing Community instruments in the area of citizenship of the Union - Final Report’ 
(December 2008) (hereafter ‘Conformity studies horizontal report’) 15. This requirement featured in 
the national implementing measures of Denmark, Ireland, Finland and the UK and was the subject of 
administrative practices to that effect in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Malta and the 
Netherlands, ibid 14-15.  
46 Case C-127/08 Metock (n 42). The case concerned several judicial appeals against a refusal by the 
Irish Minister of Justice to issue residence cards to the family members of EU citizens residing in Ireland 
on the basis that the family members had not been resident in a Member State prior to their move to 
Ireland, ibid, paras 21, 26, 30 and 35. The Irish authorities had incorrectly transposed the Directive by 
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The Court of Justice found that ‘Directive 2004/38 precludes legislation of a 
Member State which requires a national of a non-member country who is the 
spouse of a Union citizen residing in that Member State but not possessing its 
nationality to have previously been lawfully resident in another Member State 
before arriving in the host Member State, in order to benefit from the provisions 
of that directive’.47  
While Ireland complied with the Court of Justice’s ruling in eight days,48 
it took almost three years from the date of the judgment for the UK to remove 
this requirement from the EEA Regulations, and hen only as regards close 
family members.49 This delay was due to ‘heel dragging’50 by the Home Office 
which indicated that it considered that the ruling in Metock was limited to 
immediate family members covered by Article 2(2) of the Directive, but did not 
apply to ‘other family members’51 under Article 3(2) and therefore did not 
consider that the offending provisions52 required amendment.53 At the same 
time, the UK was trying to rally support within the Council to bypass the Court’s 
                                                            
way of the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) (No 2) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/626, 
whose regulation 3(2), at the time these cases were brought, provided that the transposing measures 
‘shall not apply to a family member unless the family member is lawfully resident in another Member 
State’, ibid, para 16. 
47 Case C-127/08 Metock (n 42), para 80. 
48 On 31 July 2008, Ireland adopted European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 
2008, SI 2008/310 to bring its national implementing measures into line with the ruling. The Minister 
of Justice also reviewed all decisions which were refused on the basis that the family member was not 
lawfully resident in another Member State before moving to Ireland, see Irish Naturalisation and 
Immigration Service, Press release, August 2008 
 <http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/print/PR08000027> accessed 23 December 2015. 
49 SI 2011/1247 (n 6), reg 2(3) and (4). See further Home Office, ‘Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2011’ (2011) para 4.2 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/1247/pdfs/uksiem_20111247_en.pdf> accessed 23 
December 2015 
50 Shaw (n 9) 270. 
51 The UK legislation defines these as ‘extended family members’ under regs 2(1) and 8. 
52 Regs 8(2) and 10(1)(b). 
53 Correspondence between the Home Office and the European Citizen Action Service quoted in EP 
Study, supra at 150. 
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ruling through legislative amendment of the Directive.54 This was despite the 
fact that during this period, the UK courts handed down several judgments 
confirming the Regulations were non-compliant in this respect.55 The 
Regulations were eventually amended in respect of direct family members in 
2011,56 but it took another year for the changes to be made in respect of ‘other 
family members’57 following the judgment in Rahman.58 The EEA Regulations 
are now finally compliant in this respect. 
                                                            
54 In a worrying development, the UK was reported to have circulated proposals to restrict the scope of 
the Directive in preparation for the EU Council meeting held in Brussels on 27-28 November 2008; see 
Draft Council conclusions ‘Free movement of persons: abuses and substantive problems’, 15903/08 of 
18 November 2008 and 16151/1/08 of 26 November 2008. Although the UK’s efforts proved ultimately 
unsuccessful this ‘constituted a clear will to restrict the scope of the rights and freedoms envisaged by 
the EU legal system to the very institution of European citizenship’, see Sergio Carrera and Anaïs Faure 
Atger ‘Implementation of Directive 2004/38 in the context of EU Enlargement - A proliferation of 
different forms of citizenship?’ (2009) Centre for European Studies Special Report 17; see further Steve 
Peers, ‘The UK proposals on EU free movement law: an attack on the rule of law and EU fundamental 
freedoms’ (2008) Statewatch Analysis No 72.  
55 The Metock ruling was notably followed by the High Court in R (on the application of Yaw Owusu) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWHC 593 (Admin) (21 January 2009), where 
Blake J held, at [4], that reg 12(1)(b) was ‘a failure to transpose the requirements of the Directive’. The 
Court of Appeal followed suit in Bigia and Others v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] EWCA Civ 79 (19 
February 2009). In his judgment, para [41], Justice Kay LJ held that ‘[i]t follows that the provisions in 
Regulations 8 and 12 of the 2006 Regulations, to the extent that they require an OFM [other family 
member] to establish prior lawful residence in another Member State, do not accord with the Directive’. 
See also ZH (Afghanistan) v Entry clearance Officer [2009] EWCA Civ 1060 (15 October 2009); SM 
(India) v Entry Clearance Officer (Mumbai) [2009] EWCA Civ 1426 (25 November 2009); Pedro v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2009] EWCA Civ 1358 (14 December 2009).  
56 See n 48. 
57 SI 2012/2560 (n 6), Sched, para 5, which removed ‘the requirement that a person must have been 
living in the same country as an EEA national prior to arriving in the UK in order to argue that their 
dependency on that EEA national entitles them to rely on the provisions of the 2006 Regulations 
concerning extended family members’, see further Home Office, ‘Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No 2) Regulations 2012’ (2012), para 7.7  
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/2560/pdfs/uksiem_20122560_en.pdf>  accessed  
58 Case C-83/11 Rahman [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:519 (judgment of 5 September 2012), para 33. See 
further Guild, Peers and Tomkin (n 41) 77. 
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The definitions of ‘spouse’ and ‘registered partner’ exclude relationships 
of convenience.59 While at first glance this might be allowed by Article 35 of the 
Directive,60 this definition has been interpreted by the UK courts61 in such a way 
as to exclude from the scope of the regulations family members who are 
suspected of sham relationships, thereby denying them the benefit of appeal 
rights under Articles 15 and 31, which as recital (26) makes clear should be 
available ‘in all events’. This judicial interpretation62 therefore leads to non-
                                                            
59 Reg 2(1). 
60 Jo Shaw, ‘Correspondence Table, United Kingdom’, Annex to Milieu and Edinburgh University, 
‘Conformity studies of Member States’ national implementation measures transposing Community 
instruments in the area of citizenship of the Union’ (Report for Commission, 2008) (hereafter 
‘Correspondence Table for the UK’), 2. 
61 R (on the application of Bilal Ahmed) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (EEA/s 10 
appeal rights: effect) IJR [2015] UKUT 436 (IAC) (24 July 2015). For commentary, see Eslpeth Guild, 
‘Reflecting EU law faithfully? R (Bilal Ahmed) v SSHD IJR [2015] UKUT 00436 (IAC)’ (Free Movement, 
14 September 2015) <https://www.freemovement.org.uk/reflecting-eu-law-faithfully-r-bilal-ahmed-v-
sshd-ijr-2015-ukut-00436-iac/> accessed 23 December 2015, who comments ‘Judges Storey and Lane, 
both senior and experienced members of the Upper Tribunal, came to a rather odd decision: where the 
Secretary of State claims a reasonable suspicion that the third country national spouse of an EEA 
national (exercising Treaty rights in the UK) has entered into a sham marriage he or she is no longer a 
spouse under the EEA regulations and thus gets no in country appeal right. The exclusion is apparently 
based on Reg 2 EEA Regulations which states that a ‘spouse’ does not include a party to a marriage of 
convenience. … This is clearly mistaken. Someone who is appealing against a decision by the Home 
Office refusing his or her status as a spouse is obviously covered by the appeal right[s] [provided by 
Articles 15 and 31 of Directive 2004/38]. … The correct course of action for the UT if it was in doubt 
about the in country appeal right for someone whom the Home Office held was only the spouse of an 
EEA national as a result of a marriage of convenience … would have been to refer the question to the 
Court of Justice.’ It is also reported that permission to appeal against the judgment has been granted, 
ibid. 
62 As previously discussed, an assessment of the conformity of national implementing measures must 
have due regard to their interpretation given to them by the national courts, see for example, Case C-
490/04 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-6095, para 49. See further Chapter 3, Section 3.2 
(Obligations Relating to the Form of Transposition).   
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compliance of the EEA Regulations which was not identified in previous 
assessment reports.63 
Moreover, the definitions of ‘durable partner’, ‘registered partner’ and 
‘spouse’ have been further amended64 to exclude the possibility of a person 
being considered a family member where their EU relative was in a former 
relationship with another person where that relationship has not yet been 
dissolved. The effect may be to exclude the possibility for a non-EU partner to 
claim a right of residence when he (or his EU partner) is separated from a 
former partner or spouse, even though the partnership or marriage has not been 
dissolved. This appears contrary to EU case law in respect of separated 
spouses.65 The ambiguity which these amendments create should also be 
considered forms of non-compliance.  
The situation of unmarried partners in a ‘durable relationship’66 is a 
continuing source of problems. Under the Directive in order to benefit from the 
facilitation of their entry and residence,67 unmarried partners need to 
demonstrate that they are in ‘a durable relationship, duly attested’.  The UK 
authorities require unmarried partners to be able to demonstrate that they have 
been in a relationship for at least two years68 by referring back to the national 
                                                            
63 Conformity studies horizontal report (n 44); Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States’, COM(2008) 840 final (hereafter 2008 Implementation Report); European Citizen 
Action Service,‘Comparative study on the application of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’ 
(PE 410.650, European Parliament 2009) (hereafter ‘ECAS comparative study’). 
64 SI 2012/1547 (n 6), Sched 1, para 1(a), (b) and (e) respectively. 
65 Case 267/83 Diatta [1985] ECR 0567, at para 20; Case C-244/13 Ogieriakhi [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2068 (judgment of 10 July 2014), paras 37 and 47. 
66 Article 3(2) of the Directive, corresponding to reg 8(5), which uses the same term. 
67 ibid. 
68 Home Office, ‘Modernised Guidance: Extended family members of EEA nationals’ (2015) 6 and 23 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/extended-family-members-of-eea-nationals> 
accessed 15 December 2015. 
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immigration rules.69  Moreover, as a result of the UK authorities only 
recognising same-sex registered partnerships,70 the same requirement would 
apply in connection to heterosexual registered partners.71  
The UK’s the two-year requirement has been previously criticised as 
being too restrictive and inflexible72. The European Commission has issued 
guidance73 in this connection in which it takes the view that: 
‘National rules on durability of partnership can refer to a minimum 
amount of time as a criterion for whether a partnership can be considered 
as durable. However, in this case national rules would need to foresee that 
other relevant aspects (such as for example a joint mortgage to buy a 
home) are also taken into account.’ 
As a result, the two-year requirement should not be the sole criteria by 
which to judge the durability of a relationship and, in the event this requirement 
is not met, the Directive still requires the UK authorities to undertake ‘an 
extensive examination of the personal circumstances’ of unmarried partners.   
 While initially the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal took a narrow view 
that national immigration governed the content of relationships falling within 
                                                            
69 Immigration Rules (n 17), Part 8, paras 295A and 295D. 
70 See ECAS comparative study (n 62) 149-150 citing correspondence received from the Home Office, 5 
December 2008: ‘[t]he meaning of “civil partners” is given by Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978 
as amended by paragraph 59 of Schedule 27 to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (‘the 2004 Act’). Schedule 
27 of the 2004 Act defines a civil partnership as one which exists under or by virtue of the 2004 Act. 
There is no provision in UK law for heterosexual unmarried partners to register their relationship under 
the 2004 Act as a civil partnership and the UK consequently does not recognise registered partnerships 
of heterosexual couples.’ 
71 See further, ‘Five Years of the Citizens Directive - Part 1’ (n 1) 224-225. 
72 Alison Hunter, ‘Family members: an analysis of the implementation of the Citizens Directive in UK 
law’ (2007) 21 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 191-200, 197-198. 
73 Commission, ‘Communication on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 
2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States’, COM(2009) 313, part 2.1.1. 
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the scope of Article 3(2),74 the UK’s Upper Tribunal has shown some evolution 
in this regard by recognising that the concept of ‘durable relationship’ is a 
concept of EU law.75 It has as a result been is prepared to accept relationships 
that have lasted less than two years can still be considered ‘durable’.76 However 
despite these judicial pronouncements, the Home Office’s administrative policy 
still remains unchanged77 and therefore not compliant.  
The Regulations also cover certain situations that are not governed by the 
Directive but reflect legal obligations set out by case law of the European Court 
of Justice. For example, the Regulations also cover the situation of family 
members of British citizens returning home after exercising their free 
movement rights in another EEA country78 in accordance with the judgment in 
                                                            
74 See for example, AP and FP (Citizens Directive Article 3(2), discretion, dependance) India [2007] 
UKIAT 00048, paras [18] and [21], where the Tribunal ruled that ‘we do not accept that Article 3(2) 
gives, or is intended to give, or has to be read as giving, any right of free movement or residence to those 
who have no such right apart from it. Any such rights will be dependent on national law …  these rights 
under the Directive are procedural only and the Directive does not itself give any such family member 
a right of movement to or residence in a Member State. The latter rights depend on national legislation.’  
75 The Upper Tribunal in Dauhoo (EEA Regulations – reg 8(2)) [2012] UKUT 79 (IAC), para [21], where 
it held that ‘it is accepted by the Tribunal in reported decisions that despite the reference in UKBA 
European Casework Instructions to proof of a durable relationship requiring evidence that the 
relationship has lasted two years, the concept of a durable relationship is a term of EU law and as such 
it does not impose a fixed time period’ relying on YB (EEA reg 17(4) – proper approach) Ivory Coast 
[2008] UKAIT 00062. 
76 See for example, Gemuh v Secretary of State for the Home Department IA/20342/2012 (unreported 
15 July 2013); Entry Clearance Officer v Keller & Keller OA/06767/2013 & OA/06770/2013 
(unreported 11 August 2014).  
77 The former policy was set out in European casework instructions, Chapter 2, section 2.4, now replaced 
by ‘Modernised Guidance: Extended family members of EEA nationals’ (n 67). 
78 EEA Regulations, reg 9, as amended by SI 2013/3032 (n 6), Sched 1, para 5. However, it should be 
noted that there is uncertainty as to whether reg 9 complies with the Singh ruling given that reg 9 
excludes the ability of those who have resided but not worked in another EU Member State from 
claiming the benefit. This is particularly the case since the Court has recently confirmed that the Singh 
ruling would also apply to anyone - not only workers - making use of their free movement rights; see 
Case C-456/12 O and B [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:135 (judgment of 14 March 2014), para 61.  See further 
implementation in the UK, see Shaw (n 9) 268-270. 
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Singh79 and O and B80 However, this right is not formerly addressed in the 
Directive and is therefore not subject to a transposition obligation as a matter 
of Article 288 TFEU and so will not be further assessed here. Nonetheless, the 
judgment is binding on the Member States81 and does require to be given 
effect.82 
Likewise, the EEA Regulations have also since been amended83 to cover 
the primary carers of minors who benefit from residence rights under 
Regulation 492/201184 or who derive residence rights in accordance with the 
rulings of the Court of Justice in Ruiz Zambrano85 and Zhu & Chen.86 Again, 
                                                            
79 Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, paras 23 and 25.  
80 Case C-456/12 O and B (n 77), para 61. For commentary on this judgment, see further Eslpeth Guild, 
‘S v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel (C-457/12) / O v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie 
en Asiel (C-456/12)’ (2014) 28 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 284-288; Eleanor 
Spaventa, ‘Family rights for circular migrants and frontier workers: O and B, and S and G’ (2015) 52 
Common Market Law Review 753-777.  
81 See Chapter 4, Section 4.4.5 (Reference for a preliminary ruling). 
82 On the situation of returnees and Case C-370/90 Singh (n 78), see further Guild, Peers and Tomkin 
(n 41) 58-60. 
83 SI 2012/1547 (n 6), Sched 1, para 9, which inserted a new reg 15A on ‘derivative rights of residence’. 
84 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141/1. See further Case C-310/08 
Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065; Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] ECR I-01107. 
85 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177. For a discussion of these provisions, see Shaw (n 
9) 263-265. 
86 Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925. It should be noted that, prior to the amendment 
of the EEA Regulations (see n 82), the method used by the UK to comply with the Zhu and Chen ruling 
was highly questionable. Instead of considering that the primary carer of an EU minor fell within the 
scope of the EU law – given that Directive 90/364 was used as the basis for the ruling in Zhu and Chen 
– the UK authorities required such a person to apply for leave to enter or remain on the basis of para 
257C of the Immigration Rules (n 17) instead of the EEA Regulations. Furthermore, it is arguable that 
para 257C did not comply with the Zhu and Chen ruling insofar as it precluded the primary carer from 
benefiting from a right to work in the UK; see for example, MA & Others (EU national: self-sufficiency; 
lawful employment) Bangladesh [2006] UKAIT 90, para [48], where the Tribunal held that the non-
EU primary carer ‘cannot derive a right to reside as a "family member" of an EU national because that 
income cannot be taken into account in order to establish the EU national's right of residence on a self-
sufficient basis’. Following the incorporation of the Zhu and Chen cases in the EEA Regulations, the 
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these family members fall outside the scope of the Directive,87 so their situation 
will not be further contemplated.  
 
Transposition of Directive 2004/38: Beneficiaries 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
2 Definitions 
2(1) EU citizen Correct Incorrect 
  Family member 
2(2)(a) Spouse 
Correct Incorrect + Ambiguous
2(2)(b) 
registered partnership (equivalent to 
marriage) 
Correct Incorrect + Ambiguous
2(2)(c) direct descendants (under the age of 21) 
Correct
2(2)(c) direct descendants (dependants) 
Correct
2(2)(d) 





EU citizens and family members in 
terms of Art. 2 
Incorrect Correct 
3(2)(1)(a) 
facilitation for dependants in the 
country of origin 
Incorrect Correct 
3(2)(1)(a) 




facilitation for family members on 
serious health grounds 
Correct
3(2)(1)(b) 
facilitation for partners (durable 
relationship duly attested) 
Ambiguous Ambiguous 
3(2)(2) 




Table 9.1.3: Transposition outcomes for beneficiaries (Articles 2-3 of Directive 
2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburgh 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
                                                            
right of the primary carer to work still appears to be a problem as demonstrated by the case of Seye 
(Chen children; employment) France [2013] UKUT 178 (IAC) (28 March 2013), paras [35]-[51]. This 
case law arguably needs to be reconsidered in view of Case C-218/14 Singh [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:476 
(judgment of 16 July 2015), para 76, where the Court held that ‘the fact that some part of the resources 
available to the Union citizen derives from resources obtained by the spouse who is a third-country 
national from his activity in the host Member State does not preclude the condition concerning the 
sufficiency of resources in Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 from being regarded as satisfied.’  
87 See to that effect, Case C-529/11 Alarape and Tijani [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:290 (judgment of 8 May 
2013), para 48 where the Court held that ‘periods of residence in a host Member State which are 
completed by family members of a Union citizen who are not nationals of a Member State solely on the 
basis of Article 12 of Regulation No 1612/68, as amended by Directive 2004/38, where the conditions 
laid down for entitlement to a right of residence under that directive are not satisfied, may not be taken 
into consideration for the purposes of acquisition by those family members of a right of permanent 




9.1.4 Entry and exit 
The main issue of non-compliance as regards entry rights has been the 
UK’s non recognition of residence cards issued by other Member States to non-
EU nationals who are family members of EU citizens seeking to accompany or 
join their EU relative. The issue was first identified in the ECAS comparative 
study.88 
Under Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/38, the possession of a residence 
card issued under Article 10 should exempt a non-EU family member from the 
need to obtain a visa when they travel to an EU country with their EU relative 
or join them EU there. 89 
However, the UK initially refused to recognise this visa exemption.90 The 
effect was that family members of EEA nationals residing in another EU country 
needed to obtain a visa91 in order to enter the UK even when travelling with their 
EEA relative. The issue was finally settled by the Court of Justice in its judgment 
in a reference from the High Court in McCarthy,92 in which it confirmed that 
                                                            
88 ECAS comparative study (n 62) 152-153. 
89 The UK should have been exempting family members who hold a family member residence card from 
the need to obtain a visa. 
90 The problem lay in the definition of ‘residence card’ under reg 2(1) of the EEA Regulations as being 
one issued by the UK authorities. As a result, although a ‘residence card’ would permit admission to the 
UK under reg 11, this visa exemption was first limited to holders of residence cards or permanent 
residence cards issued by the UK. While the UK amended its rules with effect from 1 January 2014 to 
include a new definition of ‘qualifying EEA State residence card’, it initially limited the visa exemption 
to holders of recognised cards issued by Germany and Estonia, but not those issued by other Member 
States; see SI 2013/ 3032 (n 6), Sched 1, para 1. Apparently, according to the views of several UK 
lawyers, this limited recognition was justified on the basis of the practice of these two countries to issue 
residence cards containing the biometric data of family members. Following the changes made by SI 
2015/694 (n 6), Sched 1, para 1(b), a ‘qualifying EEA State residence card’ is now defined as a residence 
card issued under Article 10 of Directive 2004/38 by an EEA State except Switzerland, which exempts 
its holder from the need to hold an entry visa under reg 11(2)(a). Note that the consolidated version of 
the EEA Regulations (n 4), reg 2(1) is missing the text of this exclusion for Switzerland. 
91 This took the form of an EEA family permit under reg 12. 
92 Case C-202/13 McCarthy [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2450 (judgment of 18 December 2014), para 53. 
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‘Member States are, in principle, required to recognise a residence card issued 
under Article 10 of Directive 2004/38, for the purposes of entry into their 
territory without a visa’.93 The UK amended the Regulations four months later 
to correct its non-compliance.94 
The right of entry for family members remains subject to an effective 
obligation to hold a visa or residence document issued by the UK authorities95 
and excessive questioning at border controls96 which would go beyond what the 
is permitted under the Directive97 and previous case law98,99.  
While on the face of it the obligation to issue an ‘EEA Family Permit’ to 
family members as soon as possible appears compliant, the UK’s consular 
guidelines100 are not compliant as they require the submission of significant 
                                                            
93 ibid, para 62.  
94 SI 2015/694 (n 6), Sched 1, para 1. For a discussion of the UK’s response, see Shaw (n 9) 272-276. 
95 Reg 11(2). 
96 ECAS comparative study (n 62) 146-147; ‘Five Years of the Citizens Directive - Part 1’ (n 1), 230. 
97 Article 5(1).  
98 As regards entry without visas, in Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591, paras 61-62, the Court 
held ‘it is in any event disproportionate and, therefore, prohibited to send back a third country national 
married to a national of a Member State where he is able to prove his identity and the conjugal ties and 
there is no evidence to establish that he represents a risk to the requirements of public policy, public 
security or public health within the meaning of Article 10 of Directive 68/360 and Article 8 of Directive 
73/148 [now replaced by Directive 2004/38]. … a Member State may not send back at the border a third 
country national who is married to a national of a Member State and attempts to enter its territory 
without being in possession of a valid identity card or passport or, if necessary, a visa, where he is able 
to prove his identity and the conjugal ties and there is no evidence to establish that he represents a risk 
to the requirements of public policy, public security or public health within the meaning of Article 10 of 
Directive 68/360 and Article 8 of Directive 73/148.’ 
99 As regards border control formalities, the Court held in Case 321/87 Commission v Belgium Case 
[1989] ECR 997, para 11, ‘the only precondition which Member States may impose on the right of entry 
into their territory of the persons covered by [the Directive] is the production of a valid identity 
document or passport.’ 
100 UK Visas & Immigration, ‘EEA family permit: EUN02’ 




documentation.101 The process is therefore more burdensome than allowed 
under the Directive, which require Member States to ‘grant …  every facility’ to 
family members and issue them with a visas under ‘accelerated procedure’.102 
The ambiguity concerning the transposition of the exemption from the 
need to stamp the passports of family members who hold a residence card103 
has now been addressed.104 
The UK has not transposed Article 4 of the Directive on the basis that 
national law was already in conformity with its provisions.105 
 
Transposition Outcomes: Entry and Exit 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
4 Right of exit 
4(1) 
right of exit for EU citizens (ID or 
passport) 
Not transposed – compliant
4(1) 
right of exit for TCN family 
members (passport) 
Not transposed – compliant
4(2) no visa or equivalent formality 
Not transposed – compliant
4(3) 
ID or passport stating the 
nationality of the holder 
Correct
4(4) 
territorial validity of the passport (5 
years if MS do not issue ID cards 
Correct
5 Right of entry 
5(1)(1) 




right of entry for TCN family 
members (passport) 
Incorrect
5(1)(2) no visa or equivalent formality Correct
                                                            
101 Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 28; ECAS comparative study (n 62) 153; ‘Five Years of the Citizens 
Directive - Part 1’ (n 1) 228-229. See further UK Visas & Immigration, ‘Application for EEA family 
permit: form VAF5’ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/application-for-eea-family-
permit-form-vaf5> accessed 1 December 2015. 
102 Article 5(2). 
103 Article 5(3) provides that this applies all residence cards issued by any Member State under Article 
10. The UK’s transposition was incorrect because it only applied to those holding a residence card issued 
by the UK authorities. 
104 SI 2013/3032 (n 16), Sched 1, para 6(b). 
105 Home Office, ‘Explanatory Memorandum to the Immigration (European Economic Area) 
Regulations 2006’ (2008) 7  
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/1003/pdfs/uksiem_20061003_en.pdf > accessed 1 
October 2015; Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 26; Correspondence Table for the UK (n 59) 7. 
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Transposition Outcomes: Entry and Exit 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
5(2)(1) 
obligation to hold entry visa for TCN 
members (Reg. No. 539/2001) 
Correct
5(2)(2) residence card exemption Incomplete Correct 
5(2)(3) facilitation to obtain entry visa Incorrect
5(2)(4) 
accelerated procedure for issuing 
visa, free of charge 
Incorrect
5(3) 
entry or exit stamp (passport TCN 




all opportunities to enter without 
valid travel documents 
Correct
5(5) presence report (optional) Not transposed – compliant
 
Table 9.1.4: Transposition outcomes for entry and exit (Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 
2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburgh 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
 
9.1.5 The Right of residence 
The provisions on the right of residence cannot be said to have been 
satisfactorily transposed by the UK. There are notable problems in 
transposition relating to the right of residence in excess of three months.  
Firstly, the provisions of the Directive on administrative formalities 
relating to the issue of residence documentation are incomplete. While the 
Directive makes it clear that the Member States should not require documents 
beyond those listed,106 this is not adequately reflected in the Regulations.107 As 
a result, as reflected in the administrative guidance,108 the UK authorities will 
                                                            
106 See for example, Article 8(3) which states that ‘Member States may only require’ the documents 
listed therein. Member States should therefore not be requiring other documents not listed in the 
Directive, as confirmed by recital (14), which further explains that ‘[t]he supporting documents required 
by the competent authorities for the issuing of a registration certificate or of a residence card should be 
comprehensively specified in order to avoid divergent administrative practices or interpretations 
constituting an undue obstacle to the exercise of the right of residence by Union citizens and their family 
members.’ This problem affects Article 8(3) and (5) as regards applications by EU citizens and family 
members who are themselves EU citizens, as well as  
107 See regs 16 (issue of registration certificate), 17 (issue of residence card),    
108 Home Office, ‘Modernised Guidance: EEA nationals qualified persons’ (2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/european-economic-area-nationals-qualified-




require extensive documentation in respect of both EU citizens and family 
members beyond what is allowed by the Directive.109 
Moreover, while the Regulations have correctly transposed the 
requirement for those who do not work to have ‘comprehensive sickness 
insurance’,110  the UK’s administrative guidance instructs caseworkers that 
‘access to the UK’s National Health Service’ does not meet this condition. The 
policy reason is that reliance on the NHS creates a burden on the UK’s social 
assistance system.111 This is despite the fact that as a matter of UK law, any 
person ordinarily resident in the UK is entitled to NHS treatment.112 The Court 
of Appeal had upheld the legitimacy of this policy.113 As a result, EEA nationals 
who legitimately rely on the NHS for their healthcare needs while residing in 
the UK will effectively be penalised if they seek to obtain recognition of their 
                                                            
european-economic-area-eea-nationals> accessed 1 October 2015; idem, ‘Modernised Guidance: 
Extended family members of EEA nationals’ (2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/extended-family-members-of-eea-nationals> 
accessed 1 October 2015; idem, ‘Modernised Guidance: Family members of EEA nationals who have 
retained the right of residence’ (2015) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/family-
members-of-eea-nationals-who-have-retained-the-right-of-residence>. 
109 See further Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 31; Correspondence Table for the UK (n 59) 19; ECAS 
comparative study (n 62) 151. 
110 Reg 4(1)(c)(ii) as regards ‘self-sufficient persons’ and reg 4(1)(d)(ii) as regards students.  
111 W (China) v X (China) [2006] EWCA Civ 1494 (9 November 2006). 
112 The UK operates a universal residency-based healthcare system which is free at the point of use for 
persons who are ordinarily resident in the UK. Under section 1(3) of the National Health Service Act 
2006, treatment on the NHS is free for all residents of the UK. Moreover the NHS (Charges to Overseas 
Visitors) Regulations 2011 exempts certain categories of EEA nationals (including workers, students 
and pensioners) who are temporarily in the UK from the payment of overseas charges for treatment 
provided by the NHS. Similar conditions apply in Wales, under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 
2006 and the National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations 1989, SI 1989/306; 
Scotland by virtue of the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978 and the National Health Service 
(Charges to Overseas Visitors) (Scotland) Regulations 1989, SI 1989/364; and Northern Ireland 
according to the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 SI 1972/1265 and 
The Provision of Health Services to Persons Not Ordinarily Resident Regulations (Northern Ireland) 
2005, SI 2005/55. 
113 Ahmad v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 988 (16 July 2014). 
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residence rights by the UK authorities.114  The issue is currently the subject of 
on-going infringement proceedings by the Commission,115 which has issued a 
reasoned opinion against the UK.116 
It should also be noted that the residence card that is issued by the UK 
authorities is labelled ‘residence card of a family member of an EEA family 
member’117 instead of ‘… a Union citizen’.118 
Secondly, as regards the issue of residence documentation to ‘other 
family members’,119 this is subject to the proviso that ‘in all the circumstances it 
appears … appropriate to issue the residence card’. Although at first glance this 
might appear in line with the discretion to facilitate entry and residence under 
Article 3(2),120 it has been used by the UK authorities to reject applications on 
the basis of considerations not listed in the Directive. This is the case as regards 
refusals based on the previous immigration history of ‘other family members’ – 
                                                            
114 See further ‘Five Years of the Citizens Directive - Part 1’ (n 1) 342-345; Sylvia de Mars, ‘Economically 
inactive EU migrants and the United Kingdom's National Health Service: unreasonable burdens 
without real links?’ (2014) 39 European Law Review 770-789. 
115 For an overview of infringement proceedings, see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3 (Infringement action by 
the Commission). 
116 Commission ‘Free movement: Commission asks the UK to uphold EU citizens’ rights’, Press release 
IP/12/417, 26 April 2012. 
117 Reg 17(6). 
118 Article 10(1). 
119 The ‘other family members’ falling within the scope of Article 3(2) are referred to as ‘extended family 
members’ under reg 8. 
120 Case C-83/11 Rahman (n 57), para 18, where the Court held that ‘Directive 2004/38 does not oblige 
the Member States to grant every application for entry or residence submitted by persons’. 
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a practice upheld by the British courts 121 – which would appear excessive in 
light of the Court of Justice’s case law.122 
Thirdly, the EEA Regulations have been amended several times in respect 
of the right to retain the status of a worker following unemployment.123 The 
effect is that a person who becomes involuntarily unemployed after working for 
less than a year cannot retain the status of a worker for more than six months,124 
even if the Directive provides that six months should be a minimum.125 In a 
similar way, even though the Directive prescribes no limitation in time on the 
ability to retain the status of a worker for those who have become involuntarily 
                                                            
121 See for example, Moneke (EEA – OFMs) Nigeria [2011] UKUT 00341(IAC) (22 August 2011), in 
which the official headnote, para ix, states ‘In deciding whether a person falls within the material scope 
of regulation 8 of the 2006 Regulations, policy considerations relating to such matters as the appellant’s 
immigration history, the impact of an adverse decision on the exercise by the EEA national of his or her 
Treaty rights, etc are irrelevant. Such policy considerations are relevant, however, to the exercise of 
regulation 17(4) discretion.’ See also YB (EEA reg 17(4), proper approach) Ivory Coast [2008] UKAIT 
62, para [39]; MO (reg 17(4) EEA Regs) Iraq [2008] UKAIT 61.  
122 See for example, Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497, para 51, where the Court of Justice held that 
‘mere failure by a national of a Member State to comply with the formalities concerning entry, 
movement and residence of aliens is not of such a nature as to constitute in itself conduct threatening 
public policy and public security and cannot therefore by itself justify a measure ordering expulsion or 
temporary imprisonment for that purpose’; C-118/75 Watson and Belmann [1976] ECR 1185, para 20, 
where the Court emphasised that ‘the penalties attaching to a failure to comply with the prescribed 
declaration and registration formalities, deportation, in relation to persons protected by Community 
law, is certainly incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty’; Case C-459/99 MRAX (n 97), para 80, 
where the Court ruled that ‘a Member State is not permitted to refuse issue of a residence permit and 
to issue an expulsion order against a third country national who is able to furnish proof of his identity 
and of his marriage to a national of a Member State on the sole ground that he has entered the territory 
of the Member State concerned unlawfully’. 
123 SI 2013/3032 (n 6), Sched 1, para 3; SI 2014/1451 (n 6), reg 3 ; SI 2014/2761 (n 6), reg 3(2). 
124 Reg 6(2)(ba) and (2A). 
125 Article 7(3)(c) specifies that ‘the status of a worker shall be retained for no less than six months’ 
(emphasis added). The recent judgment in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:597 (15 
September 2015) does not call this into question the possibility for a person to retain the status of a 
worker beyond six months for residence purposes, since this case concerned a different question, 
namely the possibility to refuse payment of social assistance to persons after six months of 
unemployment, see ibid, para 61. 
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unemployed after having worked for at least a year,126 the EEA Regulations 
restrict this right to six months,127 unless the persons concerned can provide 
‘compelling evidence’ that they are looking for work and have genuine chances 
of being engaged. The requirement to provide ‘compelling evidence’128 also 
applies to the right of residence of jobseekers129 which adds conditions not 
foreseen by Article 14(4)(b)130 or by the Court’s ruling in Antonissen.131 These 
amendments have increased instances of non-compliant transposition of the 
EEA Regulations.  
Lastly, ambiguity in the Regulations has been noted in respect of the rules 
on family members of students,132 the validity of residence cards,133  the 
                                                            
126 Article 7(3)(b) only requires the person to register ‘as a jobseeker with the relevant employment 
office’.  
127 Reg 6(2)(b), (7) and (8)(a). 
128 This is known as the ‘Genuine Prospect of Work Test’, see for example, Department for Work and 
Pensions, ‘Decision Maker’s Guide’ (n 180), paras 073092-073102. What constitutes ‘compelling 
evidence’ appears unduly restrictive as the only examples given are ‘a definite job offer’ or evidence the 
claimant ‘will receive a job offer imminently’, ibid, para 073100. See further Martin Williams, ‘Kapow 
to the GPOW’ (2015) Child Poverty Action Group special report: 
<http://www.cpag.org.uk/sites/default/files/CPAG-Kapow-GPOW-APR2015_0.pdf> accessed 7 July 
2015. 
129 Reg 6(1)(a), (7) and 8(b). 
130 This provides that ‘an expulsion measure may in no case be adopted against Union citizens or their 
family members if: … (b) the Union citizens entered the territory of the host Member State in order to 
seek employment. In this case, the Union citizens and their family members may not be expelled for as 
long as the Union citizens can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment and that 
they have a genuine chance of being engaged.’ 
131 Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745, para 21, where the Court it made clear that ‘if after the 
expiry of that period [of six months] the person concerned provides evidence that he is continuing to 
seek employment and that he has genuine chances of being engaged, he cannot be required to leave the 
territory of the host Member State’. 
132 Article 7(4) corresponding to reg 7(2); see Correspondence for the UK (n 59) 17 identifies uncertainty 
in reg 7(2) and suggests ‘it would be desirable if the Regulation[s] were to clarify the status of those 
family members of students who are consigned to the status of what the Regulation[s] calls ‘extended 
family members’ under the facilitation provisions of Article 3(2), as suggested by the Directive.’ 
133 Article Art 11(2) not transposed; see Correspondence Table for the UK (n 59) 26 notes that there are 
‘no measures in the UK regulations specifying the need for continuity of residence specifically for the 
[343] 
 
retention of residence for family members who are EU citizens following the 
death or departure of their EU sponsor134 or following divorce or termination of 
a registered partnership.135   
 
Transposition Outcomes: Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
6 Residence (up to three months) 
6(1) EU citizens Correct
6(2) TCN family members Correct
7 Residence (more than three months) 
7(1)(a) workers or self-employed persons Correct
7(1)(b) 
sufficient resources and 




study (comprehensive sickness 
insurance +assurance of sufficient 
resources) 
Correct
7(1)(d) Family member Correct
7(2) TCN family members Correct
7(3)(a) retention in case of illness or accident Correct
7(3)(b) 
involuntary unemployment after 1 
year of employment 
Correct Incorrect 
7(3)(c) 
involuntary unemployment after 
fixed-term contract (less than 1 year) 
Incorrect Incorrect 
7(3)(d) 




special rules concerning family 
members of students 
Ambiguous
8 
Administrative formalities for EU 
citizens 
8(1) option: register Correct – optional
8(2) deadline to register Not transposed – compliant
8(2) immediate issue Correct
8(2) Sanctions Not transposed – compliant
8(3) 




documents required from self-
sufficient persons 
Incorrect
8(3) documents required from students Incorrect
8(4) 








purposes of the validity of the residence card, which may cast doubt upon the effectiveness of the 
transposition.’  
134 Article 12(1) corresponding to reg 14(3) and reg 10(1)-(3) and (6). Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 
35 notes ‘the lack of transparency in its [reg 10] drafting’ and expresses concern ‘whether it incorrectly 
applies a qualifying period of one year to EU citizen family members covered by Article 12(1)’.  
135 Article 13(1) corresponding to reg 10(1) and (5)-(6); see Correspondence Table for the UK (n 59) 30 
which notes the same concerns as n 133. 
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Transposition Outcomes: Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
9 
Administrative formalities for family 
members who are not EU citizens 
9(1) issue a residence card  Correct
9(2) deadline for submission Not transposed – compliant
9(3) Sanctions Not transposed – compliant
10 Issue of residence cards 
10(1) title of the residence card Incorrect
10(1) issue deadline of six months Correct
10(1) certificate of application Correct
10(2) 
documents required from TCN family 
members 
Incomplete
11 Validity of the residence card 
11(1) period of validity Correct




Retention of the right of residence in 
the event of death or departure of the 
EU citizen 
12(1) 
retention of residence of EU family 
members - death/departure 
Ambiguous
12(1) 




retention of residence of TCN family 
members - death of the EU citizen 
Correct
12(3) 
child in education and parent having 
custody - departure of the EU citizen 
Correct
13 
Retention of the right of residence in 
the event of divorce, annulment of 
the marriage or termination of 
registered partnership 
13(1) EU family members Ambiguous
13(1) 
conditions for the right of permanent 
residence 
Correct
13(2) TCN family members Correct
13(2)(a) 
3 years of marriage, including 1 year 
in the host MS 
Correct
13(2)(b) custody of the EU citizen's children Correct
13(2)(c) domestic violence Correct
13(2)(d) 




conditions for the right of permanent 
residence 
Correct
13(2) exclusively on personal basis Correct
14 Retention of the right of residence136 
14(1) 
retention of the right of residence 
under Art. 6 
Correct
14(2) 
retention of the right of residence 
under Art. 7, 12, 13 
Correct
 
Table 9.1.5: Transposition outcomes for residence (Articles 6-14 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburgh 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
 
                                                            
136 The provisions of Article 14(3) and (4), as well as Article 15, are examined under Section 10.1.9 
(Procedural safeguards and rights of appeal). 
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9.1.6 The Right of permanent residence 
It should be noted that prior to the entry into force of the Directive, EU 
citizens and their family members who had resided in the UK for four years or 
more were entitled to apply for indefinite leave to remain.137  Indeed, it appears 
that the UK’s rules influenced the Commission’s original proposal for the 
Directive,138 which originally provided for the acquisition of permanent 
residence after four years of continuous residence, although the final text of the 
Directive provides for the acquisition of five years of lawful residence.139   
While Article 37 the Directive does permit Member States to adopt rules 
which are more favourable than the Directive, it does not regrettably contain a 
‘standstill’ provision that would have had the effect of obliging the UK to 
maintain the former rules in force. As a result, the UK’s transposition provides 
for the acquisition of permanent residence after five years of continuous lawful 
residence in the UK.140 
The EEA Regulations contain the proviso that residence during the five-
year period should have been ‘in accordance with these Regulations’,141 for 
which there is no corresponding provision in the Directive.   
                                                            
137 The relevant parts of the Immigration Rules were examined by the CJEU in Kaba Case C-356/98 
[2000] ECR I-2623 and Kaba II Case C-466/00 [2003] ECR I-2219. The European casework 
instructions, Chapter 6 explain the rules prior to 30 April 2006: 
‘Under paragraph 255 of the Immigration Rules (HC 395 (as amended by Cm 4851)) an EEA 
national (other than a student) and non-EEA family members may have been eligible to apply 
for permanent residence. This was not provided for in EC law, only in the United Kingdom 
immigration rules. To qualify under paragraph 255 a person had to have been issued with a 
residence permit or a residence document valid for 5 years, to have remained in the UK in 
accordance with the 2000 EEA Regulations for 4 years and to continue to do so.’ 
138 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2001] OJ 
C270 E 150, COM(2001) 257 15-16. 
139 Article 16. 
140 Reg 17. 




This led to several cases related to the refusal of the UK authorities to 
recognise periods of residence under previous legal instruments.142  A 
preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal in Lassal143 led the Court to confirm 
that periods of residence completed prior to the entry into force of the Directive 
should count towards the acquisition of permanent residence.144 A further case 
on a reference from the German courts145 clarified that periods of residence 
completed prior to accession could also count, provided the conditions of Article 
7 of the Directive were met.146 These judgments have led to amendment of the 
EEA Regulations that address these aspects of non-compliance.147 
However, the EEA Regulations were amended148 so that an application 
for permanent residence can be refused on the basis that a decision has been 
taken against the applicant on grounds of abuse in the last twelve months,149 
                                                            
142 For example, periods of residence completed under the Immigration (European Economic Area) 
Regulations 2000, SI 2000/2326. 
143 Case C-162/09 Lassal [2010] ECR I-9217. 
144 In  Case C-162/09 Lassal (n 142), the Court held that periods of residence that were completed prior 
to the date entry into force of the Directive on 30 April 2006  must be taken into account in accordance 
with earlier EU law instruments, ibid, paras 35, 37 and 40. In addition, the Court held that a period of 
absence of less than two years prior to 30 April 2006 that might have taken place following the 
completion of five years’ legal residence will not affect the acquisition of the right to permanent 
residence, ibid para 57. 
145 Joined cases C-424/10 and C-425/10 Ziolkowski and Szeja [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:866 (judgment 
21 December 2011). 
146 ibid, para 63, in which the Court held that ‘periods of residence completed by a national of a 
non-Member State in the territory of a Member State before the accession of the non-Member State to 
the European Union must, in the absence of specific provisions in the Act of Accession, be taken into 
account for the purpose of the acquisition of the right of permanent residence under Article 16(1) of 
Directive 2004/38, provided those periods were completed in compliance with the conditions laid down 
in Article 7(1) of the directive.’ 
147 SI 2012/1547 (n 6), Sched 1, para 25 which amended the EEA Regulations, Sched 4 para 6 (periods 
of residence prior to the entry into force of these Regulations).  
148 SI 2013/ 3032 (n 6), Sched 1, para 10 and SI 2015/694 (n 6), Sched 1, para 6. 
149 Reg 15(3). 
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which is contrary to the provision on continuity of residence,150 which still has 
not been explicitly transposed. 
The other problems in transposition relates to the exclusion of any period 
of residence completed by a worker from a new Member State who was not 
registered under the Worker Registration Scheme during the transitional period 
(2004-2011),151 given that a policy to deny recognition of that right is likely to 
breach existing case law.152 Moreover, the Regulations is no specific 
confirmation that a person who has acquired permanent residence is no subject 
to the need to meet the conditions of Chapter III of the Directive.  
 
Transposition Outcomes: Permanent Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
16 
General rule for EU citizens 
and their family members 
(right of permanent residence) 
16(1) legal residence during 5 years Incorrect Incorrect 
16(1) 




Not transposed – 
incomplete 
16(2) TCN family members Incorrect Correct 
16(3) temporary absences Correct
16(4) 
only lost through absences 
exceeding 2 years 
Correct
17 
Exemptions for persons no 
longer working in the host 
Member State 
17(1)(a) 
worker who reaches retirement 
age after working at least a year 
Correct
17(1)(a)(2) 
retirement age (60) in case 
national law is silent 
Correct
17(1)(b) 
worker permanently incapable 




worker who has worked at least 




periods of employment under 
(a) and (b) 
Correct
                                                            
150 Article 21 provides that ‘continuity of residence may be attested by any means of proof in use in the 
host Member State’. 
151 Reg 7A and 7B as inserted by SI 2011/544 (n 6), Sched 2, para 4, and SI 2013/3032 (n 6), Sched 1, 
para 4, respectively. 
152 See case law cited at n 121, where the Court has ruled that breach of residence formalities cannot 
justify the refusal to issue residence documentation.  
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Transposition Outcomes: Permanent Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
17(1)(c)(2) 
periods of involuntary 




exemption from periods under 
(a) or (b) if citizen's spouse or 








family members acquire PR 
upon death of worker (if worker 
resided for min. 2 years) 
Correct
17(4)(b) 
family members acquire PR 
upon death of worker (if 
worker's death result of 
accident at work) 
Correct
17(4)(c)  
family members acquire PR 
upon death of worker (if worker 
spouse is ex-national) 
Correct
18 
Acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence by 
certain family members who 
are not EU citizens 
18 
permanent residence of family 
members having retained right 













permanent residence to be 
issued as soon as possible 
Correct153
20 
Permanent residence card for 
family members who are not 
nationals of a Member State 
20(1) 




submission before expiration of 
the residence card 
Not transposed – correct
20(2)(2) Sanctions Not transposed – correct





153 This provision was identified as incorrectly transposed by the Commission in that it contained 
additional requirements not contained in the Directive; see Information from Commission dated 10 
March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508). However, no such problem in transposition could be identified. The 
problems identified in the conformity study relate to application not transposition, which was assessed 
as correct; see Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 39 and Correspondence Table for the UK (n 59) 43-
44.   
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Transposition Outcomes: Permanent Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
21 Continuity of residence 
21 
continuity of residence can be 
proved by any means; 
expulsion breaks continuity 
Incomplete
 
Table 9.1.6: Transposition outcomes for residence (Articles 16-21 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburgh 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
 
9.1.7 Equality of treatment 
The UK has not transposed the provisions of the directive on related 
rights. Instead, these are contained in piecemeal instruments, which leads to 
non-compliant transposition.154  
Firstly, concerning the right to work of non-EU family members,155 the 
effect of UK legislation is that family members will be unable to secure work 
unless they hold some kind of documentation from the Home Office proving 
their right to work in the UK.156 This is contrary to Article 25 of the Directive 
                                                            
154 Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 40-42; Correspondence Table for the UK (n 59) 43-44; ECAS 
comparative study (n 62) 154-155; ‘Five Years of the Citizens Directive - Part 2’ (n 1) 338-346. 
155 Article 23 provides that family members who have a right of residence or permanent residence are 
entitled to take up employment or self-employment, regardless of their nationality.   
156 In order to ensure that they are not liable for a fine under Section 15 of the Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Act 2006 (hereafter ‘IANA’) for employing workers illegally, employers will want to see 
certain documents that establish an employee is lawfully residing in the UK. The documentary 
requirements for UK employers as to acceptable methods of proof a right to reside in the UK are laid 
down by the Immigration (Restrictions on Employment) Order 2007, SI 2007/3290, as last amended 
by the Immigration (Restrictions on Employment) (Codes of Practice and Amendment) Order 2014, SI 
2014/1183. Under article 3 of the Order, an employer will escape liability indefinitely under IANA, if the 
employer is able to produce when requested documents described in list A in the Schedule.  Documents 
in list A include a European Economic Area national’s passport or identify card, or a permanent 
residence card issued to the non-EEA family member of an EEA national. These provide proof of a right 
of residence without limitation. Under article 4, an employer will escape liability under IANA if the 
employer is able to produce when requested documents described in part 1 of list B in the Schedule. 
However, this document provides protection only for the duration of the validity of the document. 
Documents on list B include a current residence card issued by the Home Office to a non-EEA national 
who is a family member of an EEA national. Article 5 of the Order further provides that the above 
documents should be produced before employment is started and article 6 further provides that the 
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which provides that the exercise of a right is not conditional upon holding a 
residence document.157   
Secondly, the provision on equal treatment is not transposed by the EEA 
Regulations.158 the right of EU citizens and their family members to be treated 
on the same terms as British citizens residing in the UK, this is the subject of 
diverse legislation covering social security,159 access to education160 and 
                                                            
employer should retain a copy of the document in “a format which cannot subsequently be altered”, 
namely a photocopy or scanned electronic copy. 
157 Article 25 provides that ‘[p]ossession of a registration certificate as referred to in Article 8, of a 
document certifying permanent residence, of a certificate attesting submission of an application for a 
family member residence card, of a residence card or of a permanent residence card, may under no 
circumstances be made a precondition for the exercise of a right or the completion of an administrative 
formality, as entitlement to rights may be attested by any other means of proof’. 
158 Article 24 of the Directive. 
159 EEA nationals seeking to access non-contributory benefits in the UK are required to demonstrate 
they have a right of residence in the UK, which is known as the ‘right to reside’ test. This is currently the 
subject of a case pending before the Court of Justice in C-308/14 Commission v UK [2014] OJ C329/2. 
The l is unclear at present as Advocate General Cruz Villalón has concluded the case should be dismissed 
in his Opinion of 6 October 2015 (unreported). For background to case, see Commission, ‘Social security 
benefits: Commission refers UK to Court for incorrect application of EU social security safeguards’, 
Press release IP/13/475, 30 May 2013; Charlotte O’Brien, ‘An insubstantial pageant fading: a vision of 
EU citizenship under the AG’s Opinion in C-308/14 Commission v UK’ (EU Law Analysis, 7 October 
2015) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2015/10/an-insubstantial-pageant-fading-vision.html> 
accessed 8 October 2015. On the ‘right to reside’ test, see further Steven Kennedy, ‘EEA nationals: the 
‘right to reside’ requirement for benefits’ (2011) Commons Briefing papers SN05972 
<http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05972> accessed 11 
November 2015; idem, ‘People from abroad: what benefits can they claim?’ (2015) Commons Briefing 
papers SN06847 <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06847> 
accessed 11 November 2015 
160 Article 24(2) of the Directive should have no impact on the ability of students to enjoy equal 
treatment as regards tuition fees which has been recognised by the Court of Justice since Case 293/83 
Gravier [1985] ECR 593.  Nonetheless, the UK imposes a condition of prior residence in the EEA for a 
minimum of three years in order for students who are EEA nationals and their family members to be 
categorized as ‘home students’ for the purposes of university tuition fees under the Education (Fees and 
Awards) (Scotland) Regulations 2007 SI 2007/152, the Education (Fees and Awards) (England) 
Regulations 2007 SI 2007/779 and the Education (Fees and Awards) (Wales) Regulations 2007 SI 
2007/2310. Such a condition leads to some EU citizens being charged higher fees than home students, 
by sole virtue of the fact that they may have been studying or living outside the EU prior to starting their 
[351] 
 
financial support for studies161 among other matters. None of these instruments 
adequately provide for equality of treatment for all family members who are 
beneficiaries under Directive 2004/38.162   
Since the UK has been charging fees for the issue of residence 
documentation,163 as allowed by Article 25(2) of the Directive.164 The amount 






course of study in the UK. See further ‘Five Years of the Citizens Directive - Part 2’ (n 1) 346. For an 
overview of the legal framework, see Milieu/ICF-GHK, ‘Evaluation of EU rules on free movement of EU 
citizens and their family members and their practical implementation - Module 2 National Report for 
the United Kingdom’ (2014). 
161 Access to student loans and grants for EEA nationals and their family members is also conditional 
upon prior residence in the EEA for a minimum of three years under the Education (Student Loans) 
Regulations 1998 SI 1998/211, the Education (Student Support) Regulations  2011 SI 2011/1986, the 
Students' Allowances (Scotland) Regulations 2007 SI 2007/153 and the Education (Student Loans) 
(Scotland) Regulations 2007 SI 2007/154. This is an additional requirement not foreseen by Article 
24(2) of Directive 2004/38. 
162 See further, ECAS comparative study (n 62) 154-155; ‘Five Years of the Citizens Directive - Part 2’ (n 
1) 338-346. 
163 SI 2013/1391 (n 6) reg 2. 
164 Article 25(2) provides that a registration certificate, a document certifying permanent residence, a 
certificate of application, a residence card or a permanent residence card ‘shall be issued free of charge 
or for a charge not exceeding that imposed on nationals for the issuing of similar documents’. 
165 The current fee is £65.00. By way of comparison, when the Home Office used to issue identity cards 
to British citizens under the Identity Cards Act 2006 (now repealed), the Home Office charged £30 to 
issue a British ID card with a 10-year validity period. The UK authorities no longer issue identity cards, 
so this comparison is no longer possible. However, ‘similar documents’ for the purposes of the Directive 
may include a passport or driving licence. A standard adult passport costs between £72.50 and £95.25 
when issued in the UK. The fee for the issue of a driving licence in the UK is £43.00. It should be noted 
that the fee for the issue of a Schengen visa to non-EU nationals is €60.00. 
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Transposition Outcomes: Equal Treatment 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
23 Related rights  




24 Equal treatment  









derogation with regard to 
maintenance aid for studies 
Correct168 Incorrect169 
25 




possession of residence docs cannot 




charge for residence docs not to 
exceed charge for issuing nationals 
with similar documents 
Correct Correct 
 
Table 9.1.7: Transposition outcomes for equality of treatment (Articles 22-25 of Directive 
2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburgh 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
 
9.1.8 Restrictions on entry and residence 
The UK has for the most part transposed these provisions correctly, save 
for two provisions which are the subject of incomplete transposition. These 
relate to the possibility to request information from other Member States when 
an application for residence documentation is made,170 and the duty to admit 
returning nationals who have been expelled from other Member States.171 
                                                            
166 This provision was initially assessed as correct; see Correspondence Table for the UK (n 59) 48-49.  
167 See n 158. 
168 This provision was initially assessed as correct; see Correspondence Table for the UK (n 59) 48-49. 
169 See n 159-160. 
170 Article 27(3) of the Directive; see Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 44; Correspondence Table for 
the UK (n 59) 53.  
171 Article 27(4) of the Directive; see Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 44; Correspondence Table for 
the UK (n 59) 53. However, the absence of transposition is partly mitigated by the fact that British 
citizens have a right of abode in the UK by virtue of section 2(1)(a) of the Immigration Act 1971. See 
further Home Office, ‘Guidance: Right of abode’ 




The EEA Regulations have also been amended to strengthen the powers 
to take action to combat abuse of rights172 and take action to restrict free 
movement rights on grounds other than public policy, public security or public 
health.173 These amendments appear compliant, with one notable exception 
discussed below in respect of procedural safeguards.  
Transposition Outcomes: Restrictions on Entry and Residence 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
22 Territorial scope 
22 
right of residence extends to entire MS; 





27 General principles 
27(1)(1) 
restriction based on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health 
Correct
27(1)(2) not for economic ends 
Correct
27(2)(1) principle of proportionality 
Correct
27(2)(2) based on the personal conduct 
Correct
27(2)(2) 
serious threat to one of the fundamental 
interests of the society 
Correct
27(2)(2) no considerations of general prevention 
Correct
27(3) 
host MS may request police record from MS 




right of re-entry of expelled citizens in 
home MS  
Not transposed –
incomplete 
28 Protection against expulsion 
28(1) 
obligation to take account of considerations 
relating to citizen's situation 
Correct
28(2) 
persons who have permanent residence 




persons having resided for 10 years (only 
for imperative grounds of public security) 
Correct
                                                            
172 Article 35 of the Directive. The EEA Regulations were modified by SI 2013/3032 (n 6), Sched 1, para 
18, which added a new reg 21B (abuse of rights or fraud). Other amendments were made to reg 19 
(exclusion and removal from the United Kingdom). See further Home Office, ‘Modernised Guidance: 
Removals and revocations of EEA nationals’ (2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/removals-and-revocations-of-european-economic-
area-eea-nationals> accessed 31 December 2015; idem, ‘Modernised Guidance: Excluding EEA 
nationals and their families from the UK’ (2015)  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/excluding-eea-nationals-and-their-families-from-
the-uk>  accessed 31 December 2015. 
173 Article 15(1) of the Directive. Reg 20A (cancellation of a right of residence) was added by SI 2012/1547 




minors (only for imperative grounds of 
public security) unless expulsion is in best 
interests of the child  
Correct
29 Public health 
29(1) 




no expulsion based on diseases occurring 
after 3 months of residence 
Correct
29(3) option: require of a medical examination Not transposed correct
35 Abuse of rights174 
35(1) Option: measure against abuse of rights Correct Correct 
36 Sanctions 
36 Effective and proportionate sanctions Correct
 
Table 9.1.8: Transposition outcomes for restrictions on entry and residence (Article 22, 
27-29, 35-36 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburgh 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
 
9.1.9 Procedural safeguards and rights of appeal  
The original EEA Regulations presented some difficulties in 
transposition of the Directive’s provisions that aim ‘to ensure a high level of 
protection Union citizens and their family members in the event of their being 
denied leave to enter or reside in another Member State’.175      
The original EEA Regulations176 did not provide protection against 
systematic verification of the right of residence.177 The possibilities for the UK 
                                                            
174 The provisions of Article 35(2) are examined under Section 10.1.9 (Procedural safeguards and rights 
of appeal). 
175 Recital (25) of the Directive. 
176 Regs 19(3) and 20. See further Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 37; Correspondence Table for the 
UK (n 59) 34.  
177 Article 14(2) provides that ‘where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a Union citizen or his/her 
family members satisfies the conditions set out in Articles 7, 12 and 13, Member States may verify if 
these conditions are fulfilled. This verification shall not be carried out systematically.’ The transposition 
of the protections against expulsion contained in the paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article 14 will be 
examined below in the context of restrictions on the right of free movement. See Section 10.1.8 
(Restrictions on entry and residence). 
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authorities to verify the rights of residence has since been enhanced178 and have 
now transposed this provision.179  
Moreover, the UK authorities have instituted a minimum income 
threshold for EEA workers who claim social assistance in the UK.180 As a result, 
a person who earns less than the threshold at which social security 
contributions becomes due on earnings will be subjected to a test to verify that 
they engage in genuine and effective work.181 This test appears to be 
systematically applied whenever a person makes a claim to determine whether 
they are workers and therefore meet the ‘right to reside’ test.182 
                                                            
178 Reg 20B (verification of a right of residence) was inserted by SI 2013/3032 (n 6), Sched 1, para 16. 
Home Office, ‘Explanatory Memorandum to the Immigration (European Economic Area) 
(Amendment) (No 2) Regulations 2013’ (2013) 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/3032/pdfs/uksiem_20133032_en.pdf> accessed 2 
October 2015, which explains that ‘a new regulation 20B … applies when the Secretary of State has 
reasonable doubt as to whether a person has a right to reside under the Regulations, or wants to verify 
the eligibility of a person to apply for documentation … ’ and ‘will allow the Secretary of State to invite 
a person to whom the regulation applies to provide evidence or to attend an interview to support an 
application for documentation under the 2006 Regulations, or to support the existence of a right to 
reside they purport to have. If a person purports to be entitled to a right to reside on the basis of their 
relationship with another person, such as their spouse, the Secretary of State may invite that other 
person to attend an interview. If, without good reason, the information requested is not supplied, or, on 
at least two occasions, that person fails to attend an interview, the Secretary of State may draw such 
factual inferences about that person’s right to reside as appear appropriate in the circumstances. 
Following such an inference, the Secretary of State may decide that the person in question does not have 
a right to reside, but may not take such a decision on the sole basis that that person failed to comply 
with the request to attend interview or to provide further information. The power may not be used 
systematically’, ibid, paras 7.13-7.14 
179 Reg 20B(7). 
180 Department for Work and Pensions, ‘Minimum earnings threshold for EEA migrants introduced’, 
Press release, 21 February 2014 <www.gov.uk/government/news/minimum-earnings-threshold-for-
eea-migrants-introduced> accessed 22 December 2015 
181 See further, Department for Work and Pensions, ‘Decision Maker’s Guide’ (2015), paras 073031-
073052 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470826/dmgch0
703.pdf> accessed 7 July 2015. 
182 See further, Section 10.1.7 (Equality of treatment) n 158 and accompanying text. 
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The Directive does not provide for any cases where EU citizens or their 
family members may be denied a right of appeal since this should be available 
in all cases.183 This is in contrast to the EEA Regulations184 which deny the right 
of appeal to EU citizens and their family members who are unable (in the 
opinion of the Home Office) to provide evidence of their EU citizenship or 
relationship to an EU citizen as the case may be. Moreover, it goes against the 
Court’s case law on means of proof.185 This can lead to particular problems in 
practice for family members claiming a right to retain residence following a 
divorce or termination of a registered partnership where the Home Office 
deems they were not able to demonstrate the nationality of their former spouse 
or partner. While the EEA Regulations now allow186 for the UK authorities to 
‘accept alternative evidence of identity and nationality’, the relevant guidelines 
state recourse to such alternatives can only be made in exceptional 
circumstances.187 The Regulations therefore remain non-compliant in this 
respect. 
                                                            
183 Recital (26) of the Directive. 
184 Reg 26(2), (2A), (3) concerning EU citizens, durable partners and family members. Reg 26(3A) 
contains a similar restriction on family members covered by Reg 15A; see further n 82-85 and 
accompanying text. 
185 Case C-215/03 Oulane [2005] ECR I-1215, paras 25 and 53, where the Court held that where ‘the 
person concerned is able to provide unequivocal proof of his nationality by means other than a valid 
identity card or passport, the host Member State may not refuse to recognise his right of residence on 
the sole ground that he has not presented one of those documents’ and ‘where it is not specified which 
means of evidence are admissible for the person concerned to establish that he comes within one of the 
categories referred to in Articles 1 and 4 of Directive 73/148, it must be concluded that evidence may be 
adduced by any appropriate means’. 
186 Reg 29A as inserted by SI 2012/2560 (n 6), Sched, para 6. This change was made to comply with the 
Upper Tribunal’s ruling Barnett and Others (EEA Regulations: rights and documentation) Jamaica 
[2012] UKUT 142 (IAC) (5 May 2012), para [29] where it was held ‘it is unlawful to refuse applications 
merely because such documentation is not forthcoming’. 
187 Home Office, ‘Modernised Guidance: Processes and procedures: for EEA documentation 
applications’ (2015) 34 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/processes-and-procedures-
for-eea-documentation-applications> accessed 31 December 2015.   
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Furthermore, the EEA Regulations188 denies the right to EU citizens to 
make an appeal whilst still in the UK in a number of circumstances including a 
refusal to be admitted to the UK, a refusal to revoke an exclusion or deportation 
order, or a refusal to issue an EEA family permit, or wherever a decision has 
been taken when that person was outside the UK. This is likely to be contrary to 
the Court’s previous ruling in Yiadom.189 Moreover, the effect is that appellants 
must first leave the UK in order to have a right to appeal against such a decision, 
which will necessarily affect this person’s ability to access legal advice and by 
extension their ability to appeal. 190 
As mentioned above, the powers of the UK authorities to take action to 
combat abuse of rights has been strengthened.191 However the amendments 
                                                            
188 Reg 27 as amended on several occasions. 
189 Case C-357/98 Yiadom [2000] ECR I-9265, para 43, where the Court held that ‘Articles 8 and 9 of 
the Directive [64/221] of 25 February 1964 on the coordination of special measures concerning the 
movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health [1963-1964] OJ Spec Ed 117] must be interpreted as meaning that a decision 
adopted by the authorities of a Member State refusing a Community national, not in possession of a 
residence permit, leave to enter its territory cannot be classified as a decision concerning entry within 
the meaning of Article 8 thereof in a case such as that at issue in the main proceedings where the person 
concerned was temporarily admitted to the territory of that Member State, pending a decision following 
the enquiries required for the investigation of her case, and therefore resided for almost seven months 
in that territory before that decision was notified to her, since such a national must be entitled to the 
procedural safeguards referred to in Article 9 of the Directive.’ The Court also added that ‘if that State 
has accepted the physical presence of that national in its territory for a period which is manifestly longer 
than is required for such an investigation, it can also accept that national's presence during the time 
needed for him to exercise the rights of appeal referred to in Article 9 of the Directive. … All that must 
be taken into account is the time which elapsed between the physical entry into the territory and the 
competent authority's decision refusing admission’, ibid, paras 41 and 42. In this respect, reg 29(2)(b) 
effectively provides that a person whose entry has been denied will be deemed not to have been admitted 
to the UK for a period of three months, which could be considered ‘a period which is manifestly longer 
than is required’ for revoking a person’s admission to the UK. 
190 For a discussion on how this could constitute a measure that is contrary to the right to an effective 
remedy, see ‘Five Years of the Citizens Directive - Part 2’ (n 1) 354-355. 
191 See n 171 and accompanying text.  
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made allow for the imposition of an exclusion order in case of abuse,192 which is 
not permitted under the Directive.193 Moreover, it would appear that appeal 
rights are not being effectively observed given the Upper Tribunal’s recent the 
benefit of appeal rights under the EEA Regulations in respect of a person 
accused of abuse marriage of convenience.194 Hence, there is ambiguity as to 
whether the EEA Regulations currently achieve the ‘high level of protection’ 
demanded by the Directive in cases of abuse.195 This creates a new instance of 
non-compliance. 
The initial absence of a provision allowing a person to submit an appeal 
in person has now been addressed,196 as has the lack of transposition of 




192 Reg 19 (exclusion and removal from the United Kingdom) was amended by SI 2009/ 1117 (n 6), Sched 
1, para 6, with the insertion of sub-para (1AB) which provides that ‘[a] person is not entitled to be 
admitted to the United Kingdom by virtue of regulation 11 if the Secretary of State considers there to be 
reasonable grounds to suspect that his admission would lead to the abuse of a right to reside in 
accordance with regulation 21B(1).’ 
193 Article 15(3) provides that ‘The host Member State may not impose a ban on entry in the context of 
an expulsion decision to which paragraph 1 applies’, namely ‘on grounds other than public policy, public 
security or public health’. 
194 R (on the application of Bilal Ahmed) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (n 60) in which 
(for commentary, see n 60). 
195 Case C-202/13 McCarthy (n 91), para 50, where the Court has emphasised ‘measures adopted on the 
basis of that article [Article 35] are subject to the procedural safeguards provided for in Articles 30 and 
31 of the directive. As is clear from recital 25 in the preamble to the directive, those procedural 
safeguards are intended, in particular, to ensure a high level of protection of the rights of Union citizens 
and their family members in the event of their being denied leave to enter or reside in another Member 
State.’ 
196 Article 31(4) of the Directive; see Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 47; Correspondence Table for 
the UK (n 59) 66. See further n 197. The EEA Regs were amended by 2014/1976 (6), Sched, para 8, and 
inserted a new reg 29AA (temporary admission in order to submit case in person). 
197 Article 32(1) of the Directive; see Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 47; Correspondence Table for 




Transposition Outcomes: Procedural safeguards and rights of appeal 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
14 Retention of right of residence
14(2) verification of residence rights Incomplete Incorrect 
14(3) 
no automatic expulsion in case of recourse 
to social assistance 
Incomplete
14(4)(a) 




no expulsion of jobseekers looking for work 
who have genuine chances of being engaged 
Correct
14(4)(a) 
no expulsion of workers or self-employed 
persons 
Correct
15 Procedural safeguards 
15(1) 
procedures provided for by Art. 30, 31 shall 
apply by analogy 
Correct
15(2) 




Not transposed - 
incomplete 
15(3) 
no ban on entry for expulsion decision 





26(1) option to carry out checks 
Not transposed -
compliant 
30 Notification of decisions 
30(1) notification in writing Correct
30(2) 
full and precise information of the public 
policy, public security, public health 
grounds 
Correct
30(3) advising of legal remedies Correct
30(3) 
citizen must be allowed one month for 
leaving MS, except if duly substantiated 
urgency 
Correct
31 Procedural safeguards 
31(1) right to judicial review or appeal Incorrect Incorrect 
31(2) interim order suspends removal Correct
31(3) 
redress procedure (legality and facts; 
proportionality) 
Correct
31(4) right to submit defence in person (fair trial) Incorrect198 Correct 
32 Duration of exclusion orders 
32(1) 
right to submit an application for lifting 
exclusion order within three years 
Incorrect Correct 
32(1) 




no obligation for MS to allow entry during 
consideration of application 
Correct
33 
Expulsion as a penalty or legal 
consequence 
33(1) 
Expulsion may not be imposed as penalty 
unless Art. 27, 28, 29 are respected 
Correct
33(2) 
Right to re-evaluation of expulsion order 
after 2 years 
Correct
                                                            
198 This provision was identified as correctly transposed by the Commission; see Information from 
Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508). However, the Conformity Study for the UK 
(n 9) 47 and the Correspondence Table for the UK (n 59) 66 make clear it is considered incorrect. 
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Transposition Outcomes: Procedural safeguards and rights of appeal 
Article Content Transposition outcome Subsequent amendment
35 Abuse of rights 
35(2) 




Table 9.1.9: Transposition outcomes for procedural safeguards and rights of appeal 
(Article 14-15, 30-33, 35 of Directive 2004/38) 
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508); Milieu/Edinburgh 
conformity studies; ECAS comparative study
 
9.2 Application in UK 
UK Visas and Immigration, part of the Home Office has prime 
responsibility for the application of the EEA Regulations in the UK.199 There is 
a dedicated European casework team based in Liverpool that handles all 
applications for residence documents.200 
9.2.1 Application process 
It should be observed from the outset that, in theory, it is not compulsory 
for EEA nationals or their family members residing in the UK to register with 
the Home Office or obtain residence documentation.201  
However, they may choose to do so if they wish since this may help them 
to demonstrate that they have a right of residence in the UK in their dealings 
with local authorities and service providers which require proof of residence 
(such as banking institutions when opening a bank account). In practice, non-
EU family members will certainly need to apply.202 Furthermore, EEA nationals 
                                                            
199 Conformity Study for the UK (n 9) 15. This was formerly the UK Border Agency, ibid, 15-16. 
200 Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, ‘The Rights of European Citizens and 
their Spouses to Come to the UK: Inspecting the Application Process and the Tackling of Abuse’ (2014) 
15. 
201 Regs 16 and 17 do not make registration compulsory for EEA nationals or their family members. See 
further Explanatory Memorandum (n 104) 10-11. The Home Office’s website also states that such 
documentation is not mandatory, see ‘Prove your right to live in the UK as an EU citizen’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/eea-registration-certificate> accessed 31 December 2015; ‘Apply for a UK 
residence card’ <https://www.gov.uk/apply-for-a-uk-residence-card/overview> accessed 31 December 
2015. 




and their family members with an eye on naturalisation will also need to first 
obtain a permanent residence card.203  
The available literature204 suggests that the processing of applications 
under the EEA Regulations by the UK authorities is fraught with delays and 
suspicion – if not outright hostility – particularly in connection with the 
processing of applications submitted by family members who are not EU 
citizens. 
The application process in the UK is considered particularly 
burdensome.205 A notable example is provided by the size of the standard 
application forms used for applications for residence documents: Form 
                                                            
203 The British Nationality (General) (Amendment No 3) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1806, reg 7 
effectively make it compulsory for EEA nationals and their family members to hold a permanent 
residence document as part of the requirements for applying for naturalisation as a British citizen.  See 
further Colin Yeo, ‘EU nationals must apply for permanent residence card for British nationality 
applications’ (Free Movement, 9 November 2015 <https://www.freemovement.org.uk/eu-nationals-
must-apply-for-permanent-residence-card-for-british-nationality-applications/> accessed 8 
December 2015. 
204 Xavier Le Den and Janne Sylvest, ‘Understanding Citizens' and Businesses' Concerns with the Single 
Market: a View from the Assistance Services’ (Report for Commission, Ramboll 2011)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/20concerns/feedback_report_en.pdf> accessed 
26 May 2015, who draw on information from information on cases handled by SOLVIT and Your Europe 
Advice; see further Annual reports for SOLVIT (2004-2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/documents/index_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015; Commission, Single 
Market Scoreboard (SOLVIT governance tool) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/solvit/index_
en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015; Annual reports for Your Europe Advice (2007-2010) 
<http://europa.eu/youreurope/advice/about_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015; Commission, Single 
Market Scoreboard (Your Europe Advice governance tool) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/youreurope_a
dvice/index_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015. See also, ‘Five Years of the Citizens Directive - Part 2’ (n 
1) 332-336, drawing on Your Europe Advice. 
205 Shaw (n 9) 276-277. 
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EEA(PR)206 relating to permanent residence runs to 85 pages, while the 
application form for family members EEA (FM) includes 91 pages.207  
Another extensive source of problems has been delays in processing 
applications.208 
The application process has been the subject of a comparative study that 
assesses outcomes in the application process as it relates to the issuance of 
residence documents and dissemination of information.209 The results for the 







206 Home Office ‘Apply for a document certifying permanent residence or permanent residence card: 
form EEA (PR)’ (2015) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/apply-for-a-document-
certifying-permanent-residence-or-permanent-residence-card-form-eea-pr> accessed 28 August 2015; 
idem, ‘Apply for a registration certificate or residence card for a family member: form EEA (FM) (2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/apply-for-a-registration-certificate-or-residence-
card-for-a-family-member-form-eea-fm> accessed 28 August 2015. 
207 See further Colin Yeo, ‘UK blatantly obstructing EU free movement rights with red tape’ (Free 
Movement, 18 February 2015) <https://www.freemovement.org.uk/uk-blatantly-obstructing-eu-free-
movement-rights-with-red-tape/> accessed 16 June 2015, who has remarked: ‘The UK is now blatantly 
obstructing EU free movement rights. As of 30 January 2015, a new Form EEA(FM) has been 
introduced for family members of EU nationals and of British citizens exercising Surinder Singh free 
movement rights. It is 129 pages long. The old version, called the EEA2, was 37 pages long. By 
comparison, the paper versions of forms for non EEA nationals applying as family members under UK 
domestic immigration rules are a grand total of 35 pages, and that includes all the interminable detail 
required for Appendix FM applications (VAF4A and VAF4A Appendix 2).’ The 129-page long form was 
reduced to 91 pages in July 2015. 
208  
209 Astrid Henningsen, Maylis Labayle, Camino Mortera and Rossella Nicoletti ‘Evaluation of EU rules 
on free movement of EU citizens and their family members and their practical implementation’ (Report 
for Commission, ICF-GHK/Milieu 2013). 
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Application of the Directive in UK 
 
Factual outcome Criteria 




Art 34: information 
dissemination – consistency 
Consistency of information provision (all sources 
provide the same information, there is a natural link 
from general to specific information) 
2.5 2.5 2
Art 34: information 
dissemination to EU citizens 
– accuracy 
Quality and comprehensiveness of the information 
related to EU citizens (main sources) 
5 4 3
Art 34: information 
dissemination to family 
members – accuracy   
Quality and comprehensiveness of the information 
related to non-EU family members of EU citizens (main 
sources) 
5 4 3
Art 34: information 
dissemination – availability 
Availability of different sources of information (web, 
print, hotline) 
5 3 3
 Overall rating information provision 17.5 13.5 11




Art 8(3) and recital (14): 
documents comprehensively 
listed 
Supporting documentation requested by hosting MS–
EU citizens 
5 2 3
Art 9(2) and recital (14): 
documents comprehensively 
listed 
Supporting documentation requested by hosting MS – 
TCN family members of EU citizens 
5 2 3
 Overall rating preparation of applications 10 4 5




Art 8(2) and recital (14): 
undue administrative burden 
to be avoided 
Nature of the lodging system. Ease of lodging and 
requirements for leaving of documents with the 
competent authority 
5 1 3
Case C-424/98: proof by any 
appropriate means 
Flexibility in terms of acceptance of alternative 
appropriate means of proof 
5 4 3
Art 25(2): charge not 
exceeding that imposed on 
nationals for similar 
documents 
Application fees 5 1 3
 Overall rating submission of applications 15 6 9




Art.8(2): immediate issue of 
registration certificate 
 
Time needed from the successful lodging to effectively 
receiving the residence documents – EU citizens 
10 2 6
Art.10(1): issue of residence 
card no later than six months 
from date of application 
Time needed from the successful lodging to effectively 
receiving the residence documents – family members 
10 2 6
 Overall rating issuance of the residence 
document  
20 4 13
  Total rating 62.5 27.5 39




Table 9.2.1 Application outcomes (UK) 





The above would tend to confirm that in practice the UK’s application of 
the Directive is beset by problems despite the relatively satisfactory 
transposition of the EU residence rules. 
Refusal rates 
It should be noted with some concern that the Home Office has been 
refusing applications for residence documents with increasing regularity since 
the Directive came into force in 2006, with a slight dip in 2013. The average of 
refusal for applications for residence documentation by EU citizens and their 
family members in the period 2004-2013 has been 21%, which is significantly 
above the EU average of 5%.  
According to the Home Office’s control of immigration statistics, in 2005, 
before the EEA Regulations came into effect, it issued residence documents to 
a total of 35,531 EEA citizens and their family members out of a total of 44,652 
applications representing a 20.43% refusal rate. By comparison, in 2013, a total 
of 102,006 applications for residence documents was received by the Home 
Office, of which 40,807 were rejected, representing a 40%. This is down from 





Residence applications and refusals 
 
Graph 9.2.2 (a) Residence card applications and refusals (2004-2013) 
Source: Home Office statistics 
The graph below shows that in 2010 the actual annual refusal rate of 
applications (represented a dashed line) has overtaken the average refusal rate 
for applications for the period 204-2013. This coincides with the election of the 
coalition government in 2010. 
Rate of refusal of residence applications 
 
Graph 9.2.2 (b) Rate of refusal of applications for residence documents made by 
EU citizens and family members in the UK (2004-2013) 
Source: UK Home Office statistics
 
























Given that the average refusal rate for all Member States is 5% this would 
tend to indicates that decision-making in the UK may be indicative of systematic 
non-compliant application. This may be indicative of a ‘general and consistent 
practice’ capable of constituting a failure to fulfil Treaty obligations.210 
However, further research would need to be conducted as the Home Office does 
not collate statistics on the reasons for such refusals.211  
9.2.2 Expulsion rates 
The UK also publishes statistics on expulsions. This would tend to suggest 
that the incidence of the expulsion is on the increase since 2010, which 
coincides with the election of the coalition government in 2010. 
Expulsion rates in the UK 
 
Graph 9.2.2 Number of expulsions measures taken against EU citizens and family 
members in the UK (2004-2014) 
Source: UK Home Office statistics
 
 
 The above data on the refusal of applications and rates of expulsion of 
EEA nationals would tend to indicate that the application of the EEA 
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9.3 Enforcement in UK  
In order to enforce their rights under the EEA Regulations (or under the 
directly effective provisions of Directive 2004/38 as the case may be), EU 
citizens and their family members are able to avail themselves of either 
administrative or judicial redress mechanisms. 
9.3.1 Alternatives to judicial proceedings 
Where EEA nationals or their family members have had their application 
for residence document rejected by the Home Office, they have the possibility 
to request administrative reconsideration of the decision by a senior 
caseworker.212  This is not available in case an appeal is lodged against the 
decision before the First-Tier Tribunal. 
The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman can in theory 
investigate complaints against UK Visas & Immigration,213 but it appears this is 
used in less than 1% of refusals in EEA cases.214 This process requires a 
complainant to have exhausted internal complains procedures within the Home 
Office,215 and is not available in case an appeal is lodged.216 The Ombudsman 
does not have the power to overturn decisions, although it can make 




212 European Operational Policy Team notices (n 8), ‘Reconsidering Decisions in European 
Applications’, Notice 03/2011, March 2011. 
213 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, section 5 and Schedule 2. 
214 Ombudsman, ‘UK Visas and Immigration investigation outcomes’ (2015) 
<http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/about-us/being-open-and-transparent/disclosure-
log/2015/march/information-request-relating-to-complaints-about-uk-visas-and-immigration-and-
their-outcomes-in-the-last-three-business-years> accessed 9 November 2015. 
215 Ombudsman, Annual Report and Accounts 2014-15 (2015) 
<http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/ar2015/governance-statement/1.-statutory-position-and-scope-of-
responsibilities> accessed 9 November 2015. 
216 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, section 5(2). 
217 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, section 10. 
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Alternatives to court 





Ombudsman Yes No 
 
Table 9.3.1 Alternatives to judicial proceedings  
 
9.3.2 Access to justice 
The various factors that influence access to the courts in the UK such as 
legal representation, costs of procedure and the availability of legal aid can be 
summarised as follows: 
Access to justice 
Factor Nature Comment 
Legal representation Not mandatory Relatively flexible procedures means litigants in 
person can represent themselves 
Appeal filing fee £140218 6.2% of average net earnings219 
Availability of legal 
aid 
No Legal aid has been withdrawn in EU residence 
cases,220 except for victims of domestic violence221 
and appeals against deportation.222 
 






218  First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Fees Order 2011, SI 2011/2841, art 3(2)(b). 
The fee is payable upon an appeal with a hearing. The fee payable for an appeal without a hearing solely 
based on papers is £80, ibid, art 3(2)(a). 
219This is calculated on the basis of 100% of the average monthly net earnings of a single adult in the UK 
for 2014 (£2265.41) as indicated in Eurostat dataset ‘Annual Net Earnings’ (net_nt_net) (indicator: 
A1_100, NET): <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/labour-market/earnings/database> accessed on 5 
December 2015.. 
220 The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s 9. This provides that legal aid is 
available only for civil legal services listed in Schedule 1, Part 1. Appeals against decisions issued under 
the EEA Regulations are not included with the effect that they are not eligible for legal aid. 
221 Ibid, Schedule 1, Part 1, para 29. 
222 Ibid, Schedule 1, Part 1, para 19, read in conjunction with the EEA Regulations, reg 24(3) and the 
Immigration Act 1971, ss 3(5) and 5(5) and Schedule 3, and the Immigration Act, s 10. There are some 




9.3.3 Nature of first instance judicial review  
The EEA Regulations provide for a right of appeal before the First-Tier 
Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber).223 Judicial enforcement is 
entrusted to specialised courts in the UK with three possible levels of appeal. 
The allows for full judicial review of decisions and allows the tribunal to 
substitute its own decision instead of the Home Office.224 The rules permit the 
presentation of evidence and facts that have occurred after the decision was 
made. Decisions of the First-Tier Tribunal are not usually reported and are of 
limited precedential value. 
Decisions of the First-Tier Tribunal maybe appealed to the Upper 
Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber) which had full powers to remake 
the lower court’s decision.225  
                                                            
223 Regs 26-27. 
224 FD (EEA discretion: basis of appeal) Algeria [2007] UKAIT 49, para [12], in which the Tribunal 
held that ‘it is open to a person in the appellant’s situation to claim that a discretion under the 
Regulations should have been exercised differently, and that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to substitute 
its own view of how the discretion should have been exercised.’ The head note states: ‘The Tribunal has 
jurisdiction to review the exercise of the Secretary of State’s discretion under the EEA Regulations 
applying to “extended family members”. In such cases the Tribunal is not, therefore, confined to 
considering whether the decision was a lawful one.’ Although the decision was partly reversed by the 
Court of Appeal, the Tribunal held in MO (reg 17(4) EEA Regs) Iraq [2008] UKAIT 61, para [3] (a case 
involving spouses) that ‘We record here our understanding that the Tribunal’s decision in principle in 
FD that it has power to review the exercise of a discretion exercised within the EEA Regulations has not 
been the subject of judicial doubt.’ The headnote states: ‘The decision by the Tribunal in FD (Algeria) 
[2007] UKAIT 00049 that it has power to review the exercise of discretion exercised within the EEA 
Regulations remains correct, despite the reversal of that determination on other grounds by the Court 
of Appeal’. This was also confirmed by the Tribunal in YB (EEA reg 17(4) –proper approach) Ivory 
Coast [2008] UKAIT 62, at para [38] 
225 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, section 12. 
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A further appeal lies to the Court of Appeal, which also has the power to 
remake the decision of Upper Tribunal.226 Final appeal to the Supreme Court227 
may be possible on points of law. 








facts not presented 








Full review  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 9.3.3 Scope of judicial review of decisions on EU residence rights 
 
9.3.4 Statistical data on appeals 
There is scant data on the quality of decision-making by the national 
authorities in EU free movement cases. A useful proxy to measure the quality of 
national decisions would be to look at the outcome of appeals filed against 
decisions relating to EU residence rights. The UK is the only Member State for 
which data on appeals is available as shown in the following table.  
 
Appeals in EEA decisions before UK Tribunals 









































2010 81,984 17,288 20.89 7% 33% 38% 7% 31%
2011 97,982 29,170 29.77 6% 20% 37% 6% 30%
2012 83,644 36,232 43.32 9% 21% 33% 6% 21%
2013 102,088 40,807 40.00 11% 28% 31% 4% 19%
2014 100,667 38,280 38.03 9% 24% 14% 1% 7%
five-year average 34.04% 8% 25% 31% 5% 22%
 
 
Table 9.3.4 Appeals against EU residence decisions in the UK and appeal outcomes (2010-2014)   





226 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, section 13. 




The data casts doubt on the quality of decision-making by the UK Home 
Office in EEA residence cases. Over the period 2010-2014, the average rate of 
refusal in EEA residence cases by the UK authorities reached 34%.228 During 
this time, roughly a quarter of refusal decisions have been appealed to the First 
Tier Tribunal. In 31% of cases, EU citizens and their family members obtained 
a successful outcome to their appeal. In 5% of cases where the first-level appeal 
failed, a further appeal was lodged before the Upper Tribunal.  In these second-
level appeals, a further 22% of cases were resolved in favour of EU citizens and 
their family members. This would seem to suggest that roughly 10% of decisions 
are decided wrongly by the UK administrative authorities and subsequently 
overturned by the courts. The proportion of wrongly decided cases might be 
even higher, given that the withdrawal of legal aid in immigration cases in 
2013229 may have deterred EU citizens and their family members from 
appealing against a refusal by the UK authorities to issue them residence 
documents. 
9.3.5 Preliminary rulings 
Since 2006, when the Directive came into force, the UK courts have made 
references to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU seeking an 
interpretation of its provisions.230 This compares favourably with the 28 
                                                            
228 This compares with an average rate of refusal of EU residence applications by the UK authorities in 
the period 2004-2014 of 21.09%. The increase in refusal rates above this average witnessed since 2010 
coincides with the change in UK government. 
229 For a discussion, see Sheona York, ‘The End of Legal Aid in Immigration - A Barrier to Access to 
Justice for Migrants and a Decline in the Rule of Law’ (2013), 27 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Law, 106-138. 
230 Case C-507/12 St Prix [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2007 (judgment of 19 June 2014) 
[372] 
 
references that were made in the period 1968-2005 when other instruments 
governed the right of free movement of EU citizens.231 
Based on the available literature,232 the attitudes of the UK courts to 
making a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice in free 
movement cases is progressive at the lower level (namely at the level of the 
Upper Tribunal and the High Court) and more conservative at appellate level 
(Court of Appeal).233 The Supreme Court sits somewhere in between and will be 
hesitant before sending references to Luxembourg,234 unless these relate to 
issues of high salience such as, for example, access to UK social welfare by EEA 
nationals.235 This is summarised in the following table. 
 
                                                            
231 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L. Brunell, ‘The European Court and National Courts: Data Set on 
Preliminary References in EC Law (Art. 234) 1961-2006’ (2007) <http://www.eu-newgov.org/EU-
Law/deliverables_detail2.asp?Project_ID=26> accessed 30 December 2015.  
232 See for example, John Usher, ‘The Impact of EEC Legislation on the United Kingdom Courts’ (1989) 
10 Statute Law Review 95-109; Karen Alter, ‘The European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy: 
Spillover or Backlash?’ (2000) 54 International Organization 489-518; Damian Chalmers, ‘The 
Application of Community Law in the United Kingdom 1994-1998’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law 
Review 83-128; idem, ‘The Much Ado about Judicial Politics in the United Kingdom’ (2000) Harvard 
Jean Monnet Working Paper 1/00; idem, ‘The positioning of EU judicial politics within the United 
Kingdom’ (2000) 23 West European Politics 169-210; Danny Nicol, EC Membership and the 
Judicialization of British Politics (Oxford University Press 2001); Stacy Nyikos, ‘The European Court 
of Justice and National Courts’ (2001) (Paper presented at the Comparative Courts Conference in 
Washington St Louis, 1-3 November 2001); Anthony Arnull, ‘Keeping their Heads Above Water? 
European Law in the House of Lords’ in James Lee (ed), From House of Lords to Supreme Court: 
Judges, Jurists and the Process of Judging (Hart Publishing 2011) 129-148; Jennifer Sigafoos ‘What is 
driving rates of social policy preliminary references to the CJEU? Evidence from the United Kingdom 
and France’ (2012) 34 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 489-508; Arthur Dyevre, ‘European 
Integration and National Courts: Defending Sovereignty under Institutional Constraints?’ (2013) 9 
European Constitutional Law Review 139-168.  
233 See for example the Court of Appeal’s refusal in Ahmad (n 112) to refer a question as to the 
interpretation of the concept of ‘comprehensive sickness insurance’ contained in the Directive, even 
though the Court of Justice has never ruled on it. 
234 See to that effect Arnull (n 229) 147-148 









High Court  
Discretionary Yes Lower courts are open to 
making requests for 
preliminary rulings 
Court of Appeal Discretionary Yes Appellate court is reluctant to 
make references for 
preliminary ruling 
Supreme Court Mandatory Yes Higher courts is open to make 
references for preliminary 
ruling, less so on issue with 
high salience 
 
Table 9.3.5 Attitudes towards preliminary rulings 
 
9.3.6 Publicity of decisions 
Given the importance that individuals play in the indirect enforcement of 
the Directive, it is necessary that that individuals and their lawyers are able to 
obtain information on cases relating to the enforcement of the national 
implementing measures. This section therefore reviews the publicity given to 
such decisions. 
The judicial rulings of the Upper Tribunal involving the enforcement of 
the EEA Regulations are made available on the Upper Tribunal’s website 
dedicated to decisions of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber.236 Important 
cases usually tend to be reported and their visibility is heightened by the 
inclusion of the term ‘EEA’ in the case citation, if not the head note. This is not 
the case of the decisions of the higher courts. Important cases and all cases of 
the higher courts will be reported on the British and Irish Legal Institute’s 
website as well.237 
  
                                                            
236 <https://tribunalsdecisions.service.gov.uk/utiac> accessed 30 December 2015.  




Publicity of judicial decisions 
Court level Availability 
of reports 
Visibility of EU 
residence cases  
Availability of statistics on 
EU residence cases 
Immigration tribunals, 
High Court 
Yes High Yes 
Court of Appeal Yes Low No 
Supreme Court Yes Low No 
 
Table 9.3.5 Publicity given to judicial rulings on EU residence rights  
 
9.4 Conclusions on Implementation in UK 
The UK’s transposition model followed by the Government can be 
described as ‘bolt-on legislation’ under delegated powers which displays an 
elaborative approach to drafting techniques. Only six provisions or sub-
provisions were identified as following a literal approach to transposition.238 
The level of compliance of transposition was 74% in 2008, slightly above 
the EU average of 71%. Transposition has not improved despite all the 
amendments made by the UK authorities to its national implementing 
measures. Indeed, the positive actions taken by the UK authorities to correct 
non-compliance in the EEA Regulations following judgments of the Court of 
Justice have been fully counterbalanced by other non-compliant amendments 
seeking to take advantage of ambiguities in the Court’s case law. 
The UK’s application model consists in centralised application involving 
a single administrative entity that applies the rules for EU and non-EU family 
members. This is the same entity that applies the national immigration rules. 
The correctness in the practical application of the rules achieves 44%, compared 
to an average of 62% across all Member States. The high rates of refusal of 
application of residence applications may be indicative of a ‘general and 
                                                            
238 Article 16(4), Article 27(2) (four sub-provisions), and Article 28; see Correspondence Table for the 




consistent practice’ capable of constituting a failure to fulfil Treaty obligations, 
but this would require further investigation. 
The enforcement model allows for full judicial review of decisions. There 
is insufficient data to determine whether enforcement is compliant in the UK, 
although based on the reviewed evidence, it would appear that the UK courts do 
provide a possibility for EU citizens and family members to enforce their EU 
rights in such a way that meets the requirements of EU law. 
The free movement rules in the UK are considered politically important and 
therefore free movement rules can accordingly be considered of high saliency. 
The evidence that has been reviewed appears to indicate a correlation between 
both transposition and application outcomes and political factors, rather than 
any legal factors, as suggested by the influence that a change of government in 
2010 has had on both transposition and application outcomes. 
The UK’s motivation towards compliance can be characterised as selective 
non-compliance in view of its responses to judgments handed down by the 
Court of Justice and the fact that the UK has not sought to address the 
allegations of non-compliance made by the European Commission even after it 
issued its reasoned opinion. 
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10.1 Transposition Compared 
The data which is available2 enables a comparison between Member 
States as to the timeliness of transposition and its correctness. 
10.1.1 Delay in transposition of Directive 2004/38 
 Only ten Member States were able to transpose the Directive on time. The 
extent of transposition delay is shown in the following chart. The delay 
calculated by reference to the number of days between expiry of the deadline for 
transposition on 30 April 2006 and the date of entry into force of the national 
implementing measures.  The average transposition delay was 223 days. 
Transposition delay (days) 
 
Chart 10.1.1 Delay in transposition of Directive 2004/38  






2 Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508). 
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10.1.2 Level of compliance in transposition of Directive 2004/38 
In its 2008 implementation report, the Commission remarked that ‘[t]he 
overall transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC is rather disappointing. Not one 
Member State has transposed the Directive effectively and correctly in its 
entirety. Not one Article of the Directive has been transposed effectively and 
correctly by all Member States.’3 
The Commission did not make national comparisons in its report, instead 
examining horizontal issues of non-compliance and reporting on trends by 
reference to specific concepts of the Directive. Using this same data, it has been 
possible to compare the transposition outcome for each Member States, as 
presented in the following graph.    
Transposition outcome by Member State 
Chart 10.1.12(a) Outcomes in the transposition of Directive 2004/38  
Source: Information from Commission dated 10 March 2015 (GestDem 2015/1508) 
 
The above data shows that Austria achieved the worst 
transposition outcome (40% correct), followed by Slovenia (48%) and 
                                                            
3  Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’, COM(2008) 840 final (hereafter 2008 
Implementation Report), 1. 
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK















Denmark (53%). The best performers were Portugal (94%), Cyprus (92%) 
and Greece (90%). This puts to rest the stereotype that Southern Member 
States achieve less well when it comes to the transposition of directives, 
at least when it comes to Directive 2004/38. The average transposition 
outcome across Member States was 71% complaint. 
The next chart also tries to examine whether there is any 
correlation between the Commission’s infringement proceedings 
initiated under Article 258 TFEU and the transposition outcome. 
Member States which were the subject of infringement 
proceedings in 2011 have been identified by a black dot on the graph 
below. 
It can be seen that there is no apparent correlation between the 
transposition outcome and the initiation of proceedings. Cyprus whose 
transposition outcome was 92% suffered the same fate as Austria which 
achieved the worst transposition outcome (40%). 
The Commission’s infringement policy decisions also probably 
factors in other elements besides non-compliant transposition such as 
the size of the resident EU population.  
Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK all have large resident EU 
migrant populations in absolute numbers, each hosting more than a 
million EU citizens in heir territory. Belgium and Cyprus also have 
sizeable numbers of EU citizens residing in their countries in proportion 













Transposition Outcomes vs Infringement Proceedings 
 
 
Chart 10.1.2(b) Outcomes in the transposition of Directive 2004/38 compared to 
infringements 













































10.2 Application Compared 
The data collated in respect of the application of the Directive by the 
administrative authorities of the Member States will also now be reviewed. 
10.2.1 Level of compliance in application of Directive 2004/38 
The next chart examines whether there might be any correlation between 
the Commission’s infringement proceedings initiated under Article 258 TFEU 
and the transposition outcome. 
Member States which were the subject of infringement proceedings in 
2011 have again been identified by a black dot on the graph below. 
Here the results are much more interesting. There does appear to be 
stronger correlation between the application outcomes of the Member States 
and those cases in which the Commission initiated infringement action. The 
cluster of Member States with significant non-compliant application include 
Belgium, Italy, Malta and the UK. Germany, Spain and Sweden also have lower 
than average application outcomes. The Commission is likely to have based its 
decision to initiate infringement action on complaints received from individuals 













Application Outcomes vs Infringement Proceedings 
 
Chart 10.3.1 Outcomes in the application of Directive 2004/38 compared to infringements 
Source: Information from Commission dated 12 November 2013 (GestDem 2013/5460); ICF-GHK/Milieu 
Evaluation Report 
 











































10.2.2 Empirical data on the application of Directive 2004/38 
Unlike the situation of third-country nationals covered by the EU’s 
common visa and migration policies,4 Member States are not required to 
publish detailed statistical information regarding the application of Directive 
2004/38.  At present, Member States are only required to furnish data on the 
overall number of EU migrants having their usual residence in their territory, 
annual migration flows into and out of their territory, as well as the number of 
EU citizens who have acquired the nationality of the host Member State.5  It is 
therefore up to each Member State to determine what – if any – data to collate 
on the application of Directive 2004/38. They also determine whether to make 
such data available to the public in accordance with the legal framework 
governing access to such information.   
Nonetheless, Member States do not have an absolute discretion in this 
regard. The Court of Justice has had an opportunity to examine the limitations 
that EU law places on the collection of information by Member States in 
connection with EU citizens who reside on their territory.  In Huber,6 the Court 
found that the storing of personalised (as opposed to anonymised) information 
relating to EU citizens for statistical purposes on a central register kept by the 




compilation  of  statistics  on  foreign  workers  (2007)  OJ  L  199/23  (hereafter  ‘Regulation  862/2007’).  This 
instrument requires the Member States to collate detailed statistical information on persons having applied for 
international protection  including  levels of applications and rejections. The regulation also requires Member 









not be considered necessary within the meaning of the EU Data Protection 
Directive.7 The Court did not however call into question the power of Member 
States to store personalised data that is necessary for the practical application 
of Directive 2004/38 by the competent national authorities,8 nor the ability of 
Member States to keep anonymous information on EU citizens for statistical 
purposes.9  
In view of the scarcity of harmonising EU legislation on the matter, it is 
not surprising to find significant divergence between Member States in terms 
of the availability and the level of detail of statistical information on the entry 
and residence of EU citizens and their family members.  According to a 2013 
study on residence formalities undertaken for the European Commission,10 
information on the issue of residence documents is available in most Member 
States. However, statistical data on rejection rates of residence applications is 
only available from sixteen Member States. Furthermore, no data exists on 
entry bans and the data on expulsions is only publicly available in four Member 
States, even though these constitute some of the most restrictive measures that 
Member States can take against EU citizens and their family members. 
Moreover, the UK is the only Member State that has published data on appeals 
brought against administrative decisions that restrict the free movement rights 
of EU citizens and their family members. Several EU officials have unofficially 
expressed the view that the absence of publicly available statistical data on an 
EU-wide basis restricts the ability of the Commission to monitor and enforce of 












The following table provides an overview of the availability of data on EU 
residence rights across the Member States.  









Austria √ √ n/a n/a n/a n/a Ministry of the 
Interior 
Belgium √ n/a √ √ n/a n/a Immigration Office
Bulgaria √ √ √ n/a n/a n/a Ministry of the 
Interior 
Croatia (1) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Ministry of the 
Interior 




√ √ √ n/a n/a n/a Ministry of the 
Interior 
Denmark √ √ √ n/a √ n/a Immigration 
Service 
Estonia √ √ √ n/a n/a n/a Ministry of the 
Interior 
Finland √ √ √ n/a n/a n/a National Police 
Board 
France √ n/a n/a √ n/a n/a Ministry of the 
Interior 
Germany √ n/a √ n/a n/a n/a Ministry of the 
Interior 
Greece √ √ n/a n/a n/a n/a Ministry of the 
Interior 
Ireland √ √ √ n/a n/a n/a Irish Naturalisation 
& Immigration 
Service 
Italy (2) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a - 
Latvia √ n/a √ n/a n/a n/a Office of 
Citizenship and 
Migration Affairs 
Lithuania √ √ n/a n/a n/a n/a Ministry of the 
Interior 
Luxembourg √ n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Malta n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a - 
Netherlands 
(3) 
√ √ √ √ n/a n/a Immigration and 
Naturalisation 
Service 
Poland √ √ √ n/a n/a n/a Migration 
Authority 
Portugal √ n/a √ n/a n/a n/a Immigration & 
Border Service 
Romania √ n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Ministry of the 
Interior 
Slovakia √ n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Alien Police 
Department Office 
Slovenia √ √ n/a n/a n/a n/a Ministry of the 
Interior 
Spain √ √ n/a n/a n/a n/a Ministry of Interior
Sweden √ √ √ n/a n/a n/a Migration Board
UK √ √ √ √ √ √ UK Visas & 
Immigration 
Sources: ICF GHK/Milieu 2013 Evaluation Report, national authorities
 
Notes: 
* Abuse cases include marriages and partnerships of convenience; data on such cases are not systematically 
published but are in the public domain 
(1): Croatia was not included in 2013 survey; no statistics could be found on Ministry of Interior’s website  
(2): Italy ceased the publication of statistics relating to EU citizens in 2008; no response was received from the 
Ministry of Interior or the Italian Statistical Authority following author’s official request for access to 
information  
(3): The IND does not publish these statistics, but expulsion figures have been disclosed in parliament. 
 
 





Further examination of this data reveals some important trends in 
connection with the practical implementation of the EU free movement rights 
in the Member States. 
10.2.3 Data on residence applications by EU citizens and their 
family members  
 
Most Member States publish data on the issue of residence 
documentation, with the exception of Croatia, Italy and Malta. However, such 
data is of limited value when analysing the implementation of Directive 
2004/38 because such figures tend only to concern applications by EU citizens 
and their family members that have been successful.  
Data on the rates of rejection of such applications provides a much more 
useful indication of the existence of problems in the practical implementation 
of Directive 2004/38.  The data reveals a wide range of variation across the 



















Refusal rate * 
(all applications) 
Refusal rate ** 
(TCN family 
members) 
Refusal rate *** 
(Singh cases) 
Austria  48,422 3% 3% n/a 
Belgium 64,871 n/a n/a n/a 
Bulgaria 7,685 0% 0% n/a 
Cyprus 23,058 4% 30% n/a 
Czech Republic 14,676 8% 15% n/a 
Denmark (1) 30,059 1% 1% 64% 
Estonia 3,768 0% 0% n/a 
Finland 16,033 3% 3% n/a 
France (2) (3) (4) 13,531 n/a n/a n/a 
Germany (5) 11,500 n/a n/a n/a 
Greece 22,400 0.2% n/a n/a 
Hungary 19,210 0.1% 31% n/a 
Ireland (5) (6) 2,338 n/a 37% 96% 
Italy n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Latvia (2) (3) 1,584 n/a n/a n/a 
Lithuania (3) 1,343 0.4% 4% n/a 
Luxembourg (2) 23,347 n/a n/a n/a 
Malt n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Netherlands (7) 10,980 n/a n/a n/a 
Poland 8,446 2% 3% n/a 
Portugal (2) 15,765 n/a n/a n/a 
Romania (2) 52,501 n/a n/a n/a 
Slovakia (2) 4,459 n/a n/a n/a 
Slovenia (6) (8) 14,365 3% n/a n/a 
Spain 116,016 13% 34% n/a 
Sweden 34,074 22% 29% n/a 
UK 83,644 43% 65% n/a 
EU average 7% 20% - 
Sources: ICF GHK/Milieu 2013 Evaluation Report, national authorities
 
Notes: 
* Refusal rate refers to rejection of applications submitted by EU citizens and non-EU family members for residence 
and permanent residence documents. It includes applications which have been the subject of a formal refusal decision 
and applications rejected as being invalid. 
** Refusal rate refers to rejection of applications submitted by third country family members for residence and 
permanent residence documents. It includes applications which have been the subject of a formal refusal decision and 
applications rejected as being invalid. 
*** Refusal rate refers to rejection of applications submitted by non-EU family members for residence documents in 
cases claiming the benefit of family reunification under the Surinder Singh ruling (C-370/90) following the exercise of 
free movement rights by the EU relative. 
(1): data on refusal rate in Singh cases relates to applications made in first half of 2012 
(2): data only refers to number of successful applications 
(3): data only available for 2011 
(4): low number of applications may be explained by voluntary registration system for EU citizens 
(5): data only relates to application made by third country national family members 
(6): yearly average based on applications lodged in period 2007-2013 
(7): data only relates to number of successful applications made by EU citizens 
(8): refusal data only relates to applications by EU citizens 
 




While the average rate of rejection of applications for residence 
documents by EU citizens and their family members is around 7% across the 
EU, the statistics indicates the existence of significantly high rates of rejection 
in several Member States. The rejection rates for all EU residence applications 
are considerably higher in Spain (13%), Sweden (22%) and the UK (43%).11 In 
absolute terms, this means that in 2012 over 7,000 residence applications were 
turned down in Sweden, 15,000 applications were refused in Spain and 36,000 
residence applications were rejected in the UK.  
The situation of third-country national family members is even bleaker. 
A detailed examination of applications by non-EU family members reveals that 
rejection rates are even higher in a significant number of Member States: 
Cyprus (30%), Hungary (31%), Ireland (37%), Spain (34%), Sweden (29%) and 
the UK (65%).12  This compares with an average refusal rate of 20% in respect 
of applications for residence documents submitted by non-EU family members 
across the Member States.  
These high refusal rates are of serious concern. Given that the EU free 
movement rules provide ‘a largely rights-based legal framework’, a relatively 
high rate of rejection of applications in a Member State is likely to indicate that 
‘something is lacking, namely either the quality of information provided to 
applicants or the quality of decision-making in the first instance.’13 Indeed, the 
Commission’s Single Market Scoreboard confirms that EU citizens and their 
                                                            
11  Refusal  rates  refer  to  the  rates  of  rejection  of  applications  submitted  by  EU  citizens  and  non‐EU  family 
members for residence and permanent residence documents. The rates includes applications which have been 
the subject of a formal refusal decision and applications rejected as being invalid. 
12 Refusal  rates  refer  to  the  rate of  rejection of applications  submitted by  third‐country  family members  for 
residence and permanent residence documents. These include applications which have been the subject of a 
formal refusal decision and applications rejected as being invalid. 




family members encounter significant problems with residence formalities in 
all Member States with high refusal rates.14   
There is little data to determine the quality of decision-making by the 
national authorities in EU free movement cases. A useful proxy to measure the 
quality of national decisions would be to look at the outcome of appeals filed 
against decisions relating to EU residence rights. Regrettably, the UK is the only 
Member State for which data on appeals is available.15  
                                                            
14  Single  Market  Scoreboard,  Feedback  and  Concerns: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/feedback/concerns/index_en.htm>  accessed  on  31  July 
2015. The following concerns are noted:  
Cyprus:  ‘Third‐country  nationals  who  are  family members  of  EU  citizens  report  serious  delays  in  obtaining 
residence cards’; Hungary:  ‘EU citizens complain  that official  foreign documents are not always accepted by 
Hungarian authorities’; Ireland: ‘EU citizens report about delays regarding their application for residence cards. 
Difficulties are reported by some citizens whose application for a permanent residence card was refused without 
any  grounds’;  Spain:  ‘Citizens  frequently  face  delays  and  administrative  burdens  when  trying  to  obtain  a 
residence card in Spain’; Sweden: ‘EU citizens report as a problem the refusal of a “personal number” if they 
cannot  show  the  S1  form. No other  portable  form  is  accepted nor  is  proof  of  private  insurance. Without  a 
personal  number,  a  citizen  cannot  undertake  important  activities  like  opening  a  bank  account,  renting 
property, attending Swedish  courses,  filing with  the  unemployment  agency,  entering  an  agreement with  an 
employer, subscribing to a fixed telephone or mobile phone or television. A personal identity number is also the 
key to basic health care in Sweden. Students, retired persons (EU citizens and even Swedes having lived abroad) 















As regards the situation of family members of EU citizens returning home 
after exercising free movement rights, Denmark and Ireland are the only 
countries to provide information on refusal rates in so-called Surinder Singh 
cases.16 These cases concern applications for family reunification by non-EU 
family members of EU citizens returning home after exercising free movement 
in another Member State. The data suggest almost two-thirds of applications by 
non-EU family members were refused in Denmark, while Ireland refused such 
applications in 96% of cases.  
 
10.2.4 Application of provisions on abuse of rights by EU citizens   
             and their family members  
 
Under Article 35 of Directive 2004/38, Member States retain the power 
to refuse or withdraw residence documentation to EU citizens who engage in 
fraud or abuse of rights. Recital (28) of the Directive specifically cites ‘marriages 
of convenience or any other form of relationships contracted for the sole 
purpose of enjoying the right of free movement and residence’ as an example of 
such abuse. This power has been confirmed by the Court of Justice on several 
occasions,17 although so far there has been no case in which a Member State has 
been able to successfully invoke it as a justification for restricting the free 
movement rights of EU citizens and their family members.  
One of the abuses that is often cited by EU Member States as justifying a 
call for imposing further restrictions on the free movement of EU citizens 












marriage with a non-EU national for the sole purpose of enabling the latter to 
benefit from the free movement rules.  
In the recent McCarthy case,19 the UK government referred to its powers 
under Article 35 of the Directive in seeking to justify their long-standing policy 
not to recognise family residence cards issued by the Member States under 
Article 10 of Directive 2004/38 that exempts non-EU family members from the 
need for a visa when entering a Member State under Article 5(2) of the 
Directive. The UK authorities argued that the ‘“systemic problem” of abuse of 
rights and fraud by third-country nationals’ and the ‘palpable risk that a 
significant proportion of those engaged in the ‘business of sham marriages’ will 
use fake residence cards for the purpose of gaining illegal access to the United 
Kingdom’ justified a blanket policy to refuse entry to the UK to family members 
holding a residence card issued by another Member State. However, the Court 
did not agree with the UK’s contention and ruled that Article 35 could not be 
used to adopt general measures of prevention without engaging in a specific 
assessment in each individual case.20 
Despite such claims of ‘systematic abuse’,21 few EU countries routinely 
collate statistics on cases of fraud or abuse in connection with the free 
movement rules. According to the European Migration Network, 22 only six 
                                                            




21  This  is  the  term  used  in  by  the  Austrian,  British,  Dutch  and German Ministers  in  their  letter  to  the  Irish 
Presidency of the European Council (n 18) 2‐3. 









Member States systematically collate data on suspected marriages of 
convenience.23 In addition, following a request from the Council, a number of 
other Member States have provided data to the Commission on suspected cases 
of marriages of convenience.24 The following table provides an overview of 
published data on EU residence cases involving a marriage or registered 
partnership of convenience. 
  
                                                            
hoc_query_marriage_of_convenience_18mar2011_wider_dissemination_en.pdf>  accessed  31  July  2015; 











Data on Marriages of Convenience 










Belgium 990 n/a 8,561 11.6% n/a 
Bulgaria 3 n/a 857 0.4% n/a 
Cyprus(1) n/a 58 1,004 n/a 5.8% 
Czech n/a 51 2,402 n/a 2.1% 
Denmark n/a 8 3,939 n/a 0.2% 
Estonia 38 0 342 11.1% 0.0% 
Finland (visas)(2) n/a 10 650 n/a 1.5% 
Finland (residence) (3) 250 n/a 2,910 8.6% n/a 
Germany 250 n/a 7,700 3.2% n/a 
Ireland(4) n/a 9 2,338 n/a 1.4% 
Latvia(5) 5 n/a 319 1.6% n/a 
Netherlands(6) 92 61 n/a n/a n/a 
Poland 145 2 153 94.8% 1.3% 
Portugal(1) n/a 48 5,616 n/a 0.9% 
Sweden n/a 30 26,546 n/a 0.1% 
UK (EEA Family 
Permits)  256 176 12,800 2.0% 1.4% 
UK (residence cards) 1,891 n/a 32,192 5.9% 5.9%(7) 
EU average 15.5% 1.9% 
Sources: COM(2013) 837, EMN ad hoc query 27 Aug. 2013, ICF GHK/Milieu 2013 study, EMN Report June 
2012, national authorities 
 
Notes: 
(1) Yearly average based on total cases reported 2010-2012 
(2) Identified cases are in connection with 'visa applications' 
(3) Suspected cases are in connection with application for documentation submitted by all third-country 
nationals, including EU residence applications 
(4) Identified cases reported in 2010; residence applications based on yearly average 2006-2013 
(5) Cases reported in 2011 
(6) Yearly average based on total cases reported 2010-2012 
(7) Figure is an estimate based upon the findings of the Independent Chief Inspector's sample of 60 cases in 
which a residence card was refused in Oct. 2013 - Jan. 2014. This figure was calculated by multiplying the 
percentage of sampled refused residence card applications involving an identified marriage of convenience 
(20%) with the refusal rate for residence card applications in 2012 (32.5%). The resulting estimate has been 
reduced from 6.5% to 5.9% to ensure identified cases do not exceed suspected cases.  
 
 
Table 10.2.4 – Data on marriages of convenience (data for 2012 unless otherwise stated)
 
 
Based on the information provided by the Member States, it would 
appear that across the EU approximately three out of twenty residence 
applications are suspected of involving a relationship of convenience. However, 
the number of cases in which a finding of a marriage of convenience is made by 
the national administrative authorities is much lower. Cases in which residence 
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documentation is refused or withdrawn on the basis of a marriage of 
convenience account for less than 2% of EU residence applications.  
Nonetheless, there are shortcomings in this data that prevents it from 
being considered as conclusive evidence of the prevalence of marriages of 
convenience in the Member States concerned. Firstly, often the data on 
suspected marriages is not sufficiently disaggregated to distinguish suspected 
sham marriages which involve EU citizens from those involving nationals and 
resident non-EU citizens. As a result, it is by no means certain that all or even a 
majority of these cases necessarily involved EU citizens. Some of these cases 
may involve nationals of the country concerned particularly where family 
reunification rules for own nationals are not unduly restrictive. For example, 
this is the case in Belgium, where the published data on identified cases of 
marriages of convenience is not fully disaggregated by nationality.25 The official 
data does not identify any cases in which EU citizens might have been involved. 
Secondly, the data often only concerns cases in which the administrative 
authorities have a suspicion that a marriage is one of convenience (‘% suspected 
cases’ in table 3). The data also indicates that only a fraction of suspected cases 
turn out to be confirmed following an administrative investigation (column ‘% 
identified cases’ in table 3). Indeed, the data would suggest that only about one 
in eight suspected cases of marriage of convenience result in an administrative 
decision to refuse or withdraw residence rights on the grounds that the non-EU 
family member’s relationship with an EU citizen is not genuine. The only 
notable exception is the UK, where it would appear that most cases in which a 
relationship is suspected of being a sham usually result in an administrative 









In addition, no data is available to confirm whether any of these decisions 
were appealed and, if so, whether they were upheld by the judicial authorities. 
This represents a significant gap in trying to obtain an accurate picture of the 
prevalence of marriages of convenience and other sham relationships in EU 
residence cases.  
Moreover, there is some anecdotal evidence27 that suggests the national 
authorities may be misusing the powers of Article 35 by requiring non-EU 
family members who apply for a residence card to prove they are in a genuine 
relationship, thereby reversing the burden of proof contrary to the 
Commission’s guidance on investigating marriages of convenience.28 The data 
would suggest that in Poland almost all residence applications submitted by 
non-EU spouses are suspected of being fraudulent. In addition, the practice of 
the Cypriot and the UK authorities is also questionable. Both Member States 
have noticeably higher rates of decisions to refuse the issue of residence 
documentation based on the existence of marriages of convenience (5.8% and 
                                                            
Spouses  to Come to  the UK:  Inspecting  the Application Process and  the Tackling of Abuse  ‐ October 2013 – 
January  2014’,  (June  2014),  19  and  23  <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp‐







Single  Market:  a  View  from  the  Assistance  Services’,  (Report  for  the  Commission,  Ramboll  2011), 










5.9%29 respectively) which are significantly higher than the EU average (1.9%). 
Furthermore, the reliability of the UK’s data has been questioned by the House 
of Lords and the House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights.30    
Aside from fraudulent marriages and other unions, Belgium is the only 
country that regularly identifies cases in which persons have fraudulently 
claimed to be EU citizens using false identity cards or passports. This concerned 
on average 0.1% of applications during the period 2010-2014. Some 
information is also available for the UK. In a sample of 120 refusal cases relating 
to applications by EEA nationals and their family members, a report by the UK’s 
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration31 found that 
fraudulent identity documents had been used in four applications for residence 
documentation.32 If this holds true across all EU residence applications, it 
would mean around 0.5%33 of EU residence applications involve attempts to use 





attention  to  ‘the  questionable  strength  of  the  evidence  relied  on  by  the  Government  to  demonstrate  the 
necessity for legislating to supplement the powers that already exist to combat sham marriages … Asked about 
the criteria the Government proposes to use to identify suspect marriages or civil partnerships, the Government 
says  that  the  referral  [of  a  suspect marriage  or  civil  partnership  for  investigation]  will  be  assessed  against 
intelligence/evidence based risk profiles and factors to identify whether it is at high risk of being a sham marriage 
or civil partnership, e.g. that one or both parties ‘is of a nationality at high risk of involvement in a sham, on the 
basis  of  objective  information  and  intelligence  about  sham  cases’;  see  Joint  Committee  on  Human  Rights, 
‘Legislative Scrutiny: Immigration Bill (eighth report)’ (2013‐14, HL 102, HC 935) 117 and 122.  
31 Independent Chief Inspector of Border and Immigration (n 26).  









10.2.5 Expulsion of EU citizens and their family members 
 
Belgium, France and the UK are the only Member States that regularly 
publish statistics on the expulsion of EU citizens and their family members. In 
addition, some limited official data is also available for the Netherlands, as a 
result of information released in parliament.34  
The graph below provides a comparison of the number of EU citizens and 
their family members who received an order to leave the national territory in 
the four Member States concerned, irrespective of whether the expulsion was 
enforced. For the UK, the figures also include refusals at the border.  
Expulsion in Belgium, France, Netherlands and UK Compared 
 
 
Graph 10.2.5 - Expulsion of EU citizens and their family members (2004-2014) 
 
These expulsions should be seen in context. To put these figures into 
perspective, it is therefore more useful to compare these expulsion rates by 
reference to the size of the resident EU population. The table below provides a 
                                                            
34 The figures are quoted in S. BRAAKSMA and T. WESTRA, ‘De sociale zekerheid van MOE‐landers in Nederland’ in 











2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Belgium France Netherlands UK
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comparison of number of expulsions affecting EU citizens and their family 


































Belgium 1,542 0.21% 
Bulgaria 
(16%) 2,407 0.31% 
Romania 
(16%) 2,712 0.34% 
Romania 
(30%) 
France 9,608 0.71% Romania 12,331 0.89% Romania 10,915 0.77% n/a 
Nether-
lands 230 0.04% n/a 330 0.06% n/a 360(1) 0.06% n/a 
UK 2,052 0.08% 
Romania 
(21%) 2,651 0.10% 
Romania 




(1) Estimate based on number of expulsions Jan.-Jun. 2013  
 
Table 7.7.4 - Expulsion of EU citizens (2011-2013) 
Sources: Belgian Immigration Office, Belgian Ministry of the Interior, French Ministry of the Interior, 
Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Braaksma & 
Westra (2015, n 31), UK Home Office, Office of National Statistics, with additional research by the author 
 
This shows that over the period 2011-2013, the French authorities served 
expulsion orders on more EU citizens as a proportion of the resident EU 
population than Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK combined. By calculating 
the ratio of expulsions in the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK and France over this 
three-year period (1:2:6:16), this cancels out differences between the size of 
each country’s EU resident population. This exercise illustrates that for each EU 
citizen whose expulsion was ordered by the Netherlands, the UK expelled two 
EU citizens, Belgium ordered the expulsion of six EU citizens and France served 
expulsion orders on 16 EU citizens.   
Throughout this period, Romanian nationals were the most affected by 
expulsion measures in Belgium and the UK and comprised about one third of 
EU citizens affected by expulsion orders. In the case of France, the proportion 
is likely to be even higher, since 29.7% of all foreigners (EU and non-EU) 
expelled from France were from Romania. The French Ministry of the Interior 
has reported that in the period 2009-2012, Romanian citizens held the 
unenviable title of being the most prominent national group to be expelled from 
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France.35 According to a consortium of non-governmental organisations, a 
substantial proportion of Romanian citizens who were expelled from the French 
state during this period identified themselves as belonging to the Roma 
community.36  
The sheer scale of expulsions from France and the questionable 
circumstances in which these took place have generated much controversy.37 
The European Commission launched an investigation into the actions of the 
French authorities for suspected breaches of Directive 2004/38,38 spurred by 











Responsibilities  for  EU Roma Citizens:  The 2010 French Affair  on Roma Evictions  and Expulsions Continued’ 
(2013) CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe No 55; Jacqueline Gehring ‘Roma and the Limits of Free 
Movement  in  the  European Union’  in Willem Maas  (ed), Democratic  Citizenship  and  the  Free Movement  of 
People  (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 143‐174;    Julia Markham‐Cameron,  ‘The EU and  the Rights of  the 
Roma:  How  Could  the  EU  have  Changed  the  French  Repatriation  Program  of  2010?’  (2013)  Claremont‐UC 
Undergraduate  Research  Conference  on  the  European Union;  Sergio  Carrera,  ‘The  Framing  of  the  Roma  as 
Abnormal  EU  Citizens  in  Elspeth  Guild,  Cristina  Gortázar  Rotaeche  and  Dora  Kostakopolou,  The 
Reconceptualization  of  European  Union  Citizenship  (Brill  Nijhoff,  2014),  33‐63;  Ayse  Çağlar  and  Sebastian 
Mehling, ‘Sites and Scales of the Law: Third‐Country Nationals and EU Roma Citizens’ in Engin Isin and Michael 
Saward, Enacting European Citizenship (Cambridge University Press 2014) 155‐177. 




Law  of  the  Situation  of  Roma  in  France’  (27  August  2010)  <http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/france‐ec‐
legalbrief‐27‐august‐2010.pdf> accessed 31 July 2015; Groupe d’information et de soutien des  immigrés and 
others,  ‘Plainte  contre  la  France  pour  violation  du droit  communautaire  en matière de  libre  circulation  des 
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at the informal stage of the investigation40 following concessions made by the 
French government that supposedly ‘’led to the full incorporation in the French 
legislation of the safeguards established by EU law”.41 Despite these 
commitments, expulsions from France almost doubled between 2010 (6,620) 
and 2012 (12,331). In 2013, expulsion measures taken against EU citizens by the 
French authorities (10,915) were still 65% higher than in 2010.  Given the 
concerns that remain about the circumstances in which these expulsions 
continue to be carried out against EU citizens and their family members by the 
French authorities, the matter has now been brought before the European 
Parliament following the lodging of a petition by the same rights organisations 
that had originally complained to the Commission in 2010.42  
Likewise, the questionable nature of the expulsion of EU citizens by the 
Belgian authorities has also been the subject of a complaint by civil society 
organisations43 alleging breaches of Directive 2004/38 and Regulation 
                                                            
personnes’  (22  October  2010)  <http://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/cedh_plainte‐roms_2010‐10‐22.pdf>  accessed 
31 July 2015. 
40  European  Commission,  ‘Statement  by  Viviane  Reding,  Vice‐President  of  the  European  Commission,  EU 
Commissioner  for  Justice,  Fundamental  Rights  and  Citizenship,  on  the  recent  developments  concerning  the 
respect for EU law as regards the situation of Roma in France’, Press Release MEMO 10/502, 19 October 2010. 












883/2004.44 This is the subject of an on-going investigation by the European 
Commission.45  
10.3 Explaining implementation and its outcomes  
The purpose was, firstly, to identify the constitutive elements of 
implementation and how these should be taken into account to assess the 
implementation of the Free Movement Directive and, secondly, to explore the 
existence of any correlation between, on the one hand, the policy choices that 
were made by the Member States as part of the implementation process, and on 
the other hand, how correctly the Directive has been implemented by the 
Member States. 
As was shown in Chapter 3, implementation consists of three distinct 
stages namely its transposition into the national legal order by the adoption of 
an instrument containing legally binding rules, the practical application of these 
rules by the administrative authorities and their enforcement by the national 
courts. Each stage of implementation comprises distinct legal obligation flowing 
from the Treaties.  
The purpose of Chapter 4 was to examine how different outcomes in the 
three stages of implementation can generate their own source of non-
compliance. It also showed that Member States can adopt different attitudes 
towards non-compliance and may wilfully test the resolve of the Commission to 
prosecute its infringement action all the way to the Court of Justice. It also 











research as to the various factors that might influence implementation 
outcomes. 
Having identified the various obligations arising from Directive 2004/38 
in Chapter 6, the purpose of the following three Chapters was to examine how 
Belgium, Italy and the UK had complied with the obligations arising under the 
Directive.  
As to transposition, it was seen that each of the three Member States 
chose different approaches to transposition in terms of the forms and methods 
used. Each Member State used various forms of transposition, not so much out 
of free will, but rather within the constraints of their constitutional and 
legislative frameworks. Although each Member State used different techniques 
in drafting their national implementing measures, there was no clear 
correlation between those choices and the outcomes in transposition. The 
choice of form of transposition makes no difference as long as it is legally 
binding. Moreover, the choice of methods of transposition can cut both ways, it 
might make transposition appear correct while acting as a smoke screen for 
non-compliant application. Legal factors therefore do not go very far to explain 
implementation outcomes.  
Instead it became apparent that the different techniques used in drafting 
were being used as tools to pursue political goals as illustrated by the various 
motivations that the Member States display when they implement EU law. The 
UK seems to pursue a policy of selective non-compliance by exploiting the 
ambiguities in EU instruments and case law of the EU Court of Justice to its 
maximum advantage and will not blink if threatened with infringement action.  
On the other hand, Belgium’s prime motivation seems to be the 
protection of public sector expenditure by seeking to reduce its social welfare 
bill. As a result, its efforts have been to establish as many controls and 
restrictions on the ability of EU citizens to claim benefits indefinitely.  
The motivations of these two Member States also pervades their 
application efforts, which appear to be designed to interrupt continuity of 
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residence of EU citizens and their family members. By preventing EU citizens 
and their family members from acquiring permanent residence, the Member 
States can therefore control access to benefits. 
Italy’s preoccupations seem to be somewhat different and more 
concerned with security issues that feed into preoccupations about immigration 
in general. Free movement is not in and of itself politically contentious as it has 
become in the UK and is becoming in Belgium albeit to a lesser extent. Free 
movement only becomes contentious in Italy if events involving the exercise of 
free movement triggers events with wider concerns about security and 
immigration. 
The review of empirical evidence also shows that implementation is not 
just about transposition. Application of the rules in practice is just as important 
if not more so. Wherever a satisfactory level of compliance in transposition 
might be reached this does not guarantee that application will also be relatively 
compliant. As a result, any research into implementation must therefore 
necessarily take into account both application and transposition.  
Enforcement also matters, but the lack of information on this front 
prevents from making any findings. Effective research on this front aiming to 
detect non-compliance would need to look for evidence of systematic 
misinterpretation of the national implementing measures contrary to the 
objectives pursued by the Directive and at the same time conduct an 
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11.1 Enhancing the Supervision of Implementation  
This study has highlighted the importance of giving due consideration to 
all three stages of implementation when considering whether Member States 
are complying with their obligations to give effect to Directive 2004/38. 
The Commission generally has at its disposal the tools necessary to 
supervise the timely and correct transposition of the Directive. However, given 
the difficulties in effectively monitoring application and enforcement by the 
Member States, attention should be turned to what measures could be taken in 
future for the Commission to collate empirical evidence of non-compliance by 
the Member States that can be used to successfully prosecute infringement 
cases before the Court of Justice.  
At the same time, in light of the significant problems being encountered 
by EU citizens on the ground, there is also a need to ensure that the residence 
rules can be more effectively enforced by EU citizens and their family members. 
  
                                                            
1 This Chapter is based on a presentation by the author in ‘Seven Strategies to Improve Free Movement’ 
at the occasion of the conference ‘Basic European rights to free movement under threat’ organised by 




11.2 Recasting Directive 2004/38 as a Regulation 
The detailed rules that govern the free movement of persons in the EU 
are – for the most part – contained in Directive 2004/382.  
Although this Directive has the objective of simplifying and strengthening 
residence formalities for EU citizens and their family members3, it would 
appear that the Directive has had quite the opposite effect4. Some Member 
States have used the Directive as a pretext to tighten up their national rules 
governing EU rights of residence, particularly as regards healthcare insurance5. 
                                                            
2 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158/77 (hereafter the Free Movement Directive, Directive 2004/38 and the 
Directive).  
3 Recital 3 of Directive 2004/38 explains that it is intended ‘to simplify and strengthen the right of free 
movement and residence of all Union citizens’. In Case C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-6241, para 68, 
where the Court of Justice observed that ‘[e]stablishing an internal market implies that the conditions 
of entry and residence of a Union citizen in a Member State whose nationality he does not possess are 
the same in all the Member States.’ 
4 Commission, ‘EU Citizenship Report 2010 Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizens’ rights’, COM 
(2010) 603 final, 14-15. See also Sir David Edwards et al, ‘Mind the Gap: Towards a Better Enforcement 
of European Citizens’ Rights of Free Movement’ (2nd ed, ECAS 2013) and Neva Cocchi, Dana Gavril, 
Nicola Grigion, Carlos Guimaraes, Celia Mayer, Nuria Sanchez, Anna Sibley, Libor Studený, ‘Citizens 
Without Borders: Free movement and residence in the European Union a challenge for European 
citizenship’ (2013). 
5 Problems in this connection are being reported in Finland, Sweden, and the UK; see Commission, 
‘Single Market Scoreboard, Your Europe Advice governance tool’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/youreurope_a
dvice/index_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015.  As regards France, the decision of the French 
authorities to withdraw the coverage of EU citizens from the ‘couverture maladie universelle’ was the 
subject of several complaints; see Commission, ‘29th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of 
EU Law (2011), COM(2012) 714 final 25.    
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Instead of facing a harmonised approach to residence formalities in the 
EU6, EU citizens and their family members are confronted with completely 
different visa and residence formalities depending on where they choose to 
reside7, even when differences in legal traditions are factored in. As a result, EU 
citizens and their family members continue to face significant obstacles when 
trying to comply with residence and visa formalities8. Such cases continue to 
represent about a quarter of cases handled by SOLVIT9. 
To address these problems, when the time comes for Directive 2004 to be 
recast to reflect developments in the case law of the EU Court of Justice since 
200410, the EU institutions should be encouraged to opt for a Regulation rather 
                                                            
6  The harmonisation of residence formalities is an inherent aim of the Directive: Articles 8 and 10 
provide that Member States can only request the documents listed in the Directive in respect of 
applications for visas and residence documents. This is further confirmed by recital (14) which explains 
that ‘[t]he supporting documents required by the competent authorities for the issuing of a registration 
certificate or of a residence card should be comprehensively specified in order to avoid divergent 
administrative practices or interpretations constituting an undue obstacle to the exercise of the right of 
residence by Union citizens and their family members’. See further, Commission, ‘Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance for better transposition and 
application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’ COM (2009) 313 final, 8.   
7 See ICF-GHK and Milieu, ‘Evaluation of EU rules on free movement of EU citizens and their family 
members and their practical implementation’ (Report for the Commission, 2013). 
8 This is clear from the latest Commission, ‘Single Market Scoreboard, Your Europe Advice governance 
tool’ (n 5). A more detailed analysis of such problems can be found in Xavier Le Den and Janne Sylvest, 
‘Understanding Citizens' and Businesses' Concerns with the Single Market: a View from the Assistance 
Services’, (Report for the Commission, Ramboll 2011), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/20concerns/feedback_report_en.pdf> accessed 
on 31 July 2015..  
9 Commission, ‘Single Market Scoreboard, SOLVIT governance tool’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/solvit/index_
en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015; Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions under Article 25 TFEU, On progress towards effective EU Citizenship 2011-2013’ COM (2013) 
270 final 4.     
10 These would include the judgments in Case C-127/08 Metock (n 3) in which the Court recognised that 
the benefit of the Directive is not contingent upon prior lawful residence in the EU; Case C-162/09 
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than a Directive. The legislative basis for the rules on the free movement of 
persons11 does not preclude this choice of legal instrument. Opting for a 
Regulation is desirable for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, a Regulation is directly applicable12. This means it is a free-
standing law which does not require the national authorities to adopt further 
measures to give legal effect to the Regulation.  On the contrary, a Directive 
requires ‘transposition’ – the adoption of national measures, laws or regulations 
– in order to give it effect in the national legal order.13 This leaves the national 
authorities a discretion in how the objectives of the Directive are to be achieved. 
It is the improper use of this margin of discretion which has resulted in Directive 
2004/38 not having been correctly implemented by any of the 28 EU Member 
State14.  The choice of a Regulation as a legal instrument would have the effect 
of promoting a more harmonised approach to residence formalities throughout 
the EU and serve as a more effective tool in ensuring the same rules apply to all 
                                                            
Lassal [2010] ECR I-09217 and Case C-325/09 Dias [2011] ECR I-06387 which concerned the 
conditions relating to permanent residence; Case C-456/12 O & B [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:135 which 
extended the principle established in Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-04265 to the Free Movement 
Directive;  Case C-507/12 Saint Prix [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2007 which extended the circumstances 
in which a person retains the status of a worker beyond those enumerated in Article 7(3) of the Directive.  
Moreover, the Directive would also benefit from being updated to reflect case law developments prior 
to the Directive such as Case C-200/02 Chen 2004 I-09925 regarding the residence rights of carers of 
EU minors residing in a Member State other than their country of nationality. 
11 Article 21 TFEU. 
12 Article 288(2) TFEU.  
13 Article 288(3) TFEU 
14 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’ COM (2008) 840, the Commission 
observed that ‘[t]he overall transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC is rather disappointing. Not one 
Member State has transposed the Directive effectively and correctly in its entirety. Not one Article of 
the Directive has been transposed effectively and correctly by all Member States. … The problems of 
transposition are often related to failure to transpose the rules limiting the margin of administrative 
discretion, e.g. that the restrictions should not be invoked to serve economic ends.’ 
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EU citizens and their family members regardless of where they choose to live in 
the EU.  
Secondly, a Regulation is binding in its entirety15. The Court has 
explained that a Regulation has the effect of rendering automatically 
inapplicable any conflicting provision of national law. As a result, it is relatively 
simple for citizens to have recourse to an EU Regulation and invoke its 
precedence over conflicting provisions of national law: its binding nature is 
spelled out by the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and national law 
often explicitly provides for the binding effect of the EU Treaties16. For a 
Directive, such an exercise is more difficult in practice. It first requires 
demonstrating the provision at issue lays down a clear and unconditional right 
which individuals can rely upon, which is not always immediately apparent as 
regards Directive 2004/3817. In practice, it also means having to cite domestic 
case law that reflects national acceptance of the EU Court of Justice’s case law 
on the direct effect of Directives18. Recourse to a Regulation instead of a 
Directive would arguably make it easier for citizens to rely on its provisions 
                                                            
15 Article 288(2) TFEU. 
16 For example, section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 explicitly provides for this in the UK, 
as does section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 in Ireland (as amended by the European Union 
Act 2009) See also, section 3 of the European Union Act 2003 in Malta; and Articles 55 and 88-1 of the 
Constitution of the French Republic in France. In Italy, the situation is more complicated because each 
treaty has been the subject of an individual ratifying law, starting with the enactment of Law No 1203 
of 14 October 1957 as regards the EEC Treaty and more recently with adoption of Law No 130 of 2 
August 2008 as regards the Lisbon Treaty.  
17 In C-83/11 Rahman [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2012:519, para 25 the Court held that Article 3(2) of the 
Directive, which concerns the right of other family members to have their entry and residence 
facilitated, does not have direct effect. However, it went on to rule that individuals may rely upon that 
provision ‘in order to ensure [that] an applicant is entitled to a judicial review of whether the national 
legislation and its application have remained within the limits of the discretion set by that directive’, 
ibid, para 25. 
18 See for example, the CJEU’s rulings in Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53; Case C-271/91 Marshall 
[1993] ECR I-4367; Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839; Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 
Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357; Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365. 
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before the national authorities and ensure that conflicting rules of national law 
are set aside. 
Moreover, where a provision of a Regulation confers rights on individuals, it 
will usually have both vertical and horizontal direct effect19. This means the 
provision can be relied upon by citizens against both the authorities of the 
Member States (vertical direct effect) and also private bodies (horizontal direct 
effect). This is particularly significant given the privatisation of visa formalities 
through the increasing use of processing agents by Member States20 and the 
over-zealous application of carrier liability rules21 which often neutralises the 
ability of many non-EU family members to make use of the right to enter a 
Member State even if they do not have a valid visa22.  The choice of a Regulation 
to replace Directive 2004/38 would therefore limit the possibilities not just for 
Member States but also private entities23 – whether visa processing agents or 
transport companies – to circumvent the free movement rules.  
                                                            
19 See to that effect the Court of Justice of the EU’s ruling in Case C-253/00 Muñoz [2002] ECR I-7289 
and the Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in that case at paras 45-47. 
20 For Member States that form part of the Schengen area, this is provided by Article 43 of the Visa 
Code, Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing a Community Code on Visas [2009] OJ L 243/1. 
21 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on 
the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders [2000] OJ L 239/9, Article 26 establishes the 
liability of carriers for transporting into the EU non-EU nationals without adequate travel documents 
as further given effect by Council Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions 
of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 [2001] OJ L 
187/45. 
22 Article 3(4) of Directive 2004/38. In Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591, para 61, the Court of 
Justice ruled further that ‘it is in any event disproportionate and, therefore, prohibited to send back a 
third country national married to a national of a Member State where he is able to prove his identity 
and the conjugal ties and there is no evidence to establish that he represents a risk to the requirements 
of public policy, public security or public health’. 
23 The EU Court of Justice has consistently held that ‘the abolition as between Member States of 
obstacles to freedom of movement for persons and to freedom to provide services, which are 
fundamental objectives of the Community …, would be compromised if the abolition of State barriers 




11.3 Enhancing the Commission’s Powers of Supervision  
The Commission’s power to enforce the EU rules on the free movement 
of persons is limited to launching formal infringement proceedings against 
Member States24. These proceedings are cumbersome as it can take several 
years between the time when a letter of formal is sent by the Commission until 
the case is referred to the Court of Justice25. It then takes a further two years on 
average to obtain a judgment from the Court26.  
Citizens cannot initiate infringement proceedings because the 
Commission is under no obligation to launch infringement actions in respect of 
every complaint it receives and has a discretion as to which infringements it 
decides to pursue27. Moreover, infringement proceedings can only target 
Member States not private entities. As a result, the Commission is effectively 
powerless to take court action to compel private entities such as visa processing 
agents or transport companies to respect the rules contained in Directive 
2004/38. 
Before initiating infringement proceedings against Member States, the 
Commission will usually try to resolve the problem by making use of the so-
                                                            
organisations which do not come under public law’, for example in Case 36/74 Walrave & Koch [1974] 
ECR 1405, para 18 and C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-01577, para 120. 
24 Proceedings under Article 258 TFEU.  
25 According to the Commission, the average duration of infringement proceedings is 29 months from 
the time the letter of formal notice is sent; see Commission, ‘Single Market Scoreboard, Infringement 
governance tool’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/infringements
/index_en.htm> accessed on 9 May 2015. This does not factor in the time taken for compliance talks to 
be held within the context of the EU Pilot scheme – the current target is 20 weeks; see ‘Single Market 
Scoreboard, EU Pilot tool’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/eu_pilot/inde
x_en.htm#maincontentSec2> accessed on 9 May 2015. 
26 Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual Report 2014 (2015), 66. 
27 See to that effect Case 247/87 Fruit Company v Commission [1989] 291, para 11. 
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called ‘EU Pilot’ scheme28 which allows the Commission to resolve problems in 
compliance with EU law by engaging in dialogue with the Member State 
concerned29. The Commission claims this approach resolved over 90% of free 
movement cases in 201130. The Commission currently has infringement 
ongoing procedures against seven Member States31 and reported the closure of 
a further five infringement cases in 2013 following commitments by Member 
States to amend their legislation giving effect to the Directive32. 
However, several recent high profile cases – namely, the expulsion of 
Roma from France33, the short-lived reintroduction of border controls in 
                                                            
28 Further information on the EU Pilot scheme see n 25.   
29 The European Commission has also set up services such as Your Europe Advice (n 5) and SOLVIT (n 
9) to help inform, advise and assist EU citizens who face difficulties in exercising their free movement 
rights. These measures help to overcome a great number of problems, but sometimes the only possibility 
to ensure compliance with EU law is for the Commission to take formal action against a recalcitrant 
Member State. For a discussion of the limitations of the SOLVIT network, Jacques Pelkmans and 
Anabela Correia de Brito, Enforcement in the EU Single Market (2012 CEPS). 
30 See Commission, ‘Free movement: Determined Commission action has helped resolve 90% of open 
free movement cases’, Press release IP/11/981, 25 August 2011.   
31  Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, Sweden and the UK; See 
Commission, ‘Free movement: Commission upholds EU citizens' rights’, Press release IP/12/75, 26 
January 2012; idem, ‘Free movement: Commission asks the UK to uphold EU citizens' rights 
Brussels, 26 April 2012 – The European Commission has given the United Kingdom two months to 
comply with European Union rules’, Press release IP/12/417, 26 April 2012; idem, ‘Free movement: 
Commission asks Austria, Germany and Sweden to uphold EU citizens' rights’, Press release IP/12/646, 
21 June 2012; idem, ‘February infringements package: main decisions - Free movement: Commission 
asks Belgium to comply with EU rules’, Press release MEMO/13/122, 21 February 2013;  
32 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee under Article 25 TFEU: On progress towards effective EU 
Citizenship 2011-2013’ (n 9) 4, which reported the closure of infringement proceedings against Italy, 
Malta, Poland, Sweden and Spain.  
33 See Commission, ‘European Commission assesses recent developments in France, discusses overall 




Denmark34 and delays at the Gibraltar/Spain border35 – have shown the 
Commission’s powers of investigation are limited when it comes to upholding 
free movement rights. Unlike the situation under the EU competition rules36 or 
the EU air transport safety rules37, the Commission does not have the power to 
undertake unannounced inspections to investigate suspected infringements of 
the free movement rules. It has no power take witness statements, take copies 
of documents or collect other forms of evidence, nor can it take preventive 
action by way of a binding decision imposing interim measures. It cannot force 
the Member States to provide statistics.  
Given that the free movement of persons is one of the cornerstones of the 
Single Market, the Commission needs to have such stronger powers to 
investigate infringements. There is no justifiable reason why the free movement 
rules should remain the poorer cousin of the EU rules in the field of competition 
or air transport. Citizens deserve no less than a Commission equipped with a 
modern arsenal of measures that enables it to fulfil its mandate as ‘guardian of 
the Treaties’ in an effective manner. 
11.4 Collating Statistics on the Free Movement of Persons 
It will be recalled that in April 2013, the Ministers of four EU Member 
States - the UK, Austria, Germany and the Netherlands - wrote to the Irish 
Presidency of the European Council on the matter of free movement of persons 
                                                            
34 See Commission, ‘Statement by Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, on the 
announced permanent customs controls in Denmark’, Press release MEMO/11/296, 13 May 2011. 
35 See Commission, ‘Commission reports on the border situation in La Línea (Spain) and Gibraltar 
(UK)’, Press release IP/13/1086, 15 November 2013.  
36 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1 provides the Commission with 
extensive powers to investigate suspected breaches of the EU competition rules contained in Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU.  
37 Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on 
common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 [2008] 
OJ L 97/72 lays down common EU-wide legal requirements for the performance of security checks at 
airports and empower the Commission to make unannounced inspections. 
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within the Union38. The letter specifically concerned the issue of “benefits 
tourism”, namely the abuse of national welfare systems, and fraud, such as 
marriages of convenience. The measures proposed by the quartet include 
curtailing the right of newly arrived migrants to claim benefits and introducing 
bans on re-entry for those found to be abusing or defrauding the system.  
However, the letter offered no concrete evidence to back up the claims of 
systemic abuse and fraud that would justify the specific measures advocated39. 
While the letter decried the systemic abuse of free movement through marriages 
of convenience, only one of its Member State authors, namely the UK, 
systematically collates statistics on suspected sham marriages40. Aside from this 
sole exception, none of these countries collates any kind of reliable data on other 
forms of abuse of free movement rules.   
Indeed the Commission’s open challenge41 to the quartet to produce 
evidence of the extent and scale of benefits tourism has been met with silence. 
The UK’s attempt to generate such evidence through its Balance of Competences 
Review42 ended in ignominy amid allegations that the Government was 
withholding the final report43 because it was too “pro-European”44 until it was 
eventually leaked to the BBC45.  
                                                            
38 Letter from the Ministers of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK to the Irish Presidency of 
the European Council (undated)  
<http://docs.dpaq.de/3604-130415_letter_to_presidency_final_1_2.pdf> accessed 15 June 2015.  
39 ‘Benefit tourism warnings by Theresa May get short shrift from Europe’, The Guardian, (London, 29 
April 2013). 
40 See further European Migration Network, ‘Misuse of the right to family reunification’ (2012). 
41 ‘Benefit tourism claims: European Commission urges UK to provide evidence’, BBC, (London, 14 
October 2013). 
42 Home Office, Consultation ‘Free movement of persons: review of the balance of competences’ (2013).  
43 ‘David Cameron shelves migration report amid lack of evidence’, Financial Times, (London, 14 
January 2014). 
44 ‘Immigration report changed for being too “pro-European””, Daily Telegraph, (London, 18 July 
2014). 
45 ‘Immigration report "too pro-European", Tories complain’, BBC, (London, 18 July 2014). 
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What this saga illustrates is the absence of reliable data on the scope of 
free movement which can be used to inform policy decisions. While ad hoc 
studies have been published to show the impact that EU migration has had on 
welfare benefits in the EU as a whole46 and public finances in some Member 
States47 as well as at the local level48, data needs to be collated in a more 
systematic way.  
At present, the availability of data on the practical application of Directive 
2004/38 by the Member States is mostly left to the discretion of the Member 
States.  Aside from the collection of annual statistics on EU residents, migration 
flows and the acquisition of citizenship, 49 there is presently no harmonised 
approach on the compilation of statistics on the residence rights of EU citizens 
and their family members across Member States.  
On the contrary, EU law imposes an obligation on the Member States to 
collate much more detailed data on the migration of non-EU citizens.50 As a 
                                                            
46 See ICF-GHK and Milieu, ‘A fact finding analysis on the impact on the Member States' social security 
systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU migrants to special non-contributory cash benefits 
and healthcare granted on the basis of residence’ (Report for the Commission, 2013)  
47 As regards the UK, see Christian Dustmann, Tommaso Frattini and Caroline Halls, ‘Assessing the 
Fiscal Costs and Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK’ (Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration 
2013); Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini, ‘The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK’ 
(Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration 2013); as regards Sweden, see Joakim Ruist, ‘The fiscal 
consequences of unrestricted immigration from Romania and Bulgaria’, (Centre for the University of 
Gothenburg 2013); as regards Germany, see Herbert Brücker, Andreas Hauptmann and Ehsan 
Vallizadeh ‘Zuwanderer aus Bulgarien und Rumänien: Arbeitsmigration oder Armutsmigration?’ 
(German Institute for Employment Research 2013).   
48 Ernst & Young, ‘Evaluation of the impact of the free movement of EU citizens at local level’ (Report 
for the Commission 2014). 
49 Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on 
Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers (2007) OJ L 199/23, Article 3 
50 Ibid, Articles 4 requires the collation of statistics on persons having applied for or benefiting from on 
international protection; Article 5 covers statistics on illegal entry and stay; Article 6 concerns the issue 
of residence permits to third-country nationals; Article 7 relates to statistics on return; Article 8 and 9 
provide for further details on the compilation of statistics. 
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result, this leads to the paradoxical situation in which statistical information is 
much more readily available concerning the migration of non-EU nationals in 
the EU than the free movement of EU citizens.  
Serious consideration should therefore be given to impose obligations on 
the Member States to collate comprehensive data on the EU citizens and non-
EU family members. 51  This could be achieved relatively easily by amending 
Regulation 862/2007, which applies to all 28 Member States. This should allow 
for the more accurate monitoring of the application of Directive 2004/38 by the 
national authorities. 
The obligation to collate data on EU citizens and non-EU family members 
should therefore be extended so as to allow for monitoring Member States’ 
compliance with Directive 2004/38.  The obligation to collate data should 
therefore extend to the numbers of registration certificates and residence card 
issued annually, rates of applications rejected as incomplete, the average time 
taken to process applications, the rates of refusals, revocations and deportations 
disaggregated by category52, and appeal rates including outcomes. Member 
States should also be obliged to keep data on the nationality of claimants of 
social security and welfare benefits. As a final point, Member States should also 
be encouraged to extend oversight mechanisms that apply to migration affairs 
                                                            
51 The obligation to collate data should ideally extend to the numbers of registration certificates and 
residence card issued annually, rates of applications rejected as incomplete or invalid, the average time 
taken to process applications, the rates of refusals, revocations and deportations disaggregated by 
category. These would include refusals, revocations, deportations and entry bans based on public policy, 
public security and public order, as well as those based on other grounds, such as citizens being a burden 
on the social assistance system and the abuse of free movement rights, including relationships of 
convenience and the use of false travel documents. Finally, the obligation should also extend to judicial 
appeals against decisions restricting free movement rights, including outcomes. 
52 These would include refusals, revocations and deportations based on public policy, public security 
and public order, as well as those based on other grounds, such as citizens being a burden on the social 
assistance system and the abuse of free movement rights. 
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which already exist in the Member States so that they also cover free 
movement53.     
The collection of data on the free movement of EU citizens and their 
family members would encourage better evidence-based policy-making by the 
Member States as well as the EU, rather than engaging in reactionary politics 
that panders to populist rhetoric about unsubstantiated claims of “benefits 
tourism” and “poverty migration”54. 
Until such time as the collation of such information becomes obligatory 
and standardised across the EU, the availability of quantitative data concerning 
the application of the free movement rules will remain contingent upon the 
good graces of the Member States.  
11.5 Encouraging Decentralised Enforcement Further 
A significant proportion of non-governmental organisations that work on 
the rights of migrants tend to focus exclusively on non-EU citizens. In part, this 
is understandable because they make up about two-thirds of migrants living in 
EU countries, as compared to the remainder that consists in EU citizens living 
in a Member State other than their country of nationality55. As a result, many 
migrant rights organisations lack sufficient knowledge or expertise to be able to 
assist EU free movers who face problems in enforcing their free movement 
rights. There is therefore a need to develop further the capacity of civil society 
to assist EU citizen to overcome obstacles that they may face when moving 
within the EU. 
                                                            
53 For example, in the UK, the detailed regular reports into the workings of the Home Office’s 
Immigration Directorates produced by the parliamentary Home Affairs Committee of the House of 
Commons should be extended to cover EU residence cases.    
54 See further Elaine Chase and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, ‘Migration, EU Citizenship, and Social Europe’, 
(Social Europe Journal, 14 January 2014) <http://www.social-europe.eu/2014/01/eu-citizenship-
social-europe/> accessed 23 December 2015. 
55 Eurostat, ‘Nearly two-thirds of the foreigners living in EU Member States are citizens of countries 
outside the EU-27’, Statistics in Focus 31/2012 (2013). 
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Empowering civil society will assist in meeting the legal needs of EU 
citizens56. Despite a significant majority of EU citizens being aware that they 
have a right to move within the EU, almost two-thirds of them feel they do not 
have a sufficient awareness of their EU rights57. Less than a quarter of citizens 
feel sufficiently well informed about what to do if their EU rights are not 
respected58 and about a fifth of the problems were the result of citizens’ own 
lack of awareness of their rights59.  
The problems are not limited to awareness of rights. EU citizens who 
make use of their right to free movement continue to face significant obstacles 
                                                            
56 These needs are likely to grow in light of budgetary cuts which are affecting the availability of legal 
aid in a number of EU Member States.  As a result of legal aid cuts in the UK, EU migrants and their 
family members are unable to obtain legal aid in order to obtain advice on immigration or social welfare 
issues: see Sheona York, ‘The End of Legal Aid in Immigration - A Barrier to Access to Justice for 
Migrants and a Decline in the Rule of Law’ (2013), 27 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality 
Law, 106-138; Pat Feast and James Hand, ‘Impact of legal aid cuts on the Citizens Advice Bureau’ 
(Halsbury’s Law Exchange, 15 July 2014)<http://www.halsburyslawexchange.co.uk/impact-of-legal-
aid-cuts-on-the-citizens-advice-bureau/> accessed 15 July 2014; Desmond Rutledge ‘What legal aid is 
still available for work undertaken on welfare benefits post-LASPO?’ (Garden Court Chambers, 30 
May 2014) <http://gclaw.wordpress.com/2014/05/30/what-legal-aid-is-still-available-for-work-
undertaken-on-welfare-benefits-post-laspo/> accessed 30 May 2014. As regards legal aid cuts in 
Belgium, the issue has been raised in a letter addressed by the Council of Bars and Law Societies in 
Europe to the Belgian Minister of Justice (3 July 2012) < 
<http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/030712_Ministre_de_l2_1341318815.
pdf> accessed 3 November 2014. For an overview of the availability of legal aid in the EU in immigration 
cases pre-dating these reforms, see European Migration Network, ‘Ad-Hoc Query on organisation and 
management of legal assistance provided to foreigners in the EU Member States’ (2012). 
57 Commission, ‘Flash Eurobarometer 365 on European Union Citizenship’ (2013) 21. 
58 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee under Article 25 TFEU: EU Citizenship Report 2013 EU 
citizens: your rights, your future’ COM(2013) 269 final, 5; Flash Eurobarometer 365 7.  
59 Commission, ‘The EU Citizens’ Agenda: Europeans have their say’ (2012) 8. 
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in the exercise of their EU rights60 with more than 25% of citizens reporting that 
they encountered problems in moving within the EU61. 
In light of these circumstances, it is therefore to be welcomed that in its 
Decision62 implementing the Equality and Citizenship Programme for the 
period 2014 to 202063 the Commission will continue to support activities 
aiming to promote the free movement of persons as has been the case in 
previous years64.  However, further resources need to be dedicated to 
supporting civil society groups that deliver direct assistance to EU citizens and 
their family members65. It should also review its opposition to funding “actions 
consisting in legal actions”66: supporting civil society groups to litigate strategic 
issues relating to free movement in the national courts will reduce the 
Commission’s substantial enforcement burden67.   
                                                            
60  Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions under Article 25 TFEU, On progress 
towards effective EU Citizenship 2007-2010’ COM(2010) 602 final 5-8; idem, ‘Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions under Article 25 TFEU, On progress towards effective EU Citizenship 
2011-2013’ (n 9) 4-5, Single Market Scoreboard, Your Europe Advice governance tool (n 8) and Le Den 
and Janne Sylvest (n 8). 
61 Commission, ‘The EU Citizens’ Agenda: Europeans have their say’ (n 59) 8.  
62 Commission Decision C(2014) 2257. 
63 Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 
establishing a Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme for the period 2014 to 2020 [2013] OJ 
L354/62. 
64 See further the Commission’s annual work programmes for implementation of Council Decision 
2007/252 establishing for the period 2007-2013 the specific programme Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship as part of the General programme Fundamental Rights and Justice. 
65 Following the 2013 call of the Fundamental Rights and Citizenship programme, only one out of thirty 
funded projects will be supported by the European Commission in respect of the free movement of 
persons. This will fund local welcome policies for EU migrants by the Municipality of Amsterdam.  
66 See for example, Commission ‘Guide for Applicants – Action grants JUST/2013/AG’ (2013). 
67 According to the Commission ‘1566 individual queries on free movement and residence issues were 
submitted to the Commission [between 1 January 2011 and 31 March 2013], of which 581 were 
registered as formal complaints. The Commission also replied to 147 European Parliament questions 
and 137 petitions’; see Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
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While the newly-adopted Directive on the free movement of workers68 
will hopefully assist EU citizens assert their rights to equal working conditions, 
its impact is likely to be limited. The Directive only applies to workers, it does 
not relate to residence formalities and, although Member States will be required 
to ensure that civil society organisations are allowed to “engage … in any judicial 
and/or administrative procedure provided for the enforcement of [EU workers’] 
rights” this is subject to compliance with national rules of procedures such as 
those relating to legal representation. The Directive does not provide for 
concrete remedies or regulate evidence69. Regrettably, the Directive fails to 
contain any provision that guarantees that access to justice should be 
“expeditious and either free of charge or inexpensive”70 to give further 
substance to the right to an effective remedy that is guaranteed by the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights71.    
The Court of Justice has previously observed that citizens have a full role to 
play in the enforcement of EU law72. Empowering civil society groups to 
inform and assist mobile citizens will ensure that citizens can make effective 
                                                            
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions under Article 
25 TFEU, On progress towards effective EU Citizenship 2011-2013’ (n 9) 4 
68 Directive 2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on measures 
facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of movement for 
workers [2014] OJ 128/8. 
69 See further Steve Peers, ‘The new Directive on discrimination against EU citizen workers: spitting 
into the wind?’ (EU Law Analysis, 14 March 2014) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2014/03/the-
new-directive-on-discrimination.html> accessed 14 March 2014.  
70 To borrow the terminology of Article 6 of Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council 
Directive 90/313/EEC [2003] OJ L41/26. 
71 Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
72 In Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1, para, the Court remarked that ‘[t]he vigilance of 
individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the 
supervision entrusted by [Articles 258 and 259] to the diligence of the Commission and of the Member 
States.’ 
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use of their fundamental right of free movement73 and overcome obstacles 
that may come their way.   
11.6 Closing Remarks 
This study has sought to explore the implementation of directives and 
engage with literature in the fields of law, social science and political science. In 
so doing it is hoped that this study will make a modest but 
meaningful contribution to the field of compliance study. 
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